Facts
- Durado Brooks, Jr. filed a lawsuit against JFP Project One, LLC alleging multiple employment discrimination claims based on his previous employment. [lines="22-26"].
- Brooks claims he experienced a hostile work environment, racial discrimination, pay discrimination, and retaliation during nearly three years of employment. [lines="24-26"].
- Brooks had been enticed to join the company by the owner, Jackson Fager, who falsely marketed the job opportunity and salary potential. [lines="35-51"].
- Brooks filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on September 26, 2023, claiming a racially hostile work environment and retaliation. [lines="67-68"], [lines="172-178"].
- JFP's motion to dismiss argues that Brooks has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted and has failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his Title VII claims. [lines="28-30"], [lines="74-75"].
Issues
- Whether Brooks exhausted administrative remedies for his Title VII claims before filing the lawsuit [lines="146-153"].
- Whether Brooks's pay discrimination claim can be reasonably expected to arise from his EEOC charge. [lines="180-184"].
Holdings
- The court found that Brooks had properly exhausted his claims related to hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation, satisfying the Title VII exhaustion requirement. [lines="188-214"].
- The court granted the motion to dismiss Brooks's Title VII pay discrimination claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, while denying the dismissal for the other identified claims. [lines="248-251"].
OPINION
DURADO BROOKS, JR. v. JFP PROJECT ONE, LLC
NO: 24-942
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
November 27, 2024
JAY C. ZAINEY
SECTION: “A” (2)
The following motion is before the Court: Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 12) filed by the defendant, JFP Project One, LLC. The plaintiff, Durado Brooks, Jr., opposes the motion. The motion, submitted for consideration on November 13, 2024, is before the Court on the briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Background
The plaintiff, Durado Brooks, Jr., has brought this action against JFP Project One, LLC (“JFP“) alleging a litany of employment discrimination claims arising out of his former employment with the defendant.1 Brooks asserts claims for (1) hostile work environment
JFP is engaged in the business of media production and filmmaking throughout Louisiana. Jackson Fager is one of the owners of JFP. In March of 2020, Fager contacted Brooks to partner with him for a documentary project about Louisiana high school football. (FAC ¶ 10). According to Fager, he and Brooks were “old-time friends” and Brooks is the godparent of Fager‘s child. (Rec. Doc. 12-1, Memorandum in Support at 2). Brooks was offered a starting annual salary of $75,000.00 with a 5% share of the sale price of the project. (Id. ¶ 12). According to Fager, Brooks was working as a male stripper in the French Quarter and had little to no experience in the film industry but Fager was willing to help Brooks learn and give him a chance to make “some real money.” (Rec. Doc. 12-1, Memorandum in Support at 2). Brooks was told that his annual salary would increase to $125,000.00 once the project was sold. (Id.). As of June 2022, Brooks knew that this promise would not come to fruition given that the film ultimately sold for a significantly lower amount than anticipated. (Id. ¶¶ 26 & 56).
Brooks is an African American male. (FAC ¶¶ 6). Brooks maintains that for almost three years he was subjected to a racially-hostile work environment. Brooks alleges that he became emotionally stressed due to anger and profanity directed at him by Fager on
Brooks filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on September 26, 2023. (Rec. Doc. 1-2). The EEOC issued a notice of Right to Sue letter on January 17, 2024. (Rec. Doc. 1-3). This lawsuit followed.
JFP now moves to dismiss all of Brooks‘s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Although JFP maintains that the material factual allegations supporting the race claims are in fact false, JFP recognizes that in the posture of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion those allegations must be accepted as true. But according to JFP, Brooks nonetheless fails to state a claim for relief.
II. Discussion
The central issue in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief. Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008)). To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court does not accept as true “conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.” Id. (quoting Plotkin v. IP Axess, Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005)). Legal conclusions must be supported by factual allegations. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004)). However, the foregoing tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Thread-bare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Any ambiguities in the current controlling substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff‘s favor. Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1995)).
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Before bringing a claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC. Carter v. Target Corp., 541 Fed. App‘x 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013). Failure to file a charge with the EEOC and to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a Title VII action will result in dismissal. Id. (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996)).
To determine whether a Title VII claim has been exhausted, the Court construes the EEOC charge in its broadest reasonable sense and asks whether the claim “can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.” Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 891 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)). Although “[v]erbal precision and finesse [in the charge] are
On September 26, 2023, Brooks filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. (Rec. Doc. 1-2). In the section labeled “Why Do You Think You Were Discriminated Against,” Brooks checked the boxes for Race and Retaliation. (Id.). When asked to provide a short narrative in the section labeled “What Happened To You That You Think Was Discriminatory,” Brooks wrote: “I was subjected to a racially hostile workplace for almost 3 years. I was eventually forced to resign via constructive dismissal after having my oral contracts breached in retaliation.” (Id.).
JFP contends that Brooks‘s Title VII claims fall outside the scope of the EEOC charge, essentially because the narrative that Brooks provided is not descriptive enough. The Court agrees with JFP insofar as Brooks is now attempting to inject a Title VII pay discrimination claim into this lawsuit because that claim cannot be reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge, which raises only a racially hostile workplace environment and retaliation. The Court disagrees with JFP as to exhaustion of a hostile work environment claim based on race, a constructive discharge claim, and a Title VII retaliation claim tied to informal complaints that Brooks made to Fager regarding racial hostility in the work environment.
JFP complains that the EEOC charge mentions only Fager Films whereas the defendant sued in this case is JFP Project One, LLC. Generally, a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under Title VII unless there is a “clear identity of interest
As the Court observed in footnote 1 above, the relationship between Fager Films and JFP Project One, LLC, both of which appear to be eponymous designations for Jackson Fager‘s business ventures, is not clear and certainly does not foreclose a clear identify of interest.
In sum, the motion to dismiss is granted as to the Title VII pay discrimination claim, which is dismissed for failure to exhaust, and denied as to the other Title VII claims insofar as exhaustion is concerned.2
2. Title VII Claims
Although JFP raises several legitimate criticisms of the allegations provided in support of the remaining Title VII claims, the Court is persuaded that dismissal on the pleadings is not appropriate.
In sum, the motion to dismiss is denied as to the remaining Title VII claims.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. Doc. 12) filed by the defendant, JFP Project One, LLC, is GRANTED as to the Title VII claim for discrimination in pay and DENIED in all other respects.
November 27, 2024
JAY C. ZAINEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE