BROWNBACK ET AL. v. KING
No. 19-546
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
February 25, 2021
592 U. S. ____ (2021)
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Argued November 9, 2020
OCTOBER TERM, 2020
1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BROWNBACK ET AL. v. KING
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-546. Argued November 9, 2020—Decided February 25, 2021
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows a plaintiff to bring certain state-law tort claims against the United States for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, provided that the plaintiff alleges six statutory elements of an actionable claim. See
Held: The District Court‘s order was a judgment on the merits of the FTCA claims that can trigger the judgment bar. Pp. 5-10.
(a) Similar to common-law claim preclusion, the judgment bar requires a final judgment ““on the merits,” Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 502. Here, the District Court‘s summary
(b) In passing on King‘s FTCA claims, the District Court also determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims. In most cases, a plaintiff‘s failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) does not deprive a federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89. Here, however, in the unique context of the FTCA, all elements of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional. Thus, even though a plaintiff need not prove a
917 F. 3d. 409, reversed.
THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion.
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Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 19-546
DOUGLAS BROWNBACK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAMES KING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[February 25, 2021]
JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) allows a plaintiff to bring certain state-law tort suits against the Federal Government.
I
A
The FTCA streamlined litigation for parties injured by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment. Before 1946, a plaintiff could sue a federal employee
“In 1946, Congress passed the FTCA, which waived the sovereign immunity оf the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees” acting within the scope of their employment. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U. S. 471, 475-476 (1994). The Act in effect ended the private bill system by transferring most tort claims to the federal courts. See Pfander, 8 U. St. Thomas. L. J., at 424, n. 39. Plaintiffs were (and are) required to bring claims under the FTCA in federal district court. Federal courts have jurisdiction over these claims if they are “actionable under §1346(b).” Meyer, 510 U. S., at 477. A claim is actionable if it alleges the six elements of
“[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, [3] for injury or loss of property, or persоnal injury or death [4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government [5] while acting within the scope of his office or employment,
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Opinion of the Court
[6] under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” Ibid. (quoting
§1346(b) ).
While waiving sovereign immunity so parties can sue the United States directly for harms caused by its employees, the FTCA made it more difficult to sue the employees themselves by adding a judgment bar provision. That provision states: “The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter, against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.”
B
This case involves a violent encounter between respondent James King and officers Todd Allen and Douglas Brownback, members of a federal task force, who mistook King for a fugitive. King sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging that the officers committed six torts under Michigan law. He also sued the оfficers individually under the implied cause of action recognized by Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), alleging four violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The defendants moved to dismiss under
BROWNBACK v. KING
Opinion of the Court
The District Court dismissed King‘s claims. As to his FTCA claims, the court granted the Government‘s summary judgment motion.2 It found that the undisputed facts showed that the officers did not act with malice. The officers thus would have been entitled to state qualified immunity had Michigan tort claims been brought against them. See Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459, 473-474, 760 N. W. 2d 217, 224–225 (2008). The court, following its own precedent, ruled that the Government was immune because it retains the benefit of state-law immunities available to its employees. The court also ruled in the alternative that King‘s FTCA claims failed under Rule 12(b)(6) because his complaint did not present enough facts to state a plausible claim to relief for any of his six tort claims. The court dismissed King‘s Bivens claims as well, ruling that the defendants were entitled to federal qualified immunity. King appealed only the dismissal of his Bivens claims.
As a threshold question, the Sixth Circuit assessed whether the dismissal of King‘s FTCA claims triggered the judgment bar and thus blocked the parallel Bivens claims. See King v. United States, 917 F. 3d 409, 418-421 (2019). It did not, according to the Sixth Circuit, because “the district court dismissed [King]‘s FTCA claim[s] for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” when it determined that he had not stated a viable claim and thus “did not reach the merits.” Id., at 419; but see Unus v. Kane, 565 F. 3d 103, 121–122 (CA4 2009) (holding that summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ FTCA claims triggered judgment bar with respect to Bivens claims). The Sixth Circuit then held that the defendant officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and reversed the District Court.
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Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari, 589 U. S. ____ (2020), and now reverse.
II
A
The judgment bar provides that “[t]he judgment in an action under section 1346(b)” shall bar “any action by the claimant” involving the same subject matter against the employee of the Federal Government whose act gave rise to the claim.
BROWNBACK v. KING
Opinion of the Court
B
This Court has explained that the judgment bar was drafted against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata. See ibid.5 To “trigge[r] the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion” a judgment must be ““on the merits.” Semtek Int‘l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U. S. 497, 502 (2001). Under that doctrine as it existed in 1946, a judgment is “on the merits” if the underlying decision “actually passes directly on the substance of a particular claim before the court.” Id., at 501–502 (cleaned up).6 Thus, to determine if the District Court‘s decision is claim рreclusive, we must determine if it passed directly on the substance of King‘s FTCA claims. We conclude that it did.
The District Court‘s summary judgment ruling hinged on a quintessential merits decision: whether the undisputed facts established all the elements of King‘s FTCA claims. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 510–511 (2006). The court noted that one element of an FTCA claim is that the plaintiff establish that the Government employee would be liable under state law. The court then explained that Michigan law provides qualified immunity for Government employees who commit intentionаl torts but act in subjective good faith. See Odom, 482 Mich., at 461, 481-482, 760 N. W. 2d, at 218, 229. And it concluded that, because the undisputed facts here showed that the officers would have
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Opinion of the Court
been entitled to immunity from King‘s tort claims, the United States, by extension, was not liable under the FTCA.7
The court‘s alternative Rule 12(b)(6) holding also passed on the substance of King‘s FTCA claims. The District Court ruled that the FTCA count in King‘s complaint did not state a claim, because even assuming the complaint‘s veracity, the officers used reasonable force, had probablе cause to detain King, and otherwise acted within their authority. “If the judgment determines that the plaintiff has no cause of action” based “on rules of substantive law,” then “it is on the merits.” Restatement of Judgments §49, Comment a, p. 193 (1942). A ruling under Rule 12(b)(6) concerns the merits. Cf. Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 506–507. The District Court evaluated King‘s six FTCA claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and ruled that they failed for reasons of substantive law.
C
The one complication in this case is that it involves overlapping questions about sovereign immunity and subject-matter jurisdiction. In such cases, the “merits and jurisdictiоn will sometimes come intertwined,” and a court can decide “all ... of the merits issues” in resolving a jurisdictional question, or vice versa. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int‘l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. ____ (2017) (slip op., at 7). That occurred here. The District Court passed on the substance of King‘s FTCA claims and found them implausible. In doing so, the District Court also determined that it lacked jurisdiction. But an on-the-merits judgment can still trigger the judgment bar, even if that determination necessarily deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
BROWNBACK v. KING
Opinion of the Court
The District Court did lack subject-matter jurisdiction over King‘s FTCA clаims. In most cases, a plaintiffs failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) does not deprive a federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 89 (1998). “Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is proper only when the claim is so ... ‘completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Ibid. However, a plaintiff must plausibly allege all jurisdictional elements. See, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 574 U. S. 81, 89 (2014). And in the unique context of the FTCA, all elеments of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional. Meyer, 510 U. S., at 477. So even though a plaintiff need not prove a
Ordinarily, a court cannot issue a ruling on the merits “when it has no jurisdiction” because “to do so is, by very definition, for a court to act ultra vires.” Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 101-102. But where, as here, pleading a claim and pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits that triggers the judgment
*
*
*
We conclude that the District Court‘s order was a judgment on the merits of the FTCA claims that can trigger the judgment bar. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.
It is so ordered.
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SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 19-546
DOUGLAS BROWNBACK, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JAMES KING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[February 25, 2021]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring.
I join the Court‘s opinion because I agree that the District Court dismissed King‘s Fedеral Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims on the merits. Importantly, the Court does not today decide whether an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit. Although the parties briefed the issue, it was not the basis of the lower court‘s decision. See ante, at 5, n. 4. I write separately to emphasize that, while many lower courts have uncritically held that the FTCA‘s judgment bar applies to claims brought in the same action, there are reasons to question that conclusion. This issue merits far closer consideration than it has thus far received.
King argues that the judgment bar merely “supplements common-law claim preclusion by closing a narrow gap,” preventing plaintiffs from bringing duplicative litigation against first the United States and then its employees. Simmons v. Himmelreich, 578 U. S. 621, 630, n. 5 (2016); see also ibid. (“At the time that the FTCA was passed, common-law claim preclusion would have barred a plaintiff from suing the United States after having sued an employee but not vice versa”). On petitioners’ view, however, the judgment bar provides that any order resolving an FTCA claim automatically precludes separate claims
King raises a number of rеasons to doubt petitioners’ reading. Looking first to the text, the FTCA‘s judgment bar is triggered by “[t]he judgment in an action under section 1346(b).”
Similarly, once the judgment bar is triggered, it precludes “any action by the claimant.”
Thus, giving the judgment bar‘s two key terms their traditional meanings, “the judgment in an action under section 1346(b)” that triggers the bar is the final order resolving every claim in a lawsuit that includes FTCA claims. When
Turning next to the FTCA‘s purpose and effеct, under King‘s reading, the judgment bar also serves the same, familiar functions as claim preclusion: “avoiding duplicative litigation” by barring repetitive suits against employees without “reflecting a policy that a defendant should be scot free of any liability.” Ibid. Petitioners’ interpretation, by contrast, appears inefficient. Precluding claims brought in the same suit incentivizes plaintiffs to bring separate suits, first against federal employees directly and second against the United States under the FTCA. See Sterling v. United States, 85 F. 3d 1225, 1228–1229 (CA7 1996) (holding that judgment in a prior direct action did not preclude a later FTCA suit against the United States).2
Petitioners’ interpretation also produces seemingly unfair results by precluding potentially meritorious claims when a plaintiffs FTCA claims fail for unrelated reasons. Here, for example, King‘s constitutional claims require only
BROWNBACK v. KING
SOTOMAYOR, J., concurring
a showing that the officers’ behavior was objectively unreasonable, while the District Court held that the state torts underlying King‘s FTCA claims require subjective bad faith. If petitionеrs are right, King‘s failure to show bad faith, which is irrelevant to his constitutional claims, means a jury will never decide whether the officers violated King‘s constitutional rights when they stopped, searched, and hospitalized him.
There are, of course, counterarguments. On the text, petitioners point out that it would be strange to refer to the entire lawsuit as “an action under section 1346(b)” even after the Court has decided all the claims brought under the FTCA. Better, they argue, to read “judgment in an action under seсtion 1346(b)” to mean any order resolving all the FTCA claims in the suit. They urge further that claims in the same suit should be among the covered actions because the bar precludes “any action,” rather than “subsequent” actions, which is the typical formulation of claim preclusion. As to the judgment bar‘s purpose, petitioners contend that the FTCA gives tort claimants a choice that comes with a cost: They can sue the United States and access its deeper pockets, but, if they do, then the outcome of the FTCA claims resolves the entire controversy. This preserves federal resources while allowing tort claimants to decide whether to bring FTCA claims at all.
There are naturally counterarguments to those counterarguments, and so on, but further elaboration here is unnecessary. As the Court points out, ““we are a court of review, not of first view.” Ante, at 5, n. 4 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005)). While lower courts have largely taken petitioners’ view of the judgment bar, few have explained how its text or purpose compels that result. In my view, this question deserves much closer analysis and, where appropriate, reconsideration.