Case Information
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ELANA GERSHON RONALD BACK (AC 42778) Lavine, Bright and Beach, Js.* Syllabus The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant previously had been dissolved pursuant to a foreign judgment of dissolution, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her motion to open the
judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Prior to their marriage in New York, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement, which the New York dissolution court determined was valid. During the dissolution proceedings, the parties entered into a stipulation that provided, inter alia, that it superseded the prenuptial agreement, that it was incorporated but not merged into the dissolution judgment and that it was to be governed by New York law. Following the dissolution of their marriage, the parties both moved to Connecticut, and the plaintiff registered the New York dissolution judgment in Connecticut pursuant to statute (§ 46b-71). In her motion to open, the plaintiff sought to have the trial court open the dissolution judgment, vacate the stipulation and order a new trial, claiming that the judgment was obtained through the defen- dant’s fraudulent conduct in that he made material misrepresentations and failed to disclose certain assets in his sworn financial statement at the time the stipulation was negotiated. Following a hearing, the trial court, applying New York law, dismissed the plaintiff’s motion to open, concluding that to challenge the validity of the stipulation, which was incorporated but not merged into the dissolution judgment, the plaintiff was required to bring a plenary action. Held that, although the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s motion to open the dissolution judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because that court had jurisdiction to consider the motion pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 46b-1 and 46b-71 (b)), this court concluded that, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the trial court properly determined that the plain- tiff was required to bring a plenary action to vacate the stipulation, as the New York rule requiring a party to challenge a separation agreement that is not merged into the dissolution judgment through a plenary action is substantive and, as such, § 46b-71 and the stipulation required the trial court to apply that rule to the motion to open; accordingly, the trial court should have denied the motion to open rather than dismissed it, and the case was remanded with direction to render judgment denying the plaintiff’s motion to open. Argued May 20—officially released November 10, 2020
Procedural History Motion by the plaintiff to open a foreign judgment of dissolution, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the court, Hon. Michael E. Shay , judge trial referee, dismissed the plaintiff’s motion, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Improper form of judgment ; judgment directed
Alexander J. Cuda , for the appellant (plaintiff). Joseph T. O’Connor , for the appellee (defendant). *3 Opinion
LAVINE, J. The present appeal concerns the judgment rendered by the trial court when it dismissed the motion to open the 2011 New York judgment of marital dissolu- tion (motion to open) filed by the plaintiff, Elana Gers- hon, some years after she registered the judgment in Connecticut. The plaintiff claims on appeal that the trial court improperly dismissed her motion to open for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by applying New York procedural rules, rather than Connecticut procedural rules, when it dismissed the motion. [1] We conclude that the court properly determined that New York law gov- erned the plaintiff’s rights with respect to the parties’ stipulation, but we agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed the motion to open for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The form of the judgment is improper. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the case with direction to render judgment denying the motion to open.
The record discloses the following contentious and protracted litigation history between the plaintiff and her former husband, the defendant, Ronald Back. [2] In August, 1997, [3] prior to their marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement. The plaintiff was a school psychologist, and the defendant was a busi- nessman with a substantial interest in a family business. The parties married on August 16, 1997, resided in New York state, and had two children together. As the disso- lution judgment, reciting the parties’ stipulation, states: ‘‘[c]ertain unhappy and irreconcilable differences [arose] between the parties, as a result of which they . . . separated and have been living apart from each other since in or about February 6, 2009 . . . .’’ On or about the date of separation, the plaintiff, then known as Elana Back, commenced an action for divorce in the New York Supreme Court, county of Westchester (New York court). During the course of the divorce proceed- ings, the parties engaged in extensive litigation, discov- ery, and negotiations regarding the prenuptial agree- ment, which the plaintiff sought to invalidate. The New York court determined that the prenuptial agreement was valid. On April 11, 2011, the parties settled, for the time being, their dispute over the division of marital property. The parties signed a stipulation that provided in part that it superseded ‘‘the [p]renuptial [a]greement, [which] shall be of no further force or effect upon the effective date of this [stipulation].’’ The stipulation fur- ther provided, among other things, that it was to be incorporated by reference, but not merged , in the judg- ment of dissolution and that it ‘‘may be enforced inde- pendently of such decree or judgment [of dissolution].’’ [6] The stipulation also provided that ‘‘[a]ll matters affect- ing the execution, interpretation, performance and enforcement of this [a]greement and the rights of the *4 parties hereto shall be governed by the laws of the [ s ] tate of New York .’’ [7] (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, the New York court rendered a judgment of dissolution of the parties’ marriage on May 11, 2011.
The plaintiff remarried three days following her divorce from the defendant and moved with the parties’ children to Greenwich. The defendant eventually moved to Connecticut, as well. The plaintiff registered the dissolution judgment in the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk on October 27, 2014, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-71 (a). On November 24, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to modify child support (motion to modify) as permitted by the dissolution judgment. [8] The parties again engaged in extensive discovery with respect to the defendant’s finances. On April 26, 2017, pursuant to New York Domestic Relations Law, [9] the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion to modify, increased the defendant’s monthly child support obligation and awarded the plain- tiff attorney’s fees. [10] In a separate order, the court awarded the defendant a credit in light of his having paid a portion of the college room and board expenses of the parties’ older child.
On September 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed the motion to open that is the subject of the present appeal. In that motion, the plaintiff sought to have the court open the dissolution judgment, vacate the stipulation, and order a new trial, [11] ‘‘as the judgment was obtained through the fraudulent conduct of the [defendant] and there is a reasonable probability that the result of the settlement would have been different had the defendant not made material misrepresentations of fact to the court and to the plaintiff in his sworn financial statement provided at the time of settlement.’’ [12] (Emphasis added.) In con- nection with her motion to open, the plaintiff sought postjudgment discovery of the defendant’s financial records. The defendant opposed both the plaintiff’s motion to open and her request for postjudgment dis- covery. The parties filed numerous motions, objections, and memoranda with respect to the motion to open and request for discovery.
On October 26, 2018, counsel for the parties appeared
before the court at which time the court ruled on several
of the parties’ outstanding motions and objections not
at issue here. At the time, the court stated that, in
Connecticut, postjudgment discovery generally is not
permitted in the absence of a demonstration by the
plaintiff that she has more than a ‘‘mere suspicion’’ of
fraud on the part of the defendant in his conduct relating
to the execution of the stipulation. The court specifi-
cally referenced
Oneglia Oneglia
,
The court conducted an Oneglia hearing on Decem- ber 4, 5, and 6, 2018. Both parties testified at the hearing, as well as the plaintiff’s forensic accountant, Lee Sand- erson. On December 21, 2018, counsel for the parties appeared for final arguments. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the evidence demonstrated that the defen- dant had failed to disclose significant assets at the time the stipulation was negotiated. Counsel for the defen- dant argued that eight years after the plaintiff had received the benefits of the stipulation, she was pre- cluded from relitigating the parties’ divorce on the grounds of collateral estoppel, ratification, and lack of evidence to sustain the allegation of fraud. Counsel for the defendant also argued that the plaintiff could not challenge the stipulation by way of a motion to open the judgment; rather, she had to file a plenary action sounding in contract ; but that the statute of limitations had run on such an action. Counsel further argued that, given the validity of the prenuptial agreement, the plain- tiff would have received far less under the prenuptial agreement than she received under the stipulation and, therefore, she could not argue credibly that she had sustained any damages. [16]
At the conclusion of the arguments, the court explained that, under Oneglia , if the evidence demon- strated that the plaintiff had more than a mere suspicion of fraud, the discovery process would begin, and there- after the court would hold a hearing to determine whether the dissolution judgment should be opened. If the court found that the plaintiff had no more than a mere suspicion of fraud, there would be no discovery regarding the defendant’s finances. Without additional discovery, the plaintiff would have to decide whether to pursue her motion to open with the evidence she had presently.
On January 31, 2019, the court issued a memorandum of decision regarding the Oneglia hearing, the outcome of which determined whether the plaintiff could con- duct discovery of the defendant’s finances. As a prelimi- nary matter, the court stated that two facts were critical to its decision, to wit: (1) the stipulation was incorpo- rated in, but not merged into, the dissolution judgment and (2) the stipulation provided that all matters related *6 to it were to be governed by New York law. The court recounted the relevant facts and procedural history of the case and that it previously had ruled on the plaintiff’s motion to modify and the defendant’s motion for child support credit. The court then stated that the present matter came before the court by way of the plaintiff’s motion to open.
As it did at the October 26, 2018 proceeding, the court
stated that Connecticut’s rules of practice do not permit
postjudgment discovery unless the plaintiff can show
that there is more than a ‘‘mere suspicion’’ of fraud on
the part of the defendant in his conduct related to the
execution of the stipulation. See
Oneglia Oneglia
,
supra,
The court cited the New York law it had considered
in reaching its decision, stating that ‘‘[t]here is a clear
societal benefit in reliance upon the finality of judg-
ments, particularly in family relations matters, where
the judgment is based upon an agreement of the parties.
It is the general policy of the courts in New York to
uphold settled domestic relations judgments.
Rainbow
Swisher
,
The court continued, stating, ‘‘[i]n general, financial
disclosure is inappropriate unless and until the existing
separation agreement is set aside.
Rupert Rupert
,
190 App. Div. 2d 1027,
The court continued, stating that, given the circum- stances of the present case and under the standard articulated by the New York courts, ‘‘even applying a sensitive balancing, the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden with at least a prima facie showing either that the stipulation was unfair or unreasonable when negoti- ated, or unconscionable when the dissolution judgment was entered, or that the defendant’s action amounted to wilful fraud or fraudulent concealment. Moreover, [the plaintiff] has not established that, even if the judg- ment were to be opened and the stipulation were to be set aside, that the resulting judgment would likely be substantially different.’’ The court denied the plain- tiff’s request for discovery and ordered that the ‘‘matter shall be set down for argument as to show cause as to why the plaintiff’s motion to open . . . should not be denied consistent with New York law.’’ (Emphasis added.)
The parties and their counsel appeared in court on March 19, 2019. The court commenced the proceeding by stating: ‘‘I think that since the matter started with a *8 hearing with regard to postjudgment discovery and was not per se a hearing on the merits, I believe that the appropriate course of action is to dismiss . . . because it’s jurisdictional and jurisdiction . . . always in this particular instance . . . implicates the subject matter, [which] can [be] raise[d] . . . at any time and even by the court and that’s Practice Book [§] 10-33 . . . .’’ The court then explained that the judgment was subject to New York law and that the gravamen of the motion to open was the prenuptial agreement. Prior to the dissolution of the parties’ marriage, the court noted, a New York court had determined that the prenuptial agreement was valid and that there was no fraud on the part of the defendant. The trial court then reviewed and analyzed the evidence that supported the New York court’s decision regarding the absence of fraud. The court concluded: ‘‘[T]he bottom line, when all is said and done, is that New York law says you cannot attack the [ judgment ] based on a motion to open. It must be done by a plenary action, a contract action, and that is why I am going to dismiss this action immediately .’’ [20] (Emphasis added.) See Spataro Spataro , supra, 268 App. Div. 2d 468 (‘‘Supreme Court erred in entertaining defendant’s motion on merits, as motion is not proper vehicle for challenging a separation agreement incorpo- rated but not merged into divorce judgment. Rather, defendant should have commenced plenary action seek- ing vacatur or reformation of the agreement.’’).
On April 5, 2019, the plaintiff appealed from the judg- ment of dismissal, raising numerous claims. Of the plaintiff’s several claims, the determinative one is whether the court improperly dismissed the motion to open on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with the plaintiff that the court improperly dismissed the motion to open on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction but conclude that the court properly determined that the plaintiff was able to challenge the stipulation only by bringing a plenary action. In other words, the court should have denied the plaintiff’s motion to open, hence, the form of the judgment is improper.
We begin our analysis with the applicable standard of
review. ‘‘[A] determination regarding a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction is a question of law . . . .’’
Rathblott
Rathblott
,
‘‘[E]very presumption favoring jurisdiction should be
indulged.’’
Connecticut Light & Power Co. Costle
,
As we noted previously, the plaintiff registered the New York judgment of dissolution in Connecticut in October, 2014, pursuant to § 46b-71, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any party to an action in which a foreign matrimonial judgment has been rendered, shall file, with a certified copy of the foreign matrimonial judgment, in the court in this state in which enforce- ment of such judgment is sought, a certification that such judgment is final, has not been modified, altered, amended, set aside or vacated and that the enforcement of such judgment has not been stayed or suspended . . . .
‘‘(b) Such foreign matrimonial judgment shall become a judgment of the court of this state where it is filed and shall be enforced and otherwise treated in the same manner as a judgment of a court of this state . . . . A foreign matrimonial judgment so filed shall have the same effect and may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner as any like judgment of a court of this state and is subject to the same procedures for modifying, altering, amending, vacating, setting aside, staying or suspending said judgment as a judgment of a court of this state; provided, in modifying, altering, amending, setting aside, vacating, staying or suspending any such foreign matrimonial judgment in this state the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction shall be controlling .’’ (Emphasis added.)
Under General Statutes § 46b-1 (4), ‘‘the Superior
Court is vested with plenary and general subject matter
jurisdiction over legal disputes in family relations mat-
ters . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Reinke
Sing
,
Section 46b-71 provides that the Superior Court
where the foreign dissolution judgment is registered
has jurisdiction to modify the judgment, provided that
it applies the substantive law of the foreign jurisdiction.
See
Vitale Krieger
,
As the court stated in its January 31, 2019 memoran- dum of decision, two facts were critical to its decision: (1) the stipulation was incorporated but not merged in the dissolution judgment and (2) the stipulation pro- vided that all matters related to it were to be governed by New York law.
Nevertheless, because the issue of whether New York
substantive law precluded the court from granting the
plaintiff the relief she requested raises a question of
law, we consider whether the court should have denied
the plaintiff’s motion to open. ‘‘A stipulated judgment
is not a judicial determination of any litigated right.
.
. It may be defined as a contract of the parties
acknowledged in open court and ordered to be recorded
by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . [It is] the
result of a contract and its embodiment in a form which
places it and the matters covered by it beyond further
controversy. . . . The essence of the judgment is that
the parties to the litigation have voluntarily entered into
an agreement setting their dispute or disputes at rest
and that, upon this agreement, the court has entered
judgment conforming to the terms of the agreement.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Barber Barber
,
Although the court conducted an Oneglia hearing in December, 2018, in its January 31, 2019 memorandum of decision, it recognized that Oneglia did not control postjudgment discovery and applied New York law to the evidence presented at the hearing. The court further recognized that a stipulation that is incorporated, but *11 not merged, into a New York dissolution judgment may not be challenged by way of a motion to open the dissolution judgment, but only by the commencement of a plenary action seeking to undo the stipulation itself. See Anderson Anderson , supra, 153 App. Div. 3d 1628. The court also recognized that it is error for a court to entertain a motion to open such a judgment on its merits when the underlying stipulation has not been set aside. See Spataro Spataro , supra, 268 App. Div. 2d 468. [23]
The plaintiff argues that the court improperly applied New York procedural law rather than Connecticut pro- cedural law, because the rule requiring a plenary action to challenge a stipulation not merged into the judgment of dissolution is procedural and not substantive. She also argues that discovery, which is what she sought in the trial court, is inherently procedural. She further contends that the fact that § 46b-71 sets forth the proce- dure for enforcing foreign matrimonial judgments in Connecticut confirms that the New York rule is proce- dural. Finally, the plaintiff posits that the court, up until the time it improperly applied New York procedural law to deny her discovery request, recognized the proce- dural nature of the issues before it and applied Connect- icut’s procedural rules under Oneglia
The defendant argues that the New York rule requir- ing that the validity of a stipulation be challenged in a plenary action is substantive and that the trial court properly applied it. He also contends that the New York rule is predicated on public policy that recognizes that the valid substantive contractual rights of the parties take precedence over inchoate and previously waived statutory rights. We agree with the defendant that the New York rule requiring a plenary action to challenge the terms of a settlement agreement, incorporated but not merged into the judgment of dissolution, is sub- stantive.
‘‘The judicial rule of thumb, that in a choice of law
situation the forum state will apply its own procedure
. . . brings us to the vexing question of which rules
are procedural and which substantive. These terms are
much talked about in the books as though they defined
a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law.
But, of course, substance and procedure are the same
keywords to very different problems.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Paine Webber
Jackson & Curtis, Inc. Winters
,
‘‘The ordinary rule is that where a cause of action
arising in another [s]tate is asserted in our courts, we
look to the laws of that [s]tate to determine all matters
of substance involved in it, but that matters of proce-
dure are governed by our own law . . . .’’
Broderick
McGuire
,
Consequently, we must examine whether the New
York rule at issue in this case, i.e., that the validity of
a stipulation must be challenged by means of a plenary
action, defines rights under New York law or merely
provides a remedy for enforcing rights. Under New York
law, a stipulation of settlement that is incorporated but
not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract
subject to principles of contract construction and inter-
pretation. See, e.g.,
D’Sa
v.
D’Sa
, 182 App. Div. 3d 535,
536,
It is for this reason that under New York domestic
relations law, ‘‘financial disclosure in support of a claim
to overturn a separation agreement is inappropriate
until the existing separation agreement is set aside.
. . . The only exception to this rule requires the moving
party to establish a ‘legitimate factual predicate’ for
setting aside the existing agreement. . . . The spouse
seeking discovery about the other spouse’s finances—
after execution of an agreement—must adduce suffi-
cient factual support constituting a legitimate basis to
warrant modification or vacatur of the support provi-
sions of the separation agreement . . . . The Fourth
Department has adopted this requirement for a legiti-
mate factual predicate before allowing discovery by a
party to overturn a separation agreement.’’ (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Moore
v.
Moore
, supra,
In the present case, after conducting an
Oneglia
hear-
ing, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to meet
her burden with at least a prima facie showing either
that the stipulation was unfair or unreasonable when
negotiated or unconscionable when the dissolution
judgment was entered, or that the defendant’s actions
amounted to wilful fraud or fraudulent concealment,
or that, if the judgment were set aside, the resulting
judgment would be different. The court, however, deter-
mined that it erred in entertaining the merits of the
plaintiff’s discovery motion, which was ancillary to the
motion to open, because a motion to open is not the
*14
proper vehicle to challenge a stipulation incorporated,
but not merged, into a judgment of dissolution. See
Spataro
v.
Spataro
, supra, 268 App. Div. 2d 468. To
challenge the validity of the stipulation that was not
merged into the dissolution judgment, New York sub-
stantive law requires a party to bring a plenary action.
Id.; see also
Moore
v.
Moore
, supra,
The form of the judgment is improper, the judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s motion to open is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the motion to open.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of
the date of oral argument.
the merits of the motion to open after determining that it lacked subject
[1]
In addition, the plaintiff claims that the court (1) improperly addressed
matter jurisdiction, (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant her motion
for a continuance after her counsel disclosed that she intended to withdraw
her appearance, and (3) erred in finding that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate probable cause for postjudgment discovery under
Oneglia
v.
Oneglia
,
rights . . . as provided for in [New York] Domestic Relations Law [§] 236- B and that they make this Agreement with the understanding that they are hereby settling the prospective terms . . . of the marriage relationship with respect to matters of property rights, and they further understand that this Agreement is in lieu of their prospective rights to litigate such matters before a court of competent jurisdiction; and ‘‘. . . both parties have discussed the terms . . . implications and mone- tary considerations involved between themselves, [and] they desire to set forth their agreement in writing, without any duress . . . and they do fully and voluntarily enter into this Agreement. . . .
‘‘1. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE ‘‘[Each of] the parties . . . has furnished the other with a copy of [his or her] 1996 Federal Income Tax Return . . . and . . . they have each had the opportunity to review same. ‘‘[The defendant] has . . . filed . . . Corporate and Partnership Tax Returns for those items of separate property . . . which are deemed to be confidential due to the interest of . . . parties not in privity [with this] Agreement. Although [the plaintiff has requested them, she] has not been furnished with copies of such documents, and is executing this Agreement despite her lack of access to [them]. ‘‘In lieu of providing copies of such Corporate and Partnership Tax Returns, [the defendant] has [represented to the plaintiff] . . . the value of the businesses as set forth in Schedule ‘A.’ Similarly, [the plaintiff has represented to the defendant] the value of assets listed on Schedule ‘B.’ Both parties acknowledge that they are relying upon such representations . . . regarding the financial . . . circumstances of the other party, in exe- cuting this Agreement. . . .
‘‘5. OWNERSHIP AND DIVISION OF PROPERTY ‘‘In the event of a . . . judicial dissolution of the marriage, each party shall retain his or her separate property to his or her exclusive ownership and use. . . . ‘‘7. INTENTION OF AGREEMENT ‘‘This Agreement is solely intended to make provision for the ownership, division and distribution of marital and separate property. . . .
‘‘10. PAYMENT UPON OPERATIVE EVENT ‘‘If an operative event . . . occurs . . . [the defendant] shall pay to [the plaintiff] . . . in full . . . settlement of . . . all claims . . . that [the plaintiff] may have against [the defendant] for a distributive award for any contribution . . . of whatever kind . . . to the appreciation of separate property, including but not limited to: Essential Oils, Inc.; Flavormatic, Inc.; or R & R Realty or any subsidiary or derivative endeavor. . . . ‘‘C. If an operative event first occurs after . . . the seventh anniversary . . . but not later than the twelfth anniversary . . . of the marriage, then as a property settlement [the defendant] shall pay [the plaintiff a] sum equal to twenty . . . percent of [his] adjusted gross income . . . . ‘‘ ‘[A]djusted gross income’ shall be . . . the average of [the defendant’s] adjusted gross annual income . . . for the five . . . years immediately pre- ceding . . . the operative event, including the year of the operative event. . . .
‘‘11. OPERATIVE EVENT, DEFINED ‘‘[A]n operative event . . shall mean . . . [c]ommencement of an action . . . by either party seeking a . . . dissolution of the marriage . . . .
‘‘15. SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS ‘‘The parties agree that all . . . provisions of the Agreement shall be binding upon them upon the date of [their] marriage . . . [and] shall . . . be binding upon [them] and shall become a part of any subsequent agreement entered into between [them] . . . . The provisions of this Agreement shall . . . be incorporated but not merged in any judgment . . . of divorce . . . obtained by either party . . . [and] shall . . . survive the same . . . .
‘‘19. SITUS ‘‘ This Agreement shall be construed . . . in accordance with the laws
of the State of New York . . . . of their respective choice] . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘21. LEGAL REPRESENTATION ‘‘The parties represent . . . that [they have been represented by counsel The New York court upheld the validity of the prenuptial agreement,
stating in its May 4, 2010 decision: ‘‘The plaintiff has failed to establish that *16 the represented value of the Flavormatic Companies was false at the time it was made; that the defendant knew the values to be false; and that the alleged misrepresentation of the value of the companies was made for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to enter into the prenuptial agreement. Moreover, there is no showing that the plaintiff relied on the alleged misrep- resentation or that she was injured as a result of the alleged misrepresenta- tion. On the contrary, the plaintiff concedes that she knowingly waived any and all rights to the Flavormatic Companies. She testified unequivocally that she knew the defendant intended to keep these companies as separate property regardless of their values.’’ tual nature follow. Other pertinent provisions of the stipulation that underscore its contrac- ‘‘ARTICLE XVI ‘‘WAIVER OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION ‘‘1. The parties intend this Agreement to constitute an Agreement pursuant to [New York Domestic Relations Law] § 236 (B) (3). They intend this
Agreement and its provisions to be in lieu of each of their respective rights pursuant to all aspects of [New York Domestic Relations Law] § 235 (B). Accordingly, except to the extent provided in this Agreement, the parties mutually waive their rights and release each other from any claims for maintenance, distribution of marital property, distributive awards, special relief or claims regarding separate property or increase in the value thereof . . . . ‘‘ARTICLE XVII ‘‘FULL DISCLOSURE ‘‘Each party has had the opportunity to make independent inquiry into the complete financial circumstances of the other and is fully informed of
the income, assets, property and financial prospects of the other. Each has had a full opportunity and has consulted at length with his or her attorney regarding all of the circumstances hereof, and acknowledges that this Agree- ment has not been the result of any fraud , duress or undue influence exercised by either party upon the other or any other person or persons upon the other. Both parties acknowledge that this Agreement has been achieved after competent legal representation and honest negotiations. . . . ‘‘ARTICLE XXIII ‘‘RECONCILIATION AND MATRIMONIAL DECREES ‘‘1. This Agreement shall not be invalidated or otherwise affected by a reconciliation . . . and this Agreement shall not be invalidated or otherwise
affected by any decree or judgment of separation or divorce made by any court in any action which may presently exists or may hereafter be instituted by either party against the other for a separation or divorce, and the obliga- tions and covenants of this Agreement shall survive any decree or judgment of separation or divorce and shall not merge therein, and this Agreement may be enforced independently of such decree or judgment . . . . ‘‘ARTICLE XXIV ‘‘LEGAL INTERPRETATION ‘‘All matters affecting the execution, interpretation, performance and enforcement of this Agreement and the rights of the parties hereto shall be governed by the laws of the State of New York. . . . Any actions or claims
involving this Agreement . . . shall be governed by the Laws of the State
of New York and the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Westchester
County will retain jurisdiction . . . of all such issues, provided at least one
party resides in Westchester County New York. . . . If both parties reside
outside of New York State, any actions or claims involving this Agreement
. . .
shall be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction, and with respect
to any choice of laws, the Laws of the State of New York shall be applied
and govern in all respects.
’’ (Emphasis added.)
‘‘The general rule is, that by a judgment . . . the contract or instrument
upon which the proceeding is based becomes entirely merged in the judg-
ment. By the judgment of the court, it loses all of its vitality and ceases to
bind the parties to its execution. Its force and effect are then expended,
and all remaining legal liability is transferred to the judgment or decree.
Once becoming merged in the judgment, no further action at law or suit in
equity can be maintained on the instrument.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) 30 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th Ed. 2004) § 76:50, p. 237.
‘‘However, the
parties may agree that certain contractual rights will
survive the entry of a judgment. This is particularly likely in the case of
separation agreements in divorce cases
. Thus, it has been said: ‘If parties
who are dissolving their marriage wish to retain contractual remedies as
well as the remedies that are available under the dissolution judgment, then
*17
they may do so by entering into an agreement and identifying which, if any,
of the terms of their agreement they wish to have the court incorporate
into the judgment, and which terms they wish to have survive as separate
agreements.’ ’’ (Emphasis added.) Id., 239.
‘‘Contract clauses which require the application of the laws of other states
upon breach or dispute are recognized as proper in Connecticut. . . . The
ordinary rule is that where a cause of action arising in another [s]tate is
asserted in our courts, we look to the laws of that [s]tate to determine all
matters of substance involved in it, but that matters of procedure are gov-
erned by our own law . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.)
People’s United Bank Kudej
,
‘‘2. Prior to their marriage, the parties entered into a prenuptial agreement [pursuant to which], plaintiff waived her interest in defendant’s separate property, including his business interests. At the time, defendant was a 50 [percent] owner of Flavormatic Industries, Essential Oil Suppliers and R & R Realty, of which entities defendant’s brother was his partner. Defendant’s financial disclosure for purposes of the prenuptial agreement consisted of his 1996 personal income tax return reflecting $41,000 in wages and $11,157 in rental income, a schedule listing his business interests and the values of his bank and brokerage accounts . . . and a statement from his accountant of the fair market value of his business interests. Plaintiff specifically waived any further discovery in executing the prenuptial agreement. . . . ‘‘4. Plaintiff commenced a divorce action on February 2, 2009. During the divorce proceedings, plaintiff unsuccessfully challenged the prenuptial agreement on the basis of defendant’s fraud . . . and, as a result, the Court limited discovery and plaintiff was not permitted access to documents related to defendant’s business interests . . . . ‘‘5. The parties started a divorce trial on April 4, 2011 [but] settled and executed a [ stipulation ] dated April 11, 2011, which was subsequently incorporated into the divorce judgment ‘‘6. In connection with the trial, defendant had submitted to plaintiff and to the Court a sworn Statement of New Worth . . . dated April 1, 2011. ‘‘7. On his [statement of net worth] under GROSS INCOME, defendant wrote ‘0.00.’ Defendant then wrote ‘See Attached 2010 income information’ . . . [and] attached . . . documents relative to the prior year’s income . . . . ‘‘8. Defendant indicated total expenses on his [statement of net worth] of $12,096 per month . . . not including any support to be paid towards plaintiff and the parties’ two children. ‘‘9. On his [statement of net worth], defendant [listed his assets] . . . .
‘‘10. . . . According to defendant at the time of the parties’ divorce, other than the value of his business (which he stated was N/A), his other cash and retirement assets totaled $131,215 . . . which he claimed was his ‘sepa- rate property’ under the parties’ prenuptial agreement except for [a] . . . brokerage account and the cash value of his life insurance policy. ‘‘11. Based upon defendant’s ‘disclosures’ on his sworn financial statement, relied upon by plaintiff, the parties entered into [a] settlement, which set forth that their [stipulation] superseded the Prenuptial Agreement:
‘‘a. Child Support: ‘‘- Defendant to pay child support to plaintiff in the amount of $5000 per month, based upon defendant’s gross income of $265,000 in 2009 . . . ‘‘- Defendant to pay 80 [percent] of statutory add-ons for the children; and ‘‘- Defendant to pay 60 [percent] of college [costs] for the children with a [State University of New York] cap.
‘‘b. Alimony: Plaintiff waived her right to alimony. . . .
‘‘12.
.
. [P]laintiff [received] cash assets from the marriage totaling
$488,776 . . . .
‘‘15. On November 21, 2014 . . . after domesticating the New York Judg-
ment of Divorce in Connecticut, plaintiff filed a motion to modify . . . on
the ground that under New York law, defendant’s income had increased by
at least [15] percent since the Judgment of Divorce resulting in a substantial
change in circumstances requiring an upward modification . . . .
‘‘18. It was only during the discovery process on the [motion to modify]
did plaintiff begin to learn that defendant’s April, 2011 statement of net
worth . . . contained false statements and material omissions intended to
mislead plaintiff and the Court, and misrepresent his actual income and the
parties’ marital assets. . . .
‘‘20. Defendant lied on his [statement of net worth] about his available
and true compensation as the owner of Flavormatic, listing his 2011 income
as ‘0.00’ and his 2010 income as $150,000, and then each year starting
with the year of his divorce taking compensation ranging from $950,000 to
$1,900,000 . . . .
‘‘21. Defendant stockpiled money in his corporation in order to avoid
equitable distribution of marital assets and to avoid paying alimony and
child support . . . .
‘‘25. Defendant hid the income [he earned] during the marriage, which
would have resulted in significant nonbusiness assets subject to equitable
distribution, stockpiling those sums in his businesses, because he knew that
plaintiff would not have access to the information by virtue of the trial
court upholding the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement. Defendant
intentionally omitted this information on his [statement of net worth] for
the purpose of fraudulently inducing plaintiff [to enter] into a [stipulation]
which was egregiously inequitable. Defendant’s misconduct was wilful, mali-
cious and unlawful, as a result of which this Court should vacate the parties’
April, 2011 [stipulation], open the divorce judgment and order a new trial.
‘‘26. Had defendant been truthful on his [statement of net worth], there
is a reasonable possibility that . . . the settlement would have been differ-
ent [in that plaintiff would not have waived alimony, would not have agreed
to $5000 per month in child support, would have demanded counsel fees,
would not have agreed to limit the defendant’s obligation to pay for the
children’s college expenses at the State University of New York cap, would
not have agreed to pay 40 percent of the children’s college expenses, would
not have agreed to leave the marriage with less than $500,000, and would
have demanded higher life insurance coverage for child support and for
alimony].’’ (Emphasis altered; footnote omitted.)
‘‘
Oneglia
and its progeny are grounded in the principle of the finality
of judgments.’’
Brody Brody
,