224 A.3d 205
D.C.2020Background:
- At ~3:00 a.m. on June 9, 2014, MPD Officer Poor found an Infiniti parked on a grassy median between two private parking lots, with a broken rear passenger window replaced by a towel and a person (James Campbell) slumped in the driver’s seat.
- Officer Poor shined a flashlight into the car, saw a one-third to half-empty bottle of vodka in the center console; Campbell admitted taking “a couple of sips.” Officer Poor arrested him for possession of an open container (POCA). A search incident to arrest recovered car keys, stolen watches, a screwdriver, and glass shards.
- Trial counsel moved to suppress evidence as the fruit of an illegal stop/arrest, arguing the car was on private property; counsel chose to resolve the suppression issue on trial testimony and did not press a statutory-construction argument that POCA does not reach private-property parking areas.
- Jury convicted Campbell of first-degree theft (vehicle), UUV, RSP (vehicle), and POCA; on direct appeal this court (Campbell I) reversed the POCA conviction, holding the grassy median on private property was not a “parking area” under § 25‑1001(a)(2), but affirmed the other convictions.
- Campbell filed a D.C. Code § 23‑110 motion alleging trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue at trial that the POCA statute did not apply to private-property parking; the trial court denied the motion without a hearing, and this appeal followed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advance a statutory-construction POCA argument at trial | Campbell: counsel omitted the dispositive argument that POCA excludes an open container in a vehicle parked on private-property grassy median, causing prejudice | Govt: even if counsel omitted it, the omission was not prejudicial because the officer’s belief that the location fell within POCA was objectively reasonable and alternative probable cause (DUI) existed | Held: No ineffective assistance — counsel’s omission did not create reasonable probability of a different outcome; denial of § 23‑110 affirmed |
| Whether Officer Poor’s mistaken belief that the grassy median was a POCA “parking area” made the arrest reasonable under Heien, and whether alternative probable cause (DUI) justified the arrest and admission of evidence | Campbell: MPD had prior notice/training issues and Campbell’s arrest could not be justified as POCA or DWI because he was on private property and there was no evidence he operated the vehicle while intoxicated on a highway | Govt: Officer’s reading of the ambiguous term “parking area” was objectively reasonable (Heien); in any event, facts supported probable cause for DUI | Held: Officer’s mistake was objectively reasonable under Heien; probable cause for DUI was likely; suppression would not probably have succeeded |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell v. United States, 163 A.3d 790 (D.C. 2017) (direct appeal reversing POCA conviction because private grassy median is not a “parking area”)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) (an objectively reasonable mistake of law can justify a stop/arrest under the Fourth Amendment)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (standard for ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Porter v. United States, 37 A.3d 251 (D.C. 2012) (when ineffectiveness centers on a Fourth Amendment claim, defendant must show the claim is meritorious and prejudice likely)
- Turner v. United States, 116 A.3d 894 (D.C. 2015) (multi-step framework for prejudice from failure to litigate a motion)
- Diaz v. United States, 854 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.) (reasonable interpretation of ambiguous law can support arrest for open-container violations)
- Derosiers v. District of Columbia, 19 A.3d 796 (D.C. 2011) (upholding POCA conviction based on open container in private-employer parking lot)
- Bell v. District of Columbia, 132 A.3d 854 (D.C. 2015) (principles on ‘‘physical control’’ for DUI statutes)
- Copeland v. United States, 111 A.3d 627 (D.C. 2015) (standard of review for denial of § 23‑110 motion without a hearing)
