SPEICHER v COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Docket No. 148617
Supreme Court of Michigan
Argued October 8, 2014. Decided December 22, 2014.
497 Mich 125
SPEICHER v COLUMBIA TOWNSHIP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Docket No. 148617. Argued October 8, 2014. Decided December 22, 2014.
Kenneth J. Speicher brought an action against the Columbia Township Board of Trustees and the Columbia Township Planning Commission in the Van Buren Circuit Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of defendants’ alleged violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA),
In an opinion by Justice VIVIANO, joined by Chief Justice YOUNG and Justices MARKMAN, KELLY, ZAHRA, and MCCORMACK, the Supreme Court held:
Prior decisions of the Court of Appeals strayed from the plain language of
1. If a public body is not complying with the OMA, and a person commences a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act and succeeds in obtaining relief in the action, the person shall recover court costs and actual attorney fees for the action. The first statutory condition—if a public body is not complying with the act—contemplates an ongoing violation, precisely the circumstances in which injunctive relief is appropriate. The second statutory condition—commencement of a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act—requires that the person seek injunctive relief. The third statutory condition—a requirement that a person who files an action seeking such relief succeeds in obtaining relief in the action—cannot be separated from the phrase that precedes it. Given that the phrase “relief in the action,” uses a definite article and immediately follows the phrase “a person commences a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief,” the phrase “relief in the action” must be construed as referring to injunctive relief. The Legislature was not required to restate the modifier “injunctive” when again referring to the noun “relief” because the modifier is implied when the statute is read as a whole. When read in the context of the statutory scheme,
2. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals agreed that plaintiff failed to show that he was entitled to injunctive relief because there was no evidence that the commission had a history of OMA violations, there was no evidence that this violation was willful, and there was no evidence that the public or plaintiff was harmed. Therefore, while the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief for defendants’ notice violation, he was not entitled to court costs and attorney fees because he did not succeed in obtaining injunctive relief.
Court of Appeals opinion and order issued December 19, 2013, reversed; portion of the Court of Appeals opinion issued January 22, 2013, concerning court costs and attorney fees reinstated.
Justice CAVANAGH, dissenting, would have held that plaintiff was entitled to costs and attorney fees. Shortly after the enactment of the OMA, the Court of Appeals effectively held that declaratory relief granted in lieu of or as the functional equivalent of an injunction supports an award of costs and attorney fees under
STATUTES — OPEN MEETINGS ACT — ENFORCEMENT PROVISION — COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES — INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
Under
Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (by John J. Bursch) and Silverman, Smith & Rice, PC (by Robert W. Smith), for Kenneth J. Speicher.
Plunkett Cooney (by Mary Massaron, Hilary A. Ballentine, and Robert A. Callahan) for the Columbia Township Board of Trustees and the Columbia Township Planning Commission.
Amici Curiae:
Bauckham, Sparks, Lohrstorfer, Thall & Seeber, PC (by Robert E. Thall), for the Michigan Townships Association and the Michigan Municipal League.
Outside Legal Counsel PLC (by Philip L. Ellison) for Outside Legal Counsel PLC and Philip L. Ellison.
VIVIANO, J. In this Open Meetings Act (OMA)1 case, defendants Columbia Township Board of Trustees and Columbia Township Planning Commission appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision holding that plaintiff Kenneth Speicher was entitled to an award of court costs and actual attorney fees based on his entitlement to declaratory relief under the OMA. The Court of Appeals reached this decision only because it was compelled to do so by Court of Appeals precedent.2 If not for this binding precedent, the Court of Appeals would have denied plaintiff‘s request for court costs and actual attorney fees on the ground that the plain language of
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In early 2010, the Columbia Township Board of Trustees (the Board) adopted a resolution that fixed the regular monthly meetings of the Board and the Columbia Township Planning Commission (the Planning Commission) for the year 2010-2011. However, during the regularly scheduled October 18, 2010 meeting, the Planning Commission adopted another resolution that it would conduct quarterly, rather than monthly, meet-ings beginning January 2011. According to the Township Clerk, after the Planning Commission adopted the new schedule, she contacted a local newspaper, the South Haven Tribune, and requested publication of the new meeting schedule. She stated that she also posted a revised meeting schedule at the Township Hall entrance with the February and March 2011 meetings whited out.
Plaintiff is a property owner in the township. According to plaintiff, he had no notice of the new quarterly meeting schedule, and he appeared for the meetings in February and March 2011, seeking to raise a number of issues before the Planning Commission. Plaintiff claimed that the posted schedule did not reflect the change to quarterly meetings and no notices appeared in the South Haven Tribune prior to those previously scheduled meetings.
Plaintiff sued defendants, alleging that the decision to change the schedule was
sought a declaration that the Planning Commission‘s decision to cancel the regularly scheduled meetings was made in violation of the OMA, and he sought to enjoin the Planning Commission and the Board from further noncompliance with the OMA.6 Plaintiff also cited
Finding that defendants’ conduct was not actionable, the trial court denied plaintiff‘s motion for summary disposition and granted summary disposition to defendants. The trial court also denied plaintiff‘s motion for reconsideration. The trial court ruled that defendants did not violate the OMA because plaintiff was not denied access to any meetings. To the extent that notice may not have been timely posted, this was a technical violation not entitling plaintiff to relief. The trial court acknowledged that the notice cancelling the February and March Planning Commission meetings “may not have been done in strict compliance with” the OMA, but the court concluded that any violations were “technical in nature, and did not impair the rights of the public in having their governmental bodies make decisions in an open meeting.” Plaintiff had, at most, been inconvenienced by the failure to post timely notice of the meeting changes given that “[p]laintiff had the option
and the court finds that the noncompliance or failure has impaired the rights of the public under this act.
However, plaintiff has specifically disclaimed that he sought to invalidate defendants’ decision under that provision, stating that “[t]he damage had been done and invalidation under
of bringing his concerns to the Planning Commission at its next regularly scheduled meeting.”
Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part in an unpublished opinion.7 The Court of Appeals concluded that while the meeting schedule change was properly made at an open meeting, defendants plainly violated the OMA by not timely posting the modified schedule. It therefore held that the trial court erred by failing to grant declaratory relief to plaintiff on that point. However, the Court of Appeals also held that the trial court properly denied injunctive relief for defendants’ technical notice violation because “there
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, arguing that because the Court of Appeals had held that he was entitled to declaratory relief under the OMA, he was entitled to an award of court costs and actual attorney fees under
published opinion, the Court of Appeals then held that plaintiff was entitled to court costs and actual attorney fees under existing case law because he established entitlement to declaratory relief.11 However, the Court of Appeals reached this conclusion only because it was compelled by court rule to follow prior published Court of Appeals decisions.12 The Court explained that the rule that court costs and actual attorney fees were available whenever a plaintiff files a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief under
the Court of Appeals
Defendants sought review in this Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred by awarding plaintiff court costs and actual attorney fees but correctly reasoned that such costs and fees were improper because plaintiff did not obtain injunctive relief as required by
whether
MCL 15.271(4) authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs to a plaintiff who obtains declaratory relief regarding claimed violations of the Open Meetings Act (MCL 15.261 et seq.), or whether the plaintiff must obtain injunctive relief as a necessary condition of recovering attorney fees and costs underMCL 15.271(4) .[16]
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.17 In interpreting a statute, we consider “both the
654 NW2d 918 (2002); Nicholas v Meridian Charter Twp Bd, 239 Mich App 525; 609 NW2d 574 (2000); Manning v East Tawas, 234 Mich App 244; 593 NW2d 649 (1999); Schmiedicke v Clare Sch Bd, 228 Mich App 259, 266-267; 577 NW2d 706 (1998); Menominee Co Taxpayers Alliance, Inc v Menominee Co Clerk, 139 Mich App 814, 820; 362 NW2d 871 (1984).
plain meaning of the critical word or phrase as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.”18 As with any statutory interpretation, our goal is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature by focusing on the statute‘s plain language.19
III. ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the phrase “succeeds in obtaining relief in the action” in
Under the OMA, public bodies must conduct their meetings, make all of their decisions, and conduct their deliberations
open to the public.21 The OMA also requires public bodies to give notice of their regular meetings and changes in their meeting schedule in the manner prescribed by the act.22 If a public body has failed to comply with the requirements of the act, in addition to authorizing enforcement actions by the attorney general or local prosecuting attorney, the OMA also allows for any person to commence a civil action.23 The OMA creates a three-tiered enforcement scheme for private litigants:
(1) Section 10 of the OMA allows a person to file a civil suit “to challenge the validity of a decision of a public body made in violation of this act.”24 Subsection (2) specifies when a decision may be invalidated, and Subsection (5) allows a public body to cure the alleged defect by reenacting a disputed decision in conformity with the OMA. Notably, § 10 does not provide for an award of attorney fees or costs.
(2) If a public body is not complying with the OMA, § 11 allows a person to file a civil suit “to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with this act.”25 Subsection (4) provides for an award of court costs and actual attorney fees when three conditions are met: (a) a public body is not complying with the act; (b) a person files “a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or enjoin further noncompliance with the act“; and (c) the person “succeeds in obtaining relief in the action[.]”26 The meaning of this latter phrase is the crux of this case.
(3) Finally, § 13 provides that a public official who intentionally violates the OMA is “personally liable in a civil action for actual or exemplary damages of not more than $500.00 total, plus court costs and actual attorney fees....” 27
As an initial matter, “these sections, and the distinct kinds of relief that they provide, stand alone.”28 This is an important point because “[t]o determine whether a plaintiff may bring a cause of action for a specific remedy, this Court must determine whether [the Legislature] intended to create such a cause of action.”29 When a statute, like the OMA, “gives new rights and prescribes new remedies, such remedies must be strictly pursued; and a party seeking a remedy under the act is confined to the remedy conferred thereby and to that only.”30
Plaintiff does not seek to invalidate any action by defendants or make a claim for personal liability against a public official. Therefore, we must train our focus on § 11 of the OMA to determine if it provides an adequate basis for the Court of Appeals’ award of court costs and actual attorney fees in this case.31
provides as follows:
(1) If a public body is not complying with this act, the attorney general, prosecuting attorney of the county in which the public body serves, or a person may commence a civil action to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with this act. (2) An action for injunctive relief against a local public body shall be commenced in the circuit court, and venue is proper in any county in which the public body serves. An action for an injunction against a state public body shall be commenced in the circuit court and venue is proper in any county in which the public body has its principal office, or in Ingham county. If a person commences an action for injunctive relief, that person shall not be required to post security as a condition for obtaining a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order.
(3) An action for mandamus against a public body under this act shall be commenced in the court of appeals.
(4) If a public body is not complying with this act, and a person commences a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act and succeeds in obtaining relief in the action, the person shall recover court costs and actual attorney fees for the action.
At the outset, we acknowledge that, in isolation, the phrase “relief in the action” in
plaintiff was entitled to declaratory relief on its claim that defendants violated the act by not timely posting the Planning Commission‘s modified meeting schedule, as required by
isolation; rather, context matters, and thus statutory provisions are to be read as a whole.”33 An attempt to segregate any portion or exclude any portion of a statute from consideration is almost certain to distort legislative intent.34 Therefore, plaintiff‘s strained reading of an excerpt of one sentence must yield to context. If, when reading the statute as a whole, it is apparent that “relief in the action” refers to injunctive relief, we should not circumscribe our analysis to one clause of the sentence.
Looking to the plain language of
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that, in this latter phrase, the Legislature did not specifically modify the word “relief” with the word “injunctive,” and argues that this means that any relief obtained for a violation of the OMA mandates an award of attorney fees and costs. However, by its plain language,
Moreover, even though the Legislature did not modify the word “relief” with the word “injunctive” in the particular phrase at issue, use of the word “injunctive” when again referring to “relief” was unnecessary. This Court was faced with an almost identical problem in Robinson v City of Lansing: the Legislature modified
a noun, but omitted the modifier from its subsequent use of the noun.40 The defendant City argued that the Legislature‘s failure to qualify “highway” as a “county highway” in
The same analysis applies here. Subsection (4) specifically refers to and is limited to injunctive relief by use of the word “injunctive” in the preceding phrase, “a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief[.]” Because the word “relief” appears twice in the same sentence, only a strained reading of a portion of that sentence prevents the obvious conclusion that the second mention of “relief” is in direct reference to the first. The Legislature was not required to restate the modifier, “injunctive,” when again referring to the noun, “relief,” as the modifier was already sufficiently incorporated into the statute and, when read in context, was implied when the Legislature subsequently used the word “relief.”44 A reasonable reader of
Our conclusion is reinforced by viewing
if a person “succeeds in obtaining relief in the action.”47 Thus, as a whole,
In sum, when considering both the plain meaning of the critical phrase in context as well as its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme,
public body persists in violating the act, a suit is brought to enjoin such behavior, and that suit is successful in obtaining injunctive relief. Accordingly, we conclude that the phrase “succeeds in obtaining relief in the action” necessarily mandates that the plaintiff succeed in obtaining injunctive relief, not just any relief, in order to be entitled to court costs and actual attorney fees under
In so holding, we acknowledge the line of contrary holdings of the Court of Appeals. But, for the reasons explained above, the Ridenour court and the cases that followed it impermissibly strayed from the plain language of
IV. APPLICATION
Plaintiff commenced a civil action against the Board and Planning Commission
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that a person cannot recover court costs and actual attorney fees under
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals opinion and order issued December 19, 2013, and reinstate the portion of the Court of Appeals decision issued January 22, 2013, regarding court costs and actual attorney fees.
YOUNG, C.J., and MARKMAN, KELLY, ZAHRA, and MCCORMACK, JJ., concurred with VIVIANO, J.
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). Shortly after the enactment of the Open Meetings Act (OMA),
In 1968, the Legislature enacted an open meetings law to consolidate a “patchwork of statutes” that required accountability and openness in governmental affairs. Booth v Univ of Mich Bd of Regents, 444 Mich 211, 221; 507 NW 2d 422 (1993). By rendering the decision-making process of most public bodies open and accessible to the public, the 1968 statute was intended to act as ” ‘an important check and balance on self-government.’ ” Id. at 223, quoting Osmon, Sunshine or Shadows: One State‘s Decision, 1977 Det C L Rev 613, 617. Specifically, by addressing a longstanding concern regarding the public‘s access to governmental
making,1 the statute‘s aim was to ” ‘serve as both a light and disinfectant in exposing potential abuse and misuse of power.’ ” Booth, 444 Mich at 223, quoting Sunshine or Shadows, 1977 Det CL Rev at 617. Although the goals of the 1968 statute were laudable, the statute was flawed: “because the 1968 statute failed to impose an enforcement mechanism and penalties to deter noncompliance, nothing prevented the wholesale evasion of the act‘s provisions” by public bodies, and the law was often ignored. Booth, 444 Mich at 221. See, also, Sunshine or Shadows, 1977 Det C L Rev at 619. To remedy this, the statute was “comprehensively revise[d]” in 1976 to provide for enforcement by way of several mechanisms, including actions by private citizens to vindicate, not primarily personal rights, but the rights of the public at large. Booth, 444 Mich at 222. One such enforcement provision is
If a public body is not complying with this act, and a person commences a civil action against the public body for injunctive relief to compel compliance or to enjoin further noncompliance with the act and succeeds in obtaining relief in the action, the person shall recover court costs and actual attorney fees for the action.
At issue in this case is whether the statutory phrase “succeeds in obtaining relief in the action” encompasses more than formal injunctive relief. Stated another way, at issue is whether the Court of Appeals has correctly effectuated the Legislature‘s intent by holding that the
absence of formal injunctive relief does not preclude a plaintiff from recovering statutory attorney fees and costs under
As previously noted, four years after the effective date of
Subsequent panels of the Court of Appeals have followed Ridenour, reasoning
such cases, the plaintiff has “succeeded in obtaining relief in the action,” which is all that
Despite the clear holdings of the Court of Appeals, the Legislature has not amended
Indeed, the interpretation of the statutory language in Ridenour and its progeny is consistent with the purpose of
interpretive aid. See McCahan v Brennan, 492 Mich 730, 757 n 22; 822 NW2d 747 (2012) (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting); Karaczewski v Farbman Stein & Co, 478 Mich 28, 53-54; 732 NW2d 56 (2007) (MARILYN KELLY, J., dissenting).
would serve no useful purpose as a final determination of rights.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). See, also,
In contrast to Ridenour and its progeny, the majority‘s interpretation undermines the OMA‘s enforcement provision and the purpose of the OMA, generally. In addition to mandating formal injunctive relief before costs and attorney fees can be awarded, the majority
actual and exemplary damages of not more than $ 500.00 total, plus court costs and actual attorney fees to a person or group of persons bringing the action.“).
now clarifies that an “ongoing violation” is also a prerequisite to obtaining costs and attorney fees under the OMA. Consequently, the majority opinion effectively gives a public body at least one free pass at violating the OMA because, without more, the public body‘s violation of the OMA, no matter how substantial, is presumably not “ongoing.”7 I do not believe that the majority‘s apparent interpretation is what the Legislature intended when it adopted legislation aimed at promoting a “new era” of governmental accountability and public access to governmental decision-making. Booth, 444 Mich at 222-223.
Further, under the majority‘s interpretation of
litigation. After all, upon the trial court‘s adverse ruling, the public body need only concede defeat to preclude injunctive relief. See Wexford Co Prosecutor v Pranger, 83 Mich App 197, 205; 268 NW2d 344 (1978) (affirming declaratory relief based on a violation of the OMA, but vacating an injunction, reasoning that there was no “real and imminent danger of irreparable injury” when the defendants acted in good faith); Nicholas v Meridian Charter Twp Bd, 239 Mich App 525, 534; 609 NW2d 574 (2000) (“Where there is no reason to believe that a public body will deliberately
Of particular importance is that, in enacting
large, I cannot conclude that the Legislature intended to limit this right to the small portion of the population that is capable of pursuing such actions at their own personal expense. See Nemeth v Abonmarche Dev, Inc, 457 Mich 16, 47; 576 NW2d 641 (1998) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The result of the majority‘s decision is that the ability of private citizens to bring OMA complaints will, in all likelihood, be severely curtailed. To penalize private citizens and, consequently, the public at large, simply because relief comes in the form of a declaratory judgment, rather than injunctive relief, elevates form over substance when, as explained earlier, there is little practical difference between the two forms of relief in this context. Consequently, I do not believe that the Legislature intended the majority‘s interpretation of
In this case, plaintiff requested both injunctive and declaratory relief and was ultimately awarded the latter. Because declaratory relief is sufficient to trigger attorney fees and costs under
In light of the language, history, and purpose of the act, I cannot agree with the majority‘s decision to cast aside 33 years of precedent and erroneously write into the OMA a requirement that the Legislature did not intend—i.e., that a party must obtain formal injunctive relief as a prerequisite to an award of costs and attorney fees under
Notes
Indeed, the evasion of a court‘s judgment might trigger other enforcement provisions of the OMA, further supporting the conclusion that declaratory relief, in the context of the OMA, acts to restrain noncompliance with the OMA. SeeA decision made by a public body may be invalidated if the public body has not complied with the requirements of section 3 [
MCL 15.263 ](1), (2), and (3) in making the decision or if failure to give notice in accordance with section 5 [MCL 15.265 ] has interfered with substantial compliance with section 3(1), (2), and (3)
(1) Except as otherwise provided by this section, a municipal corporation has no duty to repair or maintain, and is not liable for injuries arising from, a portion of a county highway outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, including a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation. This subsection does not prevent or limit a municipal corporation‘s liability if both of the following are true:
(a) At least 30 days before the occurrence of the relevant injury, death, or damage, the municipal corporation knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the existence of a defect in a sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
(b) The defect described in subdivision (a) is a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage.
(2) A discontinuity defect of less than 2 inches creates a rebuttable inference that the municipal corporation maintained the sidewalk, trailway, crosswalk, or other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in reasonable repair [i.e., the “2-inch rule“]. [Emphasis added.]