*1 ARMOUR et v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA, al.
et al. Argued February 29, No. 11-161. 2012 Decided June *2 Breyer, J., Court, opinion delivered the in which Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, J., dissenting C. opinion, Alito, JJ., filed a Scalia which joined, post, p. 688. *3 argued petitioners.
Mark T Standi the cause for With Roy Englert, him on the Jr., briefs were T Daniel N. Ler- man, Waicukauski, Ronald J. Carol Nemeth Joven, and R. Davy Eaglesfield III. good respondents.
Paul D. Clement.or for the cause With George Jeffrey him on Hicks, Jr., the brief were W. M. Har-. * ris, and F. Justin Roebel. opinion Breyer delivered the of the Court. Justice n many years, For an Indiana statute, Law,” “Barrett impose upon authorized Indiana’s cities to benefited lot own- amici curiae of urging *Briefs reversal were filed for the Institute for McNamara, Mellor, III, H. Neily William Robert J. Clark M. by Justice Rowes; and for the Ari Association of by National Home Builders Jeff Pollack, Moskowitz, Callahan, Ward, Erik Michael G. Thomas J. Christo- Whitcomb, Chai; pher Amy M. C. and for the National Taxpayers Shay Dvoretzky. by Union of amici curiae urging Briefs affirmance were for the filed International Laramore, City/County Jon A. Scott Management by Association et al. Chinn, Soronen; and Lisa E. Lawyers and for Municipal the International Sorenson, by Quin Schiller, M.
Association Lowell J. and Charles W. Thompson, Jr.
Joseph D. Henchman filed a brief for the Tax Foundation as amicus curiae. improvement projects. The Barrett the cost of sewer
.ers pay permitted imme- lot either Law also those owners diately lump over time in install- in the form of sum or (Indianapolis city Indianapolis ments. In City) adopted payment method, the a new assessment any plan, forgave Law and it Barrett installments “STEP” yet paid. had that lot owners not already paid group their entire had A of lot owners who lump believe that in a sum Barrett Law assessment equivalent provided refunds. them with should do so refusal to And we must decide whether against unconstitutionally in violation discriminates them § Equal hold Clause, Protection Arndt. We distinguishing between had a rational basis for project already paid their share of those lot owners who had that there conclude costs and those who had not. And we equal protection is no violation.
I A permitted Beginning cities 1889, Indiana’s Barrett sewage projects, pay public improvements, such as “equally among project “apportioning]” all the costs of a 36-9-39-15(b)(3) (2011); § abutting lands or lots.” Ind. Code Harmony 2d Parker, 726 N. E. v. see Town Council New *4 (Ind. 2000) pay its (project’s 1217, n. 13 beneficiaries 1227, costs). city’s project, city the a built a Barrett When public lot-owner assess- create an initial works board would sewage “dividing by the total cost of ment the estimated 36-9-39-16(a). § It the number of lots.” works total adjust might if the assessment downward then an individual 36-9-39-17(b). § would others. lot would benefit less than Upon final completion project, issue a the board would lot-by-lot assessment. pay permitted assess- lot owners
The Barrett .Law single lump or in installment ment sum over time either in (with interest). payments The would collect install- payments ment “in the same manner as other taxes.” §36-9-37-6. The 10-, Barrett Law authorized or 20-, 30- 36-9-37-8.5(a). § year plans. fully paid, installment Until against an property, assessment would a lien constitute city permitting proceedings to initiate foreclosure in case §§36-9~37-9(b), aof default. -22. Indianapolis
For several decades, used the Barrett Law system g., projects. Conley See, fund sewer e. v. Brum (in (1931) banc). App. mil, 92 Ind. 620, 621, 176N. E. 880,881 City adopted system, in Septic But 2005, a new called the (STEP), Program Tank projects Elimination which financed part through thereby lowering in bonds, individual lot own By ers' sewer-connection costs. time, had con projects. App. structed more than 40 Barrett Law to Pet. installment-paying Cert. 5a. We are told that lot owners money respect projects. still owed in to 24 of those See Reply (citing City’s Response Brief for 3n. 16-17, Petitioners Damages, (SD Indianapo Plaintiff’s Brief on Record in Cox v. (Exh. A)). Ind.), No. lis, 1:09-cv-0435 Doc. 98-1 In re spect payments yet 24, to 21 of the some installment had not respect fallen money due; 3, to the other those who owed Reply were in default. Brief for n. Petitioners 3.
B still-open This case concerns one of the Barrett Law namely, projects, Brisbane/Manning Sanitary Sewers Project. Project Brisbane/Manning began in 2001. It City’s sewage system. connected about 180 homes to the completed Indianapolis Construction was in 2003. The (Board) Board of Public Works held an assessment hear- ing July in June the Board sent the And payment 180 affected homeowners a formal notice their obligations. pay
The notice made clear that each homeowner could per property lump entire $9,278 sum assessment — —in *5 678 an- 3.5% at a include interest installments, which would plan, payments would
nual rate. Under an installment years; per month per 10 $38.66 month for amount to $77.27 years. years; per event, In the 30 or month for for $25.77 10-year up pay front; 47 chose chose 38 homeowners 30-year 20-year plan; plan; and 68 chose 27 chose the paid year plan. homeowner each And in the first 10-year plan; ($9,278upfront; under $927.80 amount due 30-year 20-year plan, under the $309.27 under the $463.90 plan). App. Pet. for 48a. Cert. year, abandon the decided however,
The next financing. thought Bar- that the It Barrett Law method lot-by-lot payments too burdensome had become rett Law’s changes discouraging many pay, from less for homeowners to systems. id., septic- healthy See tanks to healthier sewer (For by helped example, the Brisbane/ at 4a-5a. homes Manning Project, each, were $9,000 than of more at cost 67.) App. $270,000. then $120,000 valued charge financing connect- each would STEP method of new by up ing the difference $2,500 make lot owner a flat fee and citywide. eventually paid floating all owners lot bonds for App. 5a, for n. See to Pet. Cert. imple- ordinance enacted an 31,
On 2005, October a fur- menting enacted December, the Board its decision. In part transi- which, resolution, ther Resolution as “forgive amounts ... established tion, would all assessment Municipal Funding pursuant Sewer to the Barrett owing programs from the date of November due and added). preamble, the App. (emphasis In its forward.” “may present financial that the Barrett Law resolution said participants who hardships many income on middle to lower sys- failing septic sanitary in lieu of most need sewer service transitioning to the pointed was that the tems”; out financing; that the STEP and it said new STEP method upon had “consid- model that a financial method was based by participants being made ered the assessments current *6 projects” projects. active Barrett Law Id., as well as future upshot at 71-72. The was those who still owed Barrett payments Law assessments would not to make further already paid but those had their who assessments would not receive refunds. This meant that homeowners who had paid Brisbane/Manning Project $9,278 full in assessment lump year preceding a sum the would receive no refund, pay while homeowners who had elected to the assessment paid in installments, and had total of $309.27, $463.90, obligation or $927.80, would be no under to make further payments. February
In paid 2006, the 38 homeowners who had Brisbane/Manning Project full assessment asked the (in partial equal forgiven refund an amount the smallest Brisbane/Manning apparently $8,062). debt, installment “ request part [refunding denied the in because payments your any project portion area, made payments, precedent inequi- would establish a of unfair and property table treatment to all other owners who have also paid [the Barrett Law . . . assessments and while Novem- might date] arbitrary you, ber 2005, cutoff seem it is essential for the to establish this date and move forward funding approach.” with the Id., new at 50-51.
C
Thirty-one
thirty-eight Brisbane/Manning-Project
lump-sum
brought
homeowners
this lawsuit
Indiana
seeking
They
state court
a refund of about $8,000 each.
part
City’s
provide
claimed in relevant
that the
refusal to
City forgave
them with refunds at the
time
same
that the
outstanding project
Brisbane/Manning
debts of other
Equal
homeowners violated the Federal Constitution’s
Pro-
tection
Clause,
§1;
Arndt.
see also Rev. Stat. §1979,
§
granted
summary judg-
U. S. C. 1983. The trial court
Appeals
ment in their favor. The State Court of
affirmed
(2009).
judgment.
I I
A
long
basis,
a rational
as
distinction has
As
Equal
Clause.
Protection
distinction does not violate
long
involv-
neither
This Court has
held that “a classification
along suspect
rights
ing
proceeding
lines
fundamental
nor
Equal
there
if
.
run
Protection Clause
. . cannot
afoul of the
relationship
disparity of treatment
is a rational
between
legitimate governmental purpose.”
Doe,
Heller v.
and some
(1993);
Co. v.
F. R.
cf.
& S.
312,
Gulf,
509 U. S.
319-320
C.
(1897).
made
We have
Ellis,
150, 155,
165
165-166
U. S.
“ordinary
analogous
commercial
that,
clear in
where
contexts
requires def-
basis review
issue,
transactions”
rational
are
underlying
judgments.
legislative
erence to reasonable
144, 152
Co., 304 U. S.
United States
Carotene Products
v.
(1938) (due process);
v.
427 U. S.
Dukes,
see
New Orleans
also
curiam)
(1976) (per
protection).
(equal
we
And
297, 303
pointed
“[legislatures
repeatedly
have
out
creating
especially
latitude in
classifications
broad
Regan v. Taxation With
distinctions
in tax statutes.”
(1983);
Representation
also
547
see
540,
Wash., 461 U. S.
of
Assn,
Racing
103,
Fitzgerald
U. S.
Iowa, 539
v.
Central
of
(1992);
(2003); Nordlinger
111,
Hahn,
v.
505 U. S.
107-108
U.
Co., 410
S.
Auto Parts
Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore
(1940);
(1973);
Kentucky,
87-88
309 U. S.
Madden v.
Telephone
Rapids
Citizens’
Co. Grand
v. Fuller, 229 U. S.
(1913).
322, 329
Indianapolis’ classification involves neither a “fundamental
right”
“suspect”
subject
nor
classification.
Its
matter is
local,
It
economic, social,
commercial.
is a tax classifica-
Indianapolis.has
tion. And no one here claims that
discrimi-
against
nated
out-of-state commerce or new residents. Cf.
Hooper
County
(1985);
v. Bernalillo
Assessor,
Consistent with these facts, the director of the De- partment explained City of Public Works later forgive outstanding part decided to “[t]he debt because process administrative remaining costs to service and bal- long past ances on Barrett Law accounts the transition to program taxpayers” the STEP would hot benefit the purpose App. would defeat the of the transition. 76. The four other members of the Board have said the same. See Taylor Gregory Affidavit of ¶6, Record in Cox, Doc. No. 57- Kipper 5; Affidavit ¶6, ibid., Tew Doc. No. 57-6; Affidavit Roger Susan Schalk ¶6, Doc. ibid., 57-7; No. Affidavit of ¶6, ibid., Brown Doc. 57-8. No. rationality City’s sup- distinction draws further
port line-drawing from the nature of the choices that con- forgiveness fronted it. To have added refunds would yet adding have meant namely, further administrative costs, processing the cost of refunds. At time, the same to have tried limit limiting costs and lost revenues (or refund) forgiveness Brisbane/Manning rules to homeown- ers alone would have led those involved other Barrett Law projects justifiably complained to have about unfairness. (as granted Yet providing forgive- to have refunds well as ness) all projects those involved in all Barrett Law (there projects) open were more projects or than in all (there 20) greater were more than would have involved even just administrative burden. The could not “cut . . . post, dissenting), checks,” J.,C. without (Roberts, funding taking programs finding from other additional keep If, instead, revenue. had tried to the amount (a goal) spread of revenue it lost constant rational but evenly among apparently thousands of homeowners in- any projects, volved in of the Barrett Law the result would yet payments, likely have been smaller individual even more justify expense. have been too small to the administrative Finally, rationality support of the distinction draws from distinguish- the fact that the line that the drew— *10 684 obligations a line
ing past payments future from —is a line takes such the law. Sometimes well known to mortgage pay- involving, say, amnesty program, form of an 108(a) § g., U. C. parking E. 26 S. tickets. ments, taxes, (federal (2006 IV) (1)(E) provision Supp. tax income ed., newly gross for- allowing income to from homeowners omit debt); mortgage 523 given Martin, v. States United home 2008) (tax whereby (CA4 amnesty program 281, 284 F.. 3d taxpayer newly forgave penalties sat- if and liabilities State (CA7 debt); Chicago, F. 2d n. Horn v. isfied 1988) whereby amnesty (city parking program out- ticket newly standing for a fraction could be' settled tickets specified). line is consistent with kind of This amount pre- actions makes between distinction the law often yet viously to come. taken and those
C contrary arguments are not sufficient Petitioners’ point change Indi- out that our conclusion. Petitioners consideration, Supreme ana listed different Court also supporting namely, hardship,” the factors as one of “financial They rationality. App. to the refer for Cert. 19a. Pet. “may pre- City’s that, the Barrett Law that said resolution hardships many income middle to lower sent financial on participants sanitary in lieu of service who most need sewer they argue failing septic App. systems.” And necessarily low- favor tax before us would not distinction income homeowners. argument, for the ad- however, not this
We
consider
need
mentioned are sufficient
we have
ministrative considerations
City’s
The Indi-
distinction.
rational
for the
show a
basis
was
Supreme
classification
ana
wrote that the
Court
part
legitimate
in re-
“rationally
interests
“to its
related”
App.
19a
ducing
Pet.
Cert.
its administrative costs.”
added).
City’s proceedings
(emphasis
is
The record
(when
App. 72
de-
See
with that determination.
consistent
veloping
transition, the
“considered the current assess
being
by participants
ments
made
in active Barrett Law
*11
projects”)-
any
legislature
In
“actually
event, a
need not
any
purpose
articulate at
supporting
time the
or rationale
Nordlinger,
its
S.,
classification.”
505 U.
at 15;see also Fitz
(similar).
gerald,
Petitioners on to various other tems that would have for included refunds at least some of already paid They argue those who had in full. that those systems superior system City are to the that the chose. We possible, systems have those, discussed and other earlier. Supra, advantages at 682-683. Each has and disadvan- tages. petitioners superior system, But if even have found a require per- does Constitution not to draw the superior fect line nor even to draw a line some other line might only requires actually have drawn. It that the line drawn abe rational line. And for the reasons we have set supra, forth in Part II-B, we believe that the line the drew here is rational. argue
Petitioners further that administrative considera- justify city tions alone should not a tax distinction, lest a arbitrarily among forgiv- a allocate taxes few citizens while ing many similarly ground citizens situated on that it is cheaper people a easier collect taxes from few than many. right from Brief for 45. Petitioners Petitioners are justify that administrative considerations could not such an system. con- is not because administrative unfair But that (any justify than more can tax differences siderations never so). reducing they question always is whether can do provides expenses, a particular circumstances, those in the question. justifying basis the tax difference rational gen- light made known or case, In this “in the of the facts erally 152, it S., 304 U. at assumed,” Co., Carotene Products system graft onto refund that to is reasonable believe (for example) City’s forgiveness im- could have decision paying collecting posed an administrative burden of both month) (say, years. per As we out small $25 sums supra, to draw said, 682-684, rational for the it is the ones Petitioners, who are line that avoids that burden. “attacking legislative arrangement,” have the burden *12 showing otherwise, e., the the are i. that that circumstances justify clas- the burden is administrative too insubstantial they not done. sification. That Finally, petitioners precedent point view that in their City to for the makes it difficult we have said more than exception, however, one show a “rational basis.” With but they based the cases which refer involve discrimination g., Hooper length Berna E. v. on or of residence. residence (state preference County 612 tax Assessor, lillo 472 U. S. distinguishing long-term and short-term resident between (state veterans); tax 14 472 U. S. use Vermont, Williams v. state); buyers car who moved that burdened out-of-state Metropolitan (state Ward, Ins. v. 470 U. S. Co. Life higher companies at a that out-of-state insurance law taxed companies); S. Williams, v. 457 U. rate than in-state Zobel dividend, (state long- system that favored distribution residents). present are not But those circumstances term here. Pittsburgh Allegheny Co. exception Coal
The
consists of
(1989).
Cty.,
The
Allegheny, require- however, involved a clear state-law clearly dramatically ment and Indeed, violated. we have Allegheny pre- described “the as rare case where the facts any reading any cluded” alternative of state law and thus Nordlinger, supra, alternative rational basis. at 16. Here, by apportioning followed state law the cost of its projects equally. says nothing Barrett Law State law about forgiveness, design forgiveness program, how a permit- doing whether or when rational distinctions in are so adopt petitioners’ transforming ted. To view would risk 688 ordinary into violations
ordinary tax law state violations of the Federal Constitution.
[*] [*] [*] City has not vio- that the we conclude reasons, For these Indiana Equal And the Clause. Federal Protection lated the judgment Supreme is similar Court’s
Affirmed. Scalia whom Justice Roberts, with ChieF Justice join, dissenting. Alito Justice succinct and unani-
Twenty-three years ago, a released we in West striking property tax scheme opinion a down mous Equal clearly ground Pro- Virginia violated that on Pittsburgh Allegheny Co.v. Commis- Coal tection Clause. (1989). Allegheny In Cty., 488 U. S. sion Webster county comport with Pittsburgh, failed to we held that property equal requirements protection it assessed when appro- price, primarily purchase no with basis of taxes on the adjustments that new priate The result was time. over “roughly 8 35 times” property at owners were assessed longer. property Id., their the rate of those who had owned disparit[y]” levéis “gross in tax such a at We found system justified that that demanded in a state could not be Id., equal 338; W. Va. uniform.” “taxation ... be §1. the commonsense affirmed Const., X, The case Art. Equal is proposition Clause violated Protection that “rough equality deprives citizen even state action specifically provides itself when state law tax.treatment,” category taxpayers in the same are the affected all Hillsborough v. Crom- purposes. 343; see S., at tax 488 U. (“The (1946) protection equal clause S. well, U. action which selects protects state . the individual from . . by subjecting discriminatory him to treatment him out for class”). imposed of the same on others taxes not *14 Brisbane/Manning Sanitary In case, this Proj- the Sewers property ect allowed 180 owners to have their homes hooked up city Indianapolis’s (City) system to the sewer under the requires State’s Barrett Law. That law sewer costs to “be primarily apportioned equally among abutting all lands or (2011). 36-9^39-15(b)(3) § lots.” Ind. Code In the case of Brisbane/Manning, property $9,278 the cost came to for each property petitioners owner. Some of the here— owners— paid up option full $9,278 front. elected Others paying Shortly hookup, City installments. after financing system switched to a forgive new and decided to hookup paying plan. debts of those on an installment City any portion pay- refused, however, to refund identically neighbors ments made their situated who had already paid the full amount due. The result was that while petitioners paid hookups, each $9,278 for their more neighbors paid than half their less than for the $500 same improvement quarter as $309.27. little as Another —some paid paid than $1,000. thus Petitioners between les.s 10 and hookups 30 times as neighbors. much for their sewer as their seeking justify gross disparity, In this ex- plained presented it that was with three choices: First, it could plan pay- have continued to collect the installment yet ments of those who had not their settled debts under the system. forgiven old it Second, could have all those debts given equivalent lump- refunds to those had who made payments up forgiven sum front. Or could have third, payments payments future and not refunded that had al- ready been made. The two choices first had the benefit of complying treating Indianapolis’s law, with state all of citi- equally, comporting zens City with the Constitution. The option. third
chose the justify And what did the believe was sufficient system effectively charge petitioners that would 80 times neighbors more than their for the same service—when state *15 things: equal desire promised Two the treatment? law challeng[e]” “fiscal[] of hassle and avoid administrative Respond- keep. money for giving Brief back wanted pass agree constitu- that reasons I cannot those ents 35-36. review. rational basis muster, tional even under options tran- City argues for the other that The either been sitioning away have Law would the Barrett from standpoint.” “immensely difficult from an administrative observing accepts that rationale, Id., 36. The this Court justify a tax- “[o]rdinarily, can considerations administrative Court cases the 682. The Ante, at related distinction.” legisla- proposition only that a however, cites, stand for the may crafting concerns take administrative ture tax scheme creating entities of taxable into when classes consideration g., v. differently. may Lehnhausen e. See, that taxed be (a (1973) State 356, 359 Co., Auto Parts 410 U. S. Lake Shore or entities may one class of individuals that treat “draw lines Kentucky, others”); differently 309 U. S. v. Madden from (1940)(referring classifi- as to to the discretion 83, 87 “broad possessed legislature”); v. Southern Carmichael cation (1937) (discussing 495, 510-511 Co., Coal & Coke 301 U. S. establishing legislature permissible considerations scheme). a tax provides explicitly
Here, however, Indiana’s tax scheme among equally primarily apportioned that “be costs will §36-9-39-15(b)(3) abutting Code all lands or Ind. lots.” added). legislature decreed (emphasis therefore The has abutting We the same class. are within that all landowners justify burdens before held administrative never pro- has grossly disparate the State treatment of those tax Allegheny Pitts- Indeed, be alike. vided should treated county argued unequal burgh were assessments that its “[ajdministrative cost[]” concerns, no avail. on based p. The Respondent, 87-1303, Brief for O. T. No. Equal rejected argument is obvious: reason we have this “deny provide shall no State not Protection Clause does any person jurisdiction equal protection within its the laws, unless it’s much of a too bother.”
Even if Court were to decide inclined that adminis- may justify grossly dispar- trative burdens alone sometimes ate treatment of members class, same this would hardly be the case to do that. The claims it cannot process issue refunds because the be difficult, would too re- pore quiring projects that it over records of old to determine *16 overpaid by which homeowners had how much. Brief Respondents holding City for 36. But the must refund petitioners’ overpayments would not mean that it has to overpayments every refund project. in Law Barrett The Equal “gross” disparity Protection Clause is concerned with taxing. in Brisbane/Manning Project the Because was initi- shortly ated disparity before Barrett the the transition, petitioners paid comparison between what in their install- plan neighbors ment respect was dramatic. Not so with to, example, project years for a initiated 10 earlier, because projects payers plan for those even installment will have largely resulting significant satisfied their debts, in far less disparities. ruling petitioners
To require the extent a issuing would overpaid refunds others who under the Barrett Law, I City up think the to the workers are task. The has in already produced showing exactly fact records how much lump-sum every payer overpaid each in Barrett Law active project penny. Indianapolis, in Cox Record v. —to (SD (Exh. Ind.), A). No. 1:09-cv-0435 Doc. 98-1 What the City'employees would need to do, therefore, is cut the checks and mail them out.
Certainly job complicated proce- not need involve the dure attempt the Court describes an to bolster adminis- its argument. trative convenience Under Court’s view the apparently accept monthly payments would continue to plan from gradually installment homeowners in order to repay money paid lump owes those who sum. approach never dreamt But this was
Ante, at (setting Respondents Brief for itself. See options,” [transition] City’s none of which out “three basic scheme). gradual the Court’s refund involved City’s suggests conven- administrative The that the Court argument law is comfortable. with which the ience is one forgive compares City’s the install- decision to The Court mortgage parking ticket and ment to the sort balances currently amnesty payment programs Ante, abound. Amnesty programs misplaced: are analogy at 683. This is unlikely pay designed their are ever to to entice those who portion pay of what at least debts to come forward they alone that It is convenience owe. not administrative help justifies rem- In a these schemes sense, such schemes. pay edy payment inequities by prompting would those who nothing pay The same their fair share. least some of system. cannot be said willing con- “administrative to concede that Court is justify system” in which an unfair siderations could not ... among city arbitrarily allocate^] a few citizens while “a taxes *17 ground forgiving many similarly that on citizens situated people cheaper from a few it to collect taxes is and easier many.” comfort, that. than 685-686. Cold Ante, from accurately quoted language case, this describe If the not does I am what it would reach. not sure City’s wisely alternative
The embrace the Court does not justified argument unequal because is that tax burden challenging fiscally “it refunds.” to issue would been gives “Fiscally challenging” Respondents Brief for 35. already euphemism it has claim that a name. The bad hardly response, spent petitioners’ money is worth a provide City recognizes it could it admits as much when payments from petitioners by “arranging] for refunds to- evade cannot at 36. One Id., non-Barrett sources.” expedi- simple money returning rightful to its owner challenge” justification spending seems it. ent of The “fiscal City an particularly inappropriate case, as the in this —with
693 budget approximately annual $900 million—admits that petitioners’ money refunding the cost of ap- all of would be proximately Adopted Budget $300,000. for the Consol- (Oct. Indianapolis, County 2011), idated Marion p. Arg. 7; Tr. of Oral n Equally unconvincing attempt distinguish is the Court’s Allegheny Pittsburgh. The Court claims that case was dif- ferent requirement because it involved “a clear state-law clearly dramatically Nothing Ante, violated.” at 687. requires less is at stake here. Indiana law that the costs of projects “apportioned equally among sewer abutting be all 36-9-39-15(b)(3). § lands.” Ind. Code The has instead apportioned Brisbane/Manning Project costs such petitioners paid between 10 and 30 times as much as neighbors. their still, Worse has done so in order to avoid money. para- administrative hassle and save a bit of To phrase profits city A Man for All nothing Seasons: “It give up treating equally its citizens for the whole world . .. but $300,000?” for Bolt, See R. A Man for All Seasons, act (1st 1990). p. Vintage II, Int’l ed. precedents government
Our do not ask for much from only “rough equality this in tax treatment.” Alle- area — gheny Pittsburgh, U. S., at 343. The Court reminds us Allegheny Pittsburgh Ante, is a “rare case.” at 687. give great leeway taxing It is and should we be; authori- good every area, ties generation this and sufficient reasons. But along comes so case when this Court needs say enough enough, Equal is if the Protection Clause is to any Allegheny Pittsburgh retain force in this context. was promised case; such a so neighbor- is one. Indiana this law ing they equally homeowners that would be treated when it paying hookups. came to up for sewer then ended *18 charging charged some homeowners 30 times what it their neighbors hookups. equal protection for the same vio- plain. accordingly lation is I would reverse the decision of Supreme respectfully Indiana Court, and dissent from the Court’s decision to do otherwise.