Charles Hunter v. City of Montgomery, Alabama
859 F.3d 1329
11th Cir.2017Background
- Montgomery contracted with American Traffic Solutions (Traffic Solutions) to operate red-light cameras; notices and fines are sent/collected by Traffic Solutions, which remits part to the City.
- Alabama law generally treats running a red light as a misdemeanor, but the legislature created a narrow “civil violation” category (applying only to camera-detected violations in Montgomery) to accommodate the program.
- Plaintiffs Hunter and Henderson (Alabama residents) filed a putative class action in Alabama state court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and refunds of fines collected under the program; monetary relief (refunds) was sought only from the City, not Traffic Solutions.
- Defendants removed under CAFA and other grounds; plaintiffs dropped their federal § 1983 claim after removal. The district court sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing on jurisdiction and remanded under CAFA’s home state and local controversy exceptions.
- Defendants appealed the remand; the Eleventh Circuit held it had appellate jurisdiction and reviewed whether the home state exception applied.
- The court concluded Traffic Solutions was not a “primary defendant” because plaintiffs sought monetary relief only from the City; thus the City was the sole primary defendant and the CAFA home state exception applied, so remand was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appellate review of the remand is barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) | Remand should be reviewed | Defendants argued remand is unreviewable under § 1447(d) | Court held it had jurisdiction: CAFA exceptions are nonjurisdictional limits on exercise of jurisdiction, so § 1447(d) did not bar review |
| Whether CAFA home state exception applies (are two-thirds of class and primary defendants citizens of Alabama?) | Plaintiffs argued Traffic Solutions is not a primary defendant; therefore exception applies | Defendants argued Traffic Solutions is a primary defendant (non-Alabama), so exception does not apply | Held: Traffic Solutions is not a primary defendant because no monetary relief was sought from it; home state exception applies and remand affirmed |
| Definition of “primary defendants” under CAFA | Plaintiffs relied on legislative history/monetary-loss focus to define primary defendants as those with substantial monetary exposure to class | Defendants urged a broader reading to include defendants facing substantial non-monetary exposure or secondary liability | Held: Majority adopts legislative-history/monetary-exposure test—primary defendants are those with direct substantial exposure to class monetary losses |
| Whether injunctive relief claims against a non-monetary-target defendant make it a primary defendant | Plaintiffs: injunctive claims alone do not make Traffic Solutions a primary defendant where monetary relief is sought only from City | Defendants: injunctive relief against Traffic Solutions supports primary-defendant status | Held: Court ruled monetary relief controls; non-monetary injunctive claims do not render Traffic Solutions a primary defendant for home state exception purposes |
Key Cases Cited
- Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (remand orders based on certain grounds are reviewable despite § 1447(d) limits)
- Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (discussion of finality and limits on review of remand orders)
- Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2007) (CAFA purpose and burden on plaintiffs to prove exceptions)
- Serrano v. 180 Connect, Inc., 478 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2007) (CAFA exceptions require abstention from exercising jurisdiction)
- Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy Props., Inc., 733 F.3d 497 (3d Cir. 2013) (defines primary defendants as those with direct substantial monetary exposure to the class)
- Whole Health Chiropractic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2001) (distinguishes remands based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction from other remands)
- Polk County v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 170 F.3d 1081 (11th Cir. 1999) (remand orders are generally reviewable as final decisions)