COURTNEY CHAVEZ and CARTER CHAVEZ v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, LLC
Case No. 1:23-cv-01205-SKO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
April 3, 2025
Sheila K. Oberto, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND RELATED MOTION TO STRIKE (Docs. 27, 28, & 43)
Plaintiffs Courtney Chavez (“Mrs. Chavez“) and Carter Chavez (“Mr. Chavez“) (collectively, “Plaintiffs“) bring this action against Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC (“Ford Credit“) alleging causes of action under the California Legal Remedies Act, the California Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. (Doc. 1-1.) On January 23 and 24, 2025, respectively, Plaintiffs and Ford Credit filed motions for summary judgment or partial summary judgment. (Docs. 27 & 28.) The parties filed their respective oppositions on February 6 and 7, 2025 (Docs. 31 & 36), and the parties replied on February 18, 2025 (Docs. 38 & 41).
Because the matters were deemed suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court vacated the hearing set for March 26, 2025, and took the matters under submission. (Doc. 47.)
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment will be denied, Ford Credit‘s motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff‘s motion to strike will be denied.1
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court examines the evidence provided by the parties, including pleadings, deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file. See
The Court has reviewed each of the evidentiary objections submitted by the parties and the responses thereto. (See Docs. 35, 40, 42.) Many of the objections are based on lack of foundation or hearsay. These evidentiary objections are overruled for the purposes of this motion (some are addressed with more specificity below). See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“When evidence is not presented in an admissible form in the context of a motion for summary judgment, but it may be presented in an admissible form at trial, a court may still consider that evidence.” (citation omitted)); see also City of Lincoln v. United States, No. 2:16-CV-1164-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 5107613, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2020) (citing Burch and overruling objections based on lack of foundation for purposes of summary judgment motion); Russell v. Walmart Inc., No. CV 19-5495-MWF (JCX), 2020 WL 5289889, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2020) (citing Burch and overruling “garden variety evidentiary objections” based on lack of foundation, lack of proper authentication and hearsay; noting that while such objections may be cognizable at trial, on a motion for summary judgment, the court is concerned only with the admissibility of the relevant facts at trial, and not the form of the facts as presented in the motion for summary judgment).
The parties further object to the evidence on the grounds of relevance. The Court notes that it must determine whether a fact is relevant and material as part of “the summary judgment standard itself,” Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, and any evidence deemed irrelevant was omitted from the Court‘s summary of the facts and contentions. Further, the Court, as a matter of course, has not factored into its analysis any statements identified by either party that are speculative or represent a legal conclusion. See Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119 (“statements in declarations based on
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE2
A. Plaintiffs Lease a New Ford Vehicle
In or around July 2018, John Andrews, car salesman for Auburn Ford, a dealership, assisted his stepdaughter, Mrs. Chavez, and her husband, Mr. Chavez, with leasing a new 2018 Ford Escape (the “Vehicle“). (Docs. 27-1 & 36-5, Andrews Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 5.) Mr. Andrews drove the Vehicle to Plaintiffs’ home and brought with him a lease agreement for them to review and sign. (Docs. 27-1 & 36-5, Andrews Decl. ¶ 4.)
On July 8, 2018, Plaintiffs entered into a lease with Auburn Ford for the Vehicle (the “Lease“). (Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 1; Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. A.) In the copy of the Lease produced by Ford Credit during discovery, Section 3 titled “Other Charges” appears as follows:
(Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. A; Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 3.) The Lease further provides, in pertinent part:
Upon return of the Vehicle, You must pay the Disposition Fee shown on the front of the lease in Section 3, “Other Charges.” If, upon termination of the lease, You enter into a lease agreement or retail installment contract for a new vehicle which is assigned to or administered by [Ford Credit], You will not be required to pay the Disposition Fee.
(Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. A; Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 4.)
According to Christopher Stormberg, Business Development Manager for Ford Credit, the handwritten $395 disposition fee (“Disposition Fee“) is a “standard fee[]” that is “charged to cover the cost of preparing previously leased vehicles for sale at auction,” and it is “not uncommon for paper contracts such as the [Lease]” to include a disposition fee that is handwritten and initialed.3 (Doc. 33, Stormberg Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3-4. See also Doc. 32, Esposito Decl. ¶ 2 and Ex. 1 at 27:16-18 (“Q. Does Ford Motor Credit ever accept contracts that have terms that are handwritten in? A. Yes.“).) Plaintiffs each testified in their depositions that they “don‘t think” that they initialed the Disposition Fee. (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶¶ 5-8 and Exs. B-E.) According to Mr. Andrews, he does “not recall any terms of the [Lease] having been written by hand” and does “not believe there were any handwritten terms on the [Lease] for the Vehicle when [Plaintiffs] signed it in 2019.”4 (Docs. 27-1 & 36-5, Andrews Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8.) Mr. Andrews further declared that in his “nine years as a car salesman,” he does “not recall a single time where [he] had a customer sign a
The Lease, which was assigned by Auburn Ford to Ford Credit, was scheduled to terminate on July 8, 2021. (Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 2; Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 2, 6.) According to Mr. Stormberg, the Disposition Fee was included in the Lease assigned to Ford Credit. (Doc. 33, Stormberg Decl. ¶ 2 and Ex. A.) Mr. Stormberg further declared that Ford Credit “does not make handwritten changes to [a] lease after it is assigned,” and he is “unaware of any instance in which Ford Credit made a handwritten change to the amount of the disposition fee in a lease after it was assigned.” (Id. ¶ 5.)
B. Plaintiffs Do Not Purchase or Lease Another Vehicle from Ford Credit
Between July 2018 and January 2021, Plaintiffs had two more children, and did not wish to renew the lease for or purchase the Vehicle because it “didn‘t fit our needs with our growing family.” (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 6 and Ex. C at 40:3-9.) Plaintiffs wished to “upscale into a larger vehicle . . . [e]ither an SUV or a minivan.” (Id. at 40:15-16.) Prior to the termination of the Lease, they “looked [] in Fresno for another Ford and there just wasn‘t anything that would fit what our family was looking for.” (Id. at 41:4-7) Mrs. Chavez testified that a “sales rep” at “our Ford dealership” showed them a “very small SUV that looked exactly like our Escape.” (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 5 and Ex. B at 31:3-32:5.)
Ultimately, Plaintiffs did not purchase or lease a vehicle that was financed by Ford Credit. (Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 8.) Instead, in May 2021, Mr. Chavez leased a 2021 Honda Odyssey for his family. (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 5 and Ex. B at 32:17-18, 34:11-21; Id. ¶ 6 and Ex. C at 42:6-9.)
C. Plaintiffs are Assessed the Disposition Fee
On July 7, 2021, Plaintiffs returned the Vehicle to Lithia Ford of Fresno, a local dealership. (Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 9; Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 7.) Mr. Chavez testified that when he dropped off the Vehicle, he asked “if there‘s anything else
Upon return of the Vehicle, Ford Credit assessed Plaintiffs the Disposition Fee in the amount of $427.98, which was comprised of the $395 fee plus $32.98 in taxes. (Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 9.) The next day, July 8, 2021, Ford Credit mailed Plaintiffs an invoice in the amount of $427.98. (Id. at 10.) Mr. Chavez testified that “sometime in the tail end of 2021, a letter or an email from Ford Credit let [Plaintiffs] know that this amount was due and owing.” (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 6 and Ex. C at 60:17-24.)
D. The Disposition Fee is Charged Off
Plaintiffs did not pay the Disposition Fee. (Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 11.) On February 15, 2022, Ford Credit “charged off”5 Plaintiffs’ account with a balance of $427.98. (Id. at 13.) On March 1, 2022, Ford Credit updated its credit reporting to reflect that the Lease had been charged off with a balance of $427. (Id. at 14.)
At that same time, Plaintiffs were looking to purchase a home. (Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 19.) Plaintiffs asked Mrs. Chavez‘s father Rocky Covarrubias, who is a mortgage broker, for assistance in getting approved for a mortgage. (Id. at 20; Docs. 27-2 & 36-6, Covarrubias Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.) Mr. Covarrubias checked Plaintiffs’ credit reports and discovered the charge off by Ford Credit. (Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 21; Docs. 27-2 & 36-6, Covarrubias Decl. ¶ 6.) He showed Plaintiffs the reports reflecting the charge off. (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 5 and Ex. B at 62:15-63:3; Id. ¶ 6 and Ex. C at 73:9-20.)
E. Plaintiffs Dispute the Charge Off
Ford Credit received Automated Consumer Dispute Verification (“ACDV“) forms dated
F. Plaintiffs’ Credit Scores Decrease
Between July 3, 2020, and March 15, 2022, at least one of Plaintiffs’ respective credit scores decreased. (Doc. 28-4, Esposito Decl. ¶ 20 and Ex. 19; Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17 and Exs. J, N.)6 According to Plaintiffs, this decrease was the result of the charge off reported by
G. The Credit Reporting Agencies Remove the Charge Off
In July 2022, after receiving a notice letter from Plaintiffs’ counsel, Ford Credit submitted a request to the credit reporting agencies that they update their information to indicate that the account status was “paid or closed account/zero balance.” (Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 30; Doc. 36-1, Plts.’ Resp. to Ford Credit‘s SSUF at 20; Doc. 28-3, Scholl Decl. ¶ 20 and Exs. 29-30.) Ford Credit wrote Plaintiffs’ counsel in August 2022 to inform him that “out of concern for [Mrs.] Chavez as a customer, the charges of $427.98 have been waived” and the “major reporting credit agencies removed the charge off from [Mrs.] Chavez‘s credit file.” (Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 9 and Ex. F at 21:4-22:20.)
Following the removal of the charge off, Mr. Covarrubias was able to help Plaintiffs get a mortgage and purchase a home. (Docs. 27-2 & 36-6, Covarrubias Decl. ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs bought a home with a $394,125 mortgage, purchasing two points for $7,882.50 that brought their 30-year fixed interest rate down to 4.5%. (Doc. 34, Ford Credit‘s Resp. to Plts.’ SSUF at 32-33; Docs. 27-2 & 36-6, Covarrubias Decl. ¶ 12.) The average rate for a 30-year fixed mortgage when Plaintiffs were searching for a home in March 2022 was 4.172%.7 (Doc. 36-7, Ex. A at p. 51.)
H. Plaintiffs File the Present Suit for Damages
On July 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the California Superior Court of Fresno
In their complaint, Plaintiffs allege a claim under the California Legal Remedies Act,
IV. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”9
The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies depending on whether the issue on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate, with affirmative evidence, that “no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id. By contrast, if the nonmoving party will have
If the movant satisfies its initial burden, then the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice in this respect. Id. at 929; see also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.“) (footnote omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.‘” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. That remains the province of the fact finder. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a factual predicate from which the inference may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff‘d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).
V. DISCUSSION
Both parties seek summary judgment, or partial summary judgment, on Plaintiffs’ claims under the California Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA“) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA“). (See Docs. 27 & 28.) Additionally, Ford Credit seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim under the California Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA“). (See Doc. 28.) The Court shall address, in turn, each of Plaintiffs’ claims that are the subject of the motions for summary judgment.
A. Summary Judgment is Appropriate on Plaintiffs’ CLRA Claim
1. Plaintiffs’ CLRA Claim is Preempted by the FCRA
Ford Credit first contends that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ first cause of action under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA“),
Generally, the FCRA does not preempt any state law.
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply . . . with respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code.10
Section 1681s-2, in turn, imposes specific duties and responsibility on “furnishers” . . . which furnish information to credit reporting agencies.” Aargon Agency, Inc. v. O‘Laughlin, 70 F.4th 1224, 1235 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing § 1681s-2). Section 1681s-2(a) requires that furnishers provide accurate information to credit reporting agencies by, for example, refraining from reporting inaccurate information when furnishers have knowledge of errors or have received notice and confirmation of errors, and correcting and updating the credit reporting agencies if previously provided information is incomplete or inaccurate. Id. (citing
In their complaint, Plaintiffs plead that Ford Credit “regularly provided information to consumer reporting agencies and is therefore an information furnisher,” and that Ford Credit “furnished inaccurate, false, or incomplete information to the consumer credit reporting agencies” and “refused to correct the information reported on Plaintiff‘s [sic] consumer credit report,” resulting in a “negative effect on Plaintiffs’ credit score.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 11, 23, 26.) Their CLRA claim is based solely on these allegations. (Id. ¶ 44 (“[Ford Credit]‘s actions as detailed above
In their opposition to Ford Credit‘s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs contend that their CLRA claim is not preempted because it is “based on Ford Credit‘s decision to misrepresent the existence of a disposition fee by forging the lease agreement.” (Doc. 36 at 28.) This allegation does not appear in Plaintiffs’ complaint.12 (See Doc. 1-1 ¶¶ 17-42.) In essence, Plaintiffs are attempting to amend their complaint through their opposition brief. This is improper, and so the Court does not consider Plaintiffs’ argument, or the declarations offered in support of it (see Docs. 36-3 & 36-4). Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 457 F.3d 963, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
2. Plaintiffs Could Not Prevail on their CLRA Claim as Pleaded
Even were their CLRA claim not preempted, Plaintiffs could not prevail because Ford Credit‘s conduct as alleged in the complaint is not covered by that statute.13 The CLRA makes unlawful “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.”
Moreover, “[b]y definition, the CLRA does not apply to unfair or deceptive practices that occur after the sale or lease has occurred.” Fierro v. Cap. One, N.A., 656 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2023) (quoting Moore v. Apple, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 3d 1191, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2014)) (emphasis in original); see also Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 837 n.6 (2006) (“In any event, those representations, such as they were, occurred in 2000 and 2001, not at the time of sale [nearly a decade earlier].“); Ross v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 19-cv-06669-JST, 2020 WL 9848766, at *16 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2020) (concluding claim lacked plausibility
In sum, because Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim is preempted by the FCRA, and because they could not prevail on that claim in any event, Ford Credit is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Fact Issues Preclude Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ CCRAA Claim
Section 1785.25(a) of the California Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (“CCRAA“) provides: “A person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.”
1. Whether Ford Credit Furnished “Incomplete or Inaccurate” Information is Disputed
The phrase “incomplete or inaccurate” in
There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the information that Ford Credit furnished to the credit reporting agencies was “incomplete or inaccurate” because whether Plaintiffs owed the charged-off Disposition Fee is in dispute. While Plaintiffs have adduced evidence that the handwritten, initialed Disposition Fee was the product of forgery potentially attributable to Ford Credit (see Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶¶ 5-8 and Exs. B-E14; Docs. 27-1 & 36-5, Andrews
Plaintiffs assert in the alternative that, notwithstanding their agreement to pay it, they did not owe the Disposition Fee because the “availability of inventory to purchase or lease” was an “implied condition precedent” to their obligation to pay it. (Doc. 27 at 10-12; Doc. 36 at 15-17.) According to Plaintiffs, because the summary judgment evidence shows there were “no vehicles available at any of the Ford dealerships near Plaintiffs” at the time the Lease terminated, Ford did not meet the condition precedent, and thus Plaintiffs’ obligation to pay the Disposition Fee did not arise. (Doc. 27 at 11; Doc. 36 at 17.)
Under California law, “[a] condition precedent may not be implied unless it is necessary to make the contract reasonable.”15 In re Old Canal Fin. Corp., 550 B.R. 519, 531 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (citing
For these reasons, the Court is disinclined to find the existence in the Lease of the implied condition precedent advanced by Plaintiffs. But, even if the Court were to supply such condition precedent, the question of whether the condition precedent occurred, that is, whether there was any inventory of vehicles to purchase or lease from Ford Credit, is in dispute. As noted above, Plaintiffs
In sum, the above-described disputed issues of fact as to whether Plaintiffs owed the charged-off Disposition Fee give rise to a factual dispute about the incompleteness or inaccuracy of the information that Ford Credit furnished to the credit reporting agencies.
2. Whether Ford Credit “Knew or Should Have Known” the Information it Furnished Was “Incomplete or Inaccurate”
“The statutory term ‘should have known’ imparts a test of reasonableness.” Holmes v. NCO Fin. Services, Inc., 538 F. App‘x 765, 766 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Shultz v. Dep‘t of Army, 886 F.2d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989)). “The critical question . . . is thus whether a reasonable [furnisher] would have known” that the furnished information was incomplete or inaccurate. Id.
As discussed above, the evidence presented shows there is a triable issue of fact as to whether (a) the handwritten, initialed Disposition Fee was the product of forgery potentially attributable to Ford Credit, and (b) if a condition precedent of “availability of inventory to purchase or lease” were implied in the Lease, that purported condition was met. Thus, there is also a triable issue of fact as to whether a reasonable furnisher in Ford Credit‘s position knew or should have known that informing the credit reporting agencies that Plaintiffs owed the Disposition Fee was inaccurate. See, e.g., Griffin v. Navient Sols., Inc., No. 15-CV-1818 DMS (DHB), 2016 WL 5719831, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016) (denying summary judgment in view of factual dispute as to whether defendant “had no knowledge, and no reasonable basis on which it ‘should have known‘” that reported
3. Whether Plaintiffs Suffered Actual Damages
To prevail on their CCRAA claim, Plaintiffs must show “[a]ctual damage, not ‘inherent harm.‘” Gadomski v. Patelco Credit Union, No. 2:17-CV-00695-TLN-AC, 2020 WL 1433138, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2020) (quoting Trujillo v. First Am. Registry, Inc., 157 Cal. App. 4th 628, 637 (2007) disproved on other grounds by Connor v. First Student, Inc., 5 Cal. 5th 1026, 1037-38 (2018));
Here, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of Ford Credit‘s allegedly incomplete and inaccurate reporting. Plaintiffs have adduced evidence that (1) after Ford Credit reported the charged-off Disposition Fee to the credit reporting agencies in March 2022, at least one of their respective credit scores decreased; (2) the decrease was the result of the charge off reported by Ford Credit; and (3) as a result, they were no longer able to afford “at least two homes” in which they were in “talks trying to purchase” at that time. (See Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶ 5 and Ex. B at 63:4-22; Id. ¶ 6 and Ex. C at 73:13-74:1; Doc. 28-4, Esposito Decl. ¶ 20 and Ex. 19; Docs. 27-3 & 36-2, Snyder Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17 and Exs. J, N; Docs. 27-2 & 36-6, Covarrubias Decl. ¶ 9.)17 Plaintiffs have also presented evidence that following the
Ford Credit counters that Plaintiffs’ evidence also shows “other derogatory accounts in March 2022,” which could have “influenced the allegedly unfavorable interest rate” due to a lowered credit score.18 (Doc. 28-1 at 27; Doc. 31 at 29.) But Plaintiffs do not need to show that Ford Credit‘s “reporting was the only cause of [their] harm“; instead, merely that its reporting was a “substantial factor in [Plaintiffs‘] loss of credit rating to create an issue of fact regarding causation.” Walker v. Higher Educ. Loan Auth. of the State of Missouri, No. 1:21-CV-00879-KES-SAB, 2024 WL 3568576, at *13 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2024). See also Jugoz v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 16-CV-05687-MMC, 2017 WL 2720184, at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 23, 2017) (“[A] reduced credit score must
In conclusion, in view of the genuinely disputed issues of fact discussed above, neither Plaintiffs nor Ford Credit are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ CCRAA claim.
C. Summary Judgment is Denied as to Plaintiffs’ FCRA Claim
Plaintiffs claim that Ford Credit violated section 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA. (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 52.) That section “regulates how furnishers must respond to a notice of dispute from a credit reporting agency.” Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1251 (9th Cir. 2022). In order to prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs must establish (1) a credit reporting inaccuracy existed on their credit report; (2) they notified the consumer reporting agency that they disputed the reporting as inaccurate; (3) the consumer reporting agency notified Ford Credit of the alleged inaccurate information of the dispute; and (4) Ford Credit failed to investigate the inaccuracies or further failed to comply with the requirements in
The Court has already found with respect to Plaintiff‘s CCRAA claim that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ford Credit‘s reporting of the charged-off Disposition Fee was inaccurate and whether Plaintiffs suffered actual damages as a result. Because the CCRAA “mirrors” the FCRA, the Court reaches the same conclusion as to Plaintiffs’ FCRA claim. Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995).
As to whether Ford Credit failed to investigate the inaccuracies or further failed to comply with the requirements of the FCRA, the Ninth Circuit has held that the obligation to conduct an investigation impliedly requires that the investigation be “reasonable” and “non-cursory.”20 Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1155-57 (noting that the term “investigation” itself denotes a “fairly searching inquiry“). The reasonableness of the investigation and whether policies were followed “will be jury questions in the overwhelming majority of cases.” Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. See also Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157. “Unless only one conclusion about the conduct‘s reasonableness is possible, the question is normally inappropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage.” Gross, 33 F.4th at 1246, 1252; Gentry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 726 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“The questions of whether an investigation was reasonable and whether a genuine dispute existed are ordinarily questions for the trier of fact.“). “Because the notice of the dispute from the CRA informs the furnisher of the nature of the consumer‘s dispute, the reasonableness of a furnisher‘s investigation depends in part on the information provided by the CRA.” Martinez v. Am. Express Nat‘l Bank, No. CV 21-8130-DMG (MAAx), 2022 WL 16571194, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2022) (citing Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157). If the notice of dispute from the CRA is “scant,” the necessary investigation will necessarily be more cursory. See Sandigo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 17-CV-02727-BLF, 2019 WL 2233051, at *24 (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2019). However, the Ninth Circuit also noted that “[i]n deciding that the notice determines the nature of the dispute to be investigated, we do not suggest that it also cabins the scope of the investigation once undertaken.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157 n.11.
The Court finds that in this case, as in most others, the jury must determine the reasonableness of Ford Credit‘s investigation. See Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1157; Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. See also Shoraka v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 8:23-CV-00309-DOC-JDE, 2023 WL 8709710, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2023) (“Courts in the Ninth Circuit routinely deny summary judgment as to reasonableness of an FCRA investigation.“) (collecting cases). In contending that its investigation was reasonable as a matter of law, Ford Credit asserts that the ACDVs provided by
Because of the triable issues of fact identified above, both parties’ motions will be denied as to Plaintiffs’ FCRA claim.21
VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ motion to strike (Doc. 43) is DENIED, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment (Doc. 27) is DENIED, and Ford Credit‘s motion for summary judgment or partial summary judgment (Doc. 28) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
- Summary judgment is GRANTED on Plaintiffs’ claim under the California Legal Remedies Act; and
- Summary judgment is DENIED on Plaintiffs’ claims under the California Consumer Reporting Agencies Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 2, 2025
/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE