CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURERS & TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD, Defendant and Respondent.
C089451
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento)
Filed 5/17/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
Allen H. Sumner, Judge.
(Super. Ct. No. 34201780002769)
Reed Smith, Raymond A. Cardozo, and Brian A. Sutherland for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Matthew Rodriguez, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Robert W. Byrne, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tracy L. Winsor and Russell B. Hildreth, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
The State Water Resources Control Board (Board) is charged with implementing the California Safe Drinking Water Act, a comprehensive statutory scheme designed to ensure that members of the public are provided with safe and clean drinking water. (
The Board promulgated a regulation setting the drinking water standard for TCP in 2017. (
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal and California Safe Drinking Water Acts
Congress passed the Safe Drinking Water Act (the federal Act) in 1974. (Pub. L. No. 93-523 (Dec. 16, 1974) 88 Stat. 1660, codified at
Our Legislature passed California‘s version of the federal Act in 1976. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1087, § 2, pp. 4908-4930, formerly codified at § 4010 et seq., presently codified at
As relevant here, the Act directs the Board to promulgate “primary drinking water standards for contaminants in drinking water.” (
Environmental Health Hazard Assessment, and reflect “an estimate of the level of the contaminant in drinking water that is not anticipated to cause or contribute to adverse health effects, or that does not pose any significant risk to health.” (
Section 116365, subdivision (b), with which we are principally concerned, directs the Board to consider three criteria in setting MCLs. First, the Board must consider the public health goal for the contaminant. (
B. The Challenged Regulation
The Board began rulemaking proceedings to adopt an MCL for TCP in February 2017. An initial statement of reasons accompanying the proposed regulation describes TCP as a chlorinated hydrocarbon that has historically been used as an industrial solvent, cleaning and degreasing agent, and paint and varnish remover. TCP has also been found in soil fumigants. According to the initial statement of reasons, TCP has been detected in drinking water sources in a significant number of California counties (24 out of 58), including more than 100 drinking water sources in Kern County alone. As noted, TCP is a known carcinogen.
The initial statement of reasons sets forth the Board‘s findings for each of the criteria required by section 116365, subdivision (b) (summarized below), and proposes an MCL of 5 parts per trillion, the lowest and most protective of six possibilities considered by the Board.4 Most of the Board‘s findings are undisputed; even so, they are recounted here briefly for context.
First, the Board determined that the public health goal for TCP has been set at 0.7 parts per trillion, a determination the Association does not challenge. Thus, the Board was required to set the MCL for TCP “as close as feasible” to the public health goal of 0.7 parts per trillion. (
Third, the Board considered the technological and economic feasibility of six possible MCLs for TCP: 5, 7, 15, 35, 70, and 150 parts per trillion. For technological feasibility, the Board identified granular activated carbon as the best available technology for treating TCP in drinking water. The Board found that granular activated carbon has been shown to successfully reduce TCP in drinking water to levels below 5 parts per trillion, below the lowest of the MCLs under consideration. The Board thus determined that an MCL of 5 parts per trillion was technologically feasible, and “as close as feasible to the corresponding public health goal” of 0.7 parts per trillion. (
Turning to economic feasibility, the Board focused on the estimated costs of compliance for each of the contemplated MCLs, assuming the use of granular activated carbon as a treatment technology. For each possible MCL, the Board estimated the number of water systems that would be affected, the aggregate annual costs of compliance for all affected systems statewide, and the average annual costs for service connections (e.g., households or customers) in large water systems (with 200 or more service connections) and small water systems (with fewer than 200 service connections). These estimates (which the Association does not challenge) are summarized in the table below:
| Contemplated MCL | Annual aggregate costs (in millions) | Number of systems affected | Average annual cost for service connections in small water systems | Average annual cost for service connections in large water systems |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | $33.9 | 103 | $609 | $25 |
| 7 | $26.9 | 89 | $660 | $24 |
| 15 | $20.7 | 66 | $600 | $21 |
| 35 | $11.3 | 45 | $632 | $14 |
| 70 | $6.6 | 30 | $501 | $14 |
| 150 | $3.2 | 12 | $872 | $10 |
As shown in the table, the Board estimated that aggregate, statewide annual costs of compliance for the lowest and most protective MCL (5 parts per trillion) would be $33.9 million, compared to $3.2 million for the highest and least protective MCL (150 parts per trillion). Customers in small water
The Board also considered the benefits of the contemplated MCLs, including the “estimated annual cost per theoretical excess cancer cases reduced,” for large and small water systems. By way of example, the Board estimated that the aggregate annual cost of complying with an MCL of 5 parts per trillion would be $33.9 million and would result in the avoidance of 2.36 cancer cases, while the aggregate annual cost of complying with an MCL of 7 parts per trillion would be $26.9 million and would result in the avoidance of 2.32 cancer cases. As before, the Board anticipated that costs would be greater for small water systems, as small water systems would be unlikely to realize the same economies of scale as large water systems.
The Board identified other anticipated benefits of the proposed regulation, including ensuring access to safe and clean drinking water, reducing exposure to a chemical known to cause cancer, and reducing the use of bottled water and alternatives to drinking water such as sweetened beverages and soda. The Board did not attempt to assign dollar values to these benefits.
Turning to the ultimate question of economic feasibility, the Board concluded that the proposed MCL of 5 parts per trillion would not place a significant economic burden on the State of California as a whole. The Association does not challenge the Board‘s conclusion.
As noted, the Board also found the proposed MCL would raise rates for service connections in large water systems by an estimated $25 per year, or
As noted, the Board estimated the proposed MCL would raise rates for service connections in small water systems by $609 per year, or $50.75 per month. The initial statement of reasons “acknowledges that some [small water systems] are economically disadvantaged and that the estimated annual cost of $609 per connection could represent a significant financial burden to some California communities.”6 Nevertheless, the Board found “the cost per connection of centralized treatment does not greatly decrease at higher MCLs and therefore, an economically disadvantaged [small water system] would likely not find a higher MCL to be more economically feasible.” Furthermore, the Board observed that there might be alternatives to centralized treatment that would be less costly for small water systems, including point-of-entry treatment, which involves treating only the water entering a house or building, rather than all of the water sent to the distribution center. The Board further observed that the regulatory process of qualifying for point of entry treatment requires a showing of economic infeasibility (
Based on the foregoing, the Board concluded that, “although the estimated annual cost of $609 may be economically infeasible for a [small water system], there may be alternative, lower-cost treatment options and financing opportunities, such as grants and low-interest loans from the State Water Board, which would make centralized treatment economically feasible.” Accordingly, the Board concluded that the proposed MCL of 5
parts per trillion was economically feasible, notwithstanding the potential burden on households and customers served by small water systems.
Having determined that the proposed MCL would satisfy the statutory criteria required by section 116365, the Board next considered reasonable alternatives to the regulation that would lessen any impact on small business, and the Board‘s reasons for rejecting them. (
The Board acknowledged that “a small number of the identified public water systems likely provide water solely to businesses, and that public water systems identified as community water systems often provide water to businesses.” The Board assumed that public water systems that would be required to incur costs to comply with the proposed MCL would pass those costs on to their customers, including businesses. The Board did not specifically consider the economic impact of the proposed MCL on operators of nontransient noncommunity water systems, such as food processors and agricultural businesses.7
Based on the foregoing, the Board concluded that, “any economic impact to businesses statewide is not anticipated to be significant.” Accordingly, the Board
proposed setting the MCL at 5 parts per trillion, the lowest of the six possibilities under consideration. Following a comment period and public hearing, the Board adopted a regulation setting the MCL for TCP at 5 parts per trillion. (
C. The Petition
Kern County Taxpayers Association and the Association filed their petition for writ of mandate on December 18, 2017. The petition alleges that the Board failed to comply with the Act and the Administrative Procedure Act in setting the MCL for TCP. Specifically, the petition alleged that the Board failed to determine the economic feasibility of the new MCL and failed to analyze the economic impacts of the MCL on businesses that operate their own water systems, such as nontransient, noncommunity water systems, and mutual water systems. The petition sought an order requiring the Board to withdraw the MCL for TCP and promulgate a new one.
The petition was set for hearing in December 2018. In anticipation of the hearing, the Association and the Board each filed requests for judicial notice. The Association requested judicial notice of a trial court order granting a petition for writ of mandate in another action against the Board, this one arising out of a challenge to the MCL for hexavalent chromium, designated by the parties as the “Chrome 6” case. (California Manufacturers and Technology Association et al. v. State Water Resources Control Board (Superior Ct. Sacramento County, 2017, No. 34-2014-80001850) (“Chrome 6“).) The Board, for its part, sought judicial notice of the State of California Drinking Water Annual Compliance Report for 2017, which shows that more than 95 percent of Californians are served by large water systems, and less than two percent are served by small water systems.
Following argument, the trial court denied the petition, finding that the Association failed to show the Board abused its discretion in setting the MCL at 5 parts per trillion. The trial court rejected the Association‘s argument—renewed herein—that the Act required the Board to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The trial court also rejected the Association‘s argument—also renewed herein—that the Board failed to consider economic impacts on businesses operating their own water systems. The trial court denied the Association‘s request for judicial notice and granted the Board‘s.
The trial court entered judgment in the Board‘s favor in March 2019. This appeal timely followed.8
II. DISCUSSION
A. Compliance with the Act
The Association challenges the MCL as inconsistent with the Act. According to the Association, the Board (1) misinterpreted the statutory requirement that the proposed MCL be “economically feasible,” (2) failed to perform a cost-benefit analysis of the contemplated MCLs, and (3) failed to apply any other discernible standard for determining economic feasibility. We consider these contentions momentarily. Before doing so, however, we address the Association‘s arguments based on the order granting the petition for writ of mandate in the Chrome 6 case. As the trial court correctly observed, the Chrome 6 order has no precedential value (In re Molz (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 836, 845), and cannot be considered under California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, except in circumstances not present here.9 The
1. Standard of Review
The establishment of an MCL by the Board constitutes a quasi-legislative act subject to judicial review by ordinary mandate under
Our review of an administrative agency‘s quasi-legislative activity is limited. As our Supreme Court has explained, ” ‘quasi-legislative rules . . . represent[] an authentic form of substantive lawmaking: Within its jurisdiction, the agency has been delegated the Legislature‘s lawmaking power. [Citations.] Because agencies granted such substantive rulemaking power are truly ‘making law,’ their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of statutes. When a court assesses the validity of such rules, the scope of its review is narrow. If satisfied that the rule in question lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature, and that it is reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of the statute, judicial review is at an end.’ [Citations.] When a regulation is challenged on the ground that it is not ‘reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the statute,’ our inquiry is confined to whether the rule is arbitrary, capricious, or without rational basis [citation], and whether substantial evidence supports the agency‘s determination that the rule is reasonably necessary [citation].” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization (2013) 57 Cal.4th 401, 415.)
But our review of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute is not so limited. Where, as here, “an implementing regulation is challenged on the ground that it is ‘in conflict with the statute’ [citation] or does not ‘lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature’ [citation], the issue of statutory construction is a question of law on which a court exercises independent judgment.” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 415.)
“In determining whether an agency has incorrectly interpreted the statute it purports to implement, a court gives weight to the agency‘s construction.”
2. Principles of Statutory Interpretation
We review questions of statutory interpretation “seeking, as always, to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent so as to give effect to the law‘s purpose.” (In re Corrine W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 522, 529; Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 927.) “We begin with the statute‘s plain language, as the words the Legislature chose to enact are the most reliable indicator of its intent.” (In re Corrine W., supra, at p. 529.) ” ‘[I]f there is no ambiguity, then we presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.’ ” (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227Elsner v. Uveges, supra, at p. 929.) “Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.” (Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co., supra, at p. 227.)
3. “Economic Feasibility”
We begin with the Association‘s argument that the Board misinterpreted the requirement of “economic feasibility.” As noted, section 116365, subdivision (a) directs the Board to set the MCL for a carcinogen “at a level
” ‘When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning.’ ” (De Vries v. Regents of University of California (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 574, 590-591.) “When attempting to ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the dictionary definition of that word.” (Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122.)
The Association correctly observes that dictionaries offer alternative definitions of the word, “feasible.” For example, Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary defines “feasible” to mean: (1) “capable of being done, executed, or effected: possible of realization,” (2) “capable of being managed, utilized or dealt with successfully: SUITABLE,” and (3) “REASONABLE, LIKELY.” (Webster‘s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 831, col. 3.) The Oxford English Dictionary similarly defines “feasible” to mean: (1) “Capable of being done, accomplished or carried out; possible, practicable,” (2) “Capable of being dealt with successfully in any way, either in a material or immaterial sense,” and (3) “Likely, probable.” (Oxford English Dict. (Online ed. 2021) https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/68798?redirectedFrom=feasible#eid [as of May 12, 2021], archived at <https://perma.cc/58Y7-HJ3L>.) The Association argues the Board misinterpreted the word “feasible” to mean “capable of being done” rather than “reasonable.” We disagree.
We reiterate that the Act articulates a state policy to “reduce to the lowest level feasible all concentrations of toxic chemicals that, when present in drinking water, may cause cancer, birth defects, and other chronic diseases.” (
Applying the principle that the same words or phrases should be given the same meaning within interrelated provisions of the law, we conclude that the word “feasible,” as used in section 116365, subdivision (a) means “capable of being done,” rather than “reasonable.” (Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 161 [“We generally presume that when the Legislature uses a word or phrase ‘in a particular sense in one part of a statute,’ the word or phrase should be understood to carry the same meaning when it arises elsewhere in that statutory scheme“].)10 We likewise conclude that “economic feasibility,” as used in section 116365, subdivision (b), means economically “capable of being done“; that is, capable of being done given “the management of domestic or private income and expenditure.” (Oxford English Dict. (Online ed. 2021)
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/59384?rskey=JZtOCC&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid> [as of May 12, 2021], archived at <https://perma.cc/3GUG-2KUY> [defining “economic“].)
Taking a page from the trial court‘s order, we affirm that regulations are not “infeasible” because they impose financial burdens on businesses or consumers. (See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall (D.C. Cir. 1980) 647 F.2d 1189, 1265 [considering the requirement of economic feasibility in the context of regulations promulgated by the Occupational Health & Safety Administration, and holding that: “A standard is not infeasible simply because it is financially burdensome [citation], or
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis
Having concluded (erroneously, as we have shown) that “feasible” means “reasonable,” the Association proceeds to the next phase of its argument; that section 116365 required the Board to conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the reasonableness of the contemplated MCLs. The Association‘s argument cannot be squared with the statutory language or the purpose of the statute.
Before diving into the Association‘s substantive arguments, we acknowledge some uncertainty as to what type of cost-benefit analysis the Association believes the Board should have done. The Act does not contain or define the term, and courts have long recognized that cost-benefit analyses “can take many forms.” (Sierra Club v. Sigler (5th Cir. 1983) 695 F.2d 957, 976, fn. 15; see also American Mining Congress v. Thomas (10th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2d 617, 631 [“The label ‘cost-benefit analysis’ encompasses everything from a strict mathematical balancing formula to a less strict standard that merely requires the agency to recognize both the costs and benefits of specific proposed alternatives and consider the differences in choosing an appropriate alternative“].) As one federal appellate court has explained: “[Cost-benefit analysis] varies from a formal analysis in which all costs and benefits are quantified in an identical unit of measurement, usually dollars, and compared, to an informal analysis where costs and benefits are identified, quantified if possible, and balanced.” (Sierra Club v. Sigler, supra, at p. 976, fn. 15; see also Quivira Mining Company v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (10th Cir. 1989) 866 F.2d 1246, 1250 [describing differences between “cost benefit optimization,” the strictest type of cost-benefit analysis, and “cost-benefit rationalization,” a looser approach].) The Association does not tell us what type of cost benefit analysis the Act supposedly requires.11
Federal courts have also recognized that administrative agencies commonly rely on another form of economic analysis, one which the United States Supreme Court has termed “feasibility analysis.” (American Textile, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 509.) Feasibility analysis, in the environmental context, “requires an agency to protect public health to the
maximum extent possible, constrained solely by what is economically or technically feasible.” (Quivira Mining Company v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, supra, 866 F.2d at p. 1250, fn. 4; see also American Mining Congress v. Thomas, supra, 772 F.2d at p. 631.) This approach places a lesser burden on an administrative agency than a cost-benefit analysis, which would typically require the agency to “monetize the costs and benefits of a regulation, balance the results, and then choose the regulation with the greatest net benefits.” (Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. (2009) 556 U.S. 208, 237 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.) [observing that cost-benefit analyses are particularly controversial in the environmental context in which a regulation‘s financial costs are often more obvious and easier to quantify than its environmental benefits].) Significantly, for our purposes: “Feasibility analysis and cost-benefit analysis are mutually exclusive approaches.” (American Mining Congress v. Thomas, supra, at p. 631, citing American Textile, supra, at p. 509; see also Quivira Mining Company v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, supra, at p. 1250, fn. 4 [same].) We presume the Legislature was aware of these differing forms of economic analysis when it passed the Act. (See Ramos v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 719, 727 [“We presume the Legislature knew what it was saying and meant what it said“].)
Having defined our terms, we turn once more to the language of the statute. As previously discussed, section 116365, subdivision (a) requires the Board to set the MCL “at a level that is as close as feasible to the corresponding public health goal placing primary emphasis on the protection of public health.” Section 116365, subdivision (b) requires the Board to “consider” enumerated criteria; namely, the public health goal for the contaminant, the national drinking water standard, if any, and the “technological and economic feasibility of compliance.” “For purposes of determining
The United States Supreme Court considered similar statutory language in American Textile. There, representatives of the cotton industry challenged proposed regulations limiting permissible exposure levels to cotton dust, an airborne particle byproduct of cotton products that causes serious and disabling respiratory diseases. (American Textile, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 494.) The regulations had been promulgated pursuant to section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (
As the Board observes, the Legislature expressly recognized the benefits of safe drinking water in passing the Act. (See
The Association‘s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. The Association directs our attention to In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, in which the court offered an overview of the Act, stating in dicta that the “setting of primary drinking water standards involves a balancing of public health concerns with questions of technological feasibility and cost.” (Id. at p. 679.) But the Groundwater court was concerned with the extent to which an MCL can serve as a basis for civil liability under Hartwell Corporation v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256 and the California Tort Claims Act. (Groundwater, supra, at p. 680.) The court was not concerned with the administrative process by which MCLs are set or the requirement that the Board determine the economic feasibility of a proposed MCL. Groundwater cannot be said to support the Association‘s argument that section 116365 requires a cost-benefit analysis. (See People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 [“It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered“].)
The Association next purports to find support for a required cost-benefit in section 116365, subdivision (b)‘s enumeration of statutory criteria. But subdivision (b) does not say anything about quantifying the benefits of a proposed MCL, or balancing those benefits against the costs of compliance. Subdivision (b) merely requires that the Board “consider” the “economic feasibility of compliance,” which is defined as “the costs of compliance to public water systems, customers, and other affected parties.” (
The Association‘s reliance on section 116365, subdivision (b)(2) is equally unavailing. Subdivision (b)(2) directs the Board to consider any national primary drinking water standard for the contaminant adopted by the federal EPA. (
setting an MCL, it could have done so directly. The Legislature chose not to include any such requirement in section 116365, and we cannot rewrite the statute to conform to an intention that does not appear in its language. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632-633.)
The Association‘s reliance on section 116370 fails for similar reasons. Section 116370, which we have not yet discussed, directs the Board to “adopt a finding of the best available technology for each contaminant for which a primary drinking water standard has been adopted at the time the standard is adopted.” The statute further requires that the finding “shall take into consideration the costs and benefits of best available treatment technology that has been proven effective under full-scale field applications.” (
In the absence of any authority requiring a cost-benefit analysis, the Association offers pages of public policy arguments, all steeped in dense economic jargon. We need not consider these arguments, as we conclude the language of section 116365 is clear and unambiguous, and “cannot be construed” to require a cost-benefit analysis. (American Textile, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 511.) We therefore reject the Association‘s argument that the Board failed to discharge a statutory duty to conduct a cost-benefit
4. Other Discernible Standards
The Association next argues the Board failed to apply any discernible standard for determining economic feasibility. We are not sure what the Association means. To the extent the Association means the Board failed to comply with the standard required by the statute, we disagree. As previously discussed, section 116365 required the Board to “consider the costs of compliance to public water systems, customers, and other affected parties with the proposed primary drinking water standard, including the cost per customer and aggregate cost of compliance, using best available technology.” (
B. Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act
The Association argues the Board violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to consider the potential for adverse economic impacts on operators of nontransient noncommunity water systems. As previously discussed, the Board recognized that “a small number of the identified public water systems likely provide water solely to businesses, and that public water systems identified as community water systems often provide water to businesses.” However, the Board did not specify how many nontransient noncommunity water systems would be affected by the proposed regulation or analyze how they would be affected. The Association argues the omission constitutes a violation of Government Code sections 11346.3, subdivision (a), which requires that agencies “assess the potential for adverse economic impact on California business enterprises and individuals,” and 11346.2, subdivision (b)(4)(B), which requires “description of reasonable alternatives to the regulation that would lessen any adverse impact on small business and the agency‘s reasons for rejecting those alternatives.” We are not persuaded.
The Association argues the Board should have considered and discussed the fact that more than 110 nontransient noncommunity water systems would
The trial court found the Board‘s failure to consider the economic impact of the proposed MCL on nine agricultural and food operations was not a “substantial failure to comply” with the Administrative Procedure Act. (
Our Supreme Court has explained that an agency‘s assessment of the economic impact of a proposed regulation has three phases: “First, the agency makes an initial, provisional determination of whether the proposed rule will have a significant adverse economic impact on businesses. Second, during the public comment period, affected parties may comment on the agency‘s initial determination and supply additional information relevant to the issue. Third, when the agency issues its final decision and statement of reasons, it must respond to the public comments and either change its proposal in response to the comments or explain why it has not.” (Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Board of Equalization, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 429.) An agency‘s initial determination of economic impact “need not exhaustively examine the subject or involve extensive data collection. The agency is required only to ‘make an initial showing that there was some factual basis for [its] decision.’ [Citation.] Moreover, inferences and projections that are ’ “the product of logic and reason” ’ may provide a valid basis for an initial determination of economic impact. [Citation.] And a regulation will not be invalidated simply because of disagreement over the strict accuracy of cost estimates on which the agency relied to support its initial determination.” (Ibid.)
The Board‘s initial determination of the economic impact of the proposed MCL was based on then available data, which indicated that only nine agricultural and food operations would be affected. The Association argues the Board had an obligation to “ask the right questions” and “be sufficiently
authority for the contention that the Board had an obligation to reject the data available at the time of the initial determination or seek additional information that might contradict that data. Nor does the Association suggest that the Board acted unreasonably in relying on the available data, or ignored other information presented during the notice and comment period. In the absence of any such authority or evidence, we conclude that the Association has failed to establish a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Board shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/S/
RENNER, J.
We concur:
/S/
RAYE, P. J.
/S/
HULL, J.