ELIZABETH A. HOAG, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE vs. SCOTT STEWART, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
No. 100951
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
September 18, 2014
[Cite as Hoag v. Stewart, 2014-Ohio-4090.]
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Case No. DR-12-342739
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 18, 2014
Bridgette D. Pozzuto
Urban & Pozzuto, L.L.C.
55 Public Square
Suite 2001
Cleveland, OH 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Carl A. Murway
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P.
200 Public Square
Suite 3500
Cleveland, OH 44114
John D. Zoller
Zoller & Biacsi Co., L.P.A.
3611 Prospect Avenue East
Cleveland, OH 44115
{¶1} Defendant Scott A. Stewart appeals from the judgment entry of divorce issued by the trial court, challenging several discovery and other pretrial issues, the equitable distribution of marital assets, and an award of attorney fees. For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} Stewart married Elizabeth A. Hoag on May 17, 2003. The couple had two children during their marriage. Hoag filed for divorce on July 11, 2012. Thereafter, the couple entered into a shared parenting plan, and stipulated to the value of their personal vehicles and the marital residence. The parties limited their discussion of the facts to only those related to the assigned errors. We shall do the same.
{¶3} Stewart appeals the final entry of divorce, advancing 17 assigned errors. Our review is hampered by the fact that Stewart included few citations to authority or the standards of review, in violation of
{¶4} In his first, second, and third assignments of error, Stewart challenges several pretrial discovery and evidentiary rulings. We find no merit to the first three assignments of error.
{¶5} A trial court enjoys broad discretion in the regulation of discovery matters. State ex rel. Duncan v. Middlefield, 120 Ohio St.3d 313, 2008-Ohio-6200, 898 N.E.2d 952,
{¶6} Stewart complains the trial court abused its discretion by extending discovery deadlines and by precluding his own testimony demonstrating the cost to repair the marital home and his expert‘s testimony regarding the valuation of Stewart‘s consulting business. The trial court excluded the former because Stewart‘s testimony violated the rule against hearsay, and the latter because the expert‘s report was produced untimely. The expert‘s testimony was meant to establish an alternate valuation of Stewart‘s consulting business to contrast with Hoag‘s expert‘s opinion of the same. Stewart‘s testimony was meant to demonstrate the true value of the marital home for the purposes of equitably dividing the parties’ marital assets.
{¶7} Stewart has failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion. In this case, the trial court afforded all parties a lenient discovery period by extending the discovery deadlines until the final pretrial conference, corresponding to the ever-shifting trial date. For example, the trial court granted Stewart‘s motion to compel discovery filed on October 4, 2013, despite being filed outside the court‘s discovery deadline. The final pretrial conference occurred on August 27, 2013. Stewart, as the beneficiary of such leniency, can hardly claim the court abused its discretion by disregarding the original
{¶8} Finally, with respect to the trial court‘s exclusion of Stewart‘s statements regarding any cost of repair to the marital home, Stewart attempted to substantiate the repair cost with a contractor‘s proposal, in violation of
{¶9} In his fourth, fifth, seventh, and ninth assignments of error, Stewart claims the trial court‘s allocation and valuation of marital assets was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We find no merit to any of these assigned errors.
{¶10} “The trial court‘s valuation of an asset in a divorce case is a question of fact reviewed under a manifest weight of the evidence standard.” Rossi v. Rossi, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100133 and 100144, 2014-Ohio-1832,
{¶11} Stewart advances several arguments attacking the trial court‘s ultimate valuation of several assets.1 He primarily claims that the court erred in determining the value of his business based on “more than one obvious” mistake made by Hoag‘s expert. Stewart does not support that statement with any evidence from the record, instead claiming his expert explained the mistakes. This is simply an issue of credibility between competing experts. “In determining a business‘s value, the trial court has discretion to weigh the testimony offered by the parties’ valuation experts.” Brown v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100499, 2014-Ohio-2402, ¶ 32, citing Gentile v. Gentile, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97971, 2013-Ohio-1338, ¶ 62, and Bryan v. Bryan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97817, 2012-Ohio-3691. The trial court is not required to adopt any particular methodology in determining a business‘s value. Id.
{¶13} In his sixth, eighth, and thirteenth assignments of error, Stewart claims that the trial court considered both the value of his business and the income he derived from it in determining spousal support. He also takes issue with the trial court‘s valuation of Hoag‘s retirement plan. According to Stewart, the trial court used the cash value instead of the present value. Stewart also claims the trial court miswrote the divorce decree by including a clause terminating the spousal support payment only upon Hoag‘s cohabitation, rather than marriage. The record does not support any of Stewart‘s conclusions. The trial court only considered Stewart‘s income for the purposes of determining spousal support; the trial court indicated that the parties stipulated to the value of Hoag‘s retirement plan; and from the record provided, there is no indication that the termination of spousal support upon cohabitation was a scrivener‘s error. We summarily overrule Stewart‘s sixth, eighth, and thirteenth assignments of error.
{¶14} In his tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and seventeenth assignments of error, Stewart claims the trial court erred by converting the lump sum payment reflecting Hoag‘s allocated portion of the marital assets and Hoag‘s award of attorney fees into monthly
{¶15} Stewart does not challenge the award of spousal support other than to “take issue” with 7 of the trial court‘s 19 findings — correlating to the statutory factors — in support of the spousal support determination. “In determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable, the trial court must consider the factors set forth in
{¶17} This leaves the $12,000 bill for Hoag‘s attorney fees that Stewart was ordered to pay. On that issue, we briefly digress to address Stewart‘s sixteenth assignment of error, in which he claims the trial court erred by awarding Hoag attorney and expert witnesses’ fees because of Stewart‘s conduct throughout the discovery period.
{¶18} “In an action for divorce * * * a court may award all or part of reasonable attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable.”
{¶19} He further claims he is unable to pay in light of his limited yearly income. The ability to pay an award of attorney fees, however, is not limited to considering the
{¶20} Stewart‘s only remaining contention is with the court‘s decision to provide a payment plan for the equitable distribution of property and award of attorney fees. The fact that his spousal and child support obligations combined with the monthly obligation arising from the property equalization and the award for attorney fees may exceed his stated monthly income, in and of itself, is not a basis to overturn the properly awarded child and spousal support payments. Stewart has not cited any basis in the law to so conclude. Unlike the spousal and child support obligations, the equalization of marital property and attorney fees awards, comprising approximately two-thirds of the total obligation challenged, must be considered in respect to his overall financial position, not just his monthly income. Stewart‘s argument focused on his monthly income without any discussion of his overall financial situation. We accordingly overrule his tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and seventeenth assignments of error.
{¶21} In his fourteenth assignment of error, Stewart claims the trial court erred by designating his business account as the account for the withholding or deduction notice
{¶22} Finally, in his fifteenth assignment of error, Stewart claims the trial court erred by awarding the income tax deductions for the minor children to Hoag in light of the fact that the parties stipulated to share the exemptions. We find Stewart‘s argument to be disingenuous at best. Stewart claims the parties agreed to share the exemptions for their two children in the shared parenting plan. In reviewing the agreement, however, the parties specifically agreed to share the exemptions subject to further order by the trial court. The trial court subsequently allocated the exemptions to Hoag. There was not a permanent agreement between the parties to divide the exemptions. We overrule Stewart‘s fifteenth and final assignment of error.
{¶23} The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR