Clay v. Doe
876 N.W.2d 248
Mich. Ct. App.
2015
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CLAY v DOE

Docket No. 321008

Court of Appeals of Michigan

Submitted June 3, 2015. Decided July 14, 2015.

311 Mich. App. 359

Leave to appeal sought.

Willie Clay brought an action against John Doe and the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) in the Macomb Circuit Court. Plaintiff slipped, fell, and incurred injuries while boarding a SMART bus on April 18, 2011. Plaintiff filed a claim for no-fault benefits with SMART‘s insurance administrator, which received the claim 78 days after plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff filed his circuit court complaint almost two years after he was injured. Plaintiff alleged that the unidentified driver was negligent when he accelerated too quickly as he drove the bus away from the stop. SMART moved for summary disposition. The court, James M. Biernat, Sr., J., granted SMART‘S motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff failed to comply with MCL 124.419 because he failed to timely serve SMART‘s insurance administrator with written notice of his claim. Plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeals held:

Under MCL 124.419, claims brought against a transportation authority must be presented as ordinary claims against the common carrier involved. Written notice of the claim must be served on the authority within 60 days of the occurrence through which injury occurred. In , the Supreme Court held that written notice of a plaintiff‘s application for first-party no-fault benefits does not constitute written notice of a third-party tort claim sufficient to comply with MCL 124.419. In this case, plaintiff did not submit written notice of his ordinary claim for personal injury to SMART within 60 days of his injury. Instead, he sent a claim for no-fault benefits 78 days after his injury. Because notice of a claim for first-party benefits is not the equivalent of notice of a third-party tort claim, plaintiff failed to comply with MCL 124.419 and his suit was properly dismissed under . There was no reason under Michigan law not to apply retrospectively to plaintiff‘s case given that did not create a new principle of law or overrule binding caselaw. merely interpreted a statute. Accordingly, plaintiff‘s case was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.

STATUTES - COMMON CARRIERS - WRITTEN NOTICE OF TORT CLAIMS.

Under MCL 124.419, claims brought against a transportation authority must be presented as ordinary claims against the common carrier involved; written notice of the claim must be served on the authority within 60 days of the occurrence through which injury occurred; under , written notice of a plaintiff‘s application for first-party no-fault benefits does not constitute written notice of a third-party tort claim sufficient to comply with MCL 124.419; must be applied retrospectively.

Law Office of Carl L. Collins III (by Carl L. Collins III) for Willie Clay.

Driggers, Schultz & Herbst, PC (by Brian J. Kingsley and Barbara D. Urlaub), for Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation.

Before: SAAD, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff appeals the trial court‘s order that granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While boarding a Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) bus on April 18, 2011, plaintiff slipped and fell on the wet floor of the bus aisle. Thereafter, he filed a claim for no-fault benefits from SMART‘s insurance administrator, which received the claim on July 5, 2011, 78 days after plaintiff was injured. Almost two years later, on March 20, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant SMART in the Macomb Circuit Court, which alleged that SMART and the unidentified bus driver committed the common-law tort of negligence. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that the bus driver accelerated too quickly as he drove the bus away from the stop, which caused plaintiff to slip, fall, and incur injuries.

SMART moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), and argued, among other things, that plaintiff‘s claim was barred by: (1) MCL 124.419, which requires tort claimants against a transportation authority to provide the authority with “written notice of any claim based upon injury . . . no later than 60 days from the occurrence through which such injury is sustained” and (2) , which held that a claimant, such as plaintiff, who files an application for no-fault benefits from a transit authority‘s insurance administrator, does not comply with the 60-day notice requirement of MCL 124.419. After a hearing, the trial court issued a written opinion and order that granted SMART‘s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). The court held that plaintiff failed to comply with MCL 124.419, because he did not “serve[]” SMART‘s insurance administrator with “written notice” of his claim “no later than 60 days from the occurrence” of his injury.

On appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court erred when it granted summary disposition because: (1) he complied with MCL 124.419 when he mailed a claim for no-fault benefits to SMART‘s insurance administrator and (2) postdated the events that led to this suit. SMART reiterates its arguments made below and asks us to uphold the ruling of the trial court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court‘s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. . MCR 2.116(C)(7) permits summary disposition “because of release, payment, prior judgment, [or] immunity granted by law.” MCR 2.116(C)(7). “When it grants a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7), a trial court should examine all documentary evidence submitted by the parties, accept all well-pleaded allegations as true, and construe all evidence and pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” .

We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo, and interpret a statute “to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by focusing on the statute‘s plain language.” .

III. ANALYSIS

A. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF ATKINS

“Generally, judicial decisions are given full retroactive effect, i.e., they are applied to all pending cases in which the same challenge has been raised and preserved.” . “A court may limit the retroactive effect of a judicial decision . . . if injustice might result from full retroactivity.‘” , quoting . In making a decision whether to apply caselaw retroactively, a court looks to “(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactivity on the administration of justice.” (citation and quotation marks omitted). In a civil suit, the court also looks to “whether the decision [to be applied retroactively] clearly established a new principle of law.” .

As noted, the Michigan Supreme Court recently held that an application for no-fault benefits from a transit authority‘s insurance administrator does not constitute sufficient “written notice of [a tort] claim” under MCL 124.419. .1 Specifically, the Court explained that

MCL 124.419 plainly requires “written notice” of any “ordinary claims” for personal injury within 60 days of the underlying occurrence, and the ordinary claims that may be brought pursuant to the statute are qualitatively different from a demand for no-fault benefits paid by a common carrier‘s insurer. [Id.]

As both plaintiff and defendants note, if is applied, retrospectively, to this case, plaintiff‘s claim must fail. Plaintiff did not submit a “written notice” of his “‘ordinary claims’ for personal injury” to SMART “within 60 days” of his injury. Instead, he sent a claim for no-fault benefits 78 days after his injury. Because “notice of a claim for first-party benefits is not the equivalent of notice of a third-party tort claim,” plaintiff has failed to comply with MCL 124.419 and his suit must be dismissed. .

Though plaintiff asserts that should not apply to his suit, because the Michigan Supreme Court issued its decision after the events in issue here, this assertion is not supported by Michigan law. Again, judicial decisions are generally “given full retroactive effect.” . Contrary to plaintiff‘s arguments, under Michigan caselaw, there is no reason that should not be applied to his action. As SMART accurately observes, did not create a “new principle of law” or overrule binding caselaw2—it merely interpreted a statute, MCL 124.419. . Plaintiff could not reasonably rely on an “old rule” that classified a request for no-fault benefits as compliance with the notice provision in MCL 124.419, because no such “old rule” existed. . Accordingly, we must follow the general principle that gives “judicial decisions . . . full retroactive effect,” and apply holding to this case. . For this reason, plaintiff‘s suit must be dismissed pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).

B. MCL 124.419

Were we nonetheless to assume that ruling does not apply to plaintiff‘s suit, his claim should also be dismissed because he failed to comply with the notice provisions of MCL 124.419 under his preferred, but incorrect, interpretation of the statute.

MCL 124.419 reads, in full:

All claims that may arise in connection with the transportation authority shall be presented as ordinary claims against a common carrier of passengers for hire: Provided, That written notice of any claim based upon injury to persons or property shall be served upon the authority no later than 60 days from the occurrence through which such injury is sustained and the disposition thereof shall rest in the discretion of the authority and all claims that may be allowed and final judgment obtained shall be liquidated from funds of the authority: Provided, further, That only the courts situated in the counties in which the authority principally carries on its function are the proper counties in which to commence and try action against the authority. [Emphasis added.]

As the trial court correctly held, MCL 124.419 thus requires “written notice” of an “ordinary claim[] against a common carrier” to be “served upon the authority no later than 60 days from the occurrence through which such injury is sustained . . . .” Id.; see also .

Here, plaintiff failed to provide SMART‘s insurance administrator with “written notice” of his demand for no-fault benefits within 60 days of his fall—instead, SMART‘s insurance administrator received plaintiff‘s demand 78 days after the event. He accordingly did not “serve” “written notice” on defendants “no later than 60 days” after his injury, and therefore did not comply with the mandates of MCL 124.419. See .3 Accordingly, his claim fails and must be dismissed.

The trial court properly granted summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Affirmed.

SAAD, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and SHAPIRO, JJ., concurred.

Notes

1
See also (“[N]otice of a claim for first-party benefits is not the equivalent of notice of a third-party tort claim.“).
2
Plaintiff‘s citation of unpublished cases that classified a request for no-fault benefits as compliance with MCL 124.419 is unavailing for two reasons. First, unpublished cases are not binding authority, and therefore cannot create a “rule” of law that can be relied upon. MCR 7.215(C)(1). Second, the unpublished cases to which plaintiff cites are not supportive of his position. In each of the decisions cited by plaintiff, SMART‘s insurance administrator received the claim for no-fault benefits within 60 days of the plaintiff‘s alleged injuries. In this case, SMART‘s insurance administrator did not receive plaintiff‘s claim for no-fault benefits within 60 days of plaintiff‘s alleged injuries—instead, it received plaintiff‘s claim for no-fault benefits 78 days after the occurrence of plaintiff‘s alleged injury.
3
Plaintiff‘s argument that the “mailbox rule” should apply to the notice provision of MCL 124.419 is unavailing, directly contravenes the plain language of the statute, and is unsupported by any relevant caselaw. “It is not sufficient for a party simply to announce a position . . . and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also (using Black‘s Law Dictionary (8th ed) to define the term “service” as used in MCL 124.419 as ” ‘[t]he formal delivery of a writ, summons, or other legal process’ “) (alteration in original).
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