Sorrell v. ThevenirSorrell v. Thevenir
Case No. 92-2382
{¶ 1} In her complaint before the court of common pleas, plaintiff-appellant Sherry A. Sorrell alleged that on September 15, 1988, she was working as a cashier at Brown‘s Market. Plaintiff alleged that as she bent over to sweep dirt into a dustpan, defendant-appellee, James A. Thevenir, came up behind her and grabbed her about the waist. As a result of defendant‘s unexpected conduct, plaintiff pulled herself up suddenly and twisted. Consequently, plaintiff alleged she has endured severe pain, requiring medical treatment and causing her to miss work.
{¶ 2} Plaintiff and her spouse filed the instant action requesting damages for physical injuries, emotional distress, loss of income and loss of consortium, and demanded a jury trial. A jury eventually returned a verdict of compensatory damages in the amount of $10,128.26. In response to an interrogatory, the jury
{¶ 3} Subsequently, in accordance with
{¶ 4} In an opinion dated January 31, 1991, the trial court held
{¶ 5} Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed and remanded in a split decision. The appellate court majority held that while the case was not exactly on point, Morris v. Savoy (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 576 N.E.2d 765, “indicates the [Supreme Court of Ohio] would find
{¶ 6} The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Case No. 93-1041
{¶ 8} Plaintiff and his spouse filed a personal injury action against defendant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division. A jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $241,168, plus $25,000 for the spouse‘s loss of consortium.
{¶ 9} Subsequently, defendant moved for a setoff of $146,000 for disability income, including future disability income, from Social Security and the state of Ohio, as well as the disability retirement benefits from the Public Employees Retirement System.
{¶ 10} Thereafter, in response to a motion by plaintiffs, the federal district court certified the following questions to this court:
“A. Whether
“B. Are Social Security disability income benefits paid to Plaintiff a collateral source pursuant to
“C. Are payments made through a disability income program by Plaintiff‘s employer, the State of Ohio, a collateral source pursuant to
“D. Does Plaintiff‘s election to receive disability retirement benefits pursuant to the provisions of the Public Employees Retirement System,
“E. What procedure should a trial court follow to determine whether an entitlement to such collateral benefits resulted from the tort, where the jury has returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff[?]
“F. Which party has the burden of proof on the issues under
{¶ 11} The cause is now before this court pursuant to
{¶ 12} In the cases before us,
{¶ 13} In determining the constitutionality of any statute, we begin our analysis with the principle that all legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality. State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher (1955), 164 Ohio St. 142, 57 O.O. 134, 128 N.E.2d 59, paragraph one of the syllabus; Mominee v. Scherbarth (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 270, 274, 28 OBR 346, 349, 503 N.E.2d 717, 720; Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 631, 576 N.E.2d 722, 727. While some of the arguments of the parties and amici curiae relate to the wisdom of abrogating the collateral source rule, this court‘s duty is to ignore such arguments and determine the constitutionality of
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} One commentator noted that another purpose of the Act is to prevent double recoveries in tort actions. Darling, Ohio Civil Justice Reform Act (1987) 130-131; see, also, Note, The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio Revised Code Section 2317.45 (1992), 53 Ohio St. L.J. 587; Baker v. Goldblatt (C.A. 6, 1992), 955 F.2d 402, 407. However, opponents of the Act, including the Ohio Public Interest Campaign, claimed that the insurance industry had contrived an insurance crisis in order to promote and protect “organized price
{¶ 16} In any event, one effect of the Act is to limit the collateral source rule adopted in Pryor v. Webber (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 104, 52 O.O.2d 395, 263 N.E.2d 235.2 We turn now to evaluating
II
Jury Trial
{¶ 17} As this court stated in Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday (1933), 127 Ohio St. 278, 284, 188 N.E. 1, 3: “The right to a jury trial does not involve merely a question of procedure. The right to jury trial derives from Magna Charta. It is reasserted both in the Constitution of the United States and in the Constitution of the State of Ohio. For centuries it has been held that the right of trial by jury is a fundamental constitutional right, a substantial right, and not a procedural privilege.” Accord Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 354, 356, 533 N.E.2d 743, 746. It has also been held that “[t]he right of trial by jury, being guaranteed to all our citizens by the constitution of the state, cannot be invaded or
{¶ 18}
“The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate, except that, in civil cases, laws may be passed to authorize the rendering of a verdict by the concurrence of not less than three-fourths of the jury.” (Emphasis added.)
{¶ 19} However, this constitutional provision does not guarantee a jury trial in all cases, but only for those causes of actions where the right existed at common law at the time the Ohio Constitution was adopted. Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner (1929), 121 Ohio St. 393, 169 N.E. 301, paragraph one of the syllabus. Given that negligence actions, which evolved from the common-law action of trespass on the case, and battery actions existed at common law at the time of the adoption of our state Constitution,
{¶ 20}
{¶ 21} We hold that
III
Due Process
{¶ 22}
{¶ 23} Defendants contend that the rational basis test as applied in Morris, supra, is applicable here in determining whether
{¶ 24} As pointed out earlier, the right to a jury trial in negligence and personal injury actions is a fundamental right. Thus, in order to determine whether
{¶ 25} In our view,
{¶ 26} The question whether
{¶ 27} However, with respect to the goal of
{¶ 28} In addition, amicus curiae Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers raises the persuasive argument that no double recovery from a tortfeasor occurs in the typical tort case involving collateral benefits, since ordinarily one of the supposed double recoveries is merely the plaintiff‘s benefit of his bargain with his own insurance company. In both of the causes sub judice, the benefit of the bargain is the employer-paid workers’ compensation and disability compensation programs that are earned by the plaintiff-employees as an employment benefit.
{¶ 29} In any event, regardless of whether the jury allocates damages to categories,
Equal Protection
{¶ 30}
“All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform or abolish the same, whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted, that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the general assembly.”
{¶ 31} The standard for determining whether a statutory classification involving a fundamental right violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution is again the strict scrutiny test. Shapiro, supra. The limit placed upon governmental action by the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions are nearly identical. Kinney v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. (1975), 41 Ohio St.2d 120, 123, 70 O.O.2d 206, 207-208, 322 N.E.2d 880, 882. Thus, the statutory classifications of
{¶ 32}
{¶ 33} Under
{¶ 34} In our view, the ostensible purposes of
{¶ 35} Moreover, a statutory classification violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Ohio Constitution if it treats similarly situated people differently based upon an illogical and arbitrary basis. Id. See State v. Buckley (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 128, 45 O.O. 2d 469, 243 N.E. 2d 66; and Klepper v. Ohio Bd. of Regents (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 131, 570 N.E.2d 1124. The arbitrariness of
“If there was an insurance crisis, it would be a crisis affecting all tort defendants. There is no rational reason for distinguishing between medical malpractice tort defendants and all other tort defendants. This disparate treatment can result in vastly different results involving the same injury. For example, two tort victims suffer the identical injury, the laceration of an artery resulting in death. One tort victim is injured by a piece of broken glass while driving a company truck within the scope of employment. The other tort victim is injured by the medical negligence of a physician who lacerates an artery during an elective surgery procedure. Both tort victims remain in the hospital for ten days before their death.
Due to the difference in the collateral source statutes, these two identical injuries may result in vastly different compensation for the victim. The Equal Protection Clause mandates that those similarly situated be similarly treated.”
{¶ 36} Thus, even under the less stringent rational basis test applied by the majority in Morris, supra, we believe that
V
Right to a Remedy/Open Courts
{¶ 37}
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.”
{¶ 38} In construing this constitutional provision in Hardy v. VerMeulen (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 47, 512 N.E.2d 626, 628, we noted that “[w]hen the Constitution speaks of remedy and injury to person, property, or reputation, it requires an opportunity granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Accord Gaines v. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 54, 60, 514 N.E.2d 709, 716: “Denial of a remedy and denial of a meaningful remedy lead to the same result: an injured plaintiff without legal recourse.” (Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 39} In the Sorrells’ case, the statute not only denies plaintiffs a meaningful remedy, it completely obliterates the entire jury award. As discussed earlier, the statute treats all collateral sources the same and requires collateral benefits to be deducted from the total jury award regardless of whether the jury specifically awards damages in a category for which there were collateral benefits. Under these circumstances where the collateral source benefits reduce the entire jury award, the tortfeasor obtains a rebate for the damages he or she caused, and the victim‘s rights to a jury trial, a meaningful remedy and open courts become
{¶ 40} While
{¶ 41} In addition, certain tort victims will realize that
VI
{¶ 42} Based on all the foregoing, we hold that
{¶ 43} Therefore, in case No. 92-2382, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the judgment of the trial court is reinstated. In case No. 93-1041, the first certified question is answered in the affirmative, thereby rendering the remaining certified questions moot.
Judgments accordingly.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER, JJ., concur.
MOYER, C.J., and WRIGHT, J., dissent.
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.
{¶ 44} Since I do not find
{¶ 45} In Morris v. Savoy (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 576 N.E.2d 765, we upheld the setoff of collateral benefits in medical malpractice actions against equal protection and due process challenges. We held that the General Assembly‘s elimination of double recoveries to plaintiffs is not “unreasonable or arbitrary,” nor does it “offend fundamental fairness.” Id. at 693, 576 N.E.2d at 772. I find that same logic applicable given the context in which the issues now arise.
{¶ 46} The majority holds that a plaintiff in a negligence case has rights to a remedy and a trial by jury that are violated by the setoff requirements of
{¶ 47} The majority asserts that
{¶ 48} Because I believe that the elimination of double recoveries is a rational exercise of the General Assembly‘s powers and that no fundamental right of the plaintiffs has been abridged, I dissent from the decision announced today.
WRIGHT, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.