213 A.3d 737
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2019Background
- Richard Brendoff pled guilty (2010) to theft and burglary; received concurrent sentences with most time suspended and five years supervised probation upon release.
- In 2016 the court committed Brendoff to residential drug treatment under HG § 8-507 and placed him on supervised probation; the 2016 order specified supervision by the Division of Parole and Probation (DPP).
- Brendoff entered Jude House (residential) on November 10, 2016, left on December 9, 2016, and shortly thereafter entered New Life (outpatient); New Life later reported he missed six required sessions and discharged him for attendance issues.
- The State charged violations of probation (VOPs) alleging Brendoff “absconded” from treatment and missed sessions; the circuit court found non-technical violations (absconding), revoked probation, and imposed 10 years to serve.
- On appeal, the core question was statutory: whether “absconding” (defined as “willfully evading supervision” in CS § 6-101(b)) requires willful evasion of the probation agent/DPP or may be based on leaving a treatment facility that is supervising the probationer’s program.
- The Court of Special Appeals held that under HG § 8-507(f) and the JRA statutory scheme the DPP (and the probation agent) — not the treatment facility — is the supervising authority for determining whether a probationer absconded; remanded for the court to determine whether Brendoff willfully evaded DPP supervision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether leaving treatment and missing sessions constitutes “absconding” under CS § 6-101(b) | Brendoff: absconding requires willful evasion of the probation agent/DPP; he remained under DPP supervision and kept agent informed | State: treatment facilities functioned as supervising authorities; leaving them and missing sessions is absconding | Court: DPP (probation agent) is supervising authority under HG § 8-507 and Title 6; court erred by treating facilities as supervisors; remand to determine if Brendoff willfully evaded DPP |
| Proper classification as technical vs non-technical violation under JRA | Brendoff: failure to complete treatment is a technical violation subject to JRA presumptive incarceration limits when DPP knew whereabouts | State: leaving treatment and missing sessions support non-technical finding (absconding) | Court: statutory scheme and JRA purpose support treating failures to complete treatment as technical unless willful evasion of DPP is shown |
| Standard of review for VOP factual finding | Brendoff: court applied incorrect legal standard by using treatment facility conduct instead of DPP supervision | State: factual findings supported revocation | Court: interpretation of statute reviewed de novo; factual finding that relied on incorrect legal standard was erroneous; must be reexamined under correct standard |
| Whether sentence must follow JRA presumptive limits | Brendoff: presumptive limits apply unless rebutted per CP § 6-223(d)(3) | State: non-technical finding justified full sentence | Held: presumptive limits apply to technical violations; if court finds willful evasion that creates safety risk, it may rebut presumption; remand to reassess under correct legal framework |
Key Cases Cited
- Hammonds v. State, 436 Md. 22 (probation revocation involves factual finding and discretionary revocation)
- Dopkowski v. State, 325 Md. 671 (VOP factual elements must be found by preponderance)
- Dixon v. State, 205 Md. App. 505 (DPP responsible for post-incarceration supervision of parolees, mandatory releasees, and probationers)
- Waker v. State, 431 Md. 1 (newer, more favorable statutes enacted before sentencing apply at trial/sentencing)
- Melton v. State, 811 S.E.2d 678 (N.C. Ct. App. interpretation of “abscond” under a JRA statute — absenteeism must make whereabouts unknown to probation officer)
- Costa v. State, 58 Md. App. 474 (probation authority may set specific supervisory rules to ensure compliance)
- Brown v. State, 454 Md. 546 (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)
- Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1 (principles of statutory construction and harmonizing related statutes)
- Watts v. State, 457 Md. 419 (use of legislative history and related laws to resolve statutory ambiguity)