CITY OF REDONDO BEACH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALEX PADILLA, as Secretary of State, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
B294016 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BS172218)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION SEVEN
Filed 3/23/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis J. Herrera, San Francisco City Attorney, Yvonne R. Meré, Chief of Complex and Affirmative Litigation, Aileen M. McGrath, Co-Chief of Appellate Litigation, and Ronald H. Lee, Deputy City Attorney, for League of California Cities as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2015 the California Legislature enacted the California Voter Participation Rights Act (
The City of Redondo Beach challenged the VPRA on the ground it improperly infringed the plenary authority conferred on charter cities by
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The VPRA
The VPRA was signed into law on September 1, 2015 and became operative January 1, 2018.
On July 11, 2017 the Attorney General issued an opinion concluding the VPRA applies to charter cities and school districts governed by city charter.
2. The City of Redondo Beach‘s Challenge to the VPRA
The City of Redondo Beach is a charter city. Its charter requires all municipal and school board elections to be held on “the first Tuesday after the first Monday in March of each succeeding odd-numbered year . . . .” School board elections are required to be consolidated with municipal elections. Notwithstanding these charter provisions, in October 2017 the City school board unanimously adopted a resolution rescheduling board member elections to the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each even-numbered year beginning in November 2020 to encourage voter participation and to comply with the VPRA. The board‘s resolution relied on an analysis of voter turnout rates that demonstrated “a significant decrease in voter turnout in odd-numbered years as compared to statewide election dates.”
The Redondo Beach City Council considered the effect of the VPRA at a November 7, 2017 meeting. A memorandum prepared by the City Clerk and the City Attorney advised the Council there was a question as to the applicability of the VPRA to charter cities but acknowledged that the City‘s last four local off-cycle elections showed at least a 25 percent voter turnout decline from the average turnout of the previous four statewide general elections. A memorandum from the office of the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk to Redondo Beach‘s City Clerk compared the estimated costs to the City for on-cycle and off-cycle municipal elections: The costs for on-cycle general municipal elections (that is, elections consolidated with statewide general elections) ranged between $97,000 and $111,000, while the projected costs for stand alone, off-cycle elections ranged between $588,000 and $593,000.
3. The Superior Court‘s Decision
The matter was briefed for the court;5 and the League of California Cities, an association of cities throughout California, was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the City‘s position the VPRA does not apply to charter cities.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
A writ of mandate “may be issued by any court . . . to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the party is entitled, and from which the party is unlawfully precluded . . . .” (
2. The Authority of Charter Cities over the Timing of Municipal Elections
California law recognizes two types of cities. A city organized under the general law of the Legislature is referred to as a general law city. (
In Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 398 the Court elaborated on the constitutional definition of “municipal affair“: “Whereas subdivision (a) of article XI, section 5, articulates the general principle of self-governance, subdivision (b) sets out a nonexclusive list of four ‘core’ categories that are, by definition, ‘municipal affairs.’ The first three categories of municipal affairs are: (1) regulation, etc., of ‘the city police force‘; (2) ‘subgovernment in all or part of a city‘; and (3) ‘conduct of city elections.’ The final category gives charter cities exclusive power to regulate the ‘manner’ of electing ‘municipal officers.’ It provides, ‘(4) plenary authority is hereby granted, subject only to the restrictions of this article, to provide [in all city charters for] the manner in which, the method by which, the times at which, and the terms for which the several municipal officers . . . shall be elected.‘” (Italics & fn. omitted.)
Charter cities’ constitutional authority over municipal elections is reflected in statutes governing election timing.
If construed to apply to charter cities, the VPRA conflicts with the City‘s charter, requiring the City to adopt an ordinance altering the date of its municipal elections. When a statute clearly intended to apply to charter cities appears to conflict with a city‘s constitutional home rule authority, a court must utilize a four-part analytical framework to determine whether the city‘s authority must cede to the state‘s: (1) “whether the city ordinance at issue regulates an activity that can be characterized as a ‘municipal affair‘“; (2) whether there is “an actual conflict between [local and state law]“; (3) “whether the state law addresses a matter of ‘statewide concern‘“; and (4) “whether the law is ‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern [citation] and ‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance.” (Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556, quoting CalFed, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 16-17; accord, Marquez v. City of Long Beach (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 552, 565.)
3. The Legislature Has Failed To Demonstrate a Clear Intention To Apply the VPRA to Charter Cities
a. Courts have usually insisted on statutory language clearly including charter cities before engaging in the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis
“The first principle of statutory construction requires us to interpret the words of the statute themselves, giving them their ordinary meaning, and reading them in the context of the statute . . . as a whole.” (People v. Gonzales (2017) 2 Cal.5th 858, 868.) The “plain meaning” rule, however, “does not prohibit a court from determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision is consistent with other provisions of the statute. The meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence; the words must be construed in context, and provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735; see Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1074, 1084 [“[w]e do not construe statutory language in isolation, but rather as a thread in the fabric of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part“]; DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 992 [if the statutory language is reasonably subject to multiple interpretations, a court will consider extrinsic aids, such as “the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part“].)
The Secretary contends the plain language of the VPRA, which applies to a “political subdivision” defined as “a geographic area of representation created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a city . . . ,” establishes the Legislature‘s intent that the VPRA applies to all cities, not just general law cities. The Legislature, however, is usually quite specific when it intends the term “political subdivision” to include charter cities. For instance, the Government Code often specifies “charter cities” or “any city” when defining or utilizing the term “political subdivision.” (See, e.g.,
contained a provision (
decision on this point is therefore quite limited: “[I]t is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.” (People v. Alvarez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1161, 1176; see Johnson v. Bradley, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 415 (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).)
b. The legislative history of the VPRA does not indicate a clear intention to include charter cities
The VPRA does not include a comprehensive definition of its intended reach. As introduced by State Senator Benjamin Hueso, Senate Bill No. 415 stated, “It is the intent of the Legislature to enact legislation to prohibit a political subdivision from holding an election on a date other than the date of a statewide direct primary election or statewide general election if doing so would result in a significant decrease in voter turnout as compared to the voter turnout at a statewide election.” (Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) § 1, as introduced Feb. 25, 2015.) An amended version designated the title of the bill and defined “political subdivision” as “a geographic area of representation created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a city, a school district, a community college district, or other district organized pursuant to state law.” (Sen. Bill No. 415 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 6, 2015.) The definition of “political subdivision” remained unchanged thereafter and is codified in
Senate Bill No. 415‘s definition of “political subdivision” was apparently borrowed from the California Voting Rights Act,
Only two weeks before the introduction of Senate Bill No. 415, however, Assemblymember Roger Hernández, a co-author of the bill, introduced Assembly Bill No. 277 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), which amended the CVRA‘s definition of political subdivision to encompass “a geographic area of representation created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a general law city, general law county, charter city, charter county, charter city and county, a school district, community college district, or other district organized pursuant to state law.” (
The City contends this essentially contemporaneous amendment of the CVRA to expressly include charter cities and introduction of the VPRA using the original, less specific definition of “political subdivision” demonstrate the Legislature did not intend the VPRA to apply to charter cities. Otherwise, it argues, the Legislature would have utilized the more inclusive definition of a political subdivision in the VPRA. (See Scher v. Burke (2017) 3 Cal.5th 136, 144-145 [“[a]s a general rule, when the Legislature uses a term in one provision of a statute but omits it from another . . . we generally presume that the Legislature did so deliberately, in order ‘to convey a different meaning‘“].)
Indeed, an analogous legislative background led the Supreme Court in Ector v. City of Torrance (1973) 10 Cal.3d 129 (Ector) to reject a claim that a state statute barring local agencies from requiring employees to live within their jurisdiction prevailed over a contrary city charter provision. There, the City of Torrance fired an employee when it was discovered he lived outside the city. The employee sued for reinstatement citing
In addition to analyzing this legislative history of
In addition to Assembly Bill No. 277, Assemblymember Hernández introduced Assembly Bill No. 254 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) during the same legislative session. That bill sought to require cities, school districts, community college districts and special districts to hold their general elections in conjunction with statewide elections by deleting the off-cycle election dates from
Against this legislative backdrop the Attorney General issued an opinion concluding the VPRA could be constitutionally applied to charter cities. (100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 4 (2017).) The opinion stated, “As a threshold matter, we find that the Legislature intended the Act to apply to charter cities and school districts.” (Id. at p. 7.) In support of this conclusion the Attorney General relied on the purported plain meaning of “city” and “political subdivision,” without confronting the inherent ambiguity of those terms. Further, his opinion presumes the definition of “political subdivision” was taken from the CVRA, as do we, but asserts that definition was found by the Jauregui court to include charter cities without addressing the fact that the Jauregui court did not actually construe the statute and find an intent to include charter cities, but simply proceeded directly to the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis.
Finally, the Attorney General‘s opinion cites the comments of Senator Hueso, who indicated his understanding the application of the VPRA to charter cities would not violate the Constitution. (100 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 7, fn. 30, citing Assem. Standing Com. on Elections and Redistricting, Hearing (July 1, 2015), testimony of Sen. Ben Hueso [stating his view the VPRA does not violate the constitutional rights of charter cities].) As amicus curiae League of California Cities points out, “[T]he expressions of individual legislators generally are an improper basis upon which to discern the intent of the entire Legislature.” (People v. Farrell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 394; see Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 845 [“we have repeatedly declined to discern legislative intent from comments by a bill‘s author because they reflect on the views of a single legislator instead of those of the Legislature as a whole“].) More telling is the
This comment, especially when viewed in light of Assembly Bill No. 277‘s contemporaneous amendment of the CVRA to expressly include charter cities, reinforces our view that the Legislature deliberately left unresolved the question whether the VPRA applies to charter cities, placing on the courts the responsibility to divine intent from ambiguous language. Under these circumstances, guided by the precept that, when reasonable, we will construe a statute to render it free from doubt as to its constitutionality, where the Constitution confers plenary authority on charter cities to set the timing of their elections, we will not infer an intent to contravene that authority without more explicit guidance from the Legislature.10
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the superior court ordering a peremptory writ of mandate is affirmed. The City is to recover its costs on appeal.
PERLUSS, P. J.
We concur:
SEGAL, J.
DILLON, J.*
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to