JAMES CAMPBELL, APPELLANT, v. UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.
No. 18-CO-894
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
January 30, 2020
Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia (CF2-10147-14)
(Hon. Milton Lee, Motion Judge)
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
(Submitted October 10, 2019 Decided January 30, 2020)
Vincent A. Jankoski was on the brief for appellant.
Jessie K. Liu, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, Bernard Delia, and Kristina Ament, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
Before BLACKBURNE-RIGSBY, Chief Judge, THOMPSON, Associate Judge, and NEBEKER, Senior Judge.
I.
The factual background of this case is set out more fully in this court‘s opinion in Campbell v. United States, 163 A.3d 790 (D.C. 2017) (”Campbell I“). The following is a brief summary of the facts pertinent to the instant appeal. At approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 9, 2014, Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD“) Officer George Poor was on routine patrol in the area of Third and I Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., when he observed an Infiniti sedan parked on a grassy median between two parking lots in the vicinity of Mount Carmel Baptist Church. Because the area was known for prostitution, the car was parked in an unusual manner, and the rear passenger window of the car was missing and had been replaced with a towel, Officer Poor decided to drivе into the parking lot, turn on his emergency lights, and approach the Infiniti on foot with a flashlight. The car was not running and no lights were on in the vehicle. As Officer Poor shined his flashlight into the car, he observed an individual, later identified as Mr. Campbell, slumped in the driver‘s seat of the car. The officer testified that the individual‘s lack of reaction to the emergency lights and to the officer‘s approach made him “somewhat concernеd for the well-being of the person inside the car[.]” At this point, Officer Poor knocked on the driver‘s window to get Mr. Campbell‘s attention. As Officer Poor was looking into the vehicle, he observed a bottle of Absolut vodka “a third to maybe halfway empty” in the front center console, in the proximity of Mr. Campbell‘s right arm. When asked by Officer Poor whether he had been drinking, Mr. Campbell admitted to taking “a couple of sips” of the vodka. Officеr Poor arrested Mr. Campbell for possession of an open container of alcohol (“POCA“). In the search incident to that arrest, he recovered the key to the car in appellant‘s pocket, two stolen watches, and a screwdriver, as well as paperwork indicating that Mr. Campbell was not the owner of the Infiniti. A further search at the police station revealed four shards of glass in Mr. Campbell‘s pocket, which appeared to be consistent with the shards found on and near the shattered window of the Infiniti.
On October 3, 2014, Mr. Campbell, through his counsel, filed a motion to “suppress any tangible evidence obtained as a result of [his] illegal stop” and subsequent arrest, arguing that Officer Poor had no reason to stop Mr. Campbell because his vehicle was parked in a private parking lot, the officer had no basis to believe the vehicle was parked illegally, there was no basis for an investigative detention, the
On November 4, 2014, the trial court denied Mr. Campbell‘s suppression motion, addressing it after resolving appellant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal. As to the latter motion, the trial court reasoned, without objection from appellant‘s trial counsel, that the evidence sufficed for conviction on the POCA count because the bottle of liquor was unsealed and was in physical proximity to appellant. In addrеssing the motion to suppress, the trial court reasoned that the officer‘s observation that the vehicle had a broken window and was parked on grass instead of in one of the many available parking spaces, his further observation that there was “somebody possibly asleep [or unconscious] in the driver‘s seat,” and his knowledge that the area was known for prostitution gave the officer “at least reasonable articulable suspicion” to investigate further. Appellant‘s trial counsel responded that the vehicle‘s location on private property meant that anything strange about where the vehicle was parked did not give the officer “a right to approach.” When the court then remarked that the officer‘s (flashlight-assisted) observation of a half-empty bottle of vodka in the vehicle provided probable сause, appellant did not object that an open container on private property did not provide probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a POCA violation, but said only that he would “submit on the evidence at this point[.]”
On November 5, 2014, the jury found appellant guilty of first-degree theft (vehicle), receiving stolen property (“RSP“) (vehicle), unauthorized use of a vehicle (“UUV“), and POCA. In his direct aрpeal, appellant argued that his arrest for POCA, i.e., for possession of an open container in a vehicle “in or upon any street, alley, park, or parking area,”
On August 1, 2017, Mr. Campbell filed a
This appeal followed. Appellant argues that the trial court‘s rationale for denying his
II.
The following principles guide our analysis. In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that his counsel‘s performance was deficient, and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish deficiency, a defendant must show that trial counsel “made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Dickerson v. District of Columbia, 182 A.3d 721, 730 (D.C. 2018) (internal quotations omitted). To show prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. We need not address both prongs of the test if appellant does not meet the burden of one or the other showing. Id. at 697.
“Where defense counsel‘s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.” Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251, 256 (D.C. 2012). More specifically, and as is pertinent here, a contention of prejudice arising from a failure to effectively litigate a motion requires a multi-step analysis. Turner v. United States, 116 A.3d 894, 934–35 (D.C. 2015). The defendant must first demonstrate a “reasonable probability that a competent attorney” would have filed the motion the question. Id. He must then demonstrate a reasonable probability that the motion, if properly litigated, would have been granted, and that if the motion had been granted, it is reasonably probable that the trial would have ended in an acquittal. Id.
An appellate court may affirm a judgment on any valid ground, including reasons other than those given by the trial court, so long as the appellant has had “a reasonable opportunity to be heard with respect to the reasoning on which the proposed
“We review the trial court‘s denial of appellant‘s
III.
The government agrees with appellant (as do we) that the trial court‘s rationale in denying the
Specifically, the government contends that Officer Poor‘s belief, i.e., that the grassy median between the two private parking lots came within the reach of the POCA statute, was a reasonable mistake, see Heien v. North Carolina3; and that even though Officer Poor lacked probable cause to arrest appellant for a POCA violation, he had probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence of alcohol (“DUI“). Appellant argues that Mr. Campbell‘s arrest for POCA was unreasonable because MPD was already on notice at the time of the arrest that the POCA statute did not cover conduct on private property.4
In Heien, a police officer pulled over a car for having a broken brake light, purporting to еnforce a state law requiring that “all originally equipped rear lamps” be “in good working order.” Heien, 574 U.S. at 57 (citing to
Analogous to the vehicle code provision involved in Heien, at the time of Mr. Campbell‘s arrest, our POCA statute was without a definition of “parking area” and was ambiguous as to what constituted the same, and this court had not yet had an opportunity to resolve the ambiguity. It was reasonable for Officer Poor to rely on the ordinary meaning of the term “parking area,” see, e.g., Boyle v. Giral, 820 A.2d 561, 568 (D.C. 2003) (“We look to the plain meaning of a statute first, construing words according to their ordinary meaning.“), especially given that this court had previоusly affirmed a POCA conviction based on possession of an open container of vodka in the parking lot of a private employer. See Derosiers v. District of Columbia, 19 A.3d 796, 798 (D.C. 2011). The question presented in the instant appeal is not whether the grassy median upon which Mr. Campbell was parked qualifies as a “parking area” that falls within the ambit of the POCA statute (we have already decided that it does not), but only whether Officer Poor‘s belief that it so qualifiеd was objectively reasonable at the time of appellant‘s arrest. We conclude that the officer‘s mistaken belief was objectively reasonable, and that his action in arresting Mr. Campbell was reasonable, albeit mistaken. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 854 F.3d 197, 203–5 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Officer Aybar had probable cause to arrest Diaz for a violation of New York‘s open-container law based on a reasonable belief that an apartment-building stairwеll is a public place for purposes of that law[,]” an assessment that was “premised on a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous state law, the scope of which had not yet been clarified“; citing Heien).
Appellant counters that the government‘s Heien argument is refuted by the “Report and Recommendations of the Police Complaints Board to Mayor Adrian M. Fenty, the Council of the District of Columbia, and Police Chief Cathy Lanier dated August 17, 2009” (“Report“). The Report recognized that MPD‘s then-current enforcement of the POCA statute could lead to arbitrary enforcement and constitutional
While the Report may have put MPD on notice abоut the intricacies of the POCA statute as it applies in residential areas (particularly front and back yards), we are not persuaded that the Report (or any training that might have followed it) undermines the reasonableness of Officer Poor‘s pre-Campbell I belief that appellant‘s possession of an open bottle of vodka in a vehicle parked in a grassy median in a church parking lot violated the POCA statute. That being the case, we cannot conclude that the officer‘s arrest of appellant for POCA, albeit not authorized by the POCA statute, was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Officer Poor also likely had probable cause to arrest Mr. Campbell for DUI. See
Because Officer Poor‘s conduct in arresting Mr. Campbell for a POCA violation was reasonable under Heien and because Officer Poor also likely had probable cause to arrest appellant for DUI, appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that his motion to suppress would have been successful even if his trial counsel had included in it the statutory-construction argument on which appellant prevailed in his direct appeal. Accordingly, appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that the fruits of the search incident to his POCA arrest would have been deemed inadmissible by the trial court, and thus has not shown prejudice from trial counsel‘s omission. We therefore affirm the trial
So ordered.