Bobie v. BobieBobie v. Bobie
Smith, Meier & Webb, LPA, Mark D. Webb, for appellant.
M. POWELL, J.
{1} Appellant, Francis Bobie (“Husband“), appeals a decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, dividing the parties’ assets and liabilities and awarding spousal support and attorney fees to appellee, Regina Bobie (“Wife“).
{3} Husband is an engineer in the field of oil and gas and was employed by General Electric in Cincinnati, Ohio for many years. In 2008, he began taking international assignments in Ghana, Singapore, and Switzerland and worked as an expatriate for approximately ten years. Between 2015 and 2019, his annual wage was in the mid “six figures,” with an average annual wage of $550,937. He became unemployed in March 2020 but continued his projects in Ghana throughout the divorce proceedings. Wife earned bachelor‘s and master‘s degrees during the marriage. She worked as an underwriter for Cincinnati Financial until she established her home health care business. Between 2016 and 2021, her annual wage ranged from $3,231 (2017) to $87,740 (2021). Due in part to complicated expatriate tax filings and other business interests, the parties have filed separate tax returns for nearly 20 years of their marriage. Both Husband and Wife have been successful in their career pursuits.
{4} Issues regarding the division of the parties’ marital and separate property in Ghana and the United States were considered during a contested four-day divorce trial in May 2022. Husband represented himself. Both parties testified. Isaac Agyemang and Lаwrence Tagoe, both Ghanaian real estate appraisers, and Wilson Opoku, an employee of Wife, testified on behalf of Wife. Joana Acheampong and Elizabeth Hosu, both sisters
{5} The properties in the United States included: (1) the marital house in West Chester, Ohio; (2) Maanu Bobie Properties, LLC, a joint business venture largely holding real estate in Fairfield, Ohio; (3) Bobie Whitmore, LLC, a joint venture holding real estate in Fairfield, Ohio; (4) Affribean, LLC, a logistics company owned and operated by Wife; (5) Loving Care Transitional Home, LLC, a home health care business owned and operated by Wife; (6) BTC, LLC, holding a commercial office building in West Chester, Ohio; and (7) BKK Living Trust, holding two tracts of undeveloped land in West Chester, Ohio.
{6} The properties in Ghana included: (1) the Asikasu Farm, a farm Husband intended to develop into a tourist attraction similar to an electric farm the parties visited in Singapore; (2) Clifton Gallery 1 (a one-bedroom apartment) and Clifton Gallery 2 (a two-bedroom apartment), two condominium units with high-end amenities and located within a desirable real estate market; (3) Diamond Villa, Husband‘s residence in a gated community in Accra; (4) BA Auto Parts, holding real estate, buildings, equipment, and inventory; and (5) Adade, LLC, a company established by Husband to aid in the acquisition of inventory for BA Auto Parts.
{7} The trial court issued a decision on August 31, 2022; the divorce decree was journalized on December 6, 2022. The trial court found that all the properties in Ghana and the United States were marital property, awarded the marital home and the Ghanaian properties to Husband, and awarded all the other properties located in the United States to Wife. The trial court found that the total marital property equaled $4,904,097.56 and ordered Husband to pay Wife a lump sum property equalization payment of $922,591.13 within 90 days of the filing of the divorce decree. The trial court awarded Wife $10,000 in attorney fees, ordered Husband to рay Wife $10 a year in spousal support, found that
{8} Husband now appeals, raising nine assignments of error. Husband challenges the trial court‘s property division, the awards of spousal support and attorney fees, and the court‘s finding Husband committed financial misconduct.
{9} Property division in a divorce proceeding is a two-step process that is subject to two different standards of review. Smith v. Smith, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-09-109, 2023-Ohio-982, ¶ 28. The trial court must first determine “what constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property.”
{10} After classifying the parties’ assets and debts as either marital or separate property, the trial court must then distribute the separate property and equitably divide the marital property between the spouses in accordance with the provisions of
{11} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{12} THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY IN GHANA.
{13} Husband argues the trial court erred by allocating the Ghanaian properties because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to issue orders directly affecting title to properties located within a foreign country.1 Husband cites Groza-Vance v. Vance, 162 Ohio App.3d 510, 2005-Ohio-3815 (10th Dist.), in support of his argument. Husband also briefly notes that none of the appraisal experts were able to confirm ownership of the Ghanaian properties. The ownership issue of the Ghanaian properties will be addressed under Husband‘s third assignment of error.
{14} “Subject-matter jurisdiction is a court‘s power over a type of case.” Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St. 3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 34. Subject-matter jurisdiction “does not relate to the rights of the parties, but to the power of the court.” (Emphasis omitted.) State ex rel. Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75, 1998-Ohio-275. “[T]he subject-matter jurisdiction of a trial court * * * to formulate an equitable division of the mаrital assets commences when either party files a complaint for divorce and a division of the marital property.” Bolinger v. Bolinger, 49 Ohio St.3d 120, 123 (1990). “[A] domestic relations
{15} In Groza-Vance, the Tenth District Court of Appeals observed that
a court of one state has no power to directly affect title to land located wholly within the borders of another state. In Fall v. Eastin (1909), 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, the United States Supreme Court noted as firmly established, “the doctrine that the court, not having jurisdiction of the res, cannot affect it by its decree, nor by a deed made by a master in accordance with the decree[.]” Id. at 11. * * * However, the Supreme Court also noted that “[t]he territorial limitation of the jurisdiction of courts of a state over property in another state has a limited exception in the jurisdiction of a court of equity * * *.” Id. at 8. “A court of equity, having authority to act upon the person, may indirectly act upon real estate in another state, through the instrumentality of this authority over the person.” Id.
Groza-Vance, 2005-Ohio-3815 at ¶ 17. Thus, “a court of equity, by means of its power over the person of a party, may compel the party to act in relation to property located outside the court‘s territorial jurisdiction. The court‘s decree does not operate directly upon the property or affect its title, but is made effectual through coercion of the defendant.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 18.
{16} Contrary to Husband‘s assertion, the trial court‘s divorce decree allocating the Ghanaian properties did not directly affect title to those properties. Rather, the trial court found only that the Ghanaian properties were marital property because Husband acquired an interest in the properties during the marriage, determined the value of the properties, and allocated them to Husband pursuant to its equitable power. The trial court, therefore, did not exceed its jurisdiction by allocating the Ghanaian properties.
{17} Husband‘s first assignment of error is overruled.
{18} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{19} IF THE COURT DETERMINES THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY
{20} Husband argues that even if the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the Ghanaian properties, it erred by finding they were marital property and not separate property. Husband claims that he and his siblings have only a beneficial interest in the Ghanaian properties as a result of the passing of their parents in 2018. In support of his argument, Husband cites his testimony, the testimony of his siblings, and Exhibits AA, BB, MM, and NN.
{21} “Marital property” includes “all real and personal property that currently is owned by either or both of the spouses” and “[a]ll interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property,” “that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage.”
{22} The party seeking to have a particular asset classified as separate property has the burden of proof, by a preponderance of evidence, to trace the asset to separate property. Smith, 2023-Ohio-982 at ¶ 33. “Traceability presents a question of fact, and so a court of appeals must defer to the trial court‘s findings.” Id. An appellate court will not reverse a decision on tracing so long as it is supported by competent, credible evidence. Id.
{23} Husband‘s father died in 2018; he was predeceased by his wife. The record
{24} Wife testified that the Asikasu Farm was acquired by Husband in the summer of 2019 while the family was visiting Husband in Ghana; Husband intended to develop the property into a tourist destination similar to the Singapore electric farm. Husband needed to give $3,000 to “the chief just to talk about acquiring the land.” Husband retrieved the money from a bank. The Asikasu Farm was registered with Ghana‘s Land Commission as a sole proprietorship on October 10, 2019.
{25} Wife testified that the two Clifton Gallery condominiums were under construction when Husband first showed them to her, and that is why he could not rent them. Husband was accompanied by the facility manager during that visit and wanted to show Wife the properties he had bought. The next time Wife saw the condominiums, they were completed and Husband had a key.
{26} Likewise, Wife testified thаt the Diamond Villa was under construction when she went to Ghana in 2017; Husband was trying to replicate the marital house. The record shows that Husband filed a lawsuit in Ghana against the developer of the Villa (Exhibit 21). Wife testified that a review of the Ghana lawsuit showed Husband used marital funds to build the Villa. Exhibit 21 shows that (1) Husband was the sole trustee of a trust he incorporated in Ghana in January 2014; (2) in June 2014, the trust entered into a purchase agreement with the developer to buy a “four-bedroom detached house with maids room and
{27} Wife‘s testimony and evidence show that the Asikasu Farm, the Diamond Villa, the two Clifton Gallery condominiums, and the business BA Auto Parts were acquired during the рarties’ marriage; they were therefore marital property under
{28} The testimony of Husband‘s sisters centered on the Adade Farm, the farmland upon which Husband built and started BA Auto Parts. The Adade Farm and the Asikasu Farm are two separate farmlands. One sister testified that all the properties her parents owned were passed on to her and her siblings upon the death of their father. She further testified she was not familiar with the financial state of the properties as such was managed solely by Husband and their brother William. Both sisters testified that Husband was tasked with managing the cattle and the farmlands on behalf of their family after he became unemployed in 2020.
{29} Notwithstanding his opening statement that Wife was trying “to strip me of everything that I own in Ghana,” Husband repeatedly testified that the Ghanaian properties were owned by the estate and that he (and his siblings) only had a beneficial interest in them. When confronted with evidence showing otherwise, Husband gave varying
{30} The four exhibits cited by Husband do not disclose how the Ghanaian properties were titled. Exhibits MM and NN both concern the Adade Farm. Exhibit NN is a “plan of the land property of Adade Farms.” Exhibit MM, titled “Indenture,” is a June 9, 1980 dоcument between the Chief of Ofankor (Lessor) and Husband‘s father and managing director of the Adade Memorial Farms Ltd. (Lessee). The document was registered with the Land Commission in 1998.
{31} Exhibit BB is a notarized letter from two of Husband‘s siblings stating that Husband is a beneficiary of the estate, is allowed to live in what is presumably the Villa due to his unemployment, and is managing parts of the estate which include “the Farms at Adade and Asikasu, and Multi family Dwelling properties.” Exhibit AA is a notarized declaration by Husband and his siblings stating that (1) all the properties owned by their parents were consolidated into an estate, (2) Husband and his siblings are trustees of the estate and only beneficiaries, and (3) the estate consists of vehicles, monetary accounts, multi and single-family dwellings, and “Farms at Kasoa and Asikasu.”
{32} At trial, Husband conceded that although the estate owns multiple properties, he only submitted partial evidence of ownership regarding one single asset, the Adade Farm (Exhibits MM and NN), and only did so for the benefit of the court. Husband claimed he
{33} As one of the estate‘s trustees with a beneficiary interest in the Ghanaian properties, Husband was plainly best situated to provide dispositive evidence of how and when the Ghanaian properties were acquired and titled. Husband failed to do so, instead only providing a self-serving declaration with a vague and general description of what the estate allegedly owns.
{34} In light of the foregoing, we find that Husband failed to prove that the Ghanaian properties were separate. The trial court, therefore, did not err by finding that the Ghanaian properties were marital properties and by allоcating them to Husband.
{35} Husband‘s second assignment of error is overruled.
{36} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{37} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VALUING ASSETS BY USING INCONSISTENT METHODS AND DATES.
{38} Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion in its valuation of the parties’ assets in the United States and Ghana because it used inconsistent methods and dates. The trial court established December 31, 2020, as the property valuation date. Husband does not challenge this valuation date.
{39} Prior to making an equitable division of marital property, a trial court must determine the value of marital assets. Flynn v. Flynn, 196 Ohio App.3d 93, 2011-Ohio-4714, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). “Rigid rules to determine value cannot be established, as equity
{40} As a general matter, a trial court should consistently apply the same set of dates when evaluating all marital property that is subject to division and distribution in a divorce proceeding. Homme v. Homme, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-04-093, 2010-Ohio-6080, ¶ 62. However, the circumstances of some cases may require the court to use different dates for different valuation purposes, so that the court need not utilize the same valuation date for each item of marital property. Keyser v. Keyser, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000-06-127, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1642, *8 (Apr. 9, 2001). In fact, when assigning values to marital assets, pragmatic considerations largely dictate the choice of the date utilized to make the value determination. Wei at ¶ 21. Moreover, as this court has previously stated, “it is within the trial court‘s discretion to use different valuation dates where the valuation or account balancеs at a certain date were the only evidence before the court.” Homme at ¶ 62.
{42} During the proceedings, the trial court ordered that Husband be allocated the marital house, which was owned free and clear of аny encumbrance, and permitted him to refinance or sell the property. The proceeds from any refinance or sale would then be available to Husband to finance the litigation. Husband took neither option, instead moving the trial court to stay the sale of the house which the trial court granted. The record therefore belies Husband‘s assertion he was denied funds to conduct appraisals of the real property located in the United States.
{43} It was not incumbent on the trial court to direct the parties on how to present their case or to order appraisals of the real property. If Husband believed the county auditor tax appraisals were unreliable, he could have submitted evidence, or offered testimony, as to the value of the real property. He did not. The trial court made its valuation of the real property located in the United States based upon the only valuation dates and appraisals presented at trial. Because this was the only evidence presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using the county auditor tax appraisals and different dates to value the real property in the United States. Keyser, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1642 at *9; Wei, 2003-Ohio-6253 at ¶ 19, 21.
{45} Husband‘s argument regarding depreciation is confined to a single sentence without any explanation of the argument or facts or reasoning supporting the argument in violation of
{46} Husband next argues the trial court erred by valuing the Ghanaian properties based upon the appraisal reports submitted by Wife. Specifically, Husband asserts that Agyemang‘s appraisal of the Asikasu Farm and Tagoe‘s appraisal of the Clifton Gallery condominiums are unreliable because the appraisers failed to determine ownership of these assets, did not physically inspect the properties, and used the wrong valuation methods. At
{47} The testimony of the three expert witnesses/appraisers, and in particular that of Darkwa, clearly established that property ownership records are maintained at Ghana‘s Land Commission as long as both parties to a transaction register the transaction documents with the Commission. While the records are “public,” they are not searchable without specific information. In order to request an ownership record, one must present a site plan specifically describing the location and boundaries of the property at issue. Site plans are not freely accessible and are generally provided by the owner of the property at issue. In other words, without the cooperation or permission of the property оwner, one cannot verify the ownership of a property through the Land Commission. As discussed above, Husband was in the best position to provide dispositive evidence of ownership or, alternatively, documentation for Wife to search ownership through the Land Commission. However, Husband repeatedly failed to submit evidence of ownership history of the Ghanaian properties and refused to discuss the ownership of the Ghanaian properties at trial. Husband‘s argument challenging Agyemang‘s and Tagoe‘s failure to establish the ownership of the Asikasu Farm and the Clifton Gallery condominiums (and for that matter, of the other Ghanaian properties) is disingenuous.
{48} The trial court valued the Ghanaian properties based upon the evidence presented by the parties. Wife presented the appraisal reports and testimony of Agyemang and Tagoe; Husband presented Darkwa‘s testimony. Darkwa was solely hired to review the appraisal reports of Agyemang and Tagoe; he did not appraise the properties and Husband did not present appraisal reports. In determining the valuation of an asset in a divorce case, a trial court has discretion to weigh the testimony offered by the parties’
{49} In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the value of the parties’ assets located in the United States and Ghana. Husband‘s third assignment of error is overruled.
{50} Assignment of Error No. 4:
{51} THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS AND ALLOCATE HUSBAND‘S DEBTS AND WIFE‘S LIFE INSURANCE.
{52} Husband argues that the trial court failed to address and allocate Husband‘s debts and the cash value of Wife‘s insurance policies in its property division.
{53} The record shows that Wife has two separate life insurance policies, one with The Cincinnati Life Group Insurance Company with a cash surrender value of $7,947 (Exhibit 99), and one with National Life Group with a cash surrender value of $9,528.76 (Exhibit 100). Both exhibits were presented and admitted at trial. Wife concedes that the trial court erred by not allocating the cash surrender values of her life insurance policies. We therefore sustain Husband‘s fourth assignment of error regarding Wife‘s insurance policies.
{54} At trial, Husband presented Exhibits S and TT as evidence of his debts. Both exhibits were admitted. Exhibit TT is a list summarizing Husband‘s debts. Exhibit S is a compilation of Husband‘s debts that includes: (1) a $57,690.09 judgment in favor of American Express and against Husband and his Ghanaian company Adade; (2) Discover Bank (credit card debt) for $15,681.44; (3) Wells Fargo Vendor Financial Services (rent
{55} In the divorce decree, the trial court found that Wife‘s three credit cards debts were maritаl debts for which she was responsible, allocated the American Express debt to Husband, and did not specifically address or allocate Husband‘s other debts above.2 The decree further provided, “Husband retains liability for any debt he failed to disclose during this process[.]” Likewise, the trial court‘s recapitulation table only lists and allocates Husband/Adade American Express debt and Wife‘s credit cards debts.
{56} As stated above, the concepts related to “property” relate to both the parties’ assets and debts. Ohmer v. Renn-Ohmer, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-02-020, 2013-Ohio-330, ¶ 35. Marital debt includes any debt that is incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties or for a valid marital purpose. Nichols-Ross v. Ross, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2008-03-090, 2009-Ohio-1723, ¶ 26. Husband‘s argument involves the disposition of debts incurred during the marriage, not debts incurred after the date of the divorce. Similar to assets, debts accumulated during the marriage are presumed to be marital debts. Id. Accordingly, when a debt is incurred during the marriage, the burden is on the party seeking to have the debt classified as separate debt to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that such debt was the separate obligation of the other
{57} Both parties submitted exhibit evidence of their respective debts at trial, and both briefly testified about their debts. In that regard, Wife‘s testimony was more succinct than that of Husband. However, except for Husband/Adade‘s American Express debt, the trial court did not address Husband‘s debts, did not determine whether they were marital or separate debts, and did not allocate them in the divorce decree. In light of Husband‘s testimony and exhibits, Husband‘s debts listed above do not constitute “debt he failed to disclose during this process” pursuant to the divorce decree. The trial court, therefore, erred by failing to address and allocate Husband‘s debts with Discover Bank, Wells Fargo Vendor Financial Services, PNC Visa, Capital One Mastercard, Liberty Mutual Insurance, and UC Health.
{58} Husband‘s fourth assignment is sustained.
{59} Assignment of Error No. 5:
{60} THE TRIAL COURT‘S AWARD OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND WAS ORDERED TO ENFORCE AN INEQUITABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT PAYMENT.
{61} The trial court ordered Husband to pay Wife $10 a year in spousal support without a termination date. The trial court considered several factors set forth in
Specifically, this Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce payment of the property equalization and award of attorney fees, including, but not limited to, the ability to determine [that] the property payment is in the nature of maintenance, necessity or support and is therefore nondischargeable in bankruptcy, and/or making a future spousal support order, regardless of the spousal support ordered therein.
{62} Husband challenges the trial court‘s spousal support order, arguing the trial court (1) abused its discretion by failing to set a termination date, (2) significantly undervalued Wife‘s income (by failing to consider her business, real estate holdings, and other unspecified sources) and overvalued Husband‘s income (by failing to consider his expenses associated with living abroad and his current unemployment), and (3) improperly awarded spousal support for the purpose of securing Husband‘s payment of the property equalization payment and attorney fees and protecting against Husband receiving a discharge in bankruptcy. Husband specifically complains that the trial court was without authority to find that the property equalization payment was in the nature of maintenance, necessity, or support rendering it nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
{63} A trial court has broad discretion in determining spousal support awards. Smith v. Smith, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-08-059, 2017-Ohio-7463, ¶ 24. A reviewing court will not disturb a spousal support award on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Id. “A trial court has a statutory duty to base a spousal support order оn a careful and full balancing of the factors in
{64} Husband does not develop any of the arguments he makes in this assignment of error.
{65} Husband does not explain why the lack of a termination date for the spousal support award is an abuse of discretion. The divorce decree indicates that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the duration of the spousal support. Moreover,
{66} Husband next claims that in determining the parties’ respective income, the trial court significantly undervalued Wife‘s income and overvalued his. Husband does not support this argument with any citations to the record, caselaw, or statutory authority. Husband refers only to Exhibit C, Husband‘s еmployment searches. In its decision, the trial court explicitly stated that it considered several “factors of particular importance,” including the parties’ respective income and earning abilities, the disparity in income, the property division, and the relative assets and liabilities of the parties and allocation herein. We find no abuse of discretion.
{68} In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making its spousal support determination. Husband‘s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{69} Assignment of Error No. 6:
{70} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN RESERVING JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE SALE OF 8194 MIST COURT OR “MAKE OTHER ORDERS AS NECESSARY.”
{71} To enforce Husband‘s obligation to pay Wife the property equalization payment, the trial court “reserve[d] jurisdiction to order the sale of the [marital] home or make other orders as necessary.” Husband argues this violates
{72}
{73} In the present case, the trial court retained jurisdiction to order the sale of the marital home, which was allocated to Husband, or make other orders as necessary in the event Husband does not pay Wife the property equalization payment. Pursuant to its
{74} While the trial court retains jurisdiction to administer and enforce the property division, it abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction to modify the property division. Accordingly, we sustain Husband‘s sixth assignment of error and reverse the trial court‘s judgment to the extent it attempts to reserve jurisdiction to modify the property division. The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to remove the following language from the final divorce decree under the “19. Financial Misconduct” heading: “In the event Husband refuses to pay Wife the equalization payment, the Court reserves jurisdiction to order the sale of the home at 8194 Sea Mist Court or make other orders as necessary.” See Holden, 2016-Ohio-5557 at ¶ 36.
{75} Assignment of Error No. 7:
{76} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT AGAINST HUSBAND.
{77} The trial court found that Husband engaged in financial misconduct during the marriage and divorce proceedings as follows:
Wife presented overwhelming evidence as to Husband‘s financial misconduct. She was persuasive in showing that Husbаnd * * * substantially and willfully failed to disclose
property and income to Wife. Husband engaged in dissipation, concealment or fraudulent disposition of assets causing additional time, resources, expenses, fees and aggravation for Wife.4
Husband challenges the trial court‘s financial misconduct finding, arguing it does not fall under the statutory definition of financial misconduct and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{78} An appellate court employs the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard when reviewing a trial court‘s determination that a party engaged in financial misconduct. Robinson v. Robinson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2012-11-118, 2013-Ohio-4435, ¶ 14. The reviewing court weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Smith, 2017-Ohio-7463 at ¶ 10. The burden of proving financial misconduct is on the complaining party. Id.
{79} Pursuant to
{80} Upon thoroughly reviewing the record, we find the trial court did not err by finding Husband engaged in financial misconduct.
{81} Contrary to Husband‘s assertion, the definition of financial misconduct under
{82} Nevertheless, Husband asserts that the fact Wife‘s exhibits included some of Husband‘s bank accounts “demonstrate[s] Husband provided substantial documentation.” However, these records were obtained via subpoenas. Just because Wife was able to discover concealed assets does not mean Husband did not engage in financial misconduct to conceal the assets, nor does it relieve him of his responsibility to engage in discovery in good faith, promptly, and honestly.
{83} In a September 2021 decision, the trial court described Husband‘s testimony regarding his assets and earnings as “careful” and “often times evasive.” In its August 31, 2022 divorce decision, the trial court found that Husband‘s “unmitigated and continued failure to cooperate with discovery and disclosure of assets [was] inexcusable,” his “repeated failure to comply with discovery orders” was willful, and his “intent on following
During the trial, Husband was often hostile to the proceedings. When asked about exhibits, Husband makes claim of document fraud and falsification unless the document suits his narrative. Not only did he fail to cooperate with mandatory disclosure of income and property, his actions throughout the divorce show a clear determination to conceal and obfuscate the nature and extent of interest in property. Husband demonstrated open dishonesty and lack of credibility.
{84} The trial court is in the best position to evaluate evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Wei, 2003-Ohio-6253 at ¶ 27. The trial court, in its discretion, found the testimony of Wife to be credible and that of Husband to be not credible. Upon review of the evidence presented, we find the trial court‘s finding Husband engaged in financial misconduct is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{85} Husband‘s seventh assignment of error is overruled.
{86} Assignment of Error No. 8:
{87} THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO WIFE.
{88} Husband argues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees to Wife because Wife has significant income and assets whereas he was unemployed at the time of the divorce trial and presented evidence of his attorney fees debts and inability to pay. Husband asserts that the party seeking attorney fees “must establish (1) some financial need for the award and (2) the demand for attorney fees is reasonable under the circumstances.” In support of his argument, Husband cites Nori v. Nori, 58 Ohio App.3d 69 (12th Dist.1989).
{89} Pursuant to
{90} A review of Nori and the cases it relies upon shows that the two-part test cited by Husband refers to awards of attorney fees made under
{91} The trial court awarded attorney fees to Wife, stating, “The Court considers the facts as presented at trial and in particular the significant delays and unnecessary litigation and conduct of [Husband]. After reviewing the factors set forth in
{92} At trial, Wife testified that because of Husband‘s failure to provide information or access to information about assets in Ghana, she had to hire a private investigator, an attorney, and surveyors and appraisers, thereby costing her $15,000. She further testified that Husband‘s response to discovery and the fact he constantly sent emails to her attorney resulted in a difficult and extremely expensive litigation.
{93} The trial court‘s consideration of Husband‘s conduct during discovery and the divorce trial was appropriate. See Hurst, 2020-Ohio-4006 at ¶ 33. The record supports the trial court‘s determination that Husband‘s lack of diligence and failure to fully comply with discovery orders, his evasive answers regarding the Ghanaian properties, and his
{94} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Wifе $10,000 in attorney fees.
{95} Husband‘s eighth assignment of error is overruled.
{96} Assignment of Error No. 9:
{97} THE TRIAL COURT‘S CUMULATIVE ERROR OPERATED TO DENY DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL.
{98} Husband argues that the cumulative effect of the trial court‘s numerous errors resulted in a final judgment entry/divorce decree that was neither fair nor equitable toward him, thereby warranting a new trial.
{99} Pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine, “a conviction will be reversed where the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of the constitutional right to a fair trial even though each of numerous instances of trial court error does not individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64, 1995-Ohio-168. This court has previously noted its reluctance to apply the cumulative error doctrine in civil cases. See Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. v. Heidler, 12th Dist. Clinton Nos. CA2018-06-003, CA2018-07-004, CA2018-09-012, and CA2018-09-015, 2019-Ohio-4311, ¶ 66; Allen v. Summe, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA92-04-067, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 2553, *3 (May 17, 1993). However, even setting aside such reluctance, the cumulative error doctrine is not
{100} This court has sustained Husband‘s fourth and sixth assignments of error and will remand the case for the trial court to allocate the cash value of Wife‘s insurance policies, address and allocate six of Husband‘s debts, and strike language from the divorce decree. Nonetheless, we find that the cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable here because the errors combined here do not require a new trial. See Snell v. Snell, 5th Dist. Richmond No. 13CA80, 2014-Ohio-3285; Bigler v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 7th Dist. Belmont No. 12 BE 10, 2014-Ohio-1467.
{101} Husband‘s ninth assignment of error is overruled.
{102} Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
S. POWELL, P.J., and HENDRICKSON, J., concur.