BOWMAN v. THE STATE
S22G0303
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
February 21, 2023
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court‘s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court‘s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In February 2014, a Paulding County grand jury indicted Logan Adam Bowman for crimes against his daughter. At the next term of court, Bowman properly invoked his right to a speedy trial pursuant to the applicable speedy trial statute,
Later during the July 2014 term, starting on December 1, the trial court held a proceeding at which the parties selected 12 citizens from among those summoned for jury service to try Bowman‘s case. However, neither the court nor the court clerk administered the jury oath required by
In all criminal cases, the following oath shall be administered to the trial jury: “You shall well and truly try the issue formed upon this bill of indictment (or accusation) between the State of Georgia and (name of accused), who is charged with (here state the crime or offense), and a true verdict give according to the evidence. So help you God.” The judge or clerk shall administer the oath to the jurors.
Instead, on the morning of December 2, the court gave preliminary instructions, the parties made opening statements, and the State called its first witness. On December 3, the State rested, and Bowman called the first of two witnesses. Bowman himself did not testify. On December 4, the parties made closing arguments, the court gave a jury charge, and before noon, the 12 citizens retired to deliberate.
On December 5, after deliberating for more than a day, the unsworn group of 12 citizens purported to return verdicts acquitting Bowman on seven of the nine counts of the indictment and finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of one count each of child molestation and incest. On December 30, the court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Bowman to a total term of 50 years in prison with the first 15 years to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. Bowman filed a timely motion for new trial.
More than four years later, at a status conference on March 7, 2019, Bowman requested the appointment of conflict counsel, and the court granted his request. Conflict counsel filed an amended motion for new trial arguing, among other things, that the complete failure to administer the jury oath was a structural error that required setting aside the verdicts, Bowman‘s judgment of conviction, and his sentence. At a hearing, the State informed the court that it had investigated the matter and determined that the jury oath was never administered to the 12 citizens who purported to decide Bowman‘s case. The court entered a consent order setting aside the verdicts, Bowman‘s judgment of conviction, and his sentence and reinstating his case to active status on the court‘s trial calendar.
On November 27, 2019, through new counsel, Bowman filed a motion for discharge and acquittal on statutory and constitutional speedy trial grounds. On the same day, the State filed a motion seeking a declaratory order that the December 2014 proceeding “constitute[d] a trial” for the purpose of satisfying Bowman‘s Demand for Speedy Trial pursuant to
The State appealed, and on October 5, 2021, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the trial court‘s order granting Bowman‘s motion for discharge and acquittal. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Bowman properly invoked his right under
We granted Bowman‘s petition for certiorari and posed the following question:
Was [Bowman] deprived of his statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial where the trial he received was held before a jury that had not sworn the oath required by
OCGA § 15-12-139 ?
The case was orally argued in this Court on September 20, 2022.
2. The dispute in this case centers on the meaning of the words “trial” and “tried” in
Any defendant against whom a true bill of indictment or an accusation is filed with the clerk for an offense not affecting the defendant‘s life may enter a demand for speedy trial at the court term at which the indictment or accusation is filed or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter . . . .
Subsection (b) then says:
If the defendant is not tried when the demand for speedy trial is made or at the next succeeding regular court term thereafter, provided that at both court terms there were juries impaneled and qualified to try the defendant, the defendant shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment....3
In interpreting statutes, we “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (751 SE2d 337) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).
[A]nd so, we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would. The common and customary usages of the words are important, but so is their context. For context, we may look to other provisions of the same statute, the structure and history of the whole statute, and the other law – constitutional, statutory, and common law alike that forms the legal background of the statutory provision in question.
Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (774 SE2d 688) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted). Thus, “[w]e construe statutes in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence.” In the Interest of M. D. H., 300 Ga. 46, 53 (793 SE2d 49) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Here, the Court of Appeals erred in failing to give proper weight to the constitutional
More than 125 years ago, this Court held that administration of the jury oath now codified at
Put differently, the administration of the jury oath is what turns the 12 citizens selected to hear a criminal case into a jury invested with the authority to decide whether the accused is guilty of a crime. Without the oath, there is no jury; and without the jury, there is no trial. See id. at 329 (“A jury is a body of [citizens] summoned and sworn to decide upon the facts in issue at the trial. Hence, [citizens] summoned as jurors must also be sworn before they constitute an organized and competent tribunal to which the issues in a cause can be submitted for trial.” (citation omitted)). See also Martinez v. Illinois, 572 U.S. 833, 839-840 (134 SCt 2070, 188 LE2d 1112) (2014) (“Jeopardy attaches when a defendant is ‘put to trial,’ and in a jury trial, that is when a jury is empaneled and sworn.” (citation and some punctuation omitted; emphasis added). A proceeding conducted before 12 citizens who have not taken the jury oath is nothing more than an “attempted trial,” Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533, 535 (640 SE2d 267) (2007), which does not satisfy the requirements of
The Court of Appeals’ holding that the December 2014 proceeding constituted a “trial” at which Bowman was “tried” for purposes of
Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur, except Pinson, J., disqualified.