Briаn Keith HOOPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
A16-0225
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
December 14, 2016
888 N.W.2d 138
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean E. Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
OPINION
ANDERSON, Justice.
Appellant Brian Keith Hooper appeals the postconviction court‘s summary denial of his fourth petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Hooper (Hooper I), 620 N.W.2d 31 (Minn. 2000); State v. Hooper (Hooper II), 680 N.W.2d 89 (Minn. 2004); State v. Hooper (Hooper III), 838 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 2013). The postconviction court denied Hooper‘s petition as untimely under
I.
In April 1998, police found Ann Prazniak‘s body in a box in the bedroom closet of her apartmеnt with her wrists, face, and
At Hooper‘s trial, four witnesses—C.K., C.B., L.J., and L.F.—testified that Hooper confessed to the murder. L.F. also testified that Hooper admitted to being in Prazniak‘s apartment, was nonchalant regarding Prazniak‘s murder, and said he was “hiding out.” In addition to the confession witnesses, C.L. testified that, on the night of the murder, Hooper offered her drugs tо be his lookout at Prazniak‘s apartment. C.L. heard a female voice cry “help” and left the building. Hooper then followed C.L. outside and told C.L. that she was going to be a lookout. Once inside the apartment, Hooper told C.L. to tear off strips of beige packing tape, which Hooper took into the bedroom. Later, Hooper told C.L. to clean up the apartment. Hooper used drugs and threats to obtain C.L.‘s compliance with his demands and to ensure her silence afterwards. While she was cleaning, C.L. noticed a knife wedged between the door and the doorjamb of Prazniak‘s closet. Hooper told hеr not to open the closet door. C.L. also saw Christmas lights on the floor of Prazniak‘s bedroom.
The jury heard extensive impeachment of C.L., C.K., C.B., L.J., and L.F., including the fact that L.F. had implicated Hooper falsely in another murder and had given inconsistent versions of Hooper‘s confession. Nonetheless, the jury found Hoopеr guilty of three counts of first-degree murder,
On December 28, 2000, we affirmed Hooper‘s convictions and the denial of his first postconviction petition, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Hooper‘s convictions and corroborate C.L.‘s alleged accomplice testimony. Hooper I, 620 N.W.2d at 41. Specifically, we held that C.L.‘s testimony was corroborated by Hooper‘s fingerprints, the beige packing tape, and the Christmas lights found in Prazniak‘s apartment; the testimony of the four witnesses to whom Hooper confessed; and Hooper‘s admission that he had usеd Prazniak‘s apartment. Id. at 39-40. We noted that “a theory that [C.L.] was an accomplice [is] irrelevant to the issue of [Hooper]‘s own guilt.” Id. at 41.
Hooper‘s second petition alleged, among other things, that witnesses C.K. and C.B. recanted their testimony that Hooper confessed to the murder. Hooper II, 680 N.W.2d at 91, 94. On May 27, 2004, we held that C.K.‘s act of nodding his head in response to the assertion that his testimony “must not have been true” was not a recantation and that Hooper failed to show that he was entitled to relief based on C.B.‘s recantation. Id. at 94-96.
Hooper‘s third petition again relied on the C.K. and C.B. recantations, provided new affidavits for C.K.‘s recantation, and аlleged a third recantation of L.J. Hooper III, 838 N.W.2d at 779-80. On October 30,
Hooper filed this fourth petition on July 16, 2015, alleging that the finаl confession witness, L.F., recanted her testimony that Hooper confessed to the murder. L.F.‘s affidavit states that she lied about Hooper‘s confession in the hope of receiving reward money. Specifically, L.F. said that although Hooper told her about being present in Prazniak‘s apartment, Hooper nеver specifically stated that he killed someone. Hooper also provided affidavits from investigators who stated that they sought L.F. on Hooper‘s behalf from 1999 to 2000 and from 2008 to 2011. In 2011, an investigator found L.F. and spoke to her, but she appeared to be using drugs and was unwilling to recant. In 2013, the investigator finally obtained L.F.‘s recаntation during an interview in which L.F. discussed her recent sobriety and expressed remorse for lying about the confession.2 Hooper argued that this fourth recantation, corroborated by the three previously raised recantations and the unreliability of C.L.‘s alleged accomplice testimony, establishes that he is еntitled to a new trial. The postconviction court summarily denied relief, holding that Hooper‘s petition was untimely under
II.
“A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral attack on a conviction that carries a prеsumption of regularity.” Hummel v. State, 617 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Minn. 2000). We will uphold a postconviction court‘s decision absent an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). “[W]e review the postconviction court‘s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” Greer v. State, 836 N.W.2d 520, 522 (Minn. 2013) (citations omitted). The postconviction court may summarily deny a petition without holding a hеaring if the petition, files, and records conclusively show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
The postconviction court determined that Hooper‘s fourth petition was untimely. A petition for postconviction relief is subject to a 2-year statute of limitations.
A.
First, Hooper argues that L.F.‘s recantation is newly discovered evidence. See
B.
Second, Hooper argues that his petition satisfies the interests-of-justice exception because it is “not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.” Id.,
Hooper maintains that his inability to procure L.F.‘s recantation before 2013 justifies his delay in raising this claim. We disagree. As explained above, to satisfy the interests-of-justice exception, Hooper must allegе an injustice that caused the delay in filing the petition. Id.; see also Rickert v. State, 795 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 2011) (holding that the interests-of-justice exception was satisfied when, despite defense counsel‘s timely request for a transcript of the district court proceedings, the transcript was not delivered until 2 business days before the statute of limitations expired). Here, Hooper searched for L.F. from 1999 to 2000 and then from 2008 to 2011. In light of the 7-year gap in investigative efforts between 2000 and 2007, we cannot say that the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding that Hooper failed to exercise due diligence in seeking L.F.‘s recantation. Such a failure does not satisfy the interests-of-justice exception.
Hooper also argues that the interests of justice require review of his petition because the recantation of L.F., corroborated by the recantations of C.B., C.K., and L.J. and the unreliability of C.L.‘s alleged accomplice testimony, establish that he is entitled to a new trial. See Ferguson v. State, 645 N.W.2d 437, 442 (Minn. 2002) (stating requirements for a new trial based on false testimony). This argument does not establish a valid interests-of-justice claim, however, because it relates to the merits of Hooper‘s petition rather than the reason for the delay. See Sanchez, 816 N.W.2d at 557. Because Hooper‘s petition was untimely and fails to satisfy an exception to the 2-year statute of limitations, the postconviction court did not err by summarily denying Hooper‘s petition.
Hooper does not dispute that his previously raised claims are also subject to the procedural bar announced in Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. Under the Knaffla rule, a postconviction claim that was raised, known, or should hаve been known at the time of the petitioner‘s direct appeal will not be considered in a subsequent postconviction petition. Id.; see also Powers v. State, 731 N.W.2d 499, 501 (Minn. 2007) (holding that the Knaffla rule also applies to claims raised or known at the time of earlier postconviction petitions). Hooper re-asserts his claims based on the recantаtions of C.K., C.B., and L.J., as well as his claim that C.L.‘s testimony was not reliable. We have already held, however, that Hooper‘s claims based on the recantations of C.K. and C.B. were Knaffla-barred. Hooper III, 838 N.W.2d at 788. We have also already upheld the postconviction court‘s determination after a hearing that L.J.‘s recantation was not crediblе. Id. at 785. Finally, we have already examined the testimony of C.L. and concluded that “a theory that [C.L.] was an accomplice [is] irrelevant to the issue of [Hooper]‘s own guilt.” Hooper I, 620 N.W.2d at 41.
Hooper argues that the interests of justice require an exception to the Knaffla rule because the recantations, considered together, establish his innocence.3 See Hooper III, 838 N.W.2d at 787; see also Torres v. State, 688 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn. 2004) (stating that the Knaffla rule “preserves the goals of finality and efficiency where appropriate and overrides them only where necessary in the interests of justice“). The interests-of-justice exception to the Knaffla rule applies only if Hooper‘s claim has “substantive merit” and he “did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the [claim]” in his previous appeals. Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn. 1991)). The postconviction court held that Hooper was not entitled to invoke the interests-of-justice exception to the Knaffla rule because his claim lacked substantive merit. Specifically, the postconviction court found that, even without all of the allegedly recanted confession testimony, there remained compelling evidence of Hooper‘s guilt. We agree.
To establish that he is entitled to a new trial, Hooper must show that, “without the false testimony, the jury might have reached a different conclusion.” Ferguson, 645 N.W.2d at 442; see also Doppler v. State, 771 N.W.2d 867, 872-73 (Minn. 2009) (holding that a petitioner fаiled to satisfy this requirement where a non-eyewitness recanted his testimony, but petitioner‘s confession along with other eyewitness testimony remained). Even without the confession testimony of C.K., C.B., and L.F., the strength of the remaining evidence of Hooper‘s guilt indicates that the jury would not have reached a different conclusion. The remaining evidence includes Hooper‘s confession to using Prazniak‘s apartment; Hooper‘s fingerprints found in the apartment; C.L.‘s alleged accomplice testimony, which was corroborated by the beige packing tape and Christmas lights found in the apartment and used to bind Prazniak‘s body; and L.J.‘s testimony that
In sum, the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by holding that Hooper‘s petition was untimely, and that his previously raised claims are Knaffla-barred. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court‘s summary denial of Hooper‘s fourth petition.
Affirmed.
LILLEHAUG, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.