Kurt R. Carpentino and T.E., a minor v. William L. Wrenn, Commissioner, New Hampshire Department of Corrections, et al.
Civil No. 13-cv-202-JD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
October 15, 2013
Case 1:13-cv-00202-JD Document 7
Kurt R. Carpentino has filed a complaint (doc. no. 1), on behalf of himself and his minor son, T.E., alleging that defendants have violated his federal and state constitutional rights. Because Carpentino is a prisoner proceeding pro se, the matter is before the court for preliminary review to determine, among other things, whether the complaint asserts any claim upon which relief might be granted. See
Standard for Preliminary Review
Pursuant to LR 4.3(d)(2) and
In determining whether a pro se complaint states a claim, the court must construe the complaint liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). To survive preliminary review, the complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‘” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); Sepulveda-Villarini v. Dep‘t of Educ., 628 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 2010). To determine plausibility, the court treats as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, and construes all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the plaintiff‘s favor. See Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).
Carpentino has been incarcerated at the New Hampshire State Prison (“NHSP“) for eleven years for sexual offenses against thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-old girls, who Carpentino alleges were his girlfriends, when Carpentino was seventeen. Since beginning his incarceration, Carpentino has discovered that he has an eleven-year-old son. Carpentino states that neither his son nor his son‘s mother were victims of his incarcerating offenses.
After discovering that he had a son, Carpentino sought entry into the Family Connections Center program (“FCC“), a rehabilitative program located at the NHSP. The FCC is designed to promote healthy relationships between incarcerated fathers and their children. To that end, Carpentino asserts, the program offers its participants Skype visits with their children and extra in-person visit days not available to inmates who are not participating in the FCC.
Carpentino states that defendants have each denied him access to the FCC pursuant to a New Hampshire Department of Corrections (“DOC“) policy that disqualifies inmates convicted of sexual offenses against children. Carpentino asserts that other types of sexual offenders and even individuals who have killed children are not categorically denied admittance.
Carpentino‘s complaint asserts the following claims for relief on behalf of both Carpentino and his minor son:
- Plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the laws has been violated by defendants denying Carpentino access to the FCC, based on his conviction on sexual offenses against children, when no other types of inmates are categorically excluded from the program based on the nature of their offenses;
- Carpentino‘s Eighth Amendment right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment was violated when the defendants denied him access to rehabilitative programming.
- Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to familial association and Carpentino‘s right to parent his child were violated by the defendants denying Carpentino access to the FCC.
- Carpentino‘s state constitutional right to rehabilitation was violated when the defendants denied him the ability to participate in the FCC.
Discussion
I. Representation of Minor Son
In this action, Carpentino asserts that constitutional rights accruing to his son, T.E., have been violated by defendants. As a pro se litigant, however, Carpentino cannot represent his minor child, or otherwise assert claims on behalf of his minor child, in this court. See
Carpentino asserts that the categorical exclusion of child sexual offenders from the FCC violates Carpentino‘s right, as a member of that category, to equal protection of the laws, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as no other group of inmates is, as a group, entirely barred from the program based on the nature of their offense.2 “Under equal protection jurisprudence, a governmental classification aimed at a ‘suspect class’ is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. Classifications that target non-suspect classes are subject only to rational basis review.” Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). However, “‘a classification neither involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.‘” Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (citation omitted).
Carpentino has not made that showing, and the court cannot find that he would be able to do so. The FCC connects inmate-parents to their children and allows for increased contact between them. The challenged regulation, to the extent it creates a class of child sexual offenders, and bars all members of that class from participation in the FCC, is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective. The prison has a legitimate interest in preventing inmates from participating in programs that might allow the inmates to prepare for or commit new offenses during their incarceration. The court cannot find that it is unreasonable, in furthering those goals, to exclude all child sexual offenders from the FCC.
III. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Carpentino asserts that his Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment was violated by the defendants’ withholding specific rehabilitative programming (i.e., access to FCC) from him during his incarceration. A prison inmate does not have a federal constitutional right to rehabilitation. See Fiallo v. De Batista, 666 F.2d 729, 730 (1st Cir. 1981). Because Carpentino has no right to a particular rehabilitation program, the Eighth Amendment is not violated by the defendants’ denying Carpentino the ability to participate in the FCC, and Carpentino‘s Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
IV. Familial Association Claim
Carpentino claims that denying him access to the FCC denies him the right to associate with his son, in violation of his First Amendment right to familial association. An inmate does not have a constitutionally-protected interest in unfettered
The court has found, above, that the restriction on Carpentino‘s access to the FCC is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective. Carpentino has not asserted any basis upon which this court could find that the restriction on his access to FCC privileges was an exaggerated response to the prison‘s objective. Accordingly, Carpentino has failed to demonstrate that his constitutional right of familial
V. State Constitutional Claims
Carpentino has failed to state any federal claim upon which relief might be granted against defendants. The court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim where all of the claims over which the court has original jurisdiction are dismissed. See
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Carpentino‘s claims asserting violations of his federal constitutional rights should be dismissed, as they fail to state any claim upon which relief might be granted. Carpentino‘s claims asserted under the state constitution should be dismissed without prejudice to Carpentino‘s ability to raise them in the state courts. Any objections to this report and recommendation must be filed within fourteen days of receipt of this notice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file objections within the
Landya McCafferty
United States Magistrate Judge
October 15, 2013
cc: Kurt R. Carpentino, pro se
LM:jba