TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL State of California ROB BONTA Attorney General
No. 25-902
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL State of California
May 28, 2026
The HONORABLE LISA A. SMITTCAMP, DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF FRESNO COUNTY, has requested an opinion on whether state law preempts a Fresno County Ordinance addressing copper wire theft.
QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION
Is Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008, which regulates the possession or transportation of commercial copper wire, preempted by state law?
No, Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008, regulating the possession or transportation of commercial copper wire, is not preempted by state law.
BACKGROUND
Fresno County has adopted Ordinance No. 25-008, regulating certain activities in connection with the possession of scrap, commercial-grade copper wire by individuals without a licensed business.1 The ordinance declares the prohibited activities to be a
California law criminalizes receipt of stolen property generally, as well as theft of copper components specifically. California law also closely regulates secondhand sales of scrap metals, specifically including copper components, imposing both administrative and criminal penalties depending on the nature of the violation.
Thus, Ordinance No. 25-008 operates within legal areas where state laws are in effect. This circumstance gives rise to the possibility that state law might preempt Ordinance No. 25-008. Recognizing this possibility, the Fresno County District Attorney‘s Office has requested our opinion as to whether its ordinance is preempted.
ANALYSIS
We will begin our analysis by describing Fresno‘s copper wire ordinance. Next, we will lay out the general principles under which state law may preempt local law, and then identify the relevant state statutes that might preempt Fresno‘s ordinance. Finally, we will compare the potentially preemptive aspects of the relevant state statutes to the ordinance. We end by concluding that state law does not preempt Fresno‘s ordinance.
1. Fresno County Copper Wire Ordinance
Last year, the Fresno County Board of Supervisors enacted Ordinance No. 25-008, pertaining to the illegal possession and transportation of scrap commercial-grade copper wire.3
Findings and declarations in the ordinance describe the particular conditions in Fresno County that have made copper wire theft such a problem there.4 Fresno County is a preeminent locus of commercial agriculture, providing food and other agricultural resources throughout California and across the nation. Its modern operations are characterized by wide-open spaces made productive by large-scale waterworks and machinery. Energy and telecommunication networks are essential to the industry, requiring transmission lines, often made of copper or aluminum, to operate. These metals
In support of its ordinance, the County of Fresno made findings that commercial copper lines “are nearly always sheathed in a protective, insulating coating of rubber, plastic or similar material which contains markings that identify the type of wire or cable and its lawful owner. Once the sheathing is removed it is difficult for law enforcement to identify the lawful owner of the wire or cable. Wire or cable which has had the sheathing removed also sells for more money to recyclers and junk dealers. For both reasons, metal thieves typically strip off, burn off, or otherwise remove this protective sheathing before attempting to sell the stolen metal as scrap.”6 Further, the County of Fresno found that metal theft in the County is overwhelmingly carried out by “individuals acting on their own, with no legitimate business affiliation or purpose.”7
Based on its findings, Fresno County enacted Ordinance No. 25-008 prohibiting a person to possess ten or more pounds of commercial grade scrap metal (“receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, cable, transformer coils [or other electrical components] with a total aggregate weight of 10 lbs. or more“).8 A separate provision prohibits possession of stripped commercial grade copper wire (“receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable which has had its sheathing stripped, burned off, or otherwise removed“).9 And a third provision prohibits the act of stripping or burning the coating off of commercial wire.10
2. Principles Governing State Preemption of Local Laws
Under California Supreme Court precedent, a conflict between state and local law arises if a local law duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by state law.13
An ordinance duplicates state law when it is coextensive with state law.14
An ordinance contradicts state law when it is “inimical to or cannot be reconciled with” state law.15
An ordinance can enter a field fully occupied by state law in either of two ways. First, the Legislature may fully occupy a legal field by expressly stating its intent to preclude local legislation on the subject.16
- (1) the subject is so completely covered by state law as to clearly indicate that it is now a matter of exclusive state concern;
- (2) the subject is partially covered by state law, and “couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or additional local action“; or
- (3) the subject is partially covered by state law, and the “adverse effect of a local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefit” to the locality.18
With these principles in mind, we turn to a survey of the state laws that are potentially implicated by Fresno‘s ordinance.
3. Relevant State Laws
In 2025, the California Department of Justice prepared a compilation of California laws pertaining to vandalism and theft of copper wire. Recognizing a statewide rise in copper wire thefts, the Department issued a law enforcement bulletin summarizing existing California statutes related to copper wire theft, and laws governing junk dealer or recyclers’ obligations to collect and report information regarding the receipt, purchase, and sale of copper wire.19
Laws relating to copper wire theft include:
Penal Code section 487 (grand theft, i.e., stealing, taking, or carrying away another‘s personal property exceeding $950);Penal Code section 487j (theft of copper materials exceeding $950);Penal Code section 496 (receiving stolen property, i.e., buying, receiving, concealing, selling, or withholding property from the owner);Penal Code section 591 (cutting or disconnecting a utility line);Penal Code section 594 (vandalism, i.e., damaging or destroying the real or personal property of another).
There is also a body of laws regulating secondhand dealers and recyclers, who buy and sell scrap metals. These include:
Business and Professions Code section 21600 et seq. (recordkeeping and reporting requirements for dealers trading in scrap copper wire);Business and Professions Code section 21609 (peace officer having probable cause may place 90-day hold on property in possession of scrap dealer);Penal Code section 496a (scrap dealer to record seller‘s identity; to maintain records; not to receive metals belonging to public utility).
While all these statutes might be deployed to support a general goal of preventing copper wire theft, two of them are most relevant to our preemption analysis. There is no need for us to dwell on the scrap dealer statutes because Fresno‘s ordinance expressly does not apply to secondhand scrap dealers or recyclers, and nothing in the scrap dealer laws reflects an intent to occupy the field covered by Fresno‘s ordinance.20 Nor need we engage in extended analysis of the theft crimes (
Consequently, we will focus our preemption analysis on two general laws—
4. Application of Preemption Principles to Fresno‘s Ordinance
In determining whether state law preempts local law, the ultimate question we must answer is whether the ordinance conflicts with the state statute. As set out above, a conflict exists if the ordinance duplicates the statute, contradicts it, or intrudes into a field that is already fully occupied by state law. Field preemption may be either express or implied (in one of three ways).
We will proceed through this sequence twice—once for the sections of the ordinance concerning possession of stolen property (
a. Possession of Stolen Property (Penal Code section 496 )
The first preemption question we take up is duplication: Does Fresno‘s copper wire ordinance duplicate state law in
(a) Every person who buys or receives any property that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any property from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail . . . .
Fresno County‘s ordinance addresses similar behavior, but limits the applicable property to specified items of scrap metal, as follows:
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, cable, transformer coils, transformer bands, power conducting components, or control system components of the type commonly found in electrical switch gear, or any combination thereof, with a total aggregate weight of 10 lbs. or more.
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable which has had its sheathing stripped, burned off, or otherwise removed.
Comparing the state law to Fresno‘s ordinance, it becomes plain that one does not duplicate the other, because they are not coextensive. While the state law applies to any kind of property stolen under any circumstances, Fresno‘s law targets a narrow set of scrap metal items associated with a particular type of local theft. “[C]overing some of the same ground as a state law is not enough to render an ordinance duplicative for preemption purposes.”24
The two laws differ in other ways as well, having to do with the burden of proof and the imposition of penalties.
Fresno‘s ordinance is different. It takes the form of a “public welfare” offense, imposing regulatory liability for possession of controlled items without the necessity of specifically proving guilty knowledge that the items were stolen.26 Laws of this nature are generally upheld when the importance of the public interest in controlling a noxious item justifies holding violators liable without proof of more specific intent.27 In this case, Fresno‘s ordinance closely defines the controlled items (scrap, commercial-grade copper
The second preemption question we must answer is whether the ordinance contradicts the statute. It does not. The ordinance does not prohibit anything that the statute commands, nor command anything that the statute prohibits.
That leaves field preemption, which asks whether the ordinance intrudes into an area that is already fully occupied by the statute. Field preemption may be either express or implied.
As for express preemption, we conclude that the Legislature did not expressly manifest its intent to fully occupy any area when it passed
As for implied preemption, recall that courts have identified three situations in which state enactments will impliedly preempt local laws. The first is when the subject matter of the local ordinance has been so fully and completely covered by state law as to clearly indicate that the field has become exclusively a matter of state concern. Here,
As a matter of law, a general criminal statute does not automatically occupy the field to preempt local government regulation in the same subject matter area.32 “Case law establishes that an ordinance designed to discourage criminal acts is not necessarily preempted by the statute proscribing those acts.”33 For example, Harrahill v. City of Monrovia involved an ordinance prohibiting minors to be in a public place during school hours; violators would be issued an administrative citation in “juvenile traffic court.”34 At the same time, state truancy statutes under the Education Code imposed a detailed schedule of fines and penalties on truant students (including school discipline, community service, or judicial supervision) for repeated absences from school.35 Even though the state law created a general scheme for enforcing truancy rules, the Court of Appeal concluded that the local ordinance‘s juvenile daytime curfew did not intrude into a field fully occupied by state law. The court reasoned that “the ‘field’ at issue is the regulation of off-campus juvenile activity during school hours. And there is no indication that the Legislature has sought to occupy this field, either expressly or by implication.”36 Likewise, here, there is no indication that the Legislature has sought to occupy the field of receiving stolen property to the exclusion of any local regulation.
Implied preemption has sometimes also been found when a collection of statutes works together to occupy an entire legal field. This may be seen, for example, in the areas of firearms regulation, sex offender regulation, and crime-related vehicle forfeiture.37 Thus, looking at the 2025 Department of Justice bulletin compiling laws
“A preempted field ‘cannot properly consist of statutes unified by a single common noun,’ but rather requires closely related statutes that regulate an area in a manner that reveals a legislative intent to occupy the field.”38 So it is not enough that each of the statutes collected here pertains to the subject of stolen copper wire. To find preemption, there must also be evidence that the Legislature intended for the selected statutes to work collectively and interactively.39 There is no such evidence here.40 Unlike areas where the Legislature has enacted a single, comprehensive legislative scheme, the statutes relevant to copper wire theft were enacted over time, in piecemeal fashion.41 And nothing in the legislative record suggests that, through this series of enactments, the Legislature intended to calibrate a complete set of offenses pertaining to copper wire theft, excluding any further local regulation.42 Rather, the Legislature has emphasized that theft of copper wire and other metals is a “growing problem,” which it has sought to combat over time through an expanding collection of state-law measures.43
That leaves the second and third possible paths to implied preemption. The second path explores whether the subject matter of the ordinance is partially covered by the statute in a way that clearly indicates a paramount state concern will not tolerate additional local governmental action. Field preemption happens only when “the nature and extent of the coverage of a field is such that it could be said to display a patterned approach to the subject.”46 For example, in the areas of firearms regulation, convicted sex offender regulation, and crime-related vehicle forfeiture, state laws have been found to preempt their respective fields because they contain interacting sets of statutes imposing a planned, calibrated regulatory system across a defined set of events.47 We see no such pattern or comprehensive scheme here.
The third, and least-traveled, path to implied preemptive intent explores whether the subject matter of the ordinance has been partially covered by the statute and is of such a nature to cause undue adverse effects on transient persons. This factor is often cited but little explained in the governing case law.49 It is described as guarding against local laws “in which transient citizens of the state are peculiarly concerned, as they are or might be in regulation of traffic or registration of criminals.”50 We understand this factor as a concern for people who, travelling from place to place within the state, might be disadvantaged by unexpected variations in the prevailing local rules. Applying the factor, we do perceive that state law partially covers the problem of possessing stolen copper wire, but we do not perceive any danger that the ordinance will have undue adverse effects on transient citizens. The ordinance specifically does not apply to those individuals most likely to be blindsided by it, including “a junk dealer or recycler” or “any licensed general contractor, subcontractor, or business engaged in the construction, repair, or demolition of buildings, to commercial agricultural businesses, to commercial manufacturing businesses, to licensed businesses engaged in the transport or hauling of materials including scrap metal or commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, or to the agents or employees of those entities.”51 Given its broad exceptions, we conclude that the ordinance is not preempted because of an adverse effect on transient persons.
In view of the foregoing, we conclude that
b. Vandalism (Penal Code section 594 )
We now repeat the steps of the preemption analysis for section 6.27.050 of Fresno‘s ordinance, which prohibits the act of stripping copper wire of its sheathing. The first preemption question we take up is duplication: Does the ordinance duplicate state law prohibiting vandalism? Is the ordinance coextensive with the statute?
(a) Every person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his or her own, in cases other than those specified by state law, is guilty of vandalism:
(1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material.
(2) Damages.
(3) Destroys.
. . .
We compare this statute with
No person shall strip, burn, or otherwise remove the sheathing from commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable.
Again, both provisions address doing damage to the property of another. But the differences in scope are stark: Where
The second preemption question we must answer is whether the ordinance contradicts the statute. It does not. The ordinance does not prohibit what the statute commands or command what it prohibits.
The third preemption issue is whether the ordinance intrudes into an area of law that has been fully occupied by the statute.
The first question for field preemption is whether there is express preemptive intent. We conclude that the Legislature did not expressly manifest an intent to fully occupy an area when it passed
After express preemption, we consider whether there is implied preemptive intent. Again, there are three ways that implied preemption may occur. The first asks whether the subject matter of the ordinance has been so completely covered by state law as to
The second path to implied preemption asks whether the ordinance‘s subject matter has been partially covered by the statute “in such terms as to clearly indicate that a paramount state concern will not tolerate local governmental action.”54 By its terms,
Nothing in this code shall invalidate an ordinance of, nor be construed to prohibit the adoption of an ordinance by, a city, city and county, or county, if the ordinance regulates the sale of aerosol containers of paint or other liquid substances capable of defacing property or sets forth civil administrative regulations, procedures, or civil penalties governing the
(continued...)
Lastly, there is no preemption by the third path here either. Again, for the same reasons identified above in connection with possession of copper wire, the act of stripping copper wire is not a matter in which transient persons would be particularly vulnerable.58
Accordingly, we conclude that
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Fresno County Ordinance No. 25-008 is not preempted by state law.
placement of graffiti or other inscribed material on public or private, real or personal property.
See also
Pen. Code, § 13825 (state graffiti clearinghouse for abatement grants and programs).
Chapter 6.27 - ILLEGAL POSSESSION OR TRANSPORTATION OF COMMERCIAL COPPER WIRE
§ 6.27.010 - Title, purpose, and intent.
This Chapter shall be known as the Commercial Grade Scrap Metal Ordinance. The Board of Supervisors finds that commercial agriculture is vital to the economy of the County of Fresno. Businesses engaged in commercial agriculture rely upon infrastructure, such as energy transmission and telecommunication lines, to operate. Transmission and telecommunication lines, and related infrastructure, are often made of copper or aluminum, which can be sold as scrap metal to recyclers or junk dealers. Although these components are much more valuable to their lawful owners when used for their intended purpose, they are nevertheless frequently stolen by thieves seeking to sell copper or aluminum components as scrap. The process of stealing copper and aluminum components renders vital infrastructure inoperable until repaired, thereby harming the public health, safety and welfare which depend on such infrastructure. The cost of repairing and replacing infrastructure damaged by metal thieves substantially burdens businesses, public utilities, law enforcement and the public generally. Although the damage caused by metal thieves burdens all residents of the County, commercial agricultural businesses are particularly vulnerable to metal thieves due to the rural nature of agriculture. It is estimated that metal thieves inflicted over $3 million in damage to commercial operations in the County of Fresno alone in 2023.
Telecommunications and transmission lines are nearly always sheathed in a protective, insulating coating of rubber, plastic or similar material which contains markings that identify the type of wire or cable and its lawful owner. Once the sheathing is removed it is difficult for law enforcement to identify the lawful owner of the wire or cable. Wire or cable which has had the sheathing removed also sells for more money to recyclers and junk dealers. For both reasons, metal thieves typically strip off, burn off, or otherwise remove this protective sheathing before attempting to sell the stolen metal as scrap.
Existing California law regulates the businesses of junk dealing and recycling, requiring businesses to adhere to extensive regulations when accepting scrap metal for recycling, but those laws are not readily applied to individuals without a business affiliation. However, metal theft in the County of Fresno is overwhelming carried out by individuals acting on their own, with no legitimate business affiliation or purpose. Additionally,
§ 6.27.020 - Definitions.
For the purposes of this chapter:
A. “Commercial grade” refers to copper or aluminum wire or cable with a total diameter of .15 inches or greater, exclusive of any sheathing or coating, or telecommunications cable with fifty or more pairs of conductors in a single cable.
B. “Sheathing” means the coating, typically made of plastic, rubber or a similar substance, which insulates and protects commercial grade wire or cable, and often bears markings which identify the lawful owner, purpose, or source of the wire or cable.
C. “Scrap” means material derived from manufactured components, such as transmission or telecommunications lines, which is no longer useful for its intended purpose and is primarily valuable for recycling.
§ 6.27.030 - Receipt, possession and transportation of commercial grade scrap metal.
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire, cable, transformer coils, transformer bands, power conducting components, or control system components of the type commonly found in electrical switch gear, or any combination thereof, with a total aggregate weight of 10 lbs. or more. This section does not apply to a junk dealer or recycler within the meaning of
§ 6.27.040 - Receipt, possession, and transportation of stripped commercial grade wire.
No person shall receive, possess, or transport scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable which has had its sheathing stripped, burned off, or otherwise removed. This section does not apply to a junk dealer or recycler within the meaning of
§ 6.27.050 - Stripping of commercial grade wire.
No person shall strip, burn, or otherwise remove the sheathing from commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable. This section does not apply to a junk dealer or recycler within the meaning of
A violation of this chapter is subject to enforcement through criminal prosecution, civil action, administrative citation, and civil penalties, as provided herein, including by injunction. Any violation of this chapter is a misdemeanor, punishable by up to 180 days in the County Jail, a fine of up to $1,000.00, or both.
§ 6.27.065 - Licensed businesses and proof of ownership.
A. Notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter 6.27 of the Fresno Ordinance Code, it shall be a defense to any criminal or civil enforcement of this Chapter, if, at the time of the alleged violation of Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, the person alleged to have violated these sections possesses a valid business license for one of the types of commercial activities listed in sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050, or other valid state or local business license which would render the activity prohibited by Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 a legal and legitimate commercial activity.
B. Notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter 6.27 of the Fresno Ordinance Code, it shall be a defense to any criminal or civil enforcement of this Chapter, if, at the time of the alleged violation of Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, the person alleged to have violated these sections possesses adequate written evidence of legal ownership of the scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable that is the subject of the alleged violation.
C. Notwithstanding any other provision in Chapter 6.27 of the Fresno Ordinance Code, no citation shall be issued to, and no arrest made of, any person having in their possession at the time of the alleged violation of Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, a business license as described in Subsection A, of this Section or adequate written evidence of ownership of the of the scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable that is the subject of the alleged violation as described in Subsection B, of this Section.
D. Any person who presents, shows or uses false, counterfeit or fraudulent written evidence of ownership of the scrap commercial grade copper or aluminum wire or cable alleged to be the subject of a violation of Sections 6.27.030, 6.27.040 or 6.27.050 of this Chapter, in an attempt to prove ownership of those materials shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to the criminal penalties provided in Section 6.27.060.
§ 6.27.080 - Public nuisance.
A violation of this chapter is hereby declared to be a public nuisance.
A. Administrative Citations. Pursuant to
B. Administrative fine amounts. The fine amounts for any administrative citation issued under this chapter shall be:
- 1. Five hundred dollars ($500) for a first violation.
- 2. Seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750) for a second violation of this chapter within one year of the first violation.
- 3. One thousand dollars ($1,000) for each violation of the same ordinance within one year of the first violation.
Revenues received from citations issued pursuant to the chapter shall be deposited in the account of the county department which issued the citation.
C. Contents of the Administrative Citation. An administrative citation issued for a violation of this chapter shall contain the following information: (a) the date of the violation and any previous administrative citations for violation of this chapter issued with the proceeding one-year period; (b) a description of the violation; (c) a reasonably clear description of where the violation occurred or was confirmed to have occurred; and (d) evidence identifying the person receiving the administrative citation as the person responsible for the violation.
D. Service of citations. An administrative citation issued pursuant to this chapter shall be served on the responsible person as follows:
- 1. The enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may personally serve the responsible person at any time. The enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may obtain the signature of the responsible person on the administrative citation, which shall create a presumption of personal service. The lack of signature shall in no way affect the validity of the administrative citation.
- 2. Alternatively, or in addition to personally serving the administrative citation, the enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may provide notice by mailing the administrative citation to the responsible person by first class mail, postage prepaid.
- 3. Alternatively, or in addition to, personally serving or mailing the administrative citation, an enforcement officer or deputy Sheriff may utilize
E. Effective date of service. Service of the administrative citation shall be effective on the date it was personally served, mailed, or otherwise delivered by the enforcement officer or deputy, regardless of when it is actually received by the responsible person.
F. Finality. Unless the responsible person properly requests a hearing to challenge an administrative citation issued pursuant to this chapter within 30 days of the date of issuance, the administrative citation shall constitute the final administrative order, and the imposition of the administrative penalty shall become a final order.
§ 6.27.100 - Appeals of administrative citations.
The procedures to appeal an administrative citation issued pursuant to this chapter are as follows:
A. Hearing Request. Any person issued an administrative citation for violation of this Chapter may contest the citation by requesting a hearing according to the procedures found in Section 1.13.170 of this code. A person financially unable to pay the administrative fine as provided in Section 1.13.170 may request an advance deposit hardship waiver as set forth in Section 1.13.180.
B. Hearing Officer. For hearings to challenge an administrative citations issued pursuant to this Chapter, the County Administrative Officer, or the designee thereof, in consultation with the Director of the enforcing department of the county, or the designee thereof, or the Sheriff-Coroner, or the designee thereof, shall appoint a hearing officer to preside over an administrative citation hearing that has been properly requested under the provisions of this chapter and this code.
C. Hearing Procedures. The procedures for a hearing to contest an administrative citation issued pursuant to this Chapter are the same as those procedures listed in Section 1.13.200 of this code.
D. Hearing Officer‘s Decision. A hearing officer appointed to hear a contest to an administrative citation issued pursuant to this Chapter shall follow the procedural requirements of Section 1.13.210 of this code.
E. Right to Judicial Review. Any person aggrieved by the decision of an administrative hearing officer in any hearing on an administrative citation under this Chapter, may obtain review of the administrative decision by filing a petition for review with the Fresno County Superior Court, in accordance with the timeline and other provisions set forth in
G. Recovery of Administrative Citations and Civil Penalties. The county may collect any past due administrative citation(s) or unpaid civil penalties, assessed, and issued pursuant to this Chapter, by use of any and all available legal means, including, without limitation, as a personal obligation or a lien recorded against any real property owned by the person(s) found to have violated this Chapter. County Counsel may bring a civil action in the name of the county to recover any past due administrative citation(s) or unpaid civil penalties and may enforce any judgment to collect any unpaid sum in the same manner as civil judgments.
§ 6.27.110 - Civil actions.
A. In addition to the remedies provided in this chapter, County Counsel may bring a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any person found to have violated this Chapter. In the civil action, County Counsel may pursue all available remedies authorized by law and may seek to recover all Costs related to the action.
B. The court in which such a proceeding is heard may assess a civil penalty in amount not to exceed $1,000 for each separate violation of this chapter. In determining the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall take into consideration all relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, the extent of harm caused by the violation, the nature and persistence of the violation, the fact of any past violations, and corrective action, if any taken by the violator.
§ 6.27.120 - Non-exclusive remedy.
This chapter is not the exclusive regulation or penalty for acts prohibited hereby. It supplements and is in addition to other regulatory codes, statutes, and ordinances heretofore or hereafter enacted by the County, state or any legal entity or agency having jurisdiction.
§ 6.27.130 - Severability.
If any portion of this chapter is held to be invalid by any court of competent jurisdiction, such decision shall not affect the validity or effectiveness of the remaining portions of this chapter. The Board hereby declares it would have passed each remaining portion irrespective of the fact that any one or more portions are declared invalid.