E. A. Dеe BOGERT and Ruth Marion Rogers, as the successor in interest of John Rogers, Deceased, Petitioners and Respondents, v. Harry KINZER, Clerk of the City of Pocatello, a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, and Don Brennan, Earl Pond, Fred Snyder, E. Norman Vaughan, William Roskelley, Rampton Barlow and Albert Minton, as the Board of Commissioners of the City of Pocatello, a municipal corporation of Idaho, Appellants.
No. 10446.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Feb. 17, 1970.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1970.
465 P.2d 639 | 93 Idaho 515
As this court stated in Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953),
“It is recognized that the legislature has broad discretionary power to make classifications of persons and property for all purposes which it may lawfully seek to accomplish. So long as the classifications are based upon some legitimate ground of difference between the per-sons or objects classified, are not unrea-sonable or arbitrary, and bear a reason-able relation to the legislative purpose, such classifications do not violate the constitution.” 73 Idaho at 539-540, 254 P.2d at 1071.
It is our opinion that the state has a le-gitimate interest in promoting the prompt administration of estates and that the stat-ute in question promotes this interest by curtailing litigation over the appointment of administrators. In addition it is sup-ported by the presumption of constitution-ality.
The respondent also contends that
The judgment of the district court is re-versed and the order оf the probate court awarding letters of administration to the appellant is reinstated. Costs to appellant.
McQUADE, SHEPARD and SPEAR, JJ., and FELTON, District Judge, concur.
Terrell, Green, Service & Gasser, Poca-tello, for respondents.
J. N. Leggat, Boise, amicus curiae.
SHEPARD, Justice.
This case presents for our con-sideration the alleged unconstitutionality of provisions of our Constitution and stat-utes which authorize the issuance of gen-eral obligation bonds by subdivisions of government only upon the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors voting at an election held for that purpose. The lower court held, and it is contended here, that such a requirement is violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-tution and that the assent of a simple majority should be sufficient to authorize the issuance of such bonds. It is con-tended that such two-thirds majority re-quirement gives each negative voter great-er voting power than an affirmative voter, that it, therefore, debases the vote of an affirmative voter and is оffensive to the principle of “one man, one vote.” We hold that the two-thirds assent requirement is not offensive to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and re-verse the judgment of the district court.
“§ 3. Limitations on county and mu-nicipal indebtedness.—No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school district, or other subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the in-come and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose, no [nor] unless, before or at the time of incurring such indebtedness, provisions shall be made for the col-lection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for the payment of the principal therеof, within thirty years from the time of contracting the same. Any indebtedness or liability incurred contrary to this provision shall be void: provided, that this section shall not be construed to apply to the ordinary and necessary expenses authorized by the general laws of the state and provided further that any city or village may own, purchase, construct, extend, equip, within and without the corporate limits of such city or village, water systems and sewage collection systems, and water treatment plants and sewage treatment plants, and off street parking facilities, public recreation facilities, and air navi-gation facilities, and, for the purpose of paying the cost thereof may, with-out regard to any limitation herein im-posed, with the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors voting at an elec-
tion to be held for that purpose, issue revenue bonds therefor, the principal and interest of which to be pаid solely from revenue derived from rates and charges for the use of, and the service rendered by, such systems, plants, and facilities as may be prescribed by law; and provided further that any port dis-trict, for the purpose of carrying into effect all or any of the powers now or hereafter granted to port districts by the laws of this state, may contract in-debtedness and issue revenue bonds evi-dencing such indebtedness, without the necessity of the voters of the port dis-trict authorizing the same, such revenue bonds to be payable solely from all or such part of the revenues of the port district derived from any source what-soever excepting only those revenues derived from ad valorem taxes, as the port commission thereof may determine, and such revenue bonds not to be in any manner or to any extent a general obligation of the port district issuing the same, nor a charge upon the ad valorem tаx revenue of such port dis-trict.”
“If at such election, held as provided in this chapter, two thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors who pay taxes on real property within such city voting at such election, assent to the issuing of such bonds and the incurring of the indebted-ness thereby created for the purpose aforesaid, such bonds shall be issued in the manner provided by the laws of the state of Idaho.”
On October 29, 1968, a special election was held in the city of Pocatello to de-termine if general obligation bonds should be issued to finance the construction of an airport terminal and a municipal swim-ming pool. The airport terminal and swimming pool bond proposals received affirmative votes of 58.83 per cent and 64.07 per cent, respectively, of the total vote. The results of the election were duly certified and the proposed bond is-sues were pronounced defeated for lack of the nеcessary two-thirds assent.
Plaintiffs are qualified electors who vot-ed at the election and stated that they voted in favor of the bond issues. They instituted this action against the officers of the city of Pocatello seeking a writ of mandate to compel a declaration and certification of the passage of the bond issue questions. The district court en-tered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment granting the writ of man-date. The mandate was issued command-ing the officers of the city to certify pas-sage of the bond issue questions. From that judgment and issuance of the writ of mandate, the defendant city officials appeal.
There are preliminary questions for disposition. Amicus curiae seeks to in-ject a completely new and foreign issue into this appeal. He contends that the action of the lower court should be af-firmed for a reason not framed by the pleadings, not argued in the lower сourt, and not given by the lower court as a basis for its decision. That new issue is not discussed in the briefs of the parties nor is it argued on behalf of the parties. As recited herein, the plain-tiffs are qualified electors and hence prop-erty owners. They voted in the election and complain only that their votes were debased, but do not and cannot complain that they were denied their right to vote. Amicus, however, suggests the require-ment that electors in such elections must be property owners is offensive to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is sufficient to say only that such issue is not before this Court in this case and ami-cus curiae must take a case as he finds it without attempting to inject new is-sues or to tailor the case to suit his needs. State v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926); State ex rel. Board of Railroad Com‘rs v. Martin, 210 Iowa 207, 230 N.W. 540 (1930). See also
Appellants (defendants below) cоntend that the trial court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandate in proceedings designed to test the constitutionality of our statutes and constitution, and particu-larly, where there was no clear duty to perform “an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an of-fice, trust or station.”
We are informed by all parties of the great public importance of the ultimate constitutional question involved herein. We take judicial notice of the serious problems that are presently faced by all subdivisions of government in Idaho. The questions raised in this case and Muench have practically destroyed the marketabil-ity of bonds issued by local units of gov-ernment in Idaho. In a case of such wide and extreme public and governmental im-portance, questions of technicality and methodology should, if possible, be laid aside and the decision of this Court be dispositive of the ultimate issue. Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 341 P.2d 432 (1959); Thompson v. Legislative Audit Commission, 79 N.M. 693, 448 P.2d 799 (1968); State ex rel. Sullivan v. Boos, 23 Wis. 2d 98, 126 N.W.2d 579 (1964); Hudson v. Kelly, 76 Ariz. 255, 263 P.2d 362 (1953).
Plaintiffs-respondents suggest that de-cisions of the United States Supreme Court dealing with and interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-tution beginning with the case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962), and including the late cases of Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1969), and Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 23 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1969), require the affirm-ance of the decision of the lower court in the case herein. Indeed, it is suggested that the era encompassed by these cases represents the logical development of ju-dicial thinking regarding the Equal Pro-tection Clauses as applied to the electoral process and will be characterized as “Baker to Bogert.” We are required, therefore, to analyze the opinions and decisions of the United States Supreme Court in these cases.
Baker v. Carr, supra, held that a justi-ciable issue was presented when it was alleged that the voting rights of individuals had been debased by the malapportion-ment of Tennessee legislative districts to the end that one man‘s vote was worth less than another‘s only because of a dif-ference in geographical location. We em-phasize that the decision involved only the debasement of voting rights and not the fencing out or exclusion of voting rights of any individual or group. Also, the decision dealt with the significant in-dividual rights in voting for representative government and did not extend to an in-dividual‘s voting right in any other de-cisional process.
In 1963 the Court rendered its opinion in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S. Ct. 801, 9 L. Ed. 2d 821 (1963), which is often-times referred to as the true home of “one man, one vote.” It was alleged therein that individual votes had been debased be-cause Georgia‘s county unit system of counting votes for statewide offices and United States Senators and Congressmen weighted the rural vote heavier than the urban vote—again the geographical prob-lem. Gray involved voter equality inside Georgia as a whole and not legislative rep-resentation of voters divided into several
In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 526, 11 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1964), the Court had for consideration the alleged debasement of individual voting rights by malapportionment of state congressional districts in Georgia. Although usually considered to be a “one man, one vote” de-cision and although argued as an Equal Protection Clause case, the decision of the Court was actually based on other grounds and many critics have suggested on bases which are historically invalid. Again we point out that the case in its broader context involves the debasement of the right of an individual to vote for his representatives in government and involves no broader context in the sense of other decisional processes. Wesberry involved no fencing out of any individual or class from voting.
The next significant step in the develop-ment of “one man, one vote” came in June, 1964 with the opinions of the Court in a package of reapportionment decisions often-times referred to as the “big six” and in which the most decisive language was con-tained in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964). Again, the Court dealt with the alleged debasement of individual votes resulting from malapportionment of the legislature of Alabama and five other states. The Court, over stringent dissent, held to the “one man, one vote” theory in all cases. All decisions involve the debasement of the right of an individual to vote for rep-resentatives in state government. Nothing in the decision requires the specific exten-sion to other decisional making processes and the decision was obviously limited to debasement of votes and did not include the fencing out of any individual or group from utilization of the franchise.
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 775, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1965), held that a state, Texas, could not exclude from exer-cise of the individual franchise persons serving in the armed forces. The election involved in the case was the general elec-tion of government officials in Texas. The Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause an individual who was a bona fide resident could not be denied his right to vote merely because he was in the military service. The Court affirmed the right of states to impose reasonable requirements for exercising the franchise, but held that the imposition of that particular state standard was a denial of equal protection. In that case the Court again was speaking in terms of the ability to exercise the fran-chise for the selection of representative government and the fencing out from the privilege and was not speaking of the de-basement of the vote.
In 1966 the Court decided the case of Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elec-tions, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169 (1966), in which the constitutional-ity of the Virginia poll tax was placed in issue as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that such was in-deed a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, stating:
“* * * once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Again, the Court held that what was in-volved was the fencing out from the fran-chise, not the debasement of the vote of the individual. Also involved therein were elections for government officials and no broader decisional process was involved. Although the decision was rendered on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause, it is obvious that the Court, in keeping with its previous decisions regarding primarily
In Sailors v. Board of Education, etc., 387 U.S. 105, 87 S. Ct. 1549, 18 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1967), the Court refused to extend thе Equal Protection Clause to an alleged exclusion of voters from selecting non-legislative local officials by appointment rather than by election. The Michigan statute in question provided that county school boards be chosen by delegates from local school boards rather than by direct election. The issue presented there was obviously a fencing out or exclusion of persons from exercising the franchise, al-though all persons rather than particular individuals or groups were thus “fenced out.” Although the decision is in terms of representative officials, they are repre-sentative officials selected by appointment rather than by vote and to that extent is not reflective of the right of individual voters to participate in other decisional making processes.
In Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 390 U.S. 474, 88 S. Ct. 1114, 20 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1968), it was alleged that individual vot-ing rights were debased through the mal-apportionment or maldistricting оf county precincts in elections for local officials. The Court applied the “one man, one vote” principle enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, to local units of government. The problem was debasement, not the fenc-ing out from the franchise of any persons or groups. Avery involved the selection of representative government, not an elec-tion for any other decisional making proc-ess.
This brings us to the latest cases which are relied upon heavily by plaintiffs-respondents in the instant action. In 1969 the Supreme Court announced its deci-sions in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, supra, and Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra. In both Kramer and Cipriano it was alleged that certain per-sons or groups had been fenced out of and excluded from the franchise. In Kramer the New York statute restricted the fran-chise in choosing local school board offi-cials to those who either owned real prop-erty or had children who were in school attendance in the district. In Cipriano a Louisiana statute prohibited voting in rev-enue bond elections by anyone except real property owners or their spouses.
Although the Court in Kramer in its terse per curiam opinion indicated other-wise, that decision appears to stand for the non-exclusion of individuals in what was, in effect, a representative government elec-tion. The decision hints that perhaps other decisional processes were involved, such as the imposition of taxes, but such is not clear from the opinion. Cipriano, on the other hand, deals with a decision making process other than the election of repre-sentative government. It is not involved with vote debasement, but rather involves the fencing out or exclusion of certain per-
What, then, may we view as logical and coherent threads running through the above decisions? Votes cast in the process of selecting representatives in government mаy not be debased to the end that one person‘s vote is worth more than another‘s because of geographic location. Persons may not be denied the right to vote for their representatives in government be-cause of distinctions which are “invidious.” Evidently, the determination of “invidious-ness” will be made on a case by case basis, but includes at least factors of race, wealth, property ownership and military service.
Persons may not be denied the voting right in other decision making elections when such denial results in a fencing out without a rational basis. There must be a reasonable relationship between the inter-est or non-interest of a group and its be-ing granted or denied the vote. These de-cisions again are evidently made on a case by case basis. Race is not a reasonable re-lationship upon which to base a denial; ownership of property or parenthood arе not sufficient criteria of interests in school board elections having overtones of other decision making; ownership of property is not a sufficient criteria of interest in a revenue bond election when non-property owners will utilize and pay for the services, but property ownership is a sufficient cri-teria in an election to determine the issu-ance of general obligation bonds.
Impliedly and paradoxically, however, persons under 21 and non-residents may be denied the vote even though they may be emancipated, be parents, own property, be better informed than many who are granted the franchise, and use and pay for the serv-ices to be derived from the proceeds of a bond sale.
We believe and hold that nowhere in the lines of cases is there even a hint that the constitutional and statutory provisions in the case at bar, which allegedly “debase” the vote of рlaintiffs-respondents, are of-fensive to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. We emphasize that in the case at bar there is no allegation or argument concerning fencing out or ex-clusion from the voting franchise. The election was not held for the purpose of selecting representatives in government.
Plaintiffs-respondents draw our atten-tion to additional cases in which the ques-tion presented herein was also discussed by the Courts of West Virginia and New Mexico. The West Virginia Court in the case of Lance v. Board of Education, 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969), had for consideration that state‘s constitutional requirement of a three-fifths vote for the passage of bonded indebtedness by local tax levying bodies. Plaintiffs contended that the re-quirement conflicted with the Equal Pro-tection Clause of the United States Con-stitution as interpreted by the cases enunci-ating the “one man, one vote” theory. That Court reviewed the decisions of the United States Supreme Court beginning with Baker v. Carr, supra, and including Kramer and Cipriano. Substantial reli-ance was placed on the case of State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Board, 78 N.M. 682, 437 P.2d 143 (1968). The Court held that the provisions of the West Vir-ginia Constitution were in conflict with the Equal Protection Clause and struck down the three-fifths vote requirement. The essence of that Court‘s decision is stated:
“We are unwilling to concede that a determination of issues such as those involved in this case cannot be safely entrusted to a majority of the voters.”
This Court, in contrast, is unwilling to concede that a determination between com-peting political theories and which would require the application of the doctrine of sheer majoritarianism can be safely en-trusted to the judicial branch of gov-ernment of Idaho when our people and our legislature have spoken otherwise. We are unwilling to concede that the specific words of the Equal Protection Clause require the decision reached by the West Virginia Court, and we do not
That Court further said:
“It is asserted by counsel for the de-fendants that the Constitution of the United States contains many provisions which are repugnant to the idea of ma-jority rule, including a provision that ratification of treaties requires a con-currence of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, requirements per-taining to amendment of the Constitu-tion, and provisions relating to over-riding a veto of a bill by the president. We consider this contention frivolous and wholly beside the point.”
Later discussion herein will indicate that this Court does not consider those points raised as frivolous and wholly beside the point, but rather of substantial signifi-cance in determining whether or not this nation is to be considered as completely committed to a majoritarian form of gov-ernment in all its aspects, with all of the changes in fundamental concepts of fed-eral, state and local government that such a theory implies and requires.
As stated, the Court in Lance v. Board of Education, supra, placed substantial re-liance on the New Mexico case of State ex rel. Witt v. State Canvassing Board, supra. Plaintiffs-respondents herein also rely heavily on Witt. We suggest that the opinion of the New Mexico Court does not stand analysis when cited as au-thority for the decision of the West Vir-ginia Court or the decision of the lower court herein. In fact, we can only gather from the opinion in Witt that if the New Mexico Court was squarely faced with the constitutional and statutory provisions of West Virginia and Idaho, it would find them to be constitutional and not viola-tive of the Equal Protection Clause.
The New Mexico Court in Witt was dealing with constitutional provisions which made amendment of that constitution not only burdensome and onerous, but nearly impossible. Those constitutional provi-sions required that a proposed constitu-tional amendment be approved by a vote of two-thirds of those voting in each of the many counties in the state. Secondly, a proposed amendment was required for approval to receive at least a three-fourths majority of all of the votes cast in the whole state. The principal thrust of the Witt decision related to the two-thirds majority vote required in each of the many counties. Reasoning primarily from the decisions represented by the Reynolds v. Sims, supra, opinion, the New Mexico Court held that the two-thirds majority requirement in each county vio-lated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court said at page 688, 437 P.2d at page 149:
“We can see no escape from the con-clusion that a requirement of a two-thirds favorable vote in every county, when there is a wide disparity in popu-lation among counties, must result in greatly disproportionate values to votes in different counties. Where, as here, a vote in Harding County outweighs the 100 vote in Bernalillo County, the ‘one person, one vote’ cоncept an-nounced in Gray v. Sanders, supra, cer-tainly is not met.”
Also specifically raised was the question as to whether or not the proposed constitu-tional amendment had obtained the neces-sary three-fourths majority of all the votes in the state. The New Mexico Court, in passing on that portion of the constitutional requirement, did not discuss the arguments proposed by plaintiffs-respondents here, viz., that a requirement of more than a majority vote debased the vote of a person who desired to vote in favor of a proposi-tion as compared with the value of the vote of a negative voter. The Court, without question or discussion, impliedly upheld the requirement that a proposed constitutional
Hence, although we may disagree with the assertion of the New Mexico Court that there is or should be no difference in the application of debasement of vote theo-ries between governmental representation cases and constitutional amendment cases, we remain of the opinion that the Witt case does not stand for the proposition as-serted for it by the West Virginia Court and plaintiffs-respondents herein.
We arrive then at the ultimate issue in this case, which is, do the philosophical bases underlying decisions such as Reynolds v. Sims, supra, or what Robert Dixon1 has called the outreach and impact of “one man, one vote,” require the affirmance of the lower court decision herein? Our answer is no. It has been said that the first step in the search for truth is to call things by their right names. So it is with the case at bar. What is urged upon us here has nоth-ing to do with social justice, morality or in-equality. It presents a question of govern-mental theory.
The definition of democracy and its ap-plication in any scheme of government has been argued round and about since the time of the Greek City-States. It was discussed before, during and after the formation of our present structure of federal govern-ment. DeTocqueville and others have com-mented on majoritarianism, the modifica-tions of it in American government and the dangers to America which could result from a tyranny of the majority. Modifica-tions of the doctrines of pure major-itarianism during the Federal Constitution-al Convention may have been, as some claim, sheer political experience. Never-theless, those modifications were adopted as portions of the Constitution of the United States and they remain as portions of that document today. In the minds of many scholars they have worked well in restrain-ing impulses of the moment and bringing about moderation. As stated by Robert Dahl:2
“Probably this strange hybrid, the normal American political system is not for ex-port to others. But so long as the social prerequisites of democracy are substan-tially intact in this country it appears to be a relatively efficient system for re-enforcing agreement, encouraging mod-eration and maintaining social peace in a restless and immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified and in-credibly complex society.”
The Equal Protection Clause has been de-scribed by Freund3 as a moral standard wrapped in a legal command which allows the Court in establishing constitutional doc-trine to help shape the nation‘s thinking about social justice and ethical conduct. Assuming that there has been a problem in this nation in the protection of the rights of persons accused of crime, it may be all very well for the United States Supreme Court, using as a vehicle the Equal Protection Clause, in individual state criminal cases, to attempt to change the face of law en-forcement across this country. Assuming that as a result of state legislative mal-apportionment across this country urban voters were being denied their right to rep-resentative government, it may have been all very well for the United States Supreme Court to change the face and makeup of state legislatures in the name of the Equal Protection Clause and individual rights. Assuming that racial and other minority groups were denied equality in the exercise
However, it is a far different thing for this Court or any court to insert its judg-ment into the area of pure political theory. We dо not believe that the theory of “one man, one vote,” as discovered in the Equal Protection Clause, militates against and prohibits the continuation of a political the-ory which lies at the foundation of our government, which, simply stated, is, a con-sensus amounting to more than a simple majority is not only desirable but necessary at certain times and in certain circum-stances. One viewpoint of that matter is stated as follows:
“Is a simple and invariable majori-tarianism what we mean by democracy? Since when? The Supreme Court, which has a great deal to do with how we are governed, is not only not majoritarian, it is not even elected. The Senate also wields a good bit of power over us, (and in the judgment of many it has in recent years been more responsive to the public interest than has the House); in the Sen-ate, each state, regardless of population, has an equal vote, of which no statе may be deprived, says the Constitution, even by a duly passed and ratified amendment, without its own consent. In the House, although each state has at least one vote, the whole state may be—and some are—considerably smaller in population than the average Congressional district.
“Aside from the fact that very few of our institutions, and none of our national ones, are out-and-out majoritarian, we don‘t choose to do everything by simple majority votes. It takes a two-thirds vote in the Senate to ratify a treaty, and a two-thirds vote in the Senate and House to propose a constitutional amend-ment, which must then be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states. A Congress in which the entire House and one-third of the Senate are newly-elected, and which is thus the authentic voice of a popular majority, if ever there is one in our national institutions, may pass a law, but a President elected two years earlier and now perhaps out of tune with the new majority may veto the law. If he does, it takes a two-thirds vote in the Senate and House to override his veto and make a valid law.
“One may view all these institutions and devices as outrageously undemo-cratic, hardly less undemocratic than the electoral college, and be prepared to sweep one or all of them away also, in-cluding the Supreme Court, the next time the majoritarian broom cleans out the stables. In truth these institutions and devices tell us that throughout our his-tory we have perceived other values in government than its reflection of simple majorities of the moment, which are in any event not easy to find or may be whipped up on demand. We have lived this democracy as a rather complex sum of these values, not just as uncom-promising majoritarianism. We have, since Madison, understood that people tend to act politiсally not so much as in-dividuals as in groups; that they have opinions, preferences and interests which vary in intensity, thus calling for varying degrees of respect and forbearance on the part of others, even if these others constitute a majority; that majorities sometimes act rashly and even mindless-ly, and may need to be given pause; that, in short, influence and even power should be distributed more widely than they would be in rigid adherence to the ma-joritarian principle, so that government may rest on widespread consent rather than teetering on the knife-edge of a transient 51 percent. For we have wanted government to be stable and peaceable, and to have the most limited need to resort to coercion. What we have evolved, therefore, is a pluralist system, in Professor Robert Dahl‘s phrase, of minorities rule. We have striven, perhaps it may be said, not for a
majoritarian, but for a pаrticipatory de-mocracy, in which access to the process of government is continuously available to all groups.”4
We are searching to ascertain the letter and the spirit of the United States Consti-tution. As stated as far back in our legal history as McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819):
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be with-in the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con-stitutional.”
Thus, we believe the casual brushing aside of elements in these Federal Constitu-tion modifying strict majoritarian theories, as was done by the West Virginia Court, is to ignore important aspects of the question. The Constitution in certain portions there-of, specifically requires the approval of more than a simple majority vote in de-ciding certain questions. It is, we believe, the height of illogic to suppose that a por-tion of that same document as tenuous and abstract as the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from the utilization of a political tool which it specifically author-izes and requires in other circumstances. We realize and accept that such reasoning is not borne out by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, dealing with one House of a state legislature as compared with the United States Senate. However, that doc-trinaire approach has not as yet been ap-plied to situations clearly reflecting the question of majoritarianism.
In the ultimate, all of it was perhaps best said by Mr. Justice Harlan in his opin-ion in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, supra, 383 U.S. at page 686, 86 S. Ct. at page 1092:
“It is of course entirely fitting that legis-latures should modify the law to reflect such changes in popular attitudes. How-ever, it is all wrong, in my view, for the Court to adopt the political doctrines pop-ularly accepted at a particular moment of our history and to declare all others to be irrational and invidious, barring them from the range of choice by reason-ably minded people acting through the political process. It was not too long ago that Mr. Justice Holmes felt impelled to remind the Court that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact the laissez-faire theory of society. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76, 25 S. Ct. 539, 546, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905). The times have changed, and perhaps it is appropriate to observe that neither does the Equal Protection Clause of that Amendment rigidly impose upon America an ideology of unrestrained egalitarian-ism.”
Judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to dissolve the writ of mandate and dismiss the action. Costs to appellants.
McFADDEN, C. J., and McQUADE, J., and HAGAN, District Judge, concur.
DONALDSON, Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. It is my opinion that the “one man, one vote” principle of the Equal Pro-tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-ment to the United States Constitution should be applied to a case of this nature where there is an alleged debasement of the vote in a municipal election on a general obligation bond which requires a 2/3 major-ity vote for passage. The United States Supreme Court recently held that the Equal Protection Clause applies to municipal elec-tions on revenue bonds. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S. Ct. 1897, 23 L. Ed. 2d 647 (1969). It is true that Cipri-ano involved the denial of the franchise to a non-property owner rather than the al-leged debasement or dilution of a vote. However this is a distinction without a
“* * * the right of suffrage cаn be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen‘s vote just as effec-tively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”
It is therefore apparent that the Equal Pro-tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-ment is applicable to the alleged dilution of the vote in a municipal election concerning general obligation bonds. See also, Lance v. Board of Education, W.Va., 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
Since the Fourteenth Amendment is ap-plicable the alleged Equal Protection Clause infringement must be judged by traditional standards of equal protection; i. e., it must be determined whether or not the 2/3 major-ity voting requirement creates a class against which there is discrimination, and if it does, whether there is a compelling state interest to justify it. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 23 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1969). In regard to the first question it is not disputed that by requiring a 2/3 majority of favorable votes to pass a bond issue that negative voters have twice as much voting power in the bond election as do the af-firmative voters. Apart from this dis-crepancy there is no difference in the qual-ifications of the voters. Therefore there is discrimination. However it is not direct-ed at sex, residence, color, economic status, or geographic location, but it is directed at a class of persons who happen to hold a particular point of view and results in a functional discrimination. That a point of view may not be discriminated against is clear from Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 775, 13 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1965),
“* * * ‘fencing out’ from the fran-chise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitution-ally impermissible.” 380 U.S. 89, 94, 85 S. Ct. 775, 779.
It is a sophisticated rather than simple-minded discrimination since the debase-ment or dilution only occurs when the voter decides upon which place on the ballot to place his “X.” The United States Supreme Court said in Reynolds v. Sims, supra,
“One must be ever aware that the Constitu-tion forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.‘”
However discrimination by a state law is not per se a violation of the Equal Pro-tection Clause if it is based on a compelling state interest. Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, supra; City of Houma, supra. The articulated state interest in requiring a 2/3 majority vote in bond elections is a prudent fiscal policy which requires that there be a sub-stantial approval of a given project before a municipality embarks on a voyage of in-creased indebtedness. This state policy of fiscal restraint would have more weight if it was not already safeguarded by the constitutional requirement that voters at bond elections must be property owners. In the recent case of Muench, et al. v. Paine, et al., 93 Idaho 473, 463 P.2d 939 (January 16, 1970) this Court upheld this constitutional provision. This Court held that property owners as taxpayers, by and large have a greater and more permanent economic stake in the community than non-property ownеrs. Further,
“Regardless of whether the [2/3] re-quirement could be considered appropri-ate for the conditions prevailing in the late 1800‘s, it is obvious that virtually every factor that may then have been relevant has since changed drastically. For example, great improvements have been made in the quality and integrity both of the legislative processes and of financial administration. Local legisla-tive bodies of the present are far more responsible than their counterparts were a century ago. A corps of highly trained professional administrators, finance offi-cers, and financial/bond consultants is available to serve even the smallest juris-dictions.
“Numerous modern procedures of fiscal administration have been developed since 1879. A host of auditing and financial accounting requirements have been writ-ten into law. The bond market itself is subject to safeguards preceding most of the practices that the 1879 constitutional provision was probably intended to cor-rect. For example, greatly improved re-porting procedures arе now in effect, assuring that full and accurate informa-tion on the financial and legal ramifica-tions of individual bond issues is sup-plied to prospective buyers. Highly qual-ified bond consulting firms, specialized legal counsel, and careful bond issue evaluation by respected national rating agencies, have all built strong public confidence in most local bond offerings. The sense of security appears to be gen-eral, and is not limited to states re-quiring an extraordinary majority vote. This fact, in itself, strongly suggests that the many institutional and procedural im-provements outlined here—and not the two-thirds requirement—are responsible for the soundness of modern local capi-tal outlay finance.”
Unquestionably, taxes are a vitally im-portant political necessity and must be given equality of determination by the qualified electorate the same as elected officials or constitutional amendments, that is, by one person, one vote, not one person, two votes. As the United States Supreme Court said:
“The concept of ‘we the people’ under the Constitution visualizes no preferred class of voters but equality among those who meet the basic qualifications. * * * Once a class of voters is chosen and their qualifications specified, [there is] no way by which equality of voting power may be evaded. The conception of politi-cal equality from the Declaration of In-dependence to Lincoln‘s Gettysburg Ad-dress, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.” Gray v. Sanders, supra.
I therefore find that