ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
L PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and this Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and matters. Given the shortage of district judges and staff, this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and matters necessary to reach the decision in this order. The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the offices of United States Senators Feinstein and Harris to address this Court’s inability to accommodate the parties and this action. The parties are required to reconsider consent to conduct all further proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, whose schedules are far more realistic and accommodating to parties than that of U.S. Chief District Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill, who must prioritize criminal and older civil cases.
Civil trials set before Chief Judge O’Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject to suspensiоn mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later date if Chief Judge O’Neill is unavailable on the original date set for trial. Moreover, this Court’s Fresno Division randomly and without advance notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges throughout the nation to serve as visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this action is subject to reassignment to a U.S. District Judge from inside or outside the Eastern District of California.
IL INTRODUCTION
On March 6, 2017, Plaintiff Sandra Hui-zar (“Plaintiff’) filed the original complaint with this Court. Doc. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”). Through this suit, Plaintiff brings two claims: Count 1, violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. against Defendants Exрerian Information Solutions, Inc., Trans Union LLC, and Equifax Information Services, LLC (collectively, “Credit Bureaus Defendants”); and Count 2, California Consumer Credit Reporting Agen
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs CCRAA claim pursuant to. Federal Rule of Civil Procer dure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has filed her opposition (Doc. 31), and Defendаnt filed its reply- (Doc. 32). The Court took the matter under submission on the papers pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). Doc. 33. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies Defendant’s motion
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On or about April 30, 2011, Plaintiff filed for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California (the “Bankruptcy”). Compl. ¶ 88.
On оr about July 13, 2011, Plaintiff was subsequently approved for a Bankruptcy Wage Earner Repayment Plan (the “Plan”). Id, ¶ 97. If Plaintiff completed repayment of the Plan to the Bankruptcy Trustee, she would extinguish her previous debt to Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 98, 99. Plaintiff complied with the terms of the Plan over the agreed three-year period. Id. ¶ 108. On or about September 3, 2014, the Bankruptcy Trustee filed the “Chapter 13 Standing Trustee’s Final Report and Account” that reflected Plaintiffs completion of the Plan. Id. ¶ 109. Subsequently,- thé “Bankruptcy Noticing Center” put the Defendant on notice of the order through first class mail. Id. ¶ 109.
On October 28, 2014, Plaintiffs successful completion of the Plan was сonfirmed by the Bankruptcy Court’s “Discharge of Debtor after Completion of Chapter 13 Plan” order. Id. ¶ 110, On or about October 28, 2014, the Bankruptcy Noticing Center put the Defendant on notice of the order through first class mail. Id. ¶111. Therefore, according to Plaintiff, Defendant’s credit report should have reported the dеbt as “Discharged” with no outstanding amount owed, reflecting the completion of the Plan, Id. ¶ 212.
Instead, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant, in its capacity as a consumer credit reporting agency (“CRA”), reported Plaintiffs account inaccurately in three separate credit reports. Plaintiff obtained two credit reports on June 27, 2016, and one credit report on September 29, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 185-87. Plaintiff alleges that on those reports Defendant “continued reporting information based on [Defendant’s] pre-bankrupt-cy contract terms with the Plaintiff, which were no longer enforceable upon the bankruptcy filing and confirmation of the Bаnkruptcy Plan, thereby rendering the disputed information inaccurate and materially misleading.” Id. ¶ 115. Plaintiff alleges that credit reports furnished by Defendant inaccurately reflect Plaintiff as delinquent with a-“charged off’ status, and an outstanding balance amount of $82,691 as of October 31, 2014. Id. ¶¶ 185-87. As Plaintiff asserts, “[Defendant] inaccurately аnd misleadingly suggested that Plaintiff still has a personal legal liability to pay the alleged Debt to [Defendant]” as opposed the true amount of $0. Id. ¶ 199. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant reported “inaccurate, misleading, and derogatory information” in these three reports because the reports should have reflеcted a “discharged” status with no outstanding
IV. STANDARD OF DECISION
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Taylor v. Yee,
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion, Plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
V. 'ANALYSIS
A. Statutory Framework
Section 1785.25(a) of the CCRAA provides: “A person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting - agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). While the FCRA preempts most state laws concerning the duties of persons who furnish information to CRAs, Congress expressly exempted claims under § 1785.25(a) from preemption:
No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State ,.. with respect to any subject matter regulated under ... section -1681s-2 of this title, relating to the responsibilities of persоns who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies, except that this paragraph shall not apply .,. with*1108 respect to section 1785.25(a) of the California Civil Code (as in effect September 30,1996).
15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F); Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Services, LLC,
1. § 1785.25(a) Claim
Plaintiff alleges a § 1785.25(a) claim based on the allegation that Defendant, knowing that the information was false, reported to CRAs that Plaintiff was delinquent on her account and had an outstanding balance. Under § 1785.25(a), “[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). The phrase “incomplete or inaccurate” in § 1785.25(a) requires fur-nishers of credit information from “not only refraining] from making any reports that are obviously wrong or missing crucial data, but аlso that the reports not contain information that is materially misleading.” Kuns v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC,
This standard is met when a complaint plausibly alleges that a furnisher failed to report a debt as discharged. Venugopal v. Dig. Federal Credit Union,
Here, the complaint sufficiently alleges that Defendant made reports that were “incomplete or inaccurate” and “materially misleading.” Kuns,
Further, as in Grantham, Plaintiff alleges Defendant furnished inaccurate information, which was negative to herself. Plaintiff asserts “[Defendant] inaccurately
Moreover, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendant knew, or should have known, its repоrting was inaccurate. “The statutory term ‘should have known imparts a test of reasonableness.’ ” Holmes v. NCO Fin. Services, Inc.,
Thus, taking all material allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorablе to Plaintiff, the Court finds that she has stated a cognizable claim for relief under § 1785.25(a). The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion.
B. Statute of Limitations
Defendant further alleges that Plaintiff has failed to meet the statute of limitations for her § 1785.25(a) claim. An action for a violation of the CCRAA “may be brought ... within two years from the date the plaintiff knew of, оr should have known of, the violation of this title, but not more than seven years , from the earliest date ■ oh which liability could have arisen.” Banga v. Equifax Info. Services, LLC,
In its moving papers, Defendant argues without citing any support that “Plaintiff rеlie[d] on alleged inaccurate reporting from October 2014.” Doc. 17 at 10. Defendant therefore argues that Plaintiffs claims, filed more than two years after October 2014, are untimely. However, Plaintiff does not allege that she was aware of the allegedly inaccurate reporting in October 2014. Instead, Plaintiff аsserts that she discovered ■ Defendant’s § 1785.25(a) violation on June ¶1, 2016, when she obtained her initial credit reports. Compl. ¶¶ 185, 86; see Doc. 31 at 16 n.3.
Defendant argues in its reply brief that Plaintiff “should have been specifically focused on the impact of the discharge on her various debts and credit reporting, thereon around [the time of the bаnkrupt
While the “district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief,” this Court will do so here. Zamani v. Carnes,
In fact, another district court has held that placing “a continuing obligation to [require plaintiff to] monitor [her] credit report ... places an unreasonable burden on the [p]laintiff.” Banga v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,
Thus, taking all material allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiffs claim is timely.- The Court therefore DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim as untimely.
VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons discussed above, this Court DENIES Defеndant BANA’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant must answer Plaintiffs complaint within twenty-one days of the date of this Order.
"ITIS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. This Court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true for purposes of this motion. See Lazy Y. Ranch LTD. v. Behrens,
. Defendant argues Plaintiffs claim is based on § 1785.1 because the complaint’s first page stаtes that the claim is brought under "1785.1 et seq." See generally Doc. 17. Defendant argues § 1785.1 is preempted by FCRA. Doc 31. at 13. However, Plaintiffs complaint states several times that her CCRAA claim is brought under § 1785.25(a). See Compl. ¶ 265 ("Thus, Defendants violated Cal. Civ. Code. § 1785.25(a).”); ¶ 226 ("BAÑA has violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a) by furnishing information to the Bureaus ... that BANA knew or should [have] known was inaccurate and materially misleading”).