CITY OF HUNTINGTON BEACH, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. XAVIER BECERRA, as Attorney General, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
G057013
(Super. Ct. No. 30-2018-00984280)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Filed 1/10/20
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, James L. Crandall, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Michael E. Gates, City Attorney, and Brian L. Williams for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
The California Values Act,
We hold
The trial court concluded otherwise, and granted a petition for writ of mandamus brought by the City of Huntington Beach (the City), which is a charter city. The court ordered Xavier Becerra, as the California Attorney General, to refrain from enforcing
In a companion appeal, City of Huntington Beach v. Los Alamitos Community United, G057209, two community organizations and four people challenge the trial court‘s ruling the CVA is unconstitutional as to charter cities. In that case, we conclude the appellants lack standing to appeal and grant the City‘s motion to dismiss.
RELEVANT LAW
Resolution of this appeal turns on the relationship and potential conflict among three sources of law: (1) the CVA, (2)
I.
The CVA
When enacting the CVA, the Legislature found “[i]mmigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community,” “[a] relationship of trust between California‘s immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the public safety of the people of California,” and “[t]his trust is
In addition, the Legislature found that “[e]ntangling state and local agencies with federal immigration enforcement programs diverts already limited resources and blurs the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal governments.” (
The CVA carries out its purposes by prohibiting state and local law enforcement from engaging in certain specifically identified acts related to immigration enforcement.
The CVA makes clear that California law enforcement agencies are not prohibited from engaging in certain activities with federal authorities. California law enforcement agencies are not prohibited from investigating, enforcing, detaining upon reasonable suspicion of, or arresting a person for a violation of
The CVA states that it “does not prohibit or restrict any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, federal immigration authorities, information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of [any] individual, or from requesting from federal immigration authorities immigration status information, lawful or unlawful, of any individual, or maintaining or exchanging that information with any other federal, state, or local government entity, pursuant to [federal immigration laws].” (
The CVA imposes on the California Attorney General the task of preparing and publishing “model policies limiting assistance with immigration enforcement to the fullest extent possible consistent with federal and state law at public schools, public libraries, health facilities operated by the state or a political subdivision of the state, courthouses, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement facilities, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, the Division of Workers Compensation, and shelters, and ensuring that they remain safe and accessible to all California residents, regardless of immigration status.” (
The CVA also imposes restrictions on the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR). The DCR must, in advance of an interview between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and a person in DCR custody, provide that person with a written consent form explaining the purpose of the interview, that the interview is voluntary, and that the person may decline to be interviewed or be interviewed only with an attorney
II.
California Constitution, Article XI, Section 5
California law classifies cities as either charter cities, which are organized under a charter (
Under the home rule doctrine, “[c]harter cities are specifically authorized by our state Constitution to govern themselves, free of state legislative intrusion, as to the matters deemed municipal affairs.” (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 555.)
“Whereas subdivision (a) of article XI, section 5 articulates the general principle of self-governance, subdivision (b) sets out a nonexclusive list of four ‘core’ categories that are, by definition, ‘municipal affairs.‘” (Johnson, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 398, fn. omitted.)
III.
Huntington Beach Charter and Municipal Code Provisions
Section 103 of the Huntington Beach Charter states: “The City shall have the power to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to such restrictions and limitations as may be provided in this Charter or in the Constitution of the State of California.” Section 2.52.030 of the Huntington Beach Municipal Code states: “It shall be the duty of each and every member of the Police Department to enforce impartially all the laws and statutes of the United States and of the State of California and all of the ordinances of the City, within the limits of this City, and to perform such other and further duties as by statute and ordinance now existing or hereafter enacted, may be imposed upon them in their capacity as peace officers.”
Section 2.24.050 of the Huntington Beach Municipal Code states: “The Police Chief shall perform such other acts as the laws of the state and ordinances of the Council may require.”
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The City filed a petition for writ of mandamus and a complaint for declaratory relief to “invalidate the unconstitutional mandates of the [CVA] that impermissibly strip the City‘s constitutionally protected Charter authority with respect to local ‘municipal affairs.‘” The petition and complaint had three causes of action: (1) writ of mandate, (2) declaratory relief, and (3) injunctive relief. Each cause of action alleged the CVA unconstitutionally violates the City‘s authority to conduct municipal affairs guaranteed under
In a memorandum of points and authorities in support of the petition for writ of mandamus, the City argued
The Attorney General filed opposition, which included the legislative history of the CVA, a declaration from Professor Tom K. Wong of the University of California, San Diego, and copies of declarations from four other law enforcement officials that had been filed in a federal court action. Wong concluded: “When undocumented immigrants hear about the [CVA], they have [a] deeper belief that California‘s laws can protect them, their families, and their communities, and they have more trust that California‘s laws can protect the confidentiality of witnesses to crimes even if they are undocumented.” He also concluded, “When undocumented immigrants hear that some cities in California want to opt out of the [CVA], this has wide-ranging chilling effects as they become significantly less likely to engage with public institutions, including law enforcement.”
A hearing was conducted on the City‘s petition for writ of mandamus and complaint. The City narrowed the scope of relief sought by identifying
The trial court granted the City‘s petition for writ of mandamus and issued an order for the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate. A peremptory writ of mandate was issued ordering the Attorney General to refrain from enforcing
The Attorney General timely filed a notice of appeal from the order granting the City‘s petition for writ of mandamus. An order granting or denying a petition for writ of mandamus is considered a final judgment for purposes of an appeal. (Public Defenders’ Organization v. County of Riverside (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
“[T]he question whether in a particular case the home rule provisions of the California Constitution [
II.
A Municipal Affair Identified in Section 5(b) Can Be Subject to a General Law of Statewide Concern.
A. The Four-Part Analytical Framework
Home rule authority under
The Legislature may legislate as to matters of statewide concern and, if the statute is not overbroad, then the conflicting charter city law “ceases to be a ‘municipal affair’ pro tanto and the Legislature is not prohibited by
The California Supreme Court has developed a four-part “analytical framework” to determine whether a state law unconstitutionally infringes the home rule authority of charter cities granted by
B. The Language and History of Section 5(a) and Section 5(b)
The trial court concluded and the City argues the four-part analytical framework of City of Vista and California Fed. Savings is inapplicable if the local law concerns one of the four municipal affairs identified in
The City‘s argument is based largely on the language and history of
The text of a constitutional provision is the starting point of its interpretation and “the best indicator of the intended meaning.” (Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 93.)
The history of
The term “municipal affairs” used in
One authority explains the enactment of
In Nicholl v. Koster (1910) 157 Cal. 416, 420-421, the California Supreme Court held a charter city did not have the authority to enact laws relating to municipal affairs identified in
In 1914,
Finally,
After the 1914 amendments, the municipal affairs provisions of
The lesson from this history, as relevant here, is that a charter city may provide in its charter that the city may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to “municipal affairs” (subject only to restrictions in the city charter) and otherwise is subject to general laws. Because the term “municipal affairs” was subject to judicial interpretation,
C. California Supreme Court Authority
The four-part analytical framework of City of Vista and California Fed. Savings would therefore apply to a state law that is claimed to intrude on a charter city‘s right under
The California Supreme Court, in Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 131, indirectly rejected the notion that municipal affairs identified in
The Supreme Court first observed that “[s]uperficially”
In Seal Beach, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 600, the California Supreme Court expressly rejected the notion that municipal affairs identified in
police force and provide the manner in which city employees may be compensated and removed. (Seal Beach, supra, at pp. 599-600.)
In Jauregui, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at page 781, the Court of Appeal followed the reasoning of Seal Beach to conclude that provisions of the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (
The Court of Appeal in Marquez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pages 556 through 557 addressed the issue whether charter cities must comply with state law minimum wage orders. Although
These four decisions—Baggett, Seal Beach, Juaregui, and Marquez—demonstrate the four-part analytical framework of City of Vista and California Fed. Savings applies when a state law is challenged as infringing a municipal affair identified in
class of municipal affairs but identifies certain activities at least presumptively deemed to be municipal affairs under
In arguing
The City contends Johnson, supra, 4 Cal.4th 389 impliedly holds that as to matters identified in
It is in footnote 15 that, according to the City, the California Supreme Court “necessarily implied” that a charter city‘s authority over municipal affairs identified in
Reading Johnson in the manner urged by the City would place that case in conflict with Seal Beach.
In Graham, supra, 151 Cal. 465 at pages 467-468, the court addressed whether a charter city was required to create and pay for a justice court, as required by state law, when the city had created a police court under authority conferred by
The issue in Ector, supra, 10 Cal.3d 129 was whether a city charter requirement that city employees reside within city borders was rendered unenforceable by a state law forbidding such a residence requirement. In a passage relied on by the City, the California Supreme Court stated it was “not without guidance” in resolving whether the residence requirement involved a municipal affair because
At issue in Sonoma County, supra, 23 Cal.3d 296 was a statute, passed in response to Proposition 13, prohibiting the disbursement of state surplus or loan funds to any local public agency granting its employees a cost-of-living pay increase that exceeded the cost-of-living pay increase provided for state employees. In addition, the statute nullified any agreement by a local agency to pay a cost-of-living pay increase that exceeded the cost-of-living pay increase provided for state employees. (Sonoma County, supra, at p. 302.) Labor organizations challenged the statute on the ground, among others, it violated
The Supreme Court analyzed the argument made by the respondent counties that the state statute addressed a matter of statewide concern and therefore was binding notwithstanding the plenary authority granted by
The City argues the four-part analytical framework of City of Vista and California Fed. Savings would be “ridiculously redundant” if made applicable to the municipal affairs identified in
A more fundamental problem, the City argues, is if a state law prevails over a city charter measure addressing activity deemed a municipal affair identified in
D. Substantive/Procedural Distinction
The City acknowledges that in Baggett and Seal Beach the California Supreme Court upheld state laws infringing the conduct of municipal affairs identified in
In regards to issues of the compensation, qualification, and removal of charter city employees, which come within
In County of Riverside v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 278, 282 (County of Riverside), the California Supreme Court struck down, as violating county home rule constitutional provisions, a state law requiring counties and other agencies to submit to binding arbitration economic issues arising during negotiations with unions representing firefighters or law enforcement officers. A proponent of the state law argued it was valid because it involved a matter of statewide concern. (Id. at p. 286.) The court reviewed cases addressing state laws regulating relations between local governments and their employees, including Baggett, Seal Beach, and Sonoma County, and concluded they permitted the imposition of procedural requirements governing employee relations. (Id. at pp. 287-289.) The state law in issue was invalid, the court reasoned, because it “is not merely procedural” but “is substantive,” and “permits a body other than the county‘s governing body to establish local salaries.” (Id. at p. 289.)
In City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at page 564, the court struck down the state law regulating the wages of local government contract workers in part because “it imposes substantive obligations on charter cities, not merely generally applicable procedural standards.” The substantive nature of the state law “undermined” its proponent‘s assertion that it addressed a statewide concern. (Id. at p. 565.)
The Court of Appeal, in Dimon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1279, 1289-1290, used this procedural/substantive dichotomy to conclude state laws regulating compensation for meal periods did not apply to county probation officers. The court stated: “Another factor to be considered in determining if a state law reflects
Yet in Marquez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th 552, the Court of Appeal held the statewide minimum wage law, no doubt very substantive, applied to charter cities notwithstanding
Recently, in Anderson v. City of San Jose (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 685, 715 (Anderson), the Court of Appeal, faced with a contention that a state law was substantive, stated Marquez “aptly summarized the balance of considerations when the law in question substantively regulates a municipal affair.” In Anderson, the Court of Appeal concluded the state‘s Surplus Land Act (
In summary, the substantive/procedural distinction has been made, or rejected in the case of Marquez, in situations in which charter city or charter county authority is asserted in the areas of the manner of electing city officials and the qualification, compensation, tenure, and removal of local government employees.3
Whether the same distinction should, must, or could be made in cases arising under
We do not enter the legal thicket of determining whether
Under the Four-Part Analytical Framework, the CVA Applies to Charter Cities Without Violating the California Constitution.
A. Part One: The Huntington Beach Charter and Municipal Code Provisions Regulate Municipal Affairs.
The first part of the four-part analytical framework is to determine whether the city ordinance at issue regulates an activity that can be characterized as a municipal affair. (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556.) The City identifies two charter provisions and one municipal code section as unconstitutionally infringed by
The discussion in the preceding section leaves no doubt Huntington Beach Charter section 103 and Huntington Beach Municipal Code section 2.52.030 regulate activity that can be characterized as a municipal affair—the constitution, regulation, and government of the City police force. (See
The City also asserts the CVA unconstitutionally infringes its right to compensate employees. While compensation of employees is a municipal affair under
B. Part Two: There Is an Actual Conflict Between Section 7284.6 and Huntington Beach Charter Section 103.
In part two of the analytical framework, we determine whether there is an actual conflict between
We agree with the Attorney General there is no actual conflict between
Nor do we find a conflict between
We do find a conflict, however, between
“[A] ‘conflict’ may exist between state and local authority even though the city has not specifically legislated on that point through its charter, or by other ‘enactment.‘” (Johnson, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 399, fn. 9.) By prohibiting state and local law enforcement from engaging in certain activities related to immigration enforcement,
Because there is an actual conflict between
C. Part Three: The CVA Addresses a Matter of Statewide Concern.
In the third part of the analytical framework, we decide whether the state law addresses a matter of statewide concern. (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556.) “When, as here, state law and the ordinances of a charter city actually conflict and we must decide which controls, ‘the hinge of the decision is the identification of a convincing basis for legislative action originating in extramunicipal concerns, one justifying legislative supersession based on sensible, pragmatic considerations.’ [Citation.] In other words, for state law to control there must be something more than an abstract state
We accord “great weight” to the factual record compiled by the Legislature and to any relevant facts established in trial court proceedings. (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 558Anderson, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 707, quoting County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 286-287.) Nonetheless, factual findings made by the Legislature and the trial court are not controlling, and the decision whether a state law addresses a statewide concern is a legal issue to be decided by the court. (Anderson, supra, at p. 707; see County of Riverside, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 286 [“The judicial branch, not the legislative, is the final arbiter of this question“].) Any doubt as to whether a matter is of statewide or strictly local concern must be resolved in favor of “‘the legislative authority of the state.‘” (California Fed. Savings, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 24.)
The Legislature made substantial and detailed findings to support its enactment of the CVA. We quote them in full:
“(a) Immigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community. Almost one in three Californians is foreign born and one in two children in California has at least one immigrant parent.
“(b) A relationship of trust between California‘s immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the public safety of the people of California.
“(c) This trust is threatened when state and local agencies are entangled with federal immigration enforcement, with the result that immigrant community members fear approaching police when they are victims of, and witnesses to, crimes, seeking basic health services, or attending school, to the detriment of public safety and the well-being of all Californians.
“(d) Entangling state and local agencies with federal immigration enforcement programs diverts already limited resources and blurs the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal governments.
“(e) State and local participation in federal immigration enforcement programs also raises constitutional concerns, including the prospect that
California residents could be detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, targeted on the basis of race or ethnicity in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, or denied access to education based on immigration status. See Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell, et al. (E.D. Wash. 2017) 2017 WL 3476777; Trujillo Santoya v. United States, et al. (W.D. Tex. 2017) 2017 WL 2896021; Moreno v. Napolitano (N.D. Ill. 2016) 213 F.Supp.3d 999; Morales v. Chadbourne (1st Cir. 2015) 793 F.3d 208; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County (D. Or. 2014) 2014 WL 1414305; Galarza v. Szalczyk (3d Cir. 2014) 745 F.3d 634. “(f) This chapter seeks to ensure effective policing, to protect the safety, well-being, and constitutional rights of the people of California, and to direct the state‘s limited resources to matters of greatest concern to state and local governments.
“(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter shall not be construed as providing, expanding, or ratifying any legal authority for any state or local law enforcement agency to participate in immigration enforcement.” (
Gov. Code, § 7284.2 .)
We accord those legislative findings great weight and, though not controlling, we conclude as a matter of law they sufficiently identify statewide concerns that justify binding charter cities to the dictates of
The California Assembly Committee on Public Safety understood the statewide public safety concerns justifying the CVA. That committee, in a hearing held on June 13, 2017, summarized a study by the University of Illinois at Chicago, which found: (1) 44 percent of surveyed Latinos were less likely to contact police officers if they had been victims of a crime for fear of police inquiring into their immigration status; (2) 45 percent were less likely to volunteer information about a crime and were less likely to report a crime for fear of police inquiring into their immigration status; (3) 70 percent of undocumented immigrants reported they were less likely to contact law
The University of Illinois at Chicago study found, “[c]oncerns have been raised that the increasing involvement of state and local police in immigration enforcement will increase the mistrust immigrant communities have towards the police, thereby reducing public safety.” Giving priority to immigration enforcement means that “law enforcement resources will be directed away from important public safety objectives.” The study supports the Legislature‘s finding that the CVA was necessary to promote public safety and law enforcement.
In opposition to the City‘s Petition for writ of mandamus, the Attorney General submitted copies of declarations from four law enforcement officials: (1) Arif Alikhan, the Los Angeles Police Department Director of Office of Constitutional Policing and Policy; (2) Bruce Goldstein, Sonoma County Counsel; (3) Jim Hart, Santa Cruz County Sheriff; and (4) Jeffrey F. Rosen, Santa Clara County District Attorney. These declarations had been filed in federal court litigation over the CVA. Alikhan declared: “The cooperation of immigrant communities to report crimes and assist in the investigation and prosecution of criminals is critical to the fair and effective enforcement of the law and the safety of all members of the community.” Hart declared: “We firmly believe that cooperation with ICE harms our relationship with our immigrant community and results in a less safe community because immigrants fail to disclose crimes that they witness and/or are victims to out of fear of deportation” and “based on my experience, I have found that community members are less forthcoming in assisting the Santa Cruz Sheriff‘s Office if it were viewed as an extension of [ICE].” Rosen declared: “Fear of deportation by victims, witnesses, and families and friends of undocumented victims and witnesses has a toxic effect on our ability to detect and prosecute crime, thereby making the entire community less safe.” These declarations support the Legislature‘s finding that lack of trust between immigrants and law enforcement is detrimental to public safety.
Immigrants live throughout the State of California and, as the Legislature found, are a large portion of its population. Law enforcement agencies throughout the state interact with immigrants. The need for immigrants to report crimes, work with law enforcement, and serve as witnesses, is therefore a statewide, and not purely local, concern.
The treatment and welfare of immigrants, whatever their status, is a matter of statewide concern. (See e.g.,
Finally, we conclude the protection of the constitutional rights of California residents is a matter of paramount statewide concern. The State of California has a constitution which guarantees and protects certain rights to all people. (
Uniform application of the CVA throughout the state is necessary to ensure it adequately addresses these statewide concerns. “If every city and county were able to opt out of the statutory regime simply by passing a local ordinance, the statewide goal[s] of [public safety, better law enforcement, and protection of constitutional rights] would surely be frustrated.” (Fiscal v. City and County of San Francisco (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 895, 919.)
Evidence was presented to the trial court to support the need for uniform application of the CVA. In opposition to the City‘s Petition for writ of
The fact that California is highly urbanized and integrated makes uniform statewide application of the CVA all the more critical. Over 37 years ago, the California Supreme Court recognized “[o]ur society is no longer a collection of insular communities” and “[c]ommunities today are highly interdependent.” (Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 140Pen. Code, § 830.1, subd. (a).) If a charter city were allowed to opt out of the CVA, the effect would not be limited to the city‘s residents but would extend beyond the city‘s boundaries.
In support of the petition for writ of mandamus, the City submitted a declaration from its police chief, Handy, who severely criticized the CVA. He declared: (1) the CVA limited and interfered with the City‘s ability to operate its jail; (2) tactical use of immigration in policing is an important law enforcement tool; (3) the CVA placed restrictions on law enforcement that allow criminals to be released into communities; (4) the CVA interfered with a contract the City police department had with ICE to participate in joint operations, and (5) the CVA interfered with effective law enforcement and
Handy‘s credentials and experience are impressive, and his service is to be commended. His declaration does not, however, alter our conclusion the CVA addresses a matter of statewide concern. Handy‘s statement about the degree of trust the immigrant community has in the City‘s police force is made without any facts or studies in support. Most importantly, Handy‘s declaration must be considered against the Legislature‘s thorough and detailed findings (to which we accord great weight), the evidence cited in the legislative history of the CVA (such as the research report from the University of Illinois at Chicago), Wong‘s declaration, and the declarations of the four law enforcement officials that had been prepared for the federal court action. Weighed against that record, Handy‘s declaration does not convince us the CVA addresses strictly local concerns.
D. Part Four: The CVA Is Reasonably Related to the Statewide Concerns.
The fourth part of the analytical framework directs us to determine “whether the law is ‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of [the statewide] concern [citation] and ‘narrowly tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance.” (City of Vista, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 556.) “[T]he state law must be reasonably related to the issue at hand and limit the incursion into a city‘s municipal interest.” (Lippman v. City of Oakland (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 750, 765.) All that is required is a “direct, substantial connection between the rights provided by the [CVA] and the Legislature‘s asserted purpose.” (Baggett, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 140.)
The CVA, in particular
What the CVA does not do demonstrates it is narrowly tailored and does not intrude unnecessarily into municipal interests. In particular,
The restrictions placed on local law enforcement agencies by
Reading
The City‘s only argument regarding the fourth step of the analytical framework is the CVA exempts the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) from its mandates. The City argues the CVA leaves intact
Further, the CDCR is bound by the CVA provisions set out in
E. Conclusion
We conclude, based on our application of the four-part analytical framework set forth in City of Vista and California Fed. Savings,
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to deny the petition for writ of mandamus and enter judgment in favor of Appellant. Appellant to recover costs on appeal.
FYBEL, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
IKOLA, J.
GOETHALS, J.