Connor v. First Student, Inc.Connor v. First Student, Inc.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Current and formеr bus drivers filed this class action against their employers, defendants First Student, Inc., and First Transit, Inc. (collectively First), and HireRight Solutions, Inc., and HireRight, Inc. (collectively HireRight), the investigative consumer reporting agencies that conducted background checks
Connor worked as a school bus driver for Laidlaw Education Services, which First acquired in October 2007. First requested that consumer reporting agency USIS (HireRight‘s corporate predecessor) conduct background checks on its employees on three separate occasions in 2007, 2009, and 2010. The background reports elicited information about the employees, including criminal records, sex offender registries, address history, driving records, and employment history. First “admits that those background checks [would be] used to confirm that Connor and the other employees ‘are properly qualifiеd to safely perform their job duties.’ ”
Before conducting the background checks, First sent Connor a “Safety Packet” booklet. The booklet included a notice, entitled “Investigative Consumer Report Disclosure and Release,” that authorized USIS to prepare a consumer report or investigative consumer report. The notice provided that Connor could view the file maintained on her, receive a summary of that file by telephone, or obtain a copy оf it. The notice also explained that Connor could request an “investigative consumer report” that included ” ‘names and dates of previous employers, reason for termination of employment, work experience, accidents, academic history, professional credentials, drugs/alcohol use, [and] information
Connor sued First for violating ICRAA because its 2010 notice did not satisfy ICRAA notice requirements and First did not obtain her written authorization to conduct the background investigation.3 (See
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court‘s judgment, finding that although ICRAA and CCRAA might overlap to some degree, there is no “positive repugnancy” between them that would render ICRAA unconstitutional. The court held that agencies that provide reports (including reports prepared for employers addressing employee creditworthiness and character) “can comply with each act without violating the other.” We granted First‘s petition for review.
DISCUSSION
I. Statutory Background
In 1970, the Legislature enacted the Consumer Credit Reporting Act. (Civ. Code, former § 1785.1 et seq., added by Stats. 1970, ch. 1348, § 1, p. 2512 and reрeated by Stats. 1975, ch. 1271, § 2, p. 3377.) The act governed “credit rating reports” that included consumer credit record and standing reports. That same year, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). (
In 1975, our Legislature repealed the 1970 Consumer Credit Reporting Act and enacted ICRAA and CCRAA to govern consumer background reports, including checks conducted for employment purposes. (
ICRAA states that “[a]n investigative consumer reporting agency” may provide an “investigative consumer report” to a person other than the subject of the report under limited circumstances. (
ICRAA requires the person procuring the report (or causing it to be made) for employment purposes “other than suspicion of wrongdoing or misconduct by the subject of the investigation” (
Until 1998, consumer reports were classified under CCRAA or ICRAA, depending largely on the means used to collect the information in those reports. In pertinent part, CCRAA defined “consumer credit reрort” to include “any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer‘s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, which is used or is expected to be used . . . for . . . employment purposes.” (Former § 1785.3, subd. (c).)4 That definition excluded “any report containing information solely on a consumer‘s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, or associates of the consumer reported on, or others with whom hе is acquainted or who may have knowledge concerning any such items of information.” (Ibid., italics added.) Thus, certain reports containing information gathered through personal interviews were subject to ICRAA only. But both statutes governed reports that contained information relating to character and creditworthiness, based on public information and personal interviews that were used for employment background purposes.
Congress expanded FCRA in 1996 to enhance consumer privаcy protections. (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 (Pub.L. No. 104-208 (Sept. 30, 1996) 110 Stat. 3009, 426-462).5 Two years later, our Legislature
II. Alleged Vagueness Issues
It is a well-settled rule thаt “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [people] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” (Connally v. General Const. Co. (1926) 269 U.S. 385, 391.) Although even noncriminal legislation can be void for vagueness (see A.B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co. (1925) 267 U.S. 233, 239), “economic regulation is subject to a less strict vagueness test because its subject matter is often more narrow . . . and businesses, which face economic dеmands to plan behavior carefully, can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action. . . . ” (Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates (1982) 455 U.S. 489, 498; cf. Ford Dealers Assn. v. Dep‘t of Motor Vehicles (1982) 32 Cal.3d 347, 366.)
The threshold question here is one of statutory interpretation. If we conclude that ICRAA and CCRAA are sufficiently clear to indicate that both apply to Connor‘s background report, neither statute is vague. (Cf. United States v. Batchelder (1979) 442 U.S. 114, 123 [That “particular conduct may violate both Titles does not detract from the notice afforded by each“].)
In cases involving statutory interpretation, our ” ’ “fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.” ’ [Citation.] ’ “If the statute‘s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.” ’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 803.) “We construe statutory language in the context of the statutory framework, seeking to discern the statute‘s underlying purpose and to harmonize its different components.” (Ardon v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1176, 1183.) Keeping these statutory interpretation principles in mind, wе turn to the parties’ arguments.
First‘s principal contention is that CCRAA and ICRAA were initially intended to be exclusive of each other and that the 1998 amendment was not intended to abolish that distinction. First‘s vagueness argument—that the overlap created by the ICRAA amendment renders the statute unconstitutionally vague whenever CCRAA also might apply—follows the holding of Ortiz v. Lyon Management Group, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 604 (Ortiz). By contrast, Connor asserts that the two statutes were never exclusive, and the 1998 amendment did not change that fact.
In Ortiz, an apartment rental аpplicant, who was approved after a rental manager‘s unlawful detainer search came up clear, sued the management company for violating ICRAA because it failed to provide her with a check box to request a
The Court of Appeal in Ortiz viewed the issue as a “categorization challenge” and agreed with the trial court, reasoning that the Legislature intended consumer reports to fall under either ICRAA or CCRAA, but not both. (Ortiz, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.) The court held that the categorization challenge “arises not becausе unlawful detainer information is somehow paradoxical, but because the statutory scheme fails to set forth truly distinct categories. It presents a false dichotomy between creditworthiness and character.” (Id. at pp. 612-613.) The court reasoned that because unlawful detainer information could relate to both a consumer‘s character and creditworthiness, and because ICRAA did not give adequate notice whether ICRAA or CCRAA governs for tenant screenings, ICRAA was unconstitutionally vague in this situation. (Id. at pp. 618–619.) First asks us to extend Ortiz to background checks in the employment context.
Ortiz‘s holding was based on a categorical view of the two statutes as the court interpreted their legislative history—especially focusing on the fact that the Legislature modeled both statutes after FCRA. (
As the Court of Appeal observed here, “[w]hen the Legislature amended ICRAA in 1998 to remove the limitation on [its scope] so it would govern all consumer reports that include character information, no matter how that information is obtained, it did not amend CCRAA to exclude from its scope reports that include character information obtained from sources other than personal interviews.” Even after the amendment, “consumer reports that include character information obtained from a source other than personal interviews continue to be governed by CCRAA, as long as the reports contain information ‘bearing on a consumer‘s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity.’ (
In interpreting ICRAA and CCRAA, we agree with the Court of Appeal and find that potential employers can comply with both statutes without undermining the purpose of either. If an employer seeks a consumer‘s credit records exclusively, then the employer need only comply with CCRAA. An employer seeking other information that is obtained by any means must comply with ICRAA. In the event that any other information revealed in an ICRAA background check contains a subject‘s credit information and the two statutes thus overlap, a regulated party is expected to know and follow the requirements of both statutes, even if that requires greater formality in obtaining a consumer‘s credit
In a related argument, First asserts that because ICRAA and CCRAA cover the same subject matter, it is unclear which statute applies in the context of employment background checks. However, Connor‘s example of a report that would fall within the scope of both ICRAA and CCRAA is simply one that contains information bearing on both a consumer‘s creditworthiness and on her character. It seems to us that such a duality doеs not make legal compliance particularly difficult, much less impossible.
Indeed, the terms of the 2010 notice that First sent to Connor contemplated that the background check was an investigative consumer report within the scope of ICRAA. Part 1 of the Notice is titled, “INVESTIGATIVE CONSUMER REPORT DISCLOSURE AND RELEASE.” The report‘s first sentence reads: “In connection with your employment or application for employment (including contract for services) an investigative consumer report and consumer repоrts, which may contain public record information, may be requested from USIS.” The notice specifically states that the reports may include “information relating to your character, general reputation, educational background, or any other information about you which may reflect upon your potential for employment gathered from any individual, organization, entity, agency, or other source which may have knowledge concerning any such items of information.” By its tеrms, the 2010 notice conveys that First understood that the background check would include information about Connor‘s character, thus placing it within the scope of ICRAA. Additionally, the check box portion of the notice cites to ICRAA, Civil Code
First alternatively contends that if the Legislature intended ICRAA to apply to employment screening reports that previously were exclusively subject to CCRAA, it would have amended CCRAA to conform to this understanding. The pertinent portion of CCRAA, however, speaks in limiting language, rather than language of authorization. (See
Only ICRAA governs reports obtained from personal interviews that bear solely on an individual‘s character. (See
To the extent that Ortiz v. Lyon Management Group, Inc., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 604, and its companion case Trujillo v. First American Registry Inc., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th 628 hold otherwise, we disapprove them.
CONCLUSION
The background check that First conducted here is an investigative consumer report under ICRAA because it reported on Connor‘s “character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living.” (
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeal judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
CHIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C.J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
CUÉLLAR, J.
KRUGER, J.
ROBIE, J.*
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* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.