JOSE L. CADIZ et al., Petitioners, v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent; UNITED FARM WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Real Party in Interest.
Civ. No. 4446
Fifth Dist.
Apr. 25, 1979.
92 Cal. App. 3d 365
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Joseph Herman, George Preonas, Bette Bardeen, Kenwood C. Youmans and Keith A. Hunsaker, Jr., for Petitioners.
Marvin J. Brenner, Ellen Lake, Thomas M. Sobel and Daniel G. Stone for Respondent.
Jerome Cohen, Sanford N. Nathan, John Rice-Trujillo, Tom Dalzell, Ellen Greenstone, Michael Heumann, Linton Joaquin, George C. Lazar, Dianna Lyons, Kirsten L. Zerger and James Ruthowski for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
BROWN (G. A.), P. J.—In this proceeding Jose L. Cadiz, a farm worker, and his employer, M. Caratan, Inc. (Petitioners) jointly seek a writ of
FACTS
Pursuant to an election held under the ALRA on September 6, 1975, the agricultural employees of M. Caratan, Inc. elected the UFW to serve as their collective bargaining representative. Eighteen months later, on March 22, 1977, the board certified the UFW. Negotiations between the UFW and the employer continued for more than a year until May 11, 1978, when the employer and the union executed a one-year written collective bargaining agreement pursuant to the terms of the ALRA. By its terms the agreement would automatically renew itself unless either party gave the other party 60 days’ notice prior to its expiration date requesting negotiations for a new agreement.
On August 25, 1978, approximately three and one-half months after the commencement of the one-year contract, petitioner Cadiz filed a decertification petition pursuant to
The election was held on schedule. Acting in response to the UFW‘s motion on August 31 to dismiss the petition as being untimely, the ALRB on September 1, 1978, ordered impoundment of the uncounted ballots to maintain the status quo pending resolution of the timeliness issue raised by the UFW. Petitioners’ request for reconsideration of the impoundment order was denied by the ALRB on September 7, 1978.
On September 25, 1978, a three-to-two majority of the ALRB issued the decision challenged herein (M. Caratan, Inc. (1978) 4 ALRB No. 68), dismissing the decertification petition as untimely and vacating the election. In sum, the ALRB held that as to one-year contracts under the ALRA a petition for decertification will be timely only if filed during the last month of the contract and during the eleven months succeeding expiration of the agreement.
DISCUSSION
Turning to the substantive issues first, we view the case as primarily one of applying the clear, unambiguous and unfettered language of
“(c) Upon the filing with the board by an employee or group of employees of a petition signed by 30 percent or more of the agricultural employees in a bargaining unit represented by a certified labor organization which is a party to a valid collective-bargaining agreement, requesting that such labor organization be decertified, the board shall conduct an election by secret ballot pursuant to the applicable provisions of this chapter, and shall certify the results to such labor organization and employer.
“However, such a petition shall not be deemed timely unless it is filed during the year preceding the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement which would otherwise bar the holding of an election, and when the number of agricultural employees is not less than 50 percent of the employer‘s peak agricultural employment for the current calendar year.” (Italics added.)
This language on its face explicitly permits a decertification petition to be filed at any time during the term of a one-year contract and is too clear to permit any administrative or judicial tampering with its provisions.3
The court should not, of course, be concerned with considerations of legislative policy or wisdom. “Courts do not sit as super-legislatures to determine the wisdom, desirability or propriety of statutes enacted by the Legislature.” (Estate of Horman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 62, 77 (cert. den., 404 U.S. 1015); see also Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 325.)
Notwithstanding these cardinal rules of construction the ALRB not only held that the Legislature did not mean what it plainly said in
In support of its decision and order the ALRB relies primarily upon National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) precedent under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Since the passage of the NLRA in the mid-1930‘s the NLRB has developed certain general principles relating to existing collective bargaining contracts barring petitions for decertification or rival union petitions. However, unlike the ALRA the NLRA contains no legislative direction or guidelines governing the principles of a contract bar; accordingly, NLRB has developed rules solely as a matter of administrative discretion under the broad authority delegated to it by Congress under the NLRA. The NLRB has recognized that in developing its contract bar rules it is necessary to strike a proper balance between twin policy goals of justice to agricultural workers in permitting them a maximum scope in their freedom of choice of a union to represent them and to change or reject their collective bargaining representative and the objective of attaining stability in collective bargaining agreements by assuring that contracts remain in effect a sufficient period to permit the
Because the ALRB is not required to follow NLRB precedent in this area its reliance upon NLRB precedent is misplaced.
Accordingly, the NLRB precedent in this situation is inapplicable because there is no federal statute comparable to
Thus the NLRB‘s applicability is limited by the fact that these adaptations were made to tailor the California statute to the special requirements of the California agricultural labor scene. The peak employment requirement prerequisite coupled with the requirement that an election be held within seven days of filing of the petition insure that the elections will be conducted when a meaningful number of employee workers are employed and will allow employees to freely decide upon their representation. The ALRA further promotes the speedy resolution of representation issues by statutorily fixing the collective bargaining unit and providing for post rather than preelection hearings on issues bearing on elections. (
These differences point up the inapplicability of the NLRB precedent to the California statutory contract bar. By giving weight to NLRB precedent the ALRB has ignored the California statutory provisions which distinguish California agriculture from the industries referred to in the NLRB decisions.
The ALRB and UFW argue that the language of
A close examination reveals this reasoning is untenable.
The board and the UFW ask that the court ignore the literal language of the statute because, they argue, a facial application of its language would lead to absurd results and would encroach upon the manifest purpose of the legislation as a whole. (Steilberg v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785; Teachers Management & Inv. Corp. v. City of Santa Cruz (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 438, 446.)
An examination of the few cases which have applied this principle indicates that the language being considered was not in fact clear and the
In support of the application of the principle to these proceedings the board and the UFW express a concern that because of the severe tension surrounding initial one-year contracts between agricultural employees and certified bargaining agents these contracts must be insulated from challenges regardless of the adverse impact on freedom of choice of employees and upon renewal agreements. Essentially this argument, like the other policy arguments offered in support and in opposition to a contract bar during a one-year contract, has been resolved by the Legislature and any change should come from that body. The ALRA refers to the dual objectives of the legislation. The preamble to the ALRA sets forth as one of its purposes the promotion of stability in labor relations.8
Permitting a challenge to a contract during its first year will not per se lead to absurd results. The Legislature is vested with the authority to balance the potentially conflicting purposes of the ALRA—to provide stability in labor relations and to assure that workers are left free to select their union representatives. By its decision herein the ALRB has opted to place heavier emphasis upon stability in labor relations in the earlier periods of a contract, by choosing to prefer this value over the goal of assuring to employees the right to change their representative. The Legislature‘s choice of the latter objective during the early periods of the development of collective bargaining under the act is in full accord with the purposes of the ALRA stated in
Like the period referred to by the NLRB, the processes and techniques of collective bargaining in agriculture are in their incipient stages.
The ALRB has no authority to overrule the legislative determination because it apparently considers the stability of established contractual relations more important than the rights of workers to decertify their bargaining representative. (See Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com., supra, 17 Cal.2d 321, 325.)
Moreover, the other bars in the ALRA add some stability to labor relations. The election bar (
We cannot say that the Legislature‘s choice leads to absurd results or that the manifest purpose of the legislation was to prefer stability over democracy.
The ALRB asks the court to conclude that the Legislature did not intend that a one-year contract be subject to decertification during its term from the contents of a short transcript of a small part of the proceedings at a hearing before the Assembly Ways and Means Committee when the bill was under consideration by that body. The transcript was submitted to this court with the ALRB‘s preliminary opposition to support its contention. The ALRB also relies upon a declaration from Assemblyman Howard L. Berman, one of four authors of the ALRA, submitted to this court with the ALRB‘s return.
Finally, we turn to three procedural issues raised by one or more of the parties.
The petitioners urge that the ALRB exceeded its authority by accepting the UFW‘s appeal from the regional director‘s dismissal of UFW‘s motion to dismiss the decertification petition. Essentially the argument is that the ALRB has jurisdiction to review a regional director‘s decision directing an election only in postelection objection proceedings and that such proceedings can only begin once a tallying of the ballots is completed. Having decided the substantive issues in favor of petitioner, it is unnecessary to resolve the issue presented.
The ALRB argues that the employer, M. Caratan, Inc., has no standing to seek relief before this court because it has no beneficial interest in the proceeding in that the Legislature excluded employers from participating in the decertification process. While it is true that an employer can neither file a decertification petition nor vote in a decertification election, the employer is doing neither in this proceeding. The ALRB itself apparently recognized the employer‘s interest and standing in permitting the employer to participate as a party without objection.
The last procedural argument is made both by the UFW and the ALRB and is one which has arisen in other contexts. It is contended that the review in this court is exclusively by way of the procedural provisions of
It is true that the decision of the board is not a final order and is not directly reviewable under
Independent of and prior to Belridge, this court recognized the Kyne exception in United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, supra, 72
More recently the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in an opinion filed April 2, 1979 (Physicians National House Staff Association v. Murphy (D.C.Cir. Apr. 2, 1979) Docket No. 78-1209) held it had jurisdiction to review the NLRB‘s refusal to direct an election among a group of medical interns and residents. In doing so the court established the following criteria as falling within the Leedom v. Kyne exception: “To preserve the Wagner Act‘s judgment that judicial review of non-ULP orders can obstruct collective bargaining, we must balance the equitable purpose of the Kyne exception against the need to limit recourse to the judiciary. We agree with Professor Jaffe that the basis for court ‘intervention’ in such cases must be ‘the type of gross transgression for which we invoke the label “jurisdictional” or “clear errors of law“....’ The factors relevant to this determination are (A) whether the alleged error by the Board involved a question of statutory interpretation or merely an issue of fact; (B) whether the statutory provision is ‘clear and mandatory’ in creating rights for those subject to the NLRA; (C) whether the party challenging the Board‘s action has a realistic hope of eventual court review following an unfair labor practice order; and (D) the potential for thwarting the purposes of the NLRA which would flow from finding jurisdiction in this case.” (Fns. omitted.) Applying these criteria to the issues in the case at bench, the conclusion is compelled that the exception applies in this case.
In the case at bench we have held that the petition for decertification was timely and that it met all the requirements of
Under the peculiar facts of this case, since the results of the election are unknown and cannot be known until the ballots are counted, the legal remedy is patently inadequate. To pursue the procedures under
Let a writ of mandamus issue directing the ALRB to set aside its order nullifying and dismissing the petition for decertification of the UFW and directing the ALRB to count the impounded ballots and otherwise proceed in accordance with law.
Franson, J., concurred.
HOPPER, J.—I respectfully dissent.
The Agricultural Labor Relations Board (hereinafter Board) by a three-to-two vote dismissed a decertification petition as untimely and
First, this matter is not reviewable at this time. The matter is not appropriate for threshold judicial review. It is not a final order. (See United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d 268; Radovich v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 72 Cal.App.3d 36.) A nonfinal order is reviewable only under limited circumstances which are not applicable here (see Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 21 Cal.3d 551, 558).
Petitioners contend that the exception set forth in Leedom v. Kyne (1958) 358 U.S. 184 is applicable to this case. Kyne permits judicial review of orders not coming within
Even if the statute at issue were clear on its face and were interpreted as done by the majority in the instant case, the disputed terms only define when a decertification will be “timely.” Petitioners contend that the express terms of
Second,
There are a myriad of aids in statutory construction which may be usable in a given case. “[W]here uncertainty exists consideration may be given to the consequences that flow from a particular interpretation.” (Jaynes v. Stockton (1961) 193 Cal.App.2d 47, 56; Big Sur Properties v. Mott (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 99, 105; see also Estate of Ryan (1943) 21 Cal.2d 498, 512-513.) A statute should be interpreted with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part. (People v. Comingore (1977) 20 Cal.3d 142, 147; see also extensive citations listed in Steilberg v. Lackner, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785.) Canons of construction cannot save us from the anguish of judgment. (See Frankfurter, Some Reflections On the Reading of Statutes (1947) 47 Colum. L.Rev. 527.) “The meaning of a sentence is to be felt rather than to be proved.” (United States v. Johnson (1911) 221 U.S. 488, 496.) The final rendering of the meaning of a statute, thus, becomes an act of judgment. Statutory construction implies the exercise of choice precluding the notion of capricious choice as much as choice based on private notions of a policy which, of course, should be left to the legislative branch. “[T]he primary rule of statutory construction, to which every other rule as to interpretation of particular terms must yield, is that the intention of the Legislature must be ascertained if possible, and, when once ascertained, will be given effect, even though it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute.” (Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone No. 1 (1944) 24 Cal.2d 796, 802.) We should try to give effect to the manifest purposes which appear in the provisions of the statute considered as a whole. (County of Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 849.) We should give the statute an interpretation that will promote rather than defeat the general purpose and policy of the statute. (City of L.A. v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 253, 256.) Where a
“However, such a petition shall not be deemed timely unless it is filed during the year preceding the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement which would otherwise bar the holding of an election, and when the number of agricultural employees is not less than 50 percent of the employer‘s peak agricultural employment for the current calendar year.” (Italics added.)
I conclude that a reasonable construction of the clause emphasized above is that that clause simply modifies the words “collective bargaining agreement” and was intended to refer only to collective bargaining agreements which under
I cannot conclude, particularly in light of the violence preceding the legislation and the considerable hearings which were conducted, that the Legislature intended such an unstable condition to exist during the first year of a collective bargaining agreement. Such a construction would raise the possibility of periodic elections and a potentially continuous struggle in such period similar to the chaotic conditions existing in some European countries on election of a Prime Minister. While I concede that the majority position is arguable as set forth in footnote 7 of the majority opinion, I am unable to agree that it is so obvious what the Legislature had in mind in using the “otherwise bar” language. Nor do I agree that the interpretation of the majority is compelled. I submit that the interpretation set forth in this dissenting opinion leads to the more reasonable result.
The hope of the Legislature was to eradicate the plague caused by constant turmoil threatening agriculture in this state. The Legislature recognized that, as a practical matter, the only way to hopefully solve the problem was through the mechanism of collective bargaining agreements. To adopt the interpretation urged by petitioners in this case would mean both employers and employees would be discouraged from entering into one-year contracts as a means of resolving their differences. Employees are entitled to change or reject their representatives if they desire, but
Additionally, applying
Furthermore, when the majority concludes that the statute is plain on its face and therefore needs no interpretation, they have already engaged in a type of interpretation and concluded that, as so interpreted, the statute needs no further interpretation. (See Radin, Statutory Interpretation (1930) 43 Harv.L.Rev. 863, 868-869.) This type of reasoning is similar to saying “[c]lear statutory language no more needs to be interpreted than pure water needs to be strained” (Holder v. Superior Court (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 314, 317). At first blush that statement sounds very logical and accurate. However, it is predicated upon the water being pure, which itself resolves the very matter in question.
Third, it is interesting to note that the minority on the Board seriously questioned the adequacy of the record in the instant case being used to establish a general rule to be applied in all cases. The Board minority pointed out that the record should have included the percentage of employees who actually voted, the degree of turnover since the initial election, and the degree of employer involvement in the campaign.
While I do not suggest, in the manner of a Chicken Little, that the sky will fall if we issue the writ in this case, I submit that the thread of the garment which the Legislature has pieced together, hopefully to bring peace and stability to the fields, is as fragile as the thread of Ariadne given to Theseus to aid him out of the Labyrinth. In these trying times when violence and claims of violence are daily encountered and the atmosphere is filled with emotion, I would interpret the statute to keep that garment whole and not weaken it by snipping at the thread.
I would deny the writ.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 15, 1979. Hopper J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The petitions of the respondent and the real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court were denied July 27, 1979. Bird, C. J., did not participate therein. Tobriner, J., and Newman, J., were of the opinion that the petitions should be granted.
Notes
“(a) No collective-bargaining agreement executed prior to the effective date of this chapter shall bar a petition for an election.
“(b) A collective-bargaining agreement executed by an employer and a labor organization certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of his employees pursuant to this chapter shall be a bar to a petition for an election among such employees for the term of the agreement, but in any event such bar shall not exceed three years, provided that both the following conditions are met:
“(1) The agreement is in writing and executed by all parties thereto.
“(2) It incorporates the substantive terms and conditions of employment of such employees.
“(c) Upon the filing with the board by an employee or group of employees of a petition signed by 30 percent or more of the agricultural employees in a bargaining unit represented by a certified labor organization which is a party to a valid collective-bargaining agreement, requesting that such labor organization be decertified, the board shall conduct an election by secret ballot pursuant to the applicable provisions of this chapter, and shall certify the results to such labor organization and employer.
“However, such a petition shall not be deemed timely unless it is filed during the year preceding the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement which would otherwise bar the holding of an election, and when the number of agricultural employees is not less than 50 percent of the employer‘s peak agricultural employment for the current calendar year.“(d) Upon the filing with the board of a signed petition by an agricultural employee or group of agricultural employees, or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf, accompanied by authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit, and alleging all the conditions of paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), the board shall immediately investigate such petition and, if it has reasonable cause to believe that a bona fide question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot pursuant to the applicable provisions of this chapter:
“(1) That the number of agricultural employees currently employed by the employer named in the petition, as determined from his payroll immediately preceding the filing of the petition, is not less than 50 percent of his peak agricultural employment for the current calendar year.
“(2) That no valid election pursuant to this section has been conducted among the agricultural employees of the employer named in the petition within the 12 months immediately preceding the filing thereof.
“(3) That a labor organization, certified for an appropriate unit, has a collective-bargaining agreement with the employer which would otherwise bar the holding of an election and that this agreement will expire within the next 12 months.”“Any person aggrieved by the final order of the board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in the court of appeal having jurisdiction over the county wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, by filing in such court a written petition requesting that the order of the board be modified or set aside. Such petition shall be filed with the court within 30 days from the date of the issuance of the board‘s order. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice to be served upon the board and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding. The board shall file in the court the record of the proceeding, certified by the board within 10 days after the clerk‘s notice unless such time is extended by the court for good cause shown. The court shall have jurisdiction to grant to the board such temporary relief or restraining order it deems just and proper and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part, the order of the board. The findings of the board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive.
“An order directing an election shall not be stayed pending review, but such order may be reviewed as provided in Section 1158.
“If the time for review of the board order has lapsed, and the person has not voluntarily complied with the board‘s order, the board may apply to the superior court in any county in which the unfair labor practice occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business for enforcement of its order. If after hearing, the court determines that the order was issued pursuant to procedures established by the board and that the person refuses to comply with the order, the court shall enforce such order by writ of injunction or other proper process. The court shall not review the merits of the order.”