Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc.Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- Rubintate
OPINION
ALVIN B. RUBIN and TATE, Circuit Judges:In determining whether this court has jurisdiction of an appeal, two of our panels have differed in their characterization of a post-judgment motion to amend the district court’s judgment filed within ten days after entry of the judgment. In Harcon Barge Co. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc.,1 the panel held that a post-judgment motion to amend (described as such by the moving parties who sought to avoid the taxing of costs against them), timely served within the ten-day limit in
If
I.
We detail only those fac„s necessary for this rehearing.6 A single judgment was rendered in the five consolidated actions involved at trial. On the same day a notice of appeal was timely filed by one party, opposing parties filed, and then timely served, a “Motion to Amend Judgment” seeking to have the judgment amended to relieve the moving defendants from liability for costs. The basis for the costs motion was that these parties had made an offer of judgment in an amount greater than that actually awarded by the judgment and the contention that, under
II.
Despite the harsh effect of the Griggs jurisdictional rule, this interpretation of
A.
In the instant case, the moving defendants sought to amend the judgment of the district court as to the costs assessed to them. They styled their motion as one to amend or alter the judgment and they served it within ten days after the entry of the judgment. The motion sought relief available under
In Willie, the movants sought to change the court’s judgment to reflect the terms of a pretrial stipulation regarding one of the parties’ cross-claims. They styled their motion as a “Motion to Amend Judgment,” but as in Harcon Barge, the motion itself did not state under which rule it was being brought. The Willie panel held that it was brought under
It is patent that
The scope of
Rule 60(a) finds application where the record makes apparent that the court intended one thing but by merely clerical mistake or oversight did another. Such a mistake must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of recitation, of. the sort that a clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature____ If of this sort, it matters not whether the magistrate committed it — asby mistakenly drafting his own judgment — or whether his clerk did so ... the law does not regard such trifles. In such instances the judgment can be corrected to speak the truth‘. (Citations omitted).
Thus, it is proper to use
Three other circuits have analyzed the separate roles of
While
B.
Professor Moore states that, “[a]ny motion that draws into question the correctness of a judgment is functionally a motion under Civil
As the Advisory Committee has noted, the very purpose of amending
Construing a motion as a
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal of the appellant, Southern Pacific, who shall bear the costs.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Notes
. 746 F.2d 278, 288-90 (5th Cir.1984).
. Id. at 289-90.
. 746 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (5th Cir.1984).
. 760 F.2d 86 (5th Cir.1985) (ordering rehearing en banc).
. 760 F.2d 87 (5th Cir.1985) (ordering rehearing en banc).
. For a fuller factual background, refer to the panel opinion in Harcon Barge, 746 F.2d 278 (5th Cir.1984).
. 459 U.S. 56, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam).
. 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2817 at 110-13 (1973).
. 694 F.2d 112, 114 (5th Cir.1982).
. United States ex rel. Mississippi Road Supply Co. v. H.R. Morgan, Inc., 542 F.2d 262, 269 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 828, 98 S.Ct. 106, 54 L.Ed.2d 86 (1977).
. Chavez v. Balesh, 704 F.2d 774, 776-77 (5th Cir.1983).
. 11 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2854 at 149 (1973).
. Jones v. Anderson-Tully Co., 722 F.2d 211, 212 (5th Cir.1984); Trahan v. First National Bank of Ruston, 720 F.2d 832, 833-34 (5th Cir.1983), judgment of district court aff‘d, 747 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.1984) (per curiam). See also, In re Galiardi, 745 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir.1984); Warner v. City of Bay St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir.1976), judgment of district court aff‘d, 552 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.1977) (per curiam); West Virginia Oil & Gas Co. v. George E. Breece Lumber Co., 213 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir.1954).
. 709 F.2d 524, 527-28 (9th Cir.1983).
. 684 F.2d 691, 693 (10th Cir.1982).
. 684 F.2d 270, 271-72 (3d Cir.1982).
.
. 9 Moore’s Federal Practice Tf 204.12[1] at 4-67 (1985). See abo id. 1f204.l2[l] at 4-69 (1985).
. Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978). Accord Cosgrove v. Smith, 697 F.2d 1125, 1127-28 (D.C.Cir.1983); Foman v. Davis, 292 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir.1961), rev‘d on other grounds, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1982); Rankin v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir.1985); Western Industries, Inc. v. Newcor Canada Ltd., 709 F.2d 16, 17 (7th Cir.1983) (per curiam); Seshachalam v. Creighton University Schoo’ of Medicine, 545 F.2d 1147, 1147 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 909, 97 S.Ct. 2974, 53 L.Ed.2d 1093 (1977); Sea Ranch Association v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Commissions, 537 F.2d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.1976), but see United States v. 1982 Sanger 24’ Spectra Boat, 738 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir.1984); Miller v. Leavenworth-Jefferson Electric Cooperative, Inc., 653 F.2d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir.1981).
. 759 F.2d 461, 464 & n. 4 (5th Cir.1985) (per curiam) (noting conflict between Harcon Barge and Willie).
. See Fabian v. Reed, 707 F.2d 147, 148 n. 1 (5th Cir.1983), certificate denied and appeal dismissed, 714 F.2d 39 (5th Cir.1983) (per curiam); Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 670 F.2d 503, 583-84 (5th Cir.1982); Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co. of Pelham, N.Y., 335 F.2d 551, 554-55 (5th Cir. 1964); Southern States Equipment Corp. v. USCO Power Equipment Corp., 209 F.2d 111, 116-17 (5th Cir.1953).
.
. 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3913 at 523 (1976).