CARLOS CHAVEZ and LUIS LOPEZ, Petitioners, v. GARY McFADDEN, SHERIFF, MECKLENBURG COUNTY, Respondent.
No. 437PA18
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
Filed 5 June 2020
ERVIN, Justice.
On discretionary review pursuant to
Goodman Carr, PLLC, by Rob Heroy, and Sejal Zota, for petitioners-appellants
Womble Bond Dickinson (US) LLP, by Sean F. Perrin, for respondent-appellee
Deborah M. Weissman, for Law Scholars and National Immigrant Justice Center, amici curiae
Raul A. Pinto, for North Carolina Justice Center, amicus curiae
Irena Como, Katrina Braun, Omar Jadwat, Cody Wofsy, Daniel Galindo, and Spencer Amdur, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (ACLU) and ACLU of North Carolina, et al., amici curiae
Joshua S. Press and Gill P. Beck, for United States Department of Justice, amicus curiae
ERVIN, Justice.
CHAVEZ V. MCFADDEN
Opinion of the Court
The
On 28 February 2017, then-Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, Irwin Carmichael, entered into a written agreement with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, an entity housed within the Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at
On 5 June 2017, petitioner Lopez was being held in pretrial detention in the Mecklenburg County Jail based upon common law robbery, conspiracy, resisting a public officer, and misdemeanor breaking or entering charges. On 5 July 2017, the District Attorney‘s office voluntarily dismissed the common law robbery, conspiracy, and resisting a
On the morning of 13 October 2017, an investigator employed by the Public Defender‘s Office sent an e-mail to the Sheriff‘s General Counsel bearing the subject line “Heads up-Important” for the purpose of informing the General Counsel that emergency writs of habeas corpus relating to petitioners would be submitted later that day. At 9:12 a.m., both petitioners filed petitions seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus based upon assertions that their continued detention in the Mecklenburg County Jail was unlawful because: (1) “the detainer[s] lack[ed] probable cause, [were] not [ ] warrant[s], and ha[d] not been reviewed by a judicial official” in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the Sheriff “lack[ed] authority under North Carolina General Statutes to continue to detain [p]etitioner[s] after all warrants and sentences ha[d] been served“; and (3) the Sheriff‘s “honoring of ICE‘s request[s] for detention violate[d] the anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment.”
At 9:30 a.m., the General Counsel forwarded the investigator‘s e-mail to Sheriff Carmichael; Sean Perrin, the Sheriff‘s outside legal counsel; Donald Belk, a captain serving in the Mecklenburg County Jail; and eight other individuals in which the General Counsel stated that “I do not acknowledge receipt of [the investigator‘s] emails on this topic.” At 9:37 a.m., Captain Belk responded to the General Counsel‘s e-mail by indicating that the office of the Clerk of Superior Court of Mecklenburg County had advised him that the cases “are on in [Courtroom] 5350 this morning,” that petitioner Lopez remained in the Sheriff‘s custody, and that, since petitioner Chavez had already been turned over to ICE, he “should not go to court.”
On the same morning, the trial court issued writs of habeas corpus ordering that petitioners be “immediately brought before a judge . . . to determine the legality of [their] confinement” and requiring the Sheriff to “immediately appear and file a return.” Following the issuance of the trial court‘s order, the investigator attempted to serve it at the Sheriff‘s office. After the front desk employee at the Sheriff‘s Office refused to accept service, the investigator left the trial court‘s orders at the front desk. In addition, the investigator served copies of the trial court‘s orders upon the personnel working at Mecklenburg County jail, the Sheriff‘s outside legal counsel, the office of ICE‘s Chief Counsel, and an assistant district attorney.
At 11:57 a.m., a further hearing was held before the trial court at which the Sheriff did not appear, either in person or through counsel. In addition, the Sheriff did not file a return or produce either petitioner before the trial court. At 12:08 p.m., the trial court entered orders finding that both petitioners
At 2:58 p.m., the Sheriff filed written returns relating to both petitioners. The return filed with respect to petitioner Chavez stated that, while he was being held in “exclusive” federal custody, he was physically incarcerated in the Mecklenburg County Jail. The return filed with respect to petitioner Lopez stated that, “[a]t the time of the [p]etitioner‘s filing,” he was being held in state custody and detained in the Mecklenburg County Jail pursuant to a $400.00 secured bond for misdemeanor breaking or entering and an arrest warrant and detainer that had been issued by DHS. The Sheriff declined to release either petitioner and eventually delivered them to ICE custody.
On 6 November 2017, the Sheriff filed petitions seeking the issuance of writs of certiorari with the Court of Appeals authorizing review of the trial court‘s orders and the issuance of a writ of prohibition to preclude the trial court from ruling upon any further habeas corpus petitions relating to the lawfulness of the continued detention of persons subject to immigration-related detainers or arrest warrants. On 22 December 2017, the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing the Sheriff‘s certiorari petitions and prohibiting “the trial court . . . from issuing a writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of a person detained by the Sheriff” pursuant to a 287(g) agreement and “from entering any orders or sanctions limiting the authority of the Sheriff and his officers or agents, or any officer or agent of the United States, from carrying out the acts permitt[ed] by the agreement.”
In seeking relief from the trial court‘s orders before the Court of Appeals, the Sheriff argued that the trial court lacked “jurisdiction to rule on federal immigration matters.” In addition, the Sheriff contended that the trial court had erred by ordering that petitioners be released “because [they] were being exclusively detained on United States Department of Homeland Security detainers and administrative warrants.” In response, petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals should dismiss the Sheriff‘s appeal on the grounds that the Sheriff had waived the right to assert the arguments that he was now seeking to make on appeal given that he had failed to raise them before the trial court and, in the alternative, because the case was moot. In attempting to persuade the Court of Appeals to uphold the challenged trial court orders, petitioners argued that the trial court had ample authority to rule upon the merits of their petitions because neither petitioner was being held in federal custody at the time that the relevant orders had been entered. More specifically, petitioners contended that: (1) the 287(g) agreement was not properly before the court; (2) neither federal nor state law authorized the Sheriff to detain petitioners for civil immigration purposes; (3) both petitioners remained in state custody when the trial court authorized their release; and (4) the record evidence failed to demonstrate that either petitioner was being lawfully held in DHS custody. Finally, petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals should dismiss the Sheriff‘s appeal because his continued detention of petitioners violated their rights under North Carolina law and the state and federal constitutions.
On 6 November 2018, the Court of Appeals filed an opinion vacating the challenged trial court orders on the grounds that the trial court “lacked any legitimate basis and was without jurisdiction to review, consider, or issue writs of habeas corpus for alien [p]etitioners not in state custody and held under federal authority, or to issue any orders related thereon to the Sheriff.” Chavez v. Carmichael, 262 N.C. App. 196, 216, 822 S.E.2d 131, 145 (2018). As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals determined that the Sheriff‘s appeal was not subject to dismissal for mootness on the grounds that this case was subject to the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 203–04, 822 S.E.2d at 137-38 (stating that “[t]he Sheriff‘s appeal presents significant issues of public interest because it involves the question of whether our state courts possess jurisdiction to review habeas petitions of alien detainees ostensibly held under the authority of the federal government“). According to the Court of Appeals, “[p]rompt resolution of this issue [wa]s essential because it is likely other habeas
The Court of Appeals concluded, in addressing the merits, that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in instances like this one. Id. at 206–09, 822 S.E.2d at 139–41. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that “North Carolina law does not forbid state and local law enforcement officers from performing the functions of federal immigration officers” and that “the policy of North Carolina as enacted by the General Assembly, expressly authorizes sheriffs to enter into 287(g) agreements to permit them to perform such functions.” Id. at 209, 822 S.E.2d at 140 (citing
In seeking to convince us that the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the challenged trial court orders, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals effectively “issued an advisory opinion in a moot case.” More specifically, petitioners contend that, “[a]fter refusing to respond to the noticed-writ issued by the superior court, and handing [p]etitioners over to ICE custody for deportation in contravention of that court‘s release order, the sheriff appealed the very release order it had willfully mooted in an attempt to obtain an after-the-fact advisory opinion supporting its conduct.” According to petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applied in this case, with petitioners expressing the inability to “imagine worse-suited circumstances for application of the discretionary public-interest exception” given that “the public interest exception does not overrule the long-standing rule . . . that our state‘s appellate courts are not the proper
As far as the merits of this case are concerned, petitioners argue that the trial court “retained jurisdiction to determine if [p]etitioners were in lawful state custody, and correctly found no evidence of federal custody.” According to petitioners, the trial court had “the jurisdiction to review a habeas petition to determine whether the individual is in lawful state custody,” with the trial court having “correctly determined that [petitioners] were not in federal custody because the sheriff brought no evidence to support that claim.” Finally, petitioners argue that “the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction even if the 287(g) agreement was invalid” on the grounds that its decision to this effect “was unnecessary to its conclusions.” In support of this assertion, petitioners contend that “the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to review the habeas petitions under state law” and that it “correctly determined that [p]etitioners were not in lawful state custody because state law does not authorize detainer arrests in the absence of a 287(g) agreement.”
In seeking to convince this Court to uphold the Court of Appeals’ decision in his favor, the Sheriff argues that the Court of Appeals “correctly addressed the merits of the case” on the grounds that “the public interest exception to mootness applies.” In addition, the Sheriff contends that the exception to the mootness doctrine applicable to cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” is applicable to this case as well. Moreover, the Sheriff argues that “the Court of Appeals’ holding that a state trial court cannot rule on the legality of a federal immigration arrest warrant and detainer in the absence of a 287(g) agreement was dicta” given that both petitioners were detained pursuant to a 287(g) agreement. The Sheriff denies having waived the right to challenge the lawfulness of the trial court‘s orders on appeal given that any party can raise the issue of jurisdiction at any time and given that the Court of Appeals allowed the Sheriff‘s certiorari petitions.
In addressing the merits of petitioners’ challenge to the Court of Appeals’ decision, the Sheriff argues that “the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the legality of administrative immigration arrest warrants and detainers.” In the Sheriff‘s view, when local officers act pursuant to a 287(g) agreement, they are functioning “as federal immigration officials,” with a state judicial official lacking any authority to “issue writs against federal officials.” The Sheriff contends that “the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration issues in both 287(g) jurisdictions and non 287(g) jurisdictions” and that, since individuals detained pursuant to immigration arrest warrants and detainers are being held in federal custody, “state habeas statutes cannot be used to undermine the federal government‘s exclusive jurisdiction over immigration issues.”
As a general proposition, North Carolina appellate courts do not decide moot cases. In re A.K., 360 N.C. 449, 452, 628 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2006) (stating that this Court will usually “decide a case only if the controversy which gave rise to the action continues at the time of appeal” (citing In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 148, 250 S.E.2d 890, 912 (1978))). “A case is ‘moot’ when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Roberts v. Madison Cty. Realtors Ass‘n, 344 N.C. 394, 398–99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996) (quoting Moot Case, Black‘s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)); see also Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2287, 183 L. Ed. 2d 281, 295 (2012) (stating that “[a] case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party” (cleaned up) (quoting City of Erie v. Pap‘s A. M., 529 U.S. 277, 287, 120 S. Ct. 1382, 1390, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265, 277 (2000))). “In state courts the exclusion of moot questions from determination is not based on a
The mootness doctrine is subject to exceptions, including the public interest exception, upon which the Court of Appeals relied, and the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, to which the Sheriff has referred in his brief before this Court. According to the first of these two exceptions, “this court may, if it chooses, consider a question that involves a matter of public interest, is of general importance[,] and deserves prompt resolution.” Cape Fear, 368 N.C. at 100, 772 S.E.2d at 450 (quoting N.C. State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 701, 386 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1989) (per curiam)). A case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” when the underlying conduct upon which the relevant claim rests is necessarily of such limited duration that the relevant claim cannot be fully litigated prior to its cessation and the same complaining party is likely to be subject to the same allegedly unlawful action in the future. Cooper v. Berger, 370 N.C. 392, 421, 809 S.E.2d 98, 116 (2018) (citing Shell Island Homeowners Ass‘n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 286, 292, 517 S.E.2d 401, 405 (1999)).
As all parties have conceded, the fact that both petitioners have already been turned over to federal immigration authorities renders this case moot. However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that this case comes within the scope of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. There can be no question but that issues relating to both lawful and unlawful immigration have become the subject of much debate in North Carolina in recent years.3 In addition, publicly available information provided by ICE indicates that it continues to maintain 287(g) agreements with six North Carolina law enforcement agencies.4 As a result of the public interest
surrounding this issue and the fact that several law enforcement agencies across our State continue to operate pursuant to 287(g) agreements, we believe that the Court should reach the merits of the issues that are before us in this case given the likelihood that issues similar to those that have been debated by the parties to this case will continue to arise in the future. Moreover, while the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine is
The North Carolina Constitution provides that “[e]very person restrained of his liberty is entitled to a remedy to inquire into the lawfulness thereof, and to remove the restraint if unlawful, and that remedy shall not be denied or delayed,”
An application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, made by a party or any other person on that person‘s behalf,
Any examination of the nature and extent of a state court‘s authority to entertain an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus made by an individual detained by a local law enforcement agency pursuant to immigration-related arrest warrants and detainers necessarily involves recognition of the fact that federal law is entitled to take precedence over state
Just as a state cannot enact laws that interfere with “the preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders,” Toll, 458 U.S. at 10, 102 S. Ct. at 2982, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 571, state court judges cannot interfere with the custody and detention of individuals held pursuant to federal authority. The Supreme Court of the United States outlined the applicable principles over a century ago. On 10 August 1869, a court commissioner in Dane County, Wisconsin issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering the discharge of Edward Tarble, who was held in the custody of Lieutenant Stone, a recruiting officer for the United States Army, on the grounds that Mr. Tarble had attempted to enlist in the Army while under the age of eighteen and without the consent of his father. Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. 397, 397–98, 20 L. Ed. 597, 598 (1872). After ordering Lieutenant Stone to bring Mr. Tarble before him at once and to provide a justification for his detention, id. at 398, 20 L. Ed. at 598, the commissioner, following a hearing, “held that the prisoner was illegally imprisoned and detained by Lieutenant Stone, and commanded that officer forthwith to discharge him from custody.” Id. at 399, 20 L. Ed. at 598. Following a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirming the commissioner‘s discharge order, id. at 399–400, 20 L. Ed. at 598, the United States sought and obtained review by the Supreme Court, id. at 400, 20 L. Ed. at 598, which held that “no State can authorize one of its judges or courts to exercise judicial power, by habeas corpus or otherwise, within the jurisdiction of another and independent government,” id. at 405, 20 L. Ed. at 600, and that, “although the State of Wisconsin is sovereign within its territorial limits to a certain extent, yet that sovereignty is limited and restricted by the Constitution of the United States.” Id. at 405–06, 20 L. Ed. at 600. The Supreme Court further noted that, while the federal and state governments exercise their powers “within the same territorial limits,” they “are yet separate and distinct sovereignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres.” Id. at 406, 20 L. Ed. at 600. Although “[n]either government can intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other,” when any conflict arises between the two governments, federal law is “the supreme law of the land.” Id. In light of these fundamental legal principles, the Supreme Court stated that;
State judges and State courts, authorized by laws of their States to issue writs of habeas corpus, have undoubtedly a right to issue the writ in any case where a
party is alleged to be illegally confined within their limits, unless it appear upon his application that he is confined under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of that government. If such fact appear upon the application the writ should be refused. If it do not appear, the judge or court issuing the writ has a right to inquire into the cause of imprisonment, and ascertain by what authority the person is held within the limits of the State; and it is the duty of the marshal, or other officer having the custody of the prisoner, to give, by a proper return, information in this respect. His
But, after the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division between the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offence against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress.
[T]he State judge or State court should proceed no further when it appears, from the application of the party, or the return made, that the prisoner is held by an officer of the United States under what, in truth, purports to be the authority of the United States; that is, an authority, the validity of which is to be determined by the Constitution and laws of the United States. If a party thus held be illegally imprisoned it is for the courts or judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone, to grant him release.
Id. at 409-11, 20 L. Ed. at 601-02 (cleaned up). See also Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249, 6 S. Ct. 734, 739, 29 L. Ed. 868, 870-71 (1886) (stating that “the courts and judges of the several States . . . cannot, under any authority conferred by the States, discharge from custody persons held by authority of the courts of the United States, or of commissioners of such courts, or by officers of the General Government acting under its laws” (citations omitted)). As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the grounds that “[t]he commissioner was, both by the application for the writ and the return to it, apprised that the prisoner was within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that no writ of habeas corpus issued by him could pass over the line which divided the two sovereignties.” Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. at 412, 20 L. Ed. at 602.
In the exercise of its constitutional power over immigration, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act.
According to well-established North Carolina law, a trial judge to whom an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has been submitted has jurisdiction to determine whether it has the authority to act. Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964) (stating that “every court necessarily has inherent judicial power to inquire into, hear and determine the questions of its own jurisdiction, whether of law or fact, the decision of which is necessary to determine the question of its jurisdiction“). In determining whether it has the authority to proceed when asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus at the request or on behalf of a person who might conceivably be held on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer, the trial judge should proceed in the manner delineated by the Supreme Court in Tarble‘s Case. If, when considering an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the trial judge determines that the application alleges that the petitioner is being held on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer by a custodian that is a party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal government, it must summarily deny the application for the issuance of the writ.6 See Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. at 409, 20 L. Ed. at 601 (stating that, in the event that a petition asserts that petitioners were “confined under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of the government[,] . . . the writ should be refused“). If, on the other hand, the trial judge determines that the application does not allege that the petitioner is being held on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer by a custodian operating pursuant to a 287(g) agreement, or on any other valid grounds, the trial judge has the authority to issue the writ and require the custodian to make a return. Id. (stating that, if the application does not disclose that the petitioner is held on the basis of federal authority, the court may “inquire into the cause of imprisonment, and ascertain by what authority the person is held within the limits of the State“). In the event that the custodian makes a return claiming that the petitioner is being held on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer based upon a 287(g) agreement between the custodian and the federal government, the trial judge must deny the petitioner‘s request for discharge.7 Id. at 410, 20 L. Ed. at 601 (stating that, “after the return is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further” and must deny the writ). On the other hand, if the custodian‘s return shows no valid basis for the petitioner‘s detention, the trial judge is required to order that the petitioner be discharged.
In their brief before this Court, petitioners argue that the trial court had the ability to “inquire into the legality” of petitioners’ detention and “make [a] threshold factual determination” concerning the extent to which they were lawfully detained pursuant to federal authority. As we understand their argument, petitioners appear to be asserting that the trial court had the authority to determine the lawfulness of the alleged immigration-related arrest warrants or detainers upon which the Sheriff purported to be acting and to determine if the sheriff was acting in accordance with any applicable 287(g) agreement. However, Tarble‘s Case makes it clear that a state court simply has no power, in light of the preemptive effect of federal immigration laws, to look behind a sheriff‘s claim that the petitioner is being held pursuant to a valid immigration-related process, such as an arrest warrant or ICE detainer, by an entity operating under a 287(g) agreement with the federal government given that the Sheriff claims to be operating as a de facto immigration officer in such circumstances. For that reason, a trial judge who has been presented with an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus lacks the authority to make any determination concerning the validity of any immigration-related process upon which a custodian who has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government claims to be holding the petitioner, including whether the petitioner is the person named in the immigration-related process, whether the process is facially valid, whether the personnel employed by the custodian are properly certified, or whether the process has sufficient factual support, since attempting to make such determinations would place the trial judge in the position of making decisions that have been reserved for federal, rather than state, judicial officials and potentially interfering with the manner in which federal immigration laws are administered.8 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 10, 97 S. Ct. 2120, 2126, 53 L. Ed. 2d 63, 71 (1977) (stating that “[c]ontrol over immigration and naturalization is entrusted exclusively to the Federal
In this case, petitioners’ applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus clearly reflect that former Sheriff Carmichael, who had entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government, claimed to be detaining both petitioners on the basis of an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer. More specifically, the applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed by both petitioners alleged that they were being “held at the Mecklenburg County Jail pursuant to an immigration detainer and I-200 Form” and “a municipal practice of honoring civil immigration detainers” and that the Sheriff “will likely claim that his authority is derived from” a 287(g) agreement.10 In view of the fact that the applications presented to the trial court in this case alleged that petitioners were being held on the basis of an immigration-related process by a custodian that was a party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal government, the applications, on their face, informed the trial court that its state law authority to inquire into the lawfulness of petitioners’ detentions had been superseded by federal law. As a result, although the trial court did have the authority to make an initial determination concerning whether it had the authority to grant petitioners’ applications, an examination of the applications themselves should have led the trial court to summarily deny petitioners’ habeas corpus petitions.
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we hold that, while a trial judge presented with an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has the authority to determine whether it is entitled to act upon any such petition, it should (1) summarily deny an application seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus that alleges that the petitioner is being held pursuant to an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer by a sheriff who is a party to a 287(g) agreement with the federal government and (2) deny a petitioner‘s request for discharge in the event that the return filed by a sheriff who has entered into a 287(g) agreement with the federal government claims that the petitioner is being held pursuant to an immigration-related arrest warrant or detainer. For that reason, we further hold that the trial court erred by failing to summarily deny the applications for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus submitted by petitioners for its consideration in this case.11 On the other