Bounds v. Baylor Regional Medical Center at PlanoBounds v. Baylor Regional Medical Center at Plano
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or Alternatively, Motion for New Trial (the “Motion“) (Dkt. #73). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This is an age discrimination and retaliation lawsuit. On November 7, 2024, Plaintiff Karen Bounds (“Plaintiff“) initiated this action against Defendant Baylor Regional Medical Center at Plano d/b/a Baylor Scott & White Medical Center Brain and Spine Center – Plano (“Defendant“) for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
Defendant employed Plaintiff as a nurse from February 2017 until her termination on December 21, 2023 (Dkt. #61-4; Dkt. #70 at p. 30). At the time she was hired, Plaintiff was 59 years old (Dkt. #70 at pp. 61–62). Plaintiff was assigned to primarily assist Dr. Robert Haynesworth, a pain management physician, as his nurse (Dkt. #70 at p. 30). Plaintiff’s job duties included getting patient paperwork ready, rooming patients, checking vital signs, asking questions related to the patients’ medications, and performing other office-related tasks (Dkt. #70 at p. 30).
On October 11, 2023, Plaintiff reported various workplace complaints to Defendant (Dkt. #61-1; Dkt. #70 at p. 42). Specifically, Plaintiff made the following allegations: (1) management had changed Plaintiff’s schedule, reducing her hours to less than 40 hours per week; (2) leadership was treating Plaintiff unfairly; specifically, one of Plaintiff’s supervisors Christian Poole (“Poole“), was dismissive and short with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was being excluded from department huddles; (3) work was being unevenly distributed throughout the clinic, which affected Plaintiff; (4) two of Plaintiff’s coworkers, Liz Lucio (“Lucio“) and Lee Ann Rodriguez (“Rodriguez“), discriminated against her on account of her age; and (5) Lucio and Rodriguez spoke to one another in Spanish in a shared office space, knowing Plaintiff could not understand them (Dkt. #61-1 at p. 1). Defendant’s Human Resources Department investigated the matter and determined that most of Plaintiff’s allegations were unsubstantiated; however, Plaintiff’s allegation of age discrimination by Lucio and Rodriguez was partially substantiated because Rodriguez admitted to making comments about Plaintiff’s age and telling her to retire (Dkt. #61-1 at pp. 2–3). As a result, Defendant provided a resolution and recommendation to Plaintiff, to her leadership, and to Lucio and Rodriguez (Dkt. #61-1 at p. 4).
Despite this report, Plaintiff continued with her nursing responsibilities for Dr. Haynesworth. While undertaking her assignments, she often dealt with a specific patient record known as a “Plan of Care,” which is a medical document that outlines a physician’s assessment of a patient and instructs physical therapists to plan of care for their patient (Dkt. #16 at pp. 9–10; Dkt. #70 at p. 32; Dkt. #61-5). Defendant uses a Plan of Care form that includes a signature box of at the bottom of the last page, noting that the treating physician has “reviewed the Plan of Care established for skilled therapy services and certif[ies] that the services are required and that they will be provided while the patient is under [the physician’s] care” (Dkt. #61-5 at p. 2). This signature box has three lines—the left line is for the doctor’s signature, the middle line is for the date, and the right line is for the doctor’s printed name and credentials (Dkt. #61-5 at p. 2). Dr. Haynesworth’s staff were allowed to print his name and credentials on the right line (Dkt. #70 at pp. 33, 35).
On December 4, 2023, two months after Plaintiff made her age-discrimination report to Defendant, Defendant’s management team was made aware, by Rodriguez, that Plaintiff had “allegedly forged a doctor’s signature on a Plan of Care” document (Dkt. #61-4 (emphasis added); Dkt. #61-17 at p. 10; Dkt. #70 at p. 127). On the day of this incident, Plaintiff admits that one of her coworkers brought her a stack of papers, consisting of what she was told were signed Plans of Care (Dkt. #70 at p. 33). Plaintiff testified that she flipped through the documents to see that they had all been signed but noticed that one of the lines in the Plan of Care at issue was blank (Dkt. #70 at p. 33). Plaintiff admits that she printed Dr. Haynesworth’s name on the left line of this Plan of Care, which was exclusively intended for his signature (Dkt. #70 at pp. 33–36; Dkt. #61-5). Plaintiff testified she made a mistake by printing his name on the incorrect line (Dkt. #70 at pp. 33–34).
Plaintiff further testified that she did not try to sign his name or make her writing look like Dr. Haynesworth’s signature (Dkt. #70 at pp. 36–37). Instead, Plaintiff testified that she was in a hurry and printed his name on the wrong line (Dkt. #70 at p. 36).
Plaintiff’s supervisors met with Plaintiff, at which point she admitted to them that she had not realized Rodriguez had already printed Dr. Haynesworth’s name on the right line (Dkt. #70 at p. 39). The Plan of Care at issue was scanned into the patient’s chart by another individual, before being purportedly faxed to Defendant’s Outpatient Department by another individual (Dkt. #70 at p. 39; Dkt. #70 at pp. 138–40). Ultimately, the patient associated with the relevant Plan of Care received the correct care from their physical therapist. In other words, Plaintiff’s mistake did not affect a single patient.
On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff met with some of her supervisors, none of which represented Defendant’s Human Resources Department, and was terminated (Dkt. #70 at p. 54; Dkt. #61-4). At this meeting, Plaintiff was handed an Employee Counseling Form, which stated that she was being discharged for the “[f]alsification of a patient record” on December 4, 2023 (Dkt. #70 at p. 54; Dkt. #61-4 at p. 1). The Employee Counseling Form further stated that on the date of incident, Plaintiff “allegedly forged a doctor’s signature of a Plan of Care” (Dkt. #61-4 at p. 1 (emphasis added)). Defendant’s Human Resources Business Partner, Cassandra Mills (“Mills“), reviewed the Employee Counseling Form given to Plaintiff (Dkt. #71 at pp. 28, 115). Mills testified that Plaintiff was fired because she violated Defendant’s policy when she falsified a patient record by mistakenly printing a physician’s name on the line intended for his signature (Dkt. #71 at p. 37). Mills further testified that Plaintiff’s conduct, printing Dr. Haynesworth’s name
At trial, the jury also heard from the following witnesses who played a role in Plaintiff’s termination: (1) Nardo Dumaquita, Plaintiff’s manager while she was employed by Defendant (Dkt. #70 at pp. 123–87; Dkt. #71 at pp. 3–28); (2) Jason Cole, Director of Operations for Defendant (Dkt. #71 at pp. 71–136); and (3) Dimitria Hall, a Team Members Relations Consultant for Defendant’s Human Resources Department (Dkt. #71 at pp. 139–54). Each of these witnesses similarly testified that Plaintiff was terminated for the “falsification” of a patient record (Dkt. #70 at pp. 172–73; Dkt #71 at pp. 84–85, 117–18, 133, 147–50).
Two months after Defendant terminated Plaintiff, Plaintiff began working for the Grayson County Children’s Advocacy Center on February 24, 2024, at a reduced salary (Dkt. #70 at p. 50; Dkt. #61-9; Dkt. #61-10; Dkt. #61-11; Dkt. #61-12; Dkt. #61-13; Dkt. #61-14; Dkt. #61-15). Specifically, Plaintiff testified that had she continued working for Defendant instead of being discharged, she would have earned $257,620.83 from December 22, 2023, through that day of trial (Dkt. #70 at p. 51). However, at her new job, Plaintiff had only earned $124,652.00 through February 28, 2026 (Dkt. #70 at p. 50). Plaintiff later testified that in her job search, she could not consider nursing positions that may have paid her more but required her to travel (Dkt. #70 at p. 99). Plaintiff testified that she could not travel for more than six weeks at a time because of her husband’s Alzheimer’s diagnosis (Dkt. #70 at p. 99).
On March 10, 2026, both Plaintiff and Defendant rested. At no time before the case was submitted to the jury did Defendant move under
On March 11, 2026, the jury returned a partial verdict, finding the following: (1) age was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment, constituting age discrimination under the Texas Labor Code (Dkt. #58 at p. 3); (2) because of Defendant’s wrongful conduct, Plaintiff should be awarded $132,968.83 in damages for past wages and benefits (Dkt. #58 at p. 5); and (3) Plaintiff did not fail to mitigate her damages (Dkt. #58 at p. 5).1
On March 23, 2026, Plaintiff’s counsel notified the Court and Defendant’s counsel, via letter, that she elected to accept the partial judgment on the jury’s unanimous answers and to accept a mistrial on the claims the jury was unable to answer unanimously. On March 30, 2026, the Court issued its Final Judgment, deeming Plaintiff as the prevailing party for her age discrimination claim under the Texas Labor Code (Dkt. #62). The Court also noted the jury’s award of damages and the jury’s finding on Defendant’s failure-to-mitigate damages defense (Dkt. #62 at p. 2).
On April 27, 2026, Defendant filed the instant Motion, asking the Court (1) to modify the Final Judgment to clarify that Plaintiff’s three claims that resulted in a mistrial are dismissed with prejudice, (2) grant judgment as a matter of law in Defendant’s favor, and (3) in the alternative, to grant Defendant a new trial on Plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim under the Texas Labor Code
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
The Fifth Circuit has observed that “[a]ny motion that draws into question the correctness of a judgment is functionally a motion under Civil Rule 59(e), whatever its label.” Harcon Barge Co. v. D&G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784 F.2d 665, 669–70 (5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). ”
The Fifth Circuit recognizes that
II. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Under
If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party; and (B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
Upon a party’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury verdict, the Court should properly ask whether “the state of proof is such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclusion the jury expressed in its verdict.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. United Space All., 378 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2004);
Under Fifth Circuit precedent, a court should be “especially deferential” to a jury’s verdict and must not reverse the jury’s findings unless substantial evidence does not support the findings. Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 499 (5th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions.” Threlkeld v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 211 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 2000). A motion for judgment as a matter of law must be denied “unless the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.” Baisden, 693 F.3d at 498 (citation modified). However, “[t]here must be more than a mere scintilla of evidence in the record to prevent judgment as a
In evaluating a motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must “draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the verdict and cannot substitute other inferences that [the court] might regard as more reasonable.” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). However, “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). “[T]he court should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that the evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.“’ Id. at 151 (citation omitted).
III. Motion for New Trial
Under
[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence—or any other error by the court or a party—is grounds for granting a new trial . . . . At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.
To be entitled to a new trial, Plaintiff must show that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence.
Taylor v. Seton Healthcare, No. A-10-CV-650 AWA, 2012 WL 2396880, at *2 (W.D. Tex. June 22, 2012).
ANALYSIS
Defendant’s Motion seeks multiple types of relief. The Court will first consider Defendant’s request that the Court modify the Final Judgment and then consider Defendant’s arguments that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or at a minimum, a new trial.
I. Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
The Court begins with the threshold issue of whether it should alter or amend the Final Judgment under
In her response, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he three claims which the jury simply did not answer, after an ‘Allen Charge’ constitutes a mistrial. They are not subject to a dismissal unless the Plaintiff agrees” (Dkt. #76 at p. 7). The Court agrees that the age discrimination and retaliation
Accordingly, in line with these arguments, the Court finds that severance of Plaintiff’s three claims which resulted in a mistrial—age-discrimination and retaliation under the ADEA and retaliation under the Texas Labor Code—is appropriate. Further, the Court finds that the Final Judgment issued on March 30, 2026, adjudicating Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim under the Texas Labor Code against Defendant and awarding damages in Plaintiff’s favor, is final and appealable as to that claim as of the date of this order (Dkt. #62).
II. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or in the alternative, Motion for New Trial
The Court now turns to Defendant’s substantive arguments. Defendant argues that judgment as a matter of law under
A. Rule 50
As a threshold issue, “[c]hallenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must be raised in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law before submission of
These purposes were not met in the instant case. Defendant filed the instant Motion, after a judgment was entered, arguing, in part, that the jury’s verdict is against the great weight of the evidence (Dkt. #73 at pp. 10–14). Because Defendant did not present a Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law prior to the case being submitted to the jury, Defendant’s arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence under Rule 50 have been waived. See Gen. Access Sols., Ltd. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 2:23-CV-00158-JRG, 2026 WL 823162, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2026), dismissed, No. 2026-1756, 2026 WL 1879834 (Fed. Cir. June 30, 2026); see also Perdue v. Nissan Motor Co. Ltd., No. 2:07-CV-546, 2009 WL 2460988, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2009) (“[Defendant] failed to put either this Court or Plaintiffs on notice of its objections to the sufficiency of the evidence prior to the close of the evidence at trial. As a result, its ability to
B. Rule 59
Having rejected Defendant’s request for judgment as a matter of law, the Court now turns to Defendant’s motion for new trial under
1. Weight of the Evidence
To begin, the jury in this action returned the following verdict: (1) the jury answered “Yes” to Question No. 3, finding that age was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment; (2) the jury answered “$132,968.83” to Question No. 5(a), finding that this amount of past wages and benefits would fairly and reasonable compensate Plaintiff for the damages Defendant’s wrongful conduct caused her; and (3) the jury answered “$0” to Question No. 5(b), finding that zero represented the amount by which Plaintiff’s damages could have been reduced through her reasonable diligence in seeking, obtaining, and maintaining substantially equivalent employment after the date of her discharge (Dkt. #58).
Defendant argues “[n]o evidence, much less the weight of the evidence, supports that showing, meaning the jury’s findings in Questions No. 3, 5(a), and 5(b) fail” (Dkt. #73 at p. 10). Specifically, Defendant contends that (1) “Plaintiff presented nothing more than conjecture that age had anything to do with Plaintiff’s discharge” (Dkt. #73 at pp. 10–11); and (2) “[n]o evidence, much less the weight of the evidence, supports a finding that [Defendant] held anything other than
With respect to the age discrimination claim under the Texas Labor Code, the jury was asked to determine whether age was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff (Dkt. #58 at p. 3). The Court provided the jury with the following instruction from the Business, Consumer, Insurance & Employment 2024 Edition of the Texas Pattern Jury Charge:
A “motivating factor” in an employment decision is a reason for making the decision at the time it was made. There may be more than one motivating factor for an employment decision. If you do not believe the reason Defendant has given for terminating Plaintiff’s employment, you may, but are not required to, infer that Defendant was motivated by Plaintiff’s age.
(Dkt. #55 at p. 9).
Defendant did not object to the Court’s jury instructions on the record. Instead, the crux of Defendant’s argument in its
Under the Employee Counseling Form, which Plaintiff’s supervisors handed her at the time of Plaintiff’s termination, Defendant’s stated reason for discharging Plaintiff was the “[f]alsification of a patient record“; specifically, Defendant stated that its “management team was made aware that [Plaintiff] allegedly forged a doctor’s signature on a Plan of Care,” and Defendant
The evidence at trial supports this conclusion. First, Plaintiff mistakenly printed Dr. Haynesworth’s name on the signature line of the plan of care at issue; she did not sign or forge his signature, and she did not attempt to make her handwriting look like Dr. Haynesworth’s signature (Dkt. #70 at pp. 33–37; Dkt. #61-5). Second, Rodriguez was the individual who brought this mistake to Plaintiff’s supervisor’s attention, and she was the same individual that Defendant determined made discriminatory remarks to Plaintiff based on her age (Dkt. #61-1 at pp. 2–3; Dkt. #61-4). Third, the Plan of Care at issue was scanned into the patient’s chart by another individual, then the Plan of Care was purportedly faxed to Defendant’s Outpatient Department by another individual, and the patient received the correct care from a physical therapist (Dkt. #70 at p. 39; Dkt. #70 at pp. 138–40). Indeed, the jury heard Plaintiff’s testimony that the Plan of Care at issue, which documented Plaintiff’s purported forgery, was sent to the physical therapist without any incorrect instructions regarding patient care and that it did not compromise “patient safety” (Dkt. #70 at p. 39; Dkt. #71 at pp. 62–63). If the jury did not believe Defendant’s proffered reason for firing Plaintiff, then it was allowed to infer that age was a motivating factor in Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff.
For these reasons, the Court cannot find that the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, as to this issue, Defendant’s
2. Evidentiary Errors
The Court next considers Defendant’s second argument that evidentiary errors “plagued the trial,” warranting a new trial (Dkt. #73 at p. 15). “Generally, any error in admitting or excluding evidence is not grounds for a new trial.” Dragoo v. Allstate Veh. and Prop. Ins. Co., No. 4:16-CV 00984-O, 2019 WL 13075591, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2019) (first citing
Defendant largely asserts that the Court erred in denying some of its motions in limine and its proposed jury instructions and by overruling its objections to certain testimony. Specifically, Defendant challenges the following evidentiary errors: (1) “Plaintiff improperly introduced an irrelevant and misleading dictionary definition at trial, the prejudicial effect of which was
First, Defendant takes issue with the Plaintiff’s exhibit of the Cambridge Dictionary definition of the word “falsification” (Dkt. #61-8). The Court found the exhibit relevant because when Plaintiff was terminated, she was given an Employee Counseling Form that stated she was being discharged for the “falsification” of a patient record on December 4, 2023 (Dkt. #70 at p. 54; Dkt. #61-4 at p. 1). At trial, Defendant’s witnesses (Mills, Dumaquita, Cole, and Hall), testified that Plaintiff was terminated for the “falsification” of a patient record (Dkt. #70 at pp. 172–73; Dkt. #71 at pp. 84–85, 117–18, 133, 147–50). In the Court’s view, Defendant put the word “falsification” at the center of this litigation. Again, if the jury did not believe Defendant’s stated reason for terminating Plaintiff, they were allowed to infer that Defendant was motivated by Plaintiff’s age when terminating her. Plaintiff noted that the term “falsification” was not defined by any of Defendant’s relevant policies, and Plaintiff’s counsel referenced the Cambridge Dictionary definition of the word “falsification” to provide certain witnesses with its plain, ordinary meaning (Dkt. #61-8). The Court cannot find that this evidence was irrelevant under
But, as the parties know, “even relevant evidence ‘may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.‘” United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 978 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Second, Defendant takes issue with the Court’s denial of the following motion in limine: “Any evidence, testimony, or argument relating to whether the Plan of Care (“POC“) at issue in this case was or could be subsequently corrected after Plaintiff’s admission that she wrote the physician’s name in the signature line reserved solely for the physician’s signature” (Dkt. #43 at p. 1). Defendant argues that “[w]hat happened after Plaintiff improperly wrote the physician’s name on an official medical document has no bearing on any pertinent issue regarding Plaintiff’s age-discrimination claim” (Dkt. #73 at p. 17). The Court disagrees.
Mills testified that Plaintiff’s conduct, printing Dr. Haynesworth’s name on the line intended for his signature, constituted forgery and was a “serious patient safety issue” (Dkt. #71 at pp. 62–63, 123). In Mills’s view, Defendant’s decision to terminate Plaintiff was based on conduct that compromised “patient safety” (Dkt. #71 at pp. 62–63). Again, Defendant put this issue at the forefront of its own witnesses’ testimony—whether Plaintiff compromised “patient safety.” However, the jury heard testimony that the Plan of Care at issue could have been corrected or may
Defendant argues that even if the Court found that this testimony was relevant, it should have been excluded under
Third, Defendant takes issue with the Court’s denial of the following motion in limine: “Evidence, testimony, or argument related to Plaintiff’s ‘personal opinion’ or ‘feelings’ that she has been the victim of discrimination or retaliation” (Dkt. #43 at p. 1). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s testimony on this subject was “self-serving, a waste of time, and an improper attempt to opine on a legal standard” (Dkt. #73 at p. 18). Although Defendant is correct that Plaintiff cannot offer opinions on legal issues, the Court disagrees that her testimony did so.
Defendant directs the Court to the testimony it finds problematic with the following citation: “Trial Vol. 1:20-22 [App. Tab 2]; Trial Vol. 2:161-64 [App. Tab 3]” (Dkt. #73 at p. 18). The Court could not decipher where this citation was directing it to and could not identify what proposed testimony required exclusion,4 but the Court infers that Defendant is challenging Plaintiff’s recounting of the age discrimination allegations she raised against her two co-workers. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that two months before her termination, Plaintiff reported various
The Court finds that any testimony Plaintiff may have made suggesting that she was a “victim of discrimination” while employed by Defendant was not a self-serving narrative, a waste of time, or a legal opinion. Rather, the Court finds that this testimony was relevant to Plaintiff’s attempt to rebut Defendant’s purported non-discriminatory reason for terminating her. Plaintiff was recounting a determination Defendant made about the discriminatory comments she was receiving from her coworkers (Dkt. #61-1). It was Defendant that investigated and substantiated Plaintiff’s allegation that Rodriguez made discriminatory comments to Plaintiff about her age; this evidence was not Plaintiff’s personal belief or legal opinion. Any prejudicial effect this testimony may have had did not substantially outweigh its probative value. Thus, testimony about Plaintiff believing she was a “victim of discrimination” while employed by Defendant, if there even was any, was fair game, and thus, properly admitted.
Finally, Defendant takes issue with the Court’s decision not to include some of Defendant’s proposed instructions in the jury charge. “A new trial may be properly granted when the judge issues incorrect jury instructions that would taint the deliberation process; however, the movant must have made an appropriate objection, stating the grounds for the objection with particularity,
3. Excessive Damages Award
The Court next turns to Defendant’s final argument. As a basis for a new trial, Defendant argues that the $132,968.83 awarded to Plaintiff for past wages and benefits from December 22, 2023 to the date of the jury’s verdict “cannot stand because Plaintiff admitted she stopped looking for comparable work at least by the time of her deposition in July 2025, meaning she failed to mitigate her damages by at least that point” (Dkt. #73 at p. 14).
In Plaintiff’s view, she secured comparable work as a nurse two months after her termination; specifically, Plaintiff asserts that her “damages model was based upon the wages she would have earned if employed with Defendant through trial minus the wages she had earned post-discharge through trial” (Dkt. #76 at p. 10). In support of this position, Plaintiff references her trial testimony and exhibits, which are found in the record: (1) Defendant discharged Plaintiff on or about December 21, 2023 (Dkt. #61-4); (2) Plaintiff secured full-time employment as a nurse in or about February 2024 (Dkt. #61-13; Dkt. #61-14; Dkt. #61-15; Dkt. #61-16); (3) Plaintiff found employment in a reasonable time frame considering her age at discharge (Dkt. #70 at p. 50); and (4) Plaintiff could not take a job that required her to travel because her husband has dementia (Dkt. #70 at p. 99).
Plaintiff also testified that had she continued working for Defendant instead of being discharged, she would have earned $257,620.83 from December 22, 2023, through that day of trial
CONCLUSION
It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or Alternatively, Motion for New Trial (the “Motion“) (Dkt. #73) is hereby DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the following claims Plaintiff asserted in this suit, which resulted in a mistrial, are hereby SEVERED into a new case with the same style:
- Age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;
- Retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967; and
- Retaliation under the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act.
The Clerk shall REFILE the Original Complaint in that new case, which will be operative as to the three claims listed above.
It is further ORDERED that the filing fee will be waived in this new case.
It is further ORDERED that Defendants shall have 30 days from the date of this Order to file an answer in the new case. The Court will subsequently enter an order setting this new case for trial.