Chris v. TenetChris v. Tenet
BULLOCK, District Judge:
The jurisdictional provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that, “Each United States district court and each United States court of a place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under[Title VII].”
I.
This appeal arises from two separate actions which were consolidated on appeal. Plaintiff/Appellant, Kelly Jean Chris1 (“Chris“), is an
The parties did not reach an agreement on attorney‘s fees and costs, and Chris filed a petition with the CIA claiming a total of $79,484.00 in fees based on 256.4 hours of attorney work at $310.00 per hour. Chris also sought $1,920.84 in costs. The CIA issued its final decision on the fee petition on August 23, 1995, and awarded fees totaling $48,350.00, which represented a fee award of $250.00 per hour for 193.4 hours of attorney work, and costs totaling $1,237.32. Chris appealed the award to the EEOC. The EEOC issued a decision on July 19, 1996, awarding Chris fees of $59,510.00, which was based
Chris did not pursue one of those options, but filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking the difference between the attorney‘s fees and costs awarded by the EEOC and the attorney‘s fees and costs she requested in her fee petition. Thereafter, the matter was transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia, and the CIA moved, pursuant to
While Chris‘s first two complaints of sex discrimination were pending, Chris filed a third complaint of discrimination with the Agency‘s EEO office in February 1995, alleging discriminatory reprisal. In September 1996, this claim was also resolved by way of a confidential settlement. This settlement agreement also provided that, in the event the parties did not reach an agreement on the amount of the attorney‘s fees due Chris, the CIA would pay her reasonable attorney‘s fees in accordance with
On August 16, 1999, Chris filed a civil complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia seeking attorney‘s fees for work performed by her attorney while Chris‘s third claim of sex discrimination was in the administrative process. The Agency moved to dismiss the complaint, and the district court, on September 15, 1999, in an amended order, dismissed the complaint for the reasons stated in the July 28, 1999, memorandum opinion dismissing Chris‘s first complaint. Chris filed a timely notice of appeal and the second appeal was consolidated with Chris‘s first appeal.
II.
This court reviews de novo the district court‘s dismissal of Chris‘s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 343 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Linney, 134 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that issues of statutory construction are reviewed de novo). Chris contends that Title VII‘s grant of discretionary authority to federal courts to award attorney‘s fees and costs, see
Statutory interpretation necessarily begins with an analysis of the language of the statute. See Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985). When analyzing the meaning of a statute, we must first “determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997). If the language is plain and “the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,” we need not inquire further. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989). “[T]he sole function of the courts is to enforce [the statute] according to its terms.” Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). Our analysis of the plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is guided “by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is
With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of
This analysis of the meaning of “actions brought under this subchapter” is buttressed by the specific context in which the language appears. The first sentence of
This conclusion is also supported by the manner in which other provisions of Title VII use the term “action” or its plural form. The terms “action” or “actions” appear throughout Title VII and are consistently used to refer to a court proceeding to prevent or remedy an unlawful employment practice. Also, as the district court noted:
[A]fter the “action[ ] under this subchapter” is brought in federal court, it becomes the duty of the chief judge to designate “immediately” a judge to hear the case, and then that judge must set the case for hearing “at the earliest practicable date and [ ] cause the case to be in every way expedited.”
§ 2000e-5(f)(4) -(f)(5). While these requirements are both sensible and understandable in connection with claims of employment discrimination or retaliation, they seem incongruous, if not inappropriate, when applied to an action solely for attorney‘s fees. It is doubtful that Congress intended to order expedition of claims brought solely to recover attorney‘s fees.
Our consideration of the ordinary meaning of the language of
Interpreting Title VII as not permitting an action solely for attorney‘s fees and costs is also consistent with the statutory scheme of Title VII. Congress enacted Title VII “to assure equality of employment opportunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974). To fulfill this goal, Congress created a dispute-resolution system that requires a person with a complaint of illegal discrimination, whether the complainant is a federal employee or a private-sector employee, to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit in federal court. See
Chris argues that New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1984), dictates that we conclude that Title VII permits a complaint solely for attorney‘s fees and costs. We disagree. In Carey, the Supreme Court held that Section 2000e-5(f) and Section 2000e-5(k) of Title VII “authorize a federal-court action to recover an award of attorney‘s fees for work done by the prevailing complainant in state proceedings to which the complainant was referred pursuant to the provisions of Title VII.” Carey, 447 U.S. at 71. In reaching this conclusion, the majority stated:
It would be anomalous to award fees to the complainant who is unsuccessful or only partially successful in obtaining state or local remedies, but to deny an award to the complainant who is successful in fulfilling Congress’ plan that federal policies be vindicated at the state or local level.
Since it is clear that Congress intended to authorize fee awards for work done in administrative proceedings, we must conclude that [Title VII‘s] authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely to obtain an award of attorney‘s fees for legal work done in state and local proceedings.
Id. at 66. The Carey majority went on to note that:
We note that if fees were authorized only when the complainant found an independent reason for suing in federal court under Title VII, such a ground almost always could be found. . . . The existence of an incentive to get into federal court, such as the availability of a fee award, would ensure that almost all Title VII complainants would abandon state proceedings as soon as possible. This, however, would undermine Congress’ intent to encourage full use of state remedies.
Chris‘s reliance on Carey is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, the plaintiff in Carey, unlike Chris, initially sought relief in federal court on the merits of her claims in addition to her claim for attorney‘s fees. See id. at 58; see also id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating “this federal litigation was commenced in order to obtain relief . . . on the merits . . . and not simply to recover attorney‘s fees. Whether Congress intended to authorize a separate federal action solely to recover costs, including attorney‘s fees .. . is not only doubtful but is a question that is plainly not presented . . . .“). Second, in North Carolina Dep‘t of Transp. v. Crest St. Community Council, Inc., 479 U.S. 6 (1986), the Supreme Court re-examined the policy concerns noted in the Carey decision and dismissed them as “dicta” and “exaggerated.” Crest St., 479 U.S. at 13-14.
Although Crest St. is not controlling on the issue before us, its reasoning is persuasive. In Crest St., the Crest Street Community Council (the “Community Council“) filed an administrative complaint with the United States Department of Transportation alleging that a proposed plan by the North Carolina Department of Transportation to
The Supreme Court held that a suit for attorney‘s fees is not an action to enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in Section 1988, and therefore a federal court is not authorized to entertain a claim under Section 1988 solely for attorney‘s fees. See id. In concluding that to be eligible for an award of fees under Section 1988 a complainant must, at a minimum, file a judicial complaint, the Court emphasized that “an award of attorney‘s fees under § 1988 depends not only on the results obtained, but also on what actions were needed to achieve those results.” Id. at 14. According to the Court, “It is entirely reasonable to limit the award of attorney‘s fees to those parties who, in order to obtain relief, found it necessary to file a complaint in court.” Id. This reasoning carries equal force when applied to Chris‘s argument that Title VII‘s jurisdictional grant vests federal courts with jurisdiction over civil actions brought solely for attorney‘s fees and costs following settlement of all substantive claims during Title VII‘s administrative process. Because a suit solely for attorney‘s fees and costs is not an “action[ ] brought under [Title VII],” i.e., a suit to enforce the substantive protections of Title VII, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions brought solely for attorney‘s fees and costs.
The Jones decision was written almost two years after the Supreme Court‘s decision in Crest St. expressly repudiated the first policy argument as “dicta” and “exaggerated.” Crest St., 479 U.S. at 14. Furthermore, in Crest St. the Supreme Court also rejected the second policy argument on the grounds that awarding attorney‘s fees only when a party, in order to obtain relief, found it necessary to file a complaint “creates a legitimate incentive for potential civil rights defendants to resolve disputes expeditiously, rather than risk the attorney‘s fees liability connected to civil rights litigation.” See id. at 15. The Eighth Circuit did not address the implications of the Crest St. decision and simply noted that the mandatory administrative deferral system of Title VII distinguished the Jones case from Crest St., which arose under Title VI and did not involve mandatory administrative deferral. See Jones, 875 F.2d at 498 n.10. We find this rationale unpersuasive. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court‘s discussion and disavowal of certain policy arguments underlying the Carey decision belie any assertion that the Crest St. decision is not relevant to attorney‘s fees issues under Title VII. Moreover, although Title VI, the statutory framework at issue in Crest St., does not impose mandatory participation in administrative proceedings, the absence of mandatory administrative procedures was never discussed by the Supreme Court as the basis of the Crest St. decision. Instead, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that a suit solely for attorney‘s fees under Section 1988 was not an action to enforce any of the civil rights laws listed in Section 1988, just as a suit solely for attorney‘s fees and costs is not an action
III.
The subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is limited and the federal courts may exercise only that jurisdiction which Congress has prescribed. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The jurisdictional grant in
AFFIRMED.
Notes
At the time of the settlement, the regulation provided, in relevant part, that:
If the complainant, the [complainant‘s] representative, and the agency cannot reach an agreement on the amount of attorney‘s fees or costs . . . the agency shall issue a decision determining the amount of attorney‘s fees or costs due . . . . The decision shall include a notice of right to appeal to the EEOC . . . .
An award of attorney‘s fees and costs under Title VII is authorized by
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States, a reasonable attorney‘s fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs, and the Commission and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of
Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.] , the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. ], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. ], or Section 13981 of this title, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney‘s fee as part of the costs . . ..