LEE NEWSPAPERS, dba The Casper Star-Tribune, The Douglas Budget, L.P. dba, The Douglas Budget and The Glenrock Independent, The Wyoming Press Association, and The Associated Press v. CIRCUIT COURT OF the EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
No. S-14-0015
Supreme Court of Wyoming
Aug. 12, 2014
2014 WY 101
Representing Appellees: Bruce T. Moats, Law Office of Bruce T. Moats, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.
FOX, Justice.
[¶1] The Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial District (circuit court) closed the court proceedings in a juvenile sexual assault case and sealed the court file, purportedly in accordance with
ISSUES
[¶2] 1. Have the parties presented a justiciable controversy?
2. Did the circuit court violate the United States Constitution when it closed the court proceedings and sealed the court records?
3. Did the circuit court correctly interpret
FACTS
[¶3] In May 2012, the Converse County Sheriff‘s Department issued an AMBER Alert, notifying the public that a minor child had been reported missing, and requesting assistance in finding the child. The sheriff‘s department publicly released the name of the minor in an attempt to find her. A man was later arrested and charged with sexual assault of a minor in connection with the AMBER Alert and the missing child. Following the arrest, the Chief Deputy County Attorney of Converse County requested that the circuit court restrict disclosure of information related to the case in accordance with
[¶4]
Prior to the filing of an information or indictment in district court charging a violation of an offense under this article, neither the names of the alleged actor or the victim of the charged offense nor any other information reasonably likely to disclose the identity of the victim shall be released or negligently allowed to be released to the public by any public employee except as authorized by the judge with jurisdiction over the criminal charges. The actor‘s name may be released to the public to aid or facilitate an arrest.
[¶5] The statute only applies “[p]rior to the filing of an information or indictment in district court,”
[¶6] Following the circuit court‘s closure of the court proceedings and sealing of the case file, The Casper Star-Tribune,1 aware of the case through the AMBER Alert and other sources, filed a motion to intervene, requesting that the circuit court unseal the case file and open any court proceedings to the public. The following day, the defendant waived the preliminary hearing, and the case was bound over to the district court before the circuit court ruled on the newspaper‘s motion.
[¶7] The Casper Star-Tribune, along with other news agencies (collectively the appellees), then filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court “seeking a ruling
[¶8] The appellees do not challenge the circuit court‘s confidential treatment of the victim‘s identity, nor do they dispute that the statute prohibits the circuit court from releasing the name of the alleged actor. The issue before us is how far a circuit court may go to prevent the release of the accused‘s name before it runs afoul of the First Amendment. Our opinion, therefore, focuses on the constitutional limits to the statutory protections afforded to the alleged actor charged with sexual assault under Wyoming statute Title 6, Article 3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶9] Our standards for reviewing the district court‘s order granting summary judgment are well established. We treat the summary judgment movant‘s motion as though it has been presented originally to us. We use the same materials in the record that was before the district court. Using the materials in the record, we examine them from the vantage point most favorable to the nonmoving party opposing the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the materials. . . . We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the district court‘s determinations. Bangs v. Schroth, 2009 WY 20, ¶ 20, 201 P.3d 442, 451-52 (Wyo.2009) (internal citations omitted). Constitutional challenges present issues of law which we review de novo. Operation Save Am. v. City of Jackson, 2012 WY 51, ¶ 17, 275 P.3d 438, 447 (Wyo.2012).
DISCUSSION
I. Have the parties presented a justiciable controversy?
[¶10] The circuit court asserts this case is moot because “[t]he transcripts of any hearings in front of the Circuit Court are available.” The appellees claim that the controversy remains as the transcripts of the hearing held in circuit court have not been released. The record is unclear on this factual issue. However, regardless of whether the transcripts were made available to the appellees, we find that this case presents a justiciable controversy.
The doctrine of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously justiciable controversy. This doctrine represents the time element of standing by requiring that the interests of the parties which were originally sufficient to confer standing persist throughout the duration of the suit. Thus, the central question in a mootness case is “whether decision of a once living dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision will have an impact on the parties.” Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo.1999) (citations omitted).
[¶11] If the transcripts have not been made available, the controversy continues, and there remains an available remedy for the appellees—namely, access to the transcript.2 See Williams v. Stafford, 589 P.2d 322, 326 (Wyo.1979) (In cases where a proceeding is closed erroneously, the court “should release the record of the proceedings to the public.“), abrogated on other grounds in Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Wyo.1998). Our decision in this matter would impact the parties as it would provide
[¶12] If the transcript has, in fact, been made available to the appellees, the case may be rendered moot. We generally dismiss such cases for lack of a justiciable controversy. In Interest of AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo.1987) (“Courts do not sit for the purpose of expounding the law upon abstract questions, but to determine the rights of litigants by the rendition of effective judgment.“). However, “[t]he rule that a case must be dismissed when it becomes moot is not absolute.” Operation Save Am., 2012 WY 51, ¶ 22, 275 P.3d at 448. We have decided a technically moot issue when: (1) the issue is one of great public importance; (2) we have deemed it necessary to provide guidance to state agencies and lower courts; or (3) the “controversy is capable of repetition yet evading review.” Id. at ¶¶ 22-23, 275 P.3d at 448-49. In this case, all three exceptions apply.
[¶13] The issues before us implicate the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, demonstrating the public importance of such a dispute. See id. at ¶ 26, 275 P.3d at 449 (“As a starting point, the case concerns a fundamental constitutional right[.]“). Moreover, the accessibility of the judiciary is of considerable public concern as public access ensures that the constitutionally protected right to discuss governmental affairs remains free and open. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604-05, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 2619, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) (“Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.‘” (citation omitted)). Without public participation in our judiciary, the check on that branch of government would be stilted, endangering both the judicial process and those who come before our courts. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 478 U.S. 1, 12-13, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 2742, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II) (finding that the public provides a check on “overzealous prosecutor[s]” and “biased, or eccentric judge[s]“). The issues presented here are of great public concern and importance.
[¶14] We also find it important to provide some direction to the lower courts of this state concerning the application of
[¶15] Finally, this case presents a controversy “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Operation Save Am., 2012 WY 51, ¶ 23, 275 P.3d at 449. Under this exception to the mootness doctrine, two requirements must be met: “First, the duration of the challenged action must be too short for completion of litigation prior to its cessation or expiration. Second, there must be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.” In re Guardianship of MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d 1145, 1154 (Wyo.2006) (quoting Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir.1987)). The time period when the circuit court has jurisdiction over a felony case is, necessarily, short.
[¶16] Because this case satisfies each exception to the mootness doctrine, it presents a justiciable controversy and we proceed to resolve the issues raised.
A. Judicial Proceedings
[¶17] In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 2829, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), the United States Supreme Court first recognized a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials. Finding that First Amendment guarantees implicitly encompassed the right to attend criminal trials, a plurality of the court stated, “[T]he First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors[.]” Id. at 577, 100 S.Ct. at 2827. The Court went on to expand the right of access in criminal proceedings in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., where it found unconstitutional a state statute that required the wholesale closure of trials for sex offenses involving minor victims. 457 U.S. at 602, 610-11, 102 S.Ct. at 2618, 2622. Two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510-13, 104 S.Ct. 819, 824-26, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984), the United States Supreme Court found that voir dire during a criminal trial is protected by the First Amendment right of access.
[¶18] In Press-Enterprise II, the Court held the First Amendment right of access applies to preliminary hearings, stating, “the First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., ‘trial’ or otherwise, particularly where the preliminary hearing functions much like a full-scale trial.” 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. The Court then went on to analyze the history of preliminary hearings to determine whether such proceedings were traditionally open to the public. Id. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. Exploring as far back as the treason trial of Aaron Burr, the Court found that from that time to the present, the practice has been to conduct preliminary hearings in the public realm. Id. at 10-11, 106 S.Ct. at 2741-42. Its historical examination led the Court to conclude, “Open preliminary hearings . . . have been accorded ‘the favorable judgment of experience.‘” Id. at 11, 106 S.Ct. at 2742 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. at 605, 102 S.Ct. at 2619).
[¶19] The United States Supreme Court then looked to whether public participation during preliminary hearings provides a positive and significant role in the functioning of such hearings. The Court placed considerable weight upon the fact that preliminary hearings lack juries, thus, an open court proceeding acts as a safeguard against “overzealous prosecutor[s]” and “biased[] or eccentric judge[s].” Id. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742. The Court also discussed the value that open court proceedings provide to the public at large, explaining, “Criminal acts, especially certain violent crimes, provoke public concern, outrage, and hostility. ‘When the public is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is provided for these understandable reactions and emotions.‘” Id. at 13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742-43 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. at 823). The Court concluded, as we do, that public participation in preliminary hearings provides a significant and positive role on the functioning of the judiciary. Id. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. at 2742.
B. Judicial Documents
[¶20] While not specifically finding that the First Amendment right to access attaches to judicial documents, the United States Supreme Court has observed, “It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records[.]” Nixon v. Warner Commc‘ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1312, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). Additionally, numerous federal courts have affirmed the right of public access to judicial documents pursuant to the First Amendment. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that docket sheets “enjoy a presumption of openness” under the First Amendment); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.2002) ([T]he constitutional right to access criminal court proceedings “extends to documents and kindred ma-
[¶21] The United States Supreme Court has identified “two complementary considerations” when addressing whether a judicial proceeding carries with it a First Amendment right of access. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. The Court first looks to whether the proceedings or documents have historically been open to the general public. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605, 102 S.Ct. at 2619 and Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589, 100 S.Ct. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). Second, the Court considers “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process [or document] in question.” Id. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. This is known as the test of experience and logic. Id. at 9, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. If the documents meet the requirements of this test, a First Amendment right of access attaches. Id.
[¶22] We turn, first, to the historical treatment of criminal case documents.3 The First Circuit‘s discussion in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski is apt:
That it could be suggested that our historical tradition has not been one of presumptive openness seems inconsistent with the historical materials available to the framers of the Constitution. Not only did the Philadelphia library used by the delegates to the Convention contain some sixty-three pamphlets reproducing the proceedings of mainly political prosecutions in England but it also held the ten volume set of Emlyn‘s enlargement of Salmon‘s State Trials, recounting centuries of treason, heresy and sedition trials. The use made of these materials both by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and by the Congress in deliberations leading to the Bill of Rights indicates the value placed on access to records of secretive criminal proceedings.
868 F.2d at 503. History and tradition support ensuring judicial documents remain open to the general public, including the press.
[¶23] Second, we look to whether allowing public access will significantly and positively affect the judicial process. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, the United States Supreme Court noted that open criminal trials provide “a check on the judicial process—an essential component in our structure of self-government.” 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 2620. Specifically, the press plays a vital role in disseminating information to the general public concerning the judiciary and what occurs in its domain. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92, 95 S.Ct. 1029, 1044-45, 43 L.Ed.2d 328 (1975). “[T]he press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.” Id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572-73, 100 S.Ct. at
[¶24] This, however, is not the end of the United States Supreme Court‘s inquiry in such cases, nor is it the conclusion of ours. The First Amendment right of access is not absolute. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 2620. In some limited circumstances, the public and the press can be barred from attending judicial proceedings and, likewise, can be precluded from viewing judicial records. Id. However, the presumption of openness may only be overcome by a demonstration that there is a compelling interest which makes closure “essential to preserve higher values,” and that any closure is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824. Moreover, when a court determines that a compelling interest exists, the court must articulate findings, on the record, “specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.”5 Id.
[¶25] In this case, the circuit court failed to articulate, on the record, any findings as to the compelling interest for closing and sealing the case. The circuit court argues on appeal that it was required to close the case in order to comply with state statute, to protect both the victim and the defendant from public scrutiny. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the desire to protect juvenile sexual assault victims from the additional physical and psychological intrusion that sometimes comes with a public trial is a compelling interest. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. at 2620. However, the appellees only challenge the circuit court‘s justification in acting to protect the identity of the accused, and we agree there is a less compelling interest in protecting the identity of the alleged actor than there is in protecting that of the victim. This Court has been unable to locate any case in which protecting the identity of a person accused of sexual assault constituted a compelling interest. Regardless of whether this matter can be considered a compelling interest, the circuit court failed to articulate any finding on the record as to why this case was required to be sealed and closed. A reviewing court has no way to determine whether the closure was essential to preserve a compelling interest, or whether the closure was narrowly tailored without findings from the lower court. The presumption of openness has, therefore, not been overcome. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. at 824. The circuit court violated the First Amendment when it closed the court proceedings and sealed the court records.
III. Did the circuit court correctly interpret Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-319(a) ?
[¶26]
(a) Prior to the filing of an information or indictment in district court charging a violation of an offense under this article, neither the names of the alleged actor or the victim of the charged offense nor any other information reasonably likely to disclose the identity of the victim shall be released or negligently allowed to be released to the public by any public employee except as authorized by the judge with jurisdiction over the criminal charges. The actor‘s name may be released to the public to aid or facilitate an arrest.
[¶27] The circuit court apparently determined that the statute required the court to seal the criminal case file and close all proceedings held in its courtroom, without a hearing or findings on the record. However, “to so read the statute would be to disregard the elementary principle that it will not be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a law in violation of constitutional restrictions.” Hanson v. Town of Greybull, 63 Wyo. 467, 479, 183 P.2d 393, 397 (Wyo.1947). As we have made clear, we will not interpret a statute to create an unconstitutional result if it can be avoided. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 856 (Wyo.1991); Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740, 741 (Wyo.1965).
[¶28] The district court found that a redacted case file would suffice to ensure compliance with the statute. But, the circuit court argues against a redacted case file as the risk of mistakenly revealing prohibited information is increased by the escalation of paperwork that a redacted case file would create. We find the district court‘s interpretation creates a constitutional outcome which still ensures compliance with the statute. Courts around the state regularly keep redacted and unredacted case files in the offices of the various clerks in order to comply with state statutes, judicial mandates, and judicial rules. See e.g.,
[¶29] The circuit court also interpreted
[¶30]
[¶31] We understand the circuit court‘s concern that its employees may be subjected to criminal consequences should a violation of the statute occur. However, this concern does not justify the wholesale closure of all court proceedings. The circuit court may effectively shield employees from inadvertent violations of the statute by issuing an order setting forth the procedure to be utilized when dealing with sexual assault cases in its court.
[¶33] “Jurisdiction’ refers to ‘a court‘s adjudicatory authority.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 1243, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (citation omitted). There are two types of jurisdiction—personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 160-61, 130 S.Ct. at 1243. Personal jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to make an adjudication applicable to a person, while subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and determine certain classes of cases. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction is at issue here.
[¶34] “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the exercise of judicial power. If a court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed.” Christiansen v. Christiansen, 2011 WY 90, ¶ 4, 253 P.3d 153, 155 (Wyo.2011) (internal citations omitted).
[¶35] The Wyoming legislature has granted circuit courts jurisdiction over specific cases and hearings (for example, “Circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all misdemeanor criminal cases.”
[¶36] Because circuit courts have jurisdiction over the proceedings at the preliminary examination stage until the case is bound over to district court, they also have the authority to issue orders governing their practices relating to the release of the accused‘s name in sexual assault cases, and thereby insulate circuit court employees from the possible penalties associated with
[¶37] With regard to the judicial documents, to comply with the statute without running afoul of the constitutional right of access to information, circuit courts should keep a redacted case file and docket sheet available to the public in sexual assault cases. The name of the accused should either be completely redacted or represented by initials. Attorneys filing documents in the case should provide the clerk‘s office with redacted and unredacted versions of each filing to ensure confidentiality as required by the statute. Understandably, the circuit court is concerned that when employees are asked by the public to see a case file by name, they will be revealing the name of the defendant
[¶38] The proceedings, like judicial documents, must generally remain open to the public. To avoid revealing the name of the defendant during a hearing, the circuit court judge or magistrate may use initials in the place of the name when required to name the defendant in open court.
[¶39] As a general matter, then, both proceedings and judicial documents in sexual assault proceedings must remain open, with the foregoing limits to ensure compliance with state statute. If the circuit court believes there is a compelling interest in further limiting the information available to the public, it must first hold a hearing at which members of the public have been given the opportunity to refute any allegations that the case must be closed. Following the hearing, the circuit court must find that there is a compelling interest in closing the court proceedings and sealing the case file which is essential to preserve higher values, and that any action taken is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling interest. See
CONCLUSION
[¶40] We affirm the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to the appellees.
CATHERINE M. FOX
JUSTICE