Chappell v. RichChappell v. Rich
Scott Douglas Makar, Asst. Gen. Counsel, App. and Local Government Law Div., Jacksonville, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
PER CURIAM:
The adult children of Johnnie Mae Chappell (“Chappell children“) appeal the district court‘s dismissal of their complaint asserting constitutiоnal claims under
According to the complaint, Johnnie Mae Chappell, an African-American woman, was shot and killed on March 23, 1964, by four white men during a drive-by shooting in a period of racial unrest in Jacksonville, Florida. Following an investigation at the сrime scene, no action was taken by the Duval County Sheriff‘s Office until about August 10, 1964, when two detectives in the Sheriff‘s Office inadvertently obtained a confession, as well as the murder weapon, from one of the four men while investigating another case. Unable to find any detectives working on the Chappell case, the two detectives, C. Lee Cody and Donald R. Coleman, searched for the investigative file, discovering it underneath the dеsk chair floor pad in Chief of Detectives J.C. Patrick‘s office. Detectives Cody and Coleman brought the matter to the attention of Sheriff Dale Carson, who assured them he would look into it. Shortly thereafter, Chief Patriсk removed Detectives Cody and Coleman from the Chappell murder investigation, and they were reassigned.
In September 1964, J.W. Rich, Elmer Kato, Wayne Chessman, and James Alex Davis were indicted for Mrs. Chappell‘s murder. Rich was tried separately and convicted of manslaughter. The state then moved for entry of nolle prosequi for Kato, Chessman, and Davis, citing insufficient evidence for trial.
On March 23, 1996, former detective Cody informed members of the Chappell family for the first time about the alleged interference by the Sheriff‘s Office in the Chappell investigation. The Chappell children filed their complaint on March 23, 2000 against the former and current Sheriffs of Duval County and the four men arrested in connection with their mother‘s death, alleging deprivation of their civil rights solely because of their race in violation of
The district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, determining that the Chappell children had failed to state a claim under
On appeal, the Chappell children contend first that their cause of action for denial of access to the courts accrued not in 1964 but on March 23, 1996, when Detective Cody first informed them that the Sheriff had hidden the investigative file on their mother‘s murder. In addition, they argue that the district court erred in finding that they failed to state a claim under sections 1983 and 1985. Finally, they argue that their allegations of a conspiracy between the four private individuals and the members of the Duval County Sheriff‘s Office defeat the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.
We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Lotierzo v. Woman‘s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2002). We must accept the allegations set forth in the complaint as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss. Id.
Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges аnd Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n. 12 (2002) (noting the Supreme Court‘s past reliance on all of these bases); see also Bank of Jackson County v. Cherry, 980 F.2d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir.1993) (grounding the right of access to courts in the First Amendment). To pass constitutional muster, access to the courts must be more than merely formal; it must also be adequate, effective, and meaningful. Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822 (1977)). In Bell v. Milwaukee, the Seventh Circuit observed that to deny access to the courts,
defendants need not literally bar the courthousе door or attack plaintiffs’ witnesses. This constitutional right is lost where, as here, police officials shield from the public and the victim‘s family key facts which would form the basis of the family‘s claims for redress. A contrary interprеtation of the right to due process would encourage police officials to conceal the circumstances relating to unlawful killings committed under color of state law and other deprivations of federal rights which Section 1983 was designed to remedy.
746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir.1984). Thus, interference with the right of court access by state agents who intentionally conceal the true facts about a crime may be actionable as a deprivation of constitutional rights under
Florida‘s four-year statute of limitations applies to such claims of deprivation of rights under
Thus, although denial of access is an ancillary claim, requiring that plaintiffs also plead a substantive underlying claim, see Harbury, 536 U.S. at 415, the statute of limitations for denial of access may be different than that of the undеrlying claim, beginning to run only when the plaintiffs knew or should have known that they have suffered injury to their right of access and who caused it. The Chappell children argue that in this case their allegations reflect that they did not knоw or could not have known of their denial of access to the courts a result of the actions of the Sheriff‘s Office to conceal information until 1996.
This case is thus unlike the circumstances in Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, or Bell v. Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, in which the plaintiffs successfully alleged denial of access to the courts. In Ryland, Lavonna Ryland‘s parents did not know that a crime had been committed because the police had concealed their daughter‘s murder as a suicide. Likewise, in Bell, the family‘s attempt to seek redress for Daniel Bell‘s wrongful death was thwarted by the false police representation that the Bell shooting was in self-defense.
In this case, the tragic death of Johnnie Mae Chappell and the inexcusable conduct of the Defendants, as alleged, are sad reminders of the damage done to the integrity of our justice system and to our society by racial hatred and strife. However, based on the foregoing discussion, we cannot find that the facts alleged here are sufficient to constitute a violation of the right of access to the courts. Therefore, we agree with the district court that the Chappell children have failed to state a claim for denial of the right of access to the courts under sections 1983 and 1985. As a result, we do not need to reach the question of whether the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would bar the conspiracy claim under section 1985. We thus AFFIRM the district court‘s dismissal of the Chappell children‘s section 1983 and 1985 claims.
AFFIRMED.
Notes: