Brendoff v. State
No. 578
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
August 1, 2019
Fader, C.J., Leahy, Friedman, JJ. Opinion by Leahy, J.
September Term, 2018
Statutes > Principles of Statutory Interpretation
A сourt‘s primary goal in interpreting statutes is always to discern the legislative purpose. “Every analysis begins with asking whether the relevant statutory scheme evinces a plain meaning. We read the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis may end. However, when the language of the statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous.” Conaway v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2018, slip op. at 17 (filed July 11, 2019). We look to resolve ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the statute‘s legislative history and relation to other laws, as well as any relevant case law. Watts v. State, 457 Md. 419, 430 (2018); Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9 (2011).
Criminal Procedure > Revocation of Probation
A court‘s determination on the question of whether to revoke probation typically involves two inquiries: “(1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether a violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation.” Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22, 31 (2013). Under the first inquiry, “the hearing judge must find thе essential facts comprising a violation of a condition by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Dopkowski, 325 Md. 671, 677 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
Correctional Services > Justice Reinvestment Act > Technical Violations of Probation
The Justice Reinvestment Act of 2016, codified in relevant part as
Criminal Procedure > Justice Reinvestment Act > Presumptive Incarceration Limits for Technical Violations of Probation
The Justice Reinvestment Act of 2016, codified in relevant part as
Criminal Procedure > Justice Reinvestment Act > Non-Technical Violations
Non-technical violations of probation, such as “absconding,” still remain subject to the court‘s power to revoke probation and impose sentences that might originally have been imposed, without adherence to the presumptive incarceration limits for technical violations.
Correctional Services > Justice Reinvestment Act > Non-Technical Violations of Probation > Absconding
The Justice Reinvestment Act of 2016, codified in relevant part as
Correctional Services > Justice Reinvestment Act > Non-Technical Violations of Probation > Commitment for Treatment > Absconding
When a prisoner is placed on supervised probation upon admission into a drug and alcohol treatment facility pursuant to an order issued under
Correctional Services > Justice Reinvestment Act > Non-Technical Violations of Probation > Commitment for Treatment > Absconding
When there is an allegation of a non-technical violation of probation by “absconding,” then the first inquiry in the court‘s determination, Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22, 31 (2013), is an assessment of whether the probationer willfully evaded his or her supervising authority.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case No. 02K09002331, 02K09002332, 02K09002333
REPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 578
September Term, 2018
RICHARD BRENDOFF
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Fader, C.J.,
Leahy,
Friedman,
JJ.
Opinion by Leahy, J.
Filed: August 1, 2019
In keeрing with this objective, the JRA established presumptive incarceration
Appellant, Richard Brendoff, entered guilty pleas on March 16, 2010, for theft, second-degree burglary, and attempted second-degree burglary in three separate cases in
the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. While serving his sentences, Brendoff asked the court to commit him to a drug and alcohol treatment program pursuant to
Brendoff was admitted into the Jude House Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program (“Jude House“), which he left prior to being discharged. On December 20, 2016, the State charged Brendoff with violating a condition of his probation. While the violation of probation (“VOP“) hearing was pending, Brendoff contacted his probation agent and entered New Life Addiction Counseling Service (“New Life“), a different out-patient treatment center. Unfortunately, he incurred additional VOP charges on February 23, 2017, after missing six required treatment sessions. At the VOP hearing, the circuit court found that Brendoff had committed non-technical violations of the conditions of his probation based on the allegation that he absconded from the treatment facilities. The court revoked Brendoff‘s probation and ordered him to serve 10 years of his previously
suspended sentences. We granted Brendoff leave to appeal5 the circuit
We hold that when a prisoner is placed on supervised probation upon admission into a drug and alcohol treatment facility pursuant to an order issued under
Accordingly, we remand this case to the circuit court to determine whether Brendoff absconded in violation of his probation by “willfully evading [the] supervision” of his probation agent.
BACKGROUND
On October 23, 2009, a grand jury in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County issued three separate indictments for Brendoff. The first indictment, which arose out of offenses committed on or about October 11, 2009, charged him with second-degree burglary, theft of $10,000 to under $100,000,7 malicious destruction of property, and conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary. The second indictment, which arose out of offenses committed on or about September 28, 2009, charged Brendoff with second-degree burglary, theft of $500 or more, malicious destruction of property, and conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary. The third and final indictment, which arose out of offenses committed on or about September 29, 2009, charged him with attempted second-degree burglary, malicious destruction of property, and conspiracy to commit second-degree burglary.
Brendoff waived his right to a jury trial and pleaded guilty on March 16, 2010, to theft over $1,000 to under $10,000 in the first case, second-degree burglary in the second case, and attempted burglary in the second degree in the third case.8 At the sentencing hearing on April 16, 2010, the circuit court imposed concurrent 15-year sentences with all
but eight years suspended for the burglary offenses. The court also imposed a suspended 10-year sentence for the theft offense to run consecutive to the two burglаry sentences. For all three offenses, the court placed Brendoff on five years’ supervised probation upon physical release from incarceration. The court‘s order (“2010 Probation Order“) imposed certain standard conditions of probation and, as relevant to this appeal, five special conditions of probation:
-
Submit to and pay for random urinalysis as directed by Supervising Agent. - Submit to, successfully complete, and pay required costs for [drug evaluation, testing, and treatment.]
- Attend and successfully complete [drug treatment and education program].
- Totally abstain from alcohol, illegal substances, and abusive use of a prescription drug.
- Have no contact with victims or witnesses.
HG § 8-507 Commitment
While serving his burglary sentences, Brendoff requested that the court commit him to the Department for drug and alcohol treatment pursuant to
On July 5, 2016, the Department issued an evaluation report recommending Brendoff for
That supervision of the Defendant shall be provided by:
The Division of Parole & Probation in that the sentence of the Defendant shall be suspended and the Defendant shall be placed on probation effective upon the acceptance and transporting of the Defendant to the designated DHMH Facility.
* * *
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the event the Defendant leaves the treatment facility without authorization or is terminated from the facility or any after care program for any reason, the Division of Parole and Probation and the State shall be notified as soon as reasonably possible.
(Emphasis added).
The balance of Brendoff‘s sentences for the burglary offenses was suspended upon admission to treatment. The “Probation/Supervision Order” (“2016 Probation Order“) stated that Brendoff would be supervised by “Parole and Probation” and that the length of his probationary period was five years. The 2016 Probation Order imposed general conditions and the following special conditions on his probation:
- Submit to and pay for random urinalysis as directed by Supervising Agent.
- Submit to, successfully complete, and pay required costs for [alcohol and drug evaluation, testing, treatment, education], as directed by your supervising
agent. - Totally abstain from alcohol, illegal substances, and abusive use of any prescription drug.
- Successfully complete residential program and any after care.
The order also included a Consent to Treatment form, signed by Brendoff, which stated:
I further agree to enter and complete any residential or out-patient program recommended and arranged by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and to comply with the terms of any Probation Order in this case and any after-care plan developed for me. I have been informed that if I fail to comply with the conditions of my probation, I will face imposition of the sentence which was suspended.
The Violations of Probation
Pursuant to the commitment order, Brendoff was admitted on November 10, 2016, into Jude House for 120 days of treatment. On December 9, 2016, however, Brendoff left Jude House prior to being discharged. Brendoff‘s probation agent submitted a report the next week informing the court of Brendoff‘s departure from Jude House.
On or around December 16, 2016, Brendoff was admitted into New Life, an intensive out-patient treatment center. The State nevertheless requested a warrant and filed a statement of charges on December 20, 2016, alleging that Brendoff violated a condition of the 2016 Probation Order by leaving Jude House prior to being discharged. Eight days later, the court issued a summons to Brendoff for an initial appearance on January 30, 2017. Brendoff complied, and at his initial appearance, the circuit court notified Brendoff that his VOP hearing was scheduled for March 6, 2017.
While the VOP hearing was pending, Brendoff was arrested and charged with multiple crimes, including attempted murder and armed robbery in connection with a drug deal that went bad on February 20, 2017. Brendoff‘s probation agent informed the court on February 23, 2017, of these additional violations of the conditions of his probation.10
His probation agent further reported that on February 15, 2017, New Life sent her a “status report” indicating that “Brendoff had missed six required sessions and that his attitude and appearance were an indication of relapse potential.” Consequently, the State amended its statement of charges to include additional allegations that Brendoff also violated the conditions of his probation relating to, inter alia, drug treatment by leaving Jude House prior to being discharged and for missing “six required sessions” at New Life. Accordingly, on February 27, 2017, the circuit court issued a no-bond bench warrant for Brendoff for the VOPs.11
Violation of Probation Hearing
On November 20 and 22, 2017, the circuit court held a hearing on the charged VOPs. The State called three witnesses: Felicia Powers, Brendoff‘s probation agent at the time of trial; Cheyenne Potter,
in that case. Ms. Potter and Det. Bilbrey testified about the February 20 case that formed the basis for certain VOP charges that are not the subject of the instant appeal.
Most pertinent to this appeal is the testimony of Agent Powers. She testified that she became Brendoff‘s probation agent in June 2017. According to Agent Powers, there were two agents on the case before her: Agent Thomas and Agent Sims. Agent Thomas was Brendoff‘s probation agent at the time he entered treatment at Jude House. Then, when Brendoff later entered treatment at New Life, Agent Sims became his probation agent.
Agent Powers inherited Agent Thomas‘s case file on Brendoff. Agent Powers confirmed that Agent Thomas reported the first VOP to the court, indicating that Brendoff had left the Jude House on December 9, 2016. She testified that, based on that VOP report, the circuit court issued a summons for Brendoff during the time he was meeting with Agent Sims and attending treatment at New Life, which he had entered on December 19, 2016. According to the discharge summary from New Life, which the defense moved into evidence, Brendoff was discharged on February 22, 2017, due to attendance issues.12
Agent Powers testified further about her personal knowledge of Brendoff‘s treatment at Jude House and New Life. She related that after taking over as the supervisor
on the case, she never met with Brendoff in pеrson but spoke with him over the phone once, when he called her on October 25, 2017. During that phone conversation, she explained, Brendoff told her that “he had walked away from his 8-507 program” at Jude House because he took opiates following a back injury and relapsed.
The State averred in closing that the VOP charge rested on two issues: “the treatment allegations and the failure to obey all laws[.]” With respect to the “treatment allegations,” the State argued that Agent Powers “testified that [Brendoff] was released to Jude [House] on an 8-507 and he absconded from treatment.” Brendoff‘s counsel retorted that, although Brendoff left Jude House, the events that took place after he left showed that he had not absconded. Specifically, counsel argued that Brendoff was still reporting to his probation agent after leaving Jude House, as evidenced by the fact that he entered treatment at New Life “within a week of walking out of Jude House.” Counsel highlighted, additionally, that Brendoff appeared for his arraignment following his exit from Jude House.
With regard to the allegations that Brendoff missed six treatments at New Life, his counsel acknowledged that “from [New Life‘s] discharge summary, . . . there certainly was some evidence of relapse and Brendoff had stopped going to classes or was not going consistently.” Counsel argued, however, that Brendoff “was not discharged from New Life unsuccessfully until he was arrested and, obviously, could no longer [attend].” Accordingly,
The case was continued until November 22, 2017, at which time the court issued its findings and determined whether to reincarcerate Brendoff. The court began by stating that, based on all of the evidence, it found that “this is not a technical violation because one of [the] allegations is that Brendoff absconded so it is not a technical violation.” Regarding the allegation that Brendoff absconded from drug treatment, the court found that he violated the conditions of his probation relating to drug treatment because it was “undisputed that [] Brendoff walked away from 8-507 treatment at the Jude House on December 9, 2016 without being discharged” and that he also missed the six required sessions at New Life.13
The court found that Brendoff was not doing well in either of his drug treatment programs and that he was not amenable to treatment. The court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve a total sentence of 10 years at the Department of Corrections: (1) three of the 10 years that were suspended for the theft offense; and (2) seven of the eight years that were suspended for the attempted robbery offense.14
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-204 and
for leave to appeal in all three cases to this Court on December 21, 2017, which we granted on May 31, 2018, and consolidated for appeal.
DISCUSSION
Before this Court, Brendoff contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that his failure to complete drug treatment equated to “absconding” as defined by
In response, the State argues that the evidence was sufficient for the circuit court to conclude that Brendoff willfully evaded supervision. The State asserts that Brendoff made two concessions before the circuit court: (1) that he “walked out” of Jude House and (2) that he missed six sessions at New Life. The State argues that Brendoff was under the
supervision of the treatment facility staff while at Jude House and New Life. Additionally, the State points out that there is no evidence that Brendoff told his probation agent that he left or where he was going when he stopped treatment at both facilities.
Although we ordinarily review a circuit court‘s determination that a defendant violated his or her conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion, Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22, 37 (2013), “[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546, 550 (2017) (citation omitted). “These two seemingly disparate standards of review are sometimes reconciled with the observation that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to base a decision on an incorrect legal standard.” Rodriguez v. Cooper, 458 Md. 425, 437 n.9 (2018).
I. Statutory Interpretation
The parties advance differing interpretations of
This case compels us to examine the meaning of “absconding” under
Our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional, or part of the [Maryland] Rules. There are a host of principles in aid of divining legislative intent.
Every analysis begins with asking whether the relevant statutory scheme evinces a plain meaning. We read the statute as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, our analysis may end. However, when the language of the statute is subject to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous. . . . In parsing whether plain meaning or ambiguity is the case, we view the relevant statutory scheme as a whole, rather than seizing a single provision.
Conaway v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___, No. 69, Sept. Term, 2018, slip op. at 17 (filed July 11, 2019) (alterations and internal citations omitted). We seek to harmonize statutes on the same subject and read them so as “to avoid rendering either statute or any portion,
A. Plain Language of the Statute
We begin our analysis by examining the statute‘s plain language. Section 6-101(b) defines the term “absconding:”
(b) Absconding. — (1) “Absconding” means willfully evading supervision.
(2) “Absconding” does not include missing a single appointment with a supervising authority.
Subsection (m) of the same provision clarifies that “absconding” is not a “technical violation” of probation, parole, or mandatory supervision:
(m) Technical violation.—“Technical violation” means a violation of a condition of probation, parole, or mandatory supervision that does not involve:
(1) an arrest or a summons issued by a commissioner on a statement of charges filed by a law enforcement officer;
(2) a violation of a criminal prohibition other than a minor traffic offense;
(3) a violation of a no-contact or stay-away order; or
(4) absconding.
The significance of
(d) Options after hearing. — If, at the hearing, a circuit court or the District Court finds that the probationer or defendant has violated a condition of probation, the court may:
(1) revoke the probation granted or the suspension of sentence; and
(2)(i) subject to subsection (3) of this section, for a technical violation, impose a period of incarceration of:
1. not more than 15 days for a first technical violation;
2. not more than 30 days for a second technical violation; and
3. not more than 45 days for a third technical violation; and
(ii) for a fourth or subsequent technical violation or a violation that is not a technical violation, impose any sentence that might have originally been imposed for the crime of which the probationer or defendant was convicted or pleaded nolo contendere.
period of incarceration that may be imposed for a technical violation established in paragraph (2) of this subsection are applicable” to probationers who commit technical violations of their probation.
Although these statutory provisions clarify the implications of “absconding” in terms of the consequences for a violation of probation, the plain language of
searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose and relative rationality and legal effect of various compеting constructions.
In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical or incompatible with common sense.
Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 9 (2011). We turn now to discerning the General Assembly‘s intent in enacting
B. Legislative Scheme and Relation to Other Laws
1. HG § 8-507
Brendoff was placed on supervised probation pursuant to a commitment order under
(f) Supervision of defendant. — For a defendant committed for treatment under this section, a court shall order supervision of the defendant:
(1) By an appropriate pretrial release agency, if the defendant is released pending trial;
(2) By the Division of Parole and Probation under appropriate conditions in aсcordance with §§ 6-219 through 6-225 of the Criminal Procedure Article and Maryland Rule 4-345, if the defendant is released on probation; or
(3) By the Department, if the defendant remains in the custody of a local correctional facility.
(Emphasis added). Section 8-507(f) existed prior to the JRA‘s enactment, and “we presume that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes affecting the same subject matter to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law.” Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316-17 (internal quotations omitted). Tellingly, the JRA amended portions of
language in
2. Title 6 of the Correctional Services Article
Other provisions of Title 6 of the Correctional Services Article reinforce our interpretation of
C. Legislative History
1. The Justice Reinvestment Act
Now we consider the legislative history of the JRA and
After reviewing data and research on effective corrections and sentencing policies, the JRCC ultimately developed 19 policy recommendations for legislative consideration. These recommendations were “intended to focus prison resources on serious and violent offenders, strengthen community supervision efforts, improve and enhance release and reentry practices, support local corrections systems, and ensure oversight and accountability.” Justice Reinvestment Coordinating Council, Final Report, S.B. 602, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. at 1, 21 (Md. 2015) [hereinafter JRCC Final Report]. The General Assembly largely adopted the JRCC’s recommendations, enacting the JRA by passing Senate Bill 1005 (“S.B. 1005”), which Governor Larry Hogan signed into law on May 19, 2016.
The JRA went into effect on October 1, 2017.19 As enacted, the defining features of the JRA can be summarized as follows:
First, the JRA reduced the maximum penalties for convictions on drug distribution charges. Second, it repealed mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug crimes. Finally, . . . it limited presumptively the duration of incarceration that may be imposed for a “technical” violation of probation.
Conaway, slip op. at 14.
2. CS § 6-101
In 1999, the General Assembly passed House Bill 11 (“H.B. 11”). The bill’s purpose was, among other things, to “add[] a new article to the Annotated Code of Maryland, to be designated and known as the ‘Correctional Services Article,’ to revise, restate, and recodify the laws of the State and local correctional systems, including laws that relate to . . . the Division of Parole and Probation[.]” 1999 Md. Laws ch. 54. Section 6-101, as it wаs enacted under H.B.11, did not include the term “absconding.” That term was first introduced in the statute in 2016 with passage of the JRA. 2016 Md. Laws ch. 515. As discussed, the JRA adopted the policy recommendations contained in the JRCC’s Final Report, which rested ultimately on three major findings. First, the JRCC reported that, although the number of prison admissions in Maryland had generally declined over the past decade, “[a]lmost 60 percent of all prison admissions represent
Next, the JRCC found that “increased length of stay in prison ha[d] been a consistent driver of the prison population,” with “[p]robation technical violators serv[ing] an average of 31 months longer than many offenders sentenced directly to prison.” Id. at 1, 8-9, 12. Finally, the JRCC found that Maryland’s supervision resources and practices did not focus on serious and violent offenders and that the DPP did not have a standardized framework for responding to technical violations of conditions of probation, parole or mandatory supervised release. Id. at 1, 10-11, 19.
Accordingly, for policies regarding probation and parole, the JRCC recommended that the General Assembly establish a definition for the term “technical violation” as “any violation that does not include an arrest, a conviction, a violation of a no contact order, or failure to participate in a required domestic abuse intervention program.” Id. at 19. For such technical violations, the JRCC recommended that the DPP respond using a graduated system of non-custodial sanctions before pursuing the formal revocation process. Id. Additionally, the JRCC recommended establishing graduated incarceration periods for “offenders revoked for technical violations up to 15, up to 30, and up to 45 days of the first, second, and third revocation, respectively. The judge or Parole Commission will be able to impose up to the remainder of the full sentence for any subsequent revocations.” Id. at 19.
These recommendations were largely enacted in S.B. 1005, while its counter-part, House Bill 1312, died in committee. In the final version of S.B. 1005, the General Assembly defined the term “technical violation,” which was codified under
We glean from this legislative history, together with the foregoing analysis of the statutory scheme, that the General
D. Case Law
This Court’s decision in Dixon v. State is also instructive in our analysis of
Not surprisingly, Brendoff brings to our attention a 2018 North Carolina Court of Appeals’ decision interpreting the definition of “absсonding” under North Carolina’s Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011. State v. Melton, 811 S.E.2d 678, 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). There, the trial court found that Melton violated her probation by absconding within the meaning of North Carolina’s JRA, revoked her probation, and executed her previously suspended sentences. Id. at 680. The statute at issue in Melton permits a trial court to revoke probation when, among other things, a defendant “absconds by willfully avoiding supervision or by willfully making her whereabouts unknown to the supervising probation officer[.]” Id. at 680-81 (emphasis added). As in the instant case, it was not until the enactment of North Carolina’s JRA that the term “abscond” was statutorily defined. Id. “This change was in line with the JRA’s purpose to be ‘part of a national criminal justice reform effort’ which, among other changes, ‘made it more difficult to revoke offenders’ probation and send them to prison.” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court interpreted the statute’s definition of “abscond,” and held that “a defendant absconds when he willfully makes his whereabouts unknown to his probation officer, and the probation officer is unable to contact the defendant.” Id. at 681. (citation omitted).
As the State properly observes, however, Melton has limited application here because North Carolina’s definitiоn of absconding identifies the supervising authority as the probation officer. Nevertheless, Melton and other out-of-state cases interpreting the term “absconding” under their own Justice Reinvestment laws are helpful in understanding Maryland’s JRA, which grew out of the same nationwide initiative. See e.g., Legendre v. State, 242 So.3d 1028, 1030 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (interpreting a statute permitting courts to revoke probation and execute a sentence exceeding the statutorily capped period of incarceration when a violator “absconds” as requiring proof that the violator sought to evade the legal process, “not simply that [he] failed to attend one meeting with a probation officer or could not be located for a brief period of time” (emphasis added) (citation omitted); State v. Dooley, 423 P.3d 469, 479-80 (Kan. 2018) (interpreting a statute allowing courts to bypass the graduated sanctions scheme when a probation violator “absconds from supervision” as requiring the State to show that probationer intentionally avoided probation supervision, “for example, by intentionally avoiding detection by one’s probation officer” (emphasis added)); Hobson v. State, 230 So.3d 1096, 1099 (Miss. 2017) (explaining that the statute authorizing courts to revoke probation and “impose any or all of the remainder of the suspended sentence” when a probation violator “abscond[s] from supervision,” defines “absconding” as “the failure of a probationer to report to his supervising officer for six (6) or more consecutive months” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
For all of these reasons, we hold that when a prisoner is placed on supervised probation upon admission into a drug and alcohol treatment facility pursuant to an order issued under
II. Revocation of Probation
Having concluded that the DPP is the supervising authority referred to by the terms “supervision” and “supervising authority” contained in
The Court of Appeals has established that “a revocation of probation hearing is a civil proceeding, in which the probationer is not cloaked with the full
As discussed above, the JRA enacted new laws that distinguish between technical and non-technical violations of probation and establish a progressive disciplinary scheme that presumptively limits periods of incarceration for “technical violations.”
The circuit court erred in the underlying case by implicitly treating the drug treatment facilities as the supervising authorities when the court found that Brendoff committed a non-teсhnical violation of his probation by walking away from Jude House and missing six required appointments at New Life. As we have established, Brendoff was under the supervision of the DPP, which included his probation agent, not the residential treatment facilities to which he was committed under the
Accordingly, we vacate the court’s revocation of probation and remand the case to the circuit court to determine whether Brendoff absconded in violation of his probation
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY VACATED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY TO PAY COSTS.
Notes
On June 4, 2014, Brendoff filed, pro se, a form petition for civil commitment to the Department pursuant to