KENNETH A. BLACK v. TOWN OF WEST HARTFORD ET AL.
(AC 43918)
Cradle, Suarez and Bear, Js.
July 13, 2021
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Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from an assessment by the Board of Assessment Appeals for the defendant town of West Hartford in connection with certain of the plaintiff‘s personal property. In his appeal, the plaintiff also named as a defendant the state Office of Policy and Management, claiming that it violated a certain statute (
Argued April 19—officially released July 13, 2021
Procedural History
Appeal from the decision of the named defendant‘s Board of Assessment Appeals revising the assessment of certain of the plaintiff‘s personal property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Cobb, J., granted the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant Office of Policy and Management and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Patrick T. Ring, assistant attorney general, with whom were Joseph J. Chambers, deputy associate attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, and Clare E. Kindall, solicitor general, for the appellee (defendant Office of Policy and Management).
Opinion
The following facts, which either are undisputed or are taken from the underlying complaint and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Godbout v. Attanasio, 199 Conn. App. 88, 90–91, 234 A.3d 1031 (2020), are relevant to our consideration of the plaintiff‘s claim on appeal. On October 21, 2019, the plaintiff, pursuant to
The plaintiff next alleged that the defendant “is a duly authorized agency of the State of Connecticut and is responsible for recommending a schedule of motor vehicle
He further alleged that the “NADA ‘clean retail’ value of [the plaintiff‘s vehicle] was . . . $22,050. The base [Manufacturer‘s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP)] when the vehicle was purchased in May of 2017 was $22,495. . . . This means under the valuation scheme, the over two year old vehicle has lost only $445 in value, or [2] percent of its MSRP. The ‘clean retail’ value as defined by the NADA does not state ‘average’ within the text . . . .” To support this assertion, the plaintiff provided in the complaint an excerpt that was allegedly taken from the NADA guides’ website, which contained answers to frequently asked questions about values and pricing. The excerpt states: “Clean Retail values reflect a vehicle in clean condition. This means a vehicle with no mechanical defects and passes all necessary inspections with ease. Paint, body and wheels have minor surface scratching with a high gloss finish and shine. Interior reflects minimal soiling and wear with all equipment in complete working order. Vehicle has a clean title history. Because individual vehicle condition varies greatly, users of NADAguides.com may need to make independent adjustments for actual vehicle condition.”
The plaintiff attached four documents to the complaint and incorporated them by reference in his allegations.6 Among the attachments was a September 28, 2018 memorandum from the defendant to municipal assessors in which the defendant, in accordance with
The complaint sought (1) “declaratory relief that the assessment should be based on the average retail price pursuant to . . . [
On November 18, 2019, the defendant, pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30, moved to dismiss the plaintiff‘s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that “sovereign immunity completely bar[red] the plain-
tiff‘s action against [it].”8 The defendant also argued that “the plaintiff ha[d] not exhausted his available administrative remedies,” “the plaintiff lack[ed] standing to bring his claims against [the defendant] due to lack of aggrievement,” and “the plaintiff‘s claims against [the defendant] are nonjusticiable because they are not ripe.”
On December 2, 2019, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion in which he disputed each of the defendant‘s arguments. He argued in relevant part that sovereign immunity did not apply because the defendant “acted in excess and contrary to the plain language of [
On January 13, 2020, the court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss.10 The defendant began by arguing that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies before bringing the action, and that the plaintiff failed to plead an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.11 The defendant then addressed its argument that the plaintiff
On January 31, 2020, the court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. In its order granting the motion, the court stated: “It is axiomatic that the state as the sovereign cannot be sued without its consent. Allen v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 324 Conn. 292, 298, [152 A.3d 488] (2016). Sovereign immunity applies to the state and its agencies and officers. Id. To overcome sovereign immunity the plaintiff must establish that the legislature either expressly or by force of necessary
implication waived sovereign immunity or in an action for declaratory or injunctive relief, the state or its officers acted in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711–12, [937 A.2d 675] (2007). Here, the plaintiff does not allege that the state has waived its sovereign immunity, [or refer to] any statute that constitutes a waiver and has failed to allege that the state or its officers acted in excess of their statutory authority or pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. See Carter v. Watson, 181 Conn. App. 637, 642, [187 A.3d 478] (2018).” The court did not address the merits of the defendant‘s argument that the action should be dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing. From that judgment, the plaintiff now appeals. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The plaintiff claims that the court erred in granting the defendant‘s motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The defendant argues that the court properly dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign immunity. In the alternative, the defendant argues, as it did before the trial court, that the judgment should be affirmed because the plaintiff cannot establish that he was aggrieved and, thus, had standing. We deem it appropriate to uphold the trial court‘s dismissal of the action as to the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring the action against the defendant.13
“Our Supreme Court has stated that [o]nly in [the] most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court. . . . This rule applies equally to alternat[ive] grounds for affirmance. . . . One such exceptional circumstance is a claim that implicates the trial court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time and, thus, is not subject to our rules of preservation.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation
As we have observed, the defendant raised the issue of standing before the trial court and the plaintiff had an opportunity to, and did, address the issue of standing. Moreover, the defendant raised the issue of standing in its brief to this court and the plaintiff addressed the issue in his reply brief.14 Accordingly, the issue of standing is properly before this court despite the fact
that the trial court did not rely on that ground in dismissing the action. Our plenary review of the record persuades us that the plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the action and, therefore, we affirm the court‘s judgment of dismissal on this ground.
“It is well established that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . Standing . . . is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. . . . Where a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause. . . .
“When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . . Because standing implicates the court‘s subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff . . . bears the burden of establishing standing. . . . Our review of the question of the plaintiff‘s standing is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation markets omitted.) State Marshal Assn. of Connecticut, Inc. v. Johnson, 198 Conn. App. 392, 398–99, 234 A.3d 111 (2020).
The defendant argues that the plaintiff lacks standing because he has failed to establish classical aggrievement. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he has a “specific, personal, and legally protected interest” in the matter, and that, even if he could, he “did not allege an actual harm” that was caused by its actions. To support its argument, the defendant states that the “schedule is created by [the defendant] for use in every municipality in this state. It is not applied solely to the plaintiff‘s property, or exclusively in one municipality. That is, the plaintiff‘s interests with respect to [the defendant‘s] recommended schedule are no different from every other taxpayer in the state. Indeed, the plaintiff‘s claims are similar to general ‘taxpayer standing’ claims, which the courts have historically
assessors,” and that these assessments “are subject to review by the municipalities’ boards of assessment appeals, which can alter the assessed values as necessary.” Accordingly, the defendant argues, it “is not, and could not be, the cause of any injury here.” In his reply brief to this court, the plaintiff quotes from his objection to the defendant‘s motion to dismiss to reiterate that he has been aggrieved by the defendant‘s “direct [role] in administering [the] tax bill . . . .” He argues that he has standing because he has a personal interest in the property that was taxed and that the burden is solely on him to “pay, appeal, and now bring [this matter] to court.” We agree with the defendant.
“It is axiomatic that aggrievement is a basic requirement of standing, just as standing is a fundamental requirement of jurisdiction. . . . There are two general types of aggrievement, namely, classical and statutory; either type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features. . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest. . . . Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation. . . . Aggrievement is established if there is a possibility, as distinguished from a certainty, that some legally protected interest . . . has been adversely affected.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Trikona Advisers Ltd. v. Haida Investors Ltd., 318 Conn. 476, 485–86, 122 A.3d 242 (2015).
In the present case, the plaintiff did not claim statutory aggrievement as a basis for the trial court‘s jurisdiction in the underlying complaint, in his main brief or reply brief to this court, or at oral argument before this court. Rather, his arguments on the issue of standing focus on classical aggrievement. Therefore, we consider whether he has been classically aggrieved by the defendant‘s recommendation that the municipalities of this state, including, but not limited to, the town, should apply the NADA guides’ schedule that includes the “clean retail values” of motor vehicles, as opposed to their “average retail prices.” In the complaint, the plaintiff challenges only the defendant‘s act of choosing the “clean retail value” portion of the motor vehicle pricing schedule, and there is no allegation that the defendant itself could apply or did apply any terms of that schedule to determine the value of the plaintiff‘s vehicle or any other vehicle, the plaintiff recognizing that it was the responsibility of each municipality to perform that func-
tion.15 The NADA guides recommended by
The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant played a role in assessing his vehicle beyond merely recommending the use of the “clean retail value” portion of the NADA guides. In other words, the plaintiff does not allege any affirmative conduct by the defendant determining or requiring that his vehicle should be valued in a manner different from any of the other vehicles registered with the town that are included in the NADA guides. As previously noted in this opinion, when the defendant issued its memorandum recommending the motor vehicle pricing schedule for 2018, it stated that the NADA guides contain the “average retail price/‘[c]lean [r]etail [v]alue‘” of the vehicles included therein. Furthermore, Heft‘s e-mail to the plaintiff states that the relevant NADA guides “do not list the average retail prices of vehicles,” and, instead, list “clean retail value,” which “has the same meaning as the term average retail price . . . .” On the basis of this information, we reasonably can infer that, for the 2018 tax year, municipal assessors used clean retail values to formulate assessments for every vehicle included in the NADA guides. Furthermore, on the basis of the excerpt from the NADA guides’ website that the plaintiff provided in the complaint, we reasonably can infer that the clean retail values of every vehicle are calculated using the same criteria. Thus, accepting as true the plaintiff‘s allegation that “clean retail value” is different than “average retail price,” he is unable to show how his injury is different than that of any other taxpayer whose vehicle is included in the NADA guides. Rather, the personal and legal interest that the plaintiff claims to have in the subject matter is one that is common to all of these taxpayers. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff lacks standing to maintain the action as against the defendant because he has failed to establish classical aggrievement under the first prong of the test.
In light of our conclusion that the plaintiff failed to establish that he was aggrieved by the defendant‘s conduct, we conclude that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the action as against the defendant and, thus, should have dismissed it on that ground.18 See Gershon v. Back, 201 Conn. App. 225, 244, 242 A.3d 481 (2020) (” [w]henever a court finds that it has no jurisdiction, it must dismiss the case” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.