Cedric E. Williams, Plaintiff - Appellant v. United Parcel Service, Inc., Defendant - Appellee
No. 19-1004
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
June 29, 2020
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis. Submitted: December 12, 2019.
Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
Following his demotion, Cedric Williams sued United Parcel Service, Inc. for retaliation and discrimination under
Williams, an African-American, was a District Labor Manager at UPS from 2004 to 2013.2 His job was to represent the company in grievance proceedings for union employees in Arkansas. He was responsible for helping UPS prepare for hearings, attending hearings, deciding which grievances to pay, identifying recurring violations, and providing reports to District President, Judy Henry.
Richard Gough became Williams‘s supervisor in 2010, and soon after noticed problems with his work. In January 2011, Gough determined Williams was not following basic UPS labor practices and told him to create a log to identify which grievances were recurring, how long they were pending, and how much UPS was paying to settle them. A series of emails over the next year show Gough‘s dissatisfaction with Williams‘s failure to address grievances, complete requested tasks, communicate with Henry, finish legal briefing on time, and update his grievance log. Gough told Williams he “need[ed] to see drastic improvement” and eventually sent him a list of concerns. App. 338. Gough later sent the list again, saying: “I have not received answers on most of the questions. If you think I am . . . [doing this for] my typing skills, you are sadly mistaken.” App. 342-43.
After this exchange, Gough and his supervisor, Headley Chambers, decided it was time to put Williams on a Management Performance Improvement Plan (MPIP).
Gough emailed Human Resources director Stan Roux and, on March 13, 2012, Roux provided Gough with the necessary paperwork. Gough and Roux met with Williams to discuss the MPIP a month later, identifying four deficiencies: (1) Williams was not regularly communicating with Gough and Henry; (2) his grievance logs were “continually out of date” and included “[o]ld discipline cases with no follow up“; (3) he was not adequately preparing his cases for hearings; and (4) he was not working with division managers and staff to prevent contract violations. App. 465. Gough “explained that these issues must be corrected . . . [and] that should [Williams] not meet the MPIP goals, discipline up to and including discharge will come.” App. 466.
In the following months, Gough and Roux prepared multiple MPIP progress reports and held follow-up meetings with Williams. The progress reports and notes from these meetings indicate that Williams was still failing to perform his duties.
As a result, Gough and Chambers decided to demote Williams and, on January 30, 2013, emailed Roux that they were “ready to move on.” App. 537. Roux then contacted Henry, and—although she considered terminating Williams—she eventually agreed that he should be demoted. Roux created a position for Williams in UPS‘s feeder group, and notified him of the decision. Williams‘s demotion did not decrease his salary, but he did lose incentive opportunities.
II.
“We review a district court‘s decision to grant summary judgment de novo.” Gibson v. Geithner, 776 F.3d 536, 539 (8th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
A.
Williams first challenges the district court‘s judgment on his retaliation claim. We apply the ”McDonnell Douglas analytical framework to a retaliation claim under [42 U.S.C.] § 1981.” Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 (8th Cir. 1997). Because there is no direct evidence of retaliation,3 Williams‘s first hurdle is making a prima facie case. Sayger v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 735 F.3d 1025, 1030 (8th Cir. 2013). To do so, he must show: “(1) protected activity, (2) subsequent adverse employment action, and (3) a causal relationship between the two.” Kim, 123 F.3d at 1060.
at 1060. A causal relationship exists where “the desire to retaliate was the but for cause of [the adverse action].” Sayger, 735 F.3d at 1032 (citation omitted).
Williams claims that UPS demoted him in retaliation for statements he made on two different occasions. First, in 2011, Williams was consulted about whether UPS should terminate an African-American employee who was known for filing grievances. He told management that they needed to be consistent, so if they decided to terminate the employee, they needed to “do it the right way” and treat similarly situated white employees the same. App. 213–214. Second, Williams identifies a deposition he gave on UPS‘s behalf in an employment discrimination case on March 14, 2012, where he testified about UPS‘s treatment of African-American employees.
Williams argues that his claim nevertheless survives because Henry and Roux made the ultimate decision to demote him and that both knew about his 2011 statements and the 2012 deposition. Assuming without deciding that both were decision makers, this claim still has three problems. First, Henry‘s and Roux‘s involvement in the demotion occurred almost a year after the March 2012 deposition and two years after his 2011 statements. We have previously held that, without more, an “interval of more than two months is too long to support an inference of causation.” Trammel v. Simmons First Bank of Searcy, 345 F.3d 611, 616 (8th Cir. 2003). Second, there is no evidence that anyone at UPS thought Williams‘s testimony on either occasion was harmful. After the deposition, UPS‘s counsel sent an email stating that “Williams did a good job deflecting [opposing counsel‘s] questions” and later noted that he “did not harm UPS‘s defenses in the case.” App. 963, 966. Third, undisputed facts support a different explanation for Williams‘s demotion—that he was demoted because Gough and Chambers believed his job performance was deficient. This further undercuts any connection between Williams‘s demotion and his 2012 deposition or 2011 statements. See Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 881, 888 (8th Cir. 2015) (protected activity was not a but-for cause where the “uncontroverted evidence” showed plaintiff was fired for disciplinary reasons). Because Williams cannot link protected conduct with his demotion, his retaliation claim fails.
B.
Williams next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his race discrimination claim. The McDonnell Douglas framework also applies to this claim. Williams “must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1046 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Then, UPS is required to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the demotion. Id. Finally, Williams shoulders “the ultimate burden . . . to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether [UPS‘s explanation is] . . . mere pretext for intentional discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted).
Because we believe the third step is dispositive, and because UPS offered a non-discriminatory reason for the demotion, we presume that Williams has made a prima facie case and “move directly to the issue of pretext.” Wagner v. Gallup, Inc., 788 F.3d 877, 886 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
There are multiple ways a plaintiff can show pretext. One is by demonstrating that the employer‘s stated reason for the termination is false. Barber v. C1 Truck Driver Training, LLC, 656 F.3d 782, 794 (8th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs taking this path must show “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis in original). Another way is by presenting evidence that the employer “treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner.” Lake v. Yellow Transp. Inc., 596 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2010). “At the pretext stage, the test for whether someone
Williams attempts both approaches. To demonstrate that UPS‘s explanation is false, he introduces the testimony of two coworkers and argues that the number of grievances and associated payments in his territory have not changed since he was demoted. However, his grievance and payment performance were only two of the reasons Gough and Chambers gave for his demotion. Also, after-the-fact evidence like this does little to call into question whether the decision makers here “honestly believed the asserted grounds at the time of the [demotion].” Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006). Finally, even if Williams could show that UPS‘s explanation for the demotion was false, his burden is higher than that—he must show that UPS‘s decision was motivated by racial discrimination. St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515. He has not done so.
Williams‘s claim that UPS treated similarly-situated employees differently also fails. Williams acknowledges from the outset that this argument is a longshot: as “the only Labor Manager operating under the Southern Conference contract,” he states that he belonged to “a class of one.” Williams Br. 26. Perhaps for this reason, he does not identify the other two District Labor Managers that Gough supervised as potential comparators. Instead, he lists two employees that succeeded him in the position: Don Lewick and Bret Holladay.
Though there may be some situations where a plaintiff‘s replacement can serve as a comparator, successors are often new to a role and thus require a period of acclimation. They also necessarily hold their position after the decision at issue, so disparate treatment at that point might result from an employer‘s desire to minimize turnover. Nor are Lewick and Holladay otherwise good candidates for comparison.
See Johnson, 769 F.3d at 613 (comparators must “have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” (citation omitted)). Lewick was a temporary replacement and handled Williams‘s territory for a matter of months before becoming ill. Holladay started in the position a year after Williams was demoted, was never supervised by Gough, and Henry left shortly after he was hired. Finally, the record does not show that either individual had similar performance issues to Williams.
Because Williams has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UPS‘s explanation for his demotion was pretext for discrimination, his claim fails.
III.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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