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622 F. App'x 10
2d Cir.
2015
SUMMARY ORDER
SUMMARY ORDER
SUMMARY ORDER
Notes

Carmel SPITERI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-3931-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 10, 2015.

Carmel Spiteri, pro se, Marsascala, Malta, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General, Michael S. Belohlavek, Senior Counsel, Mark H. Shawhan, Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, PETER W. HALL and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Carmel Spiteri, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s judgment dismissing his complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff‘s favor. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir.2002). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

To the extent Appellant‘s brief raises claims against appellees other than Michelle Harrington or Michelle Mulligan, those claims were dismissed previously and will not be revisited. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe‘s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir.2013). As to the claims against Harrington and Sullivan, an independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed Appellant‘s claims. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough September 2013 decision.

We have considered Appellant‘s arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court and DENY Appellant‘s several motions for judicial notice.

Shawn M. BERRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Correction Officer Castro, # 7800, Correction Officer L. Beckwith, # 1983, Defendants-Appellees, Correction Officer John Doe, who worked August 30th 2012 at Rikers Island GRVC in its Administrative Segregation MHAUII Punitive Box the 7 am to 3 pm shift as Barber Shop officer, Inmate Oscar Punter, # 210 10 01563, Defendants.

No. 14-2142-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 10, 2015.

Shawn M. Berry, pro se, Comstock, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Pastor (Richard Dearing, on the brief), for Zachary Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.

PRESENT: PETER W. HALL and GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges, JED S. RAKOFF,** District Judge.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Shawn M. Berry, pro se, appeals the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees the New York City Department of Correction and Correction Officers Beckwith and Castro in Berry‘s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, which raises Eighth Amendment failure to protect and excessive force claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in that party‘s favor.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 271 (2d Cir.2011). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

An independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants. Berry failed to demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to support his failure to protect claim, see Hayes v. New York City Dep‘t of Corrs., 84 F.3d 614, 620-21 (2d Cir.1996), or that Defendant-Appellant Beckwith‘s use of pepper spray was excessive, see Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 21-22 (2d Cir.2000). Beckwith and Castro, in any event, are entitled to qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We therefore affirm for the reasons stated by the district court in its May 22, 2014 decision.

We have considered all of Berry‘s re-maining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

Janie Marie FARLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-4436

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Nov. 10, 2015.

Janie Marie Farland, Farmingdale, N.Y., pro se.

James H. Knapp and Varuni Nelson, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Kelly T. Currie, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Central Islip, N.Y., for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges, CHRISTINA REISS,* Chief District Judge.

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Janie Marie Farland, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States on her medical malpractice claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Farland has abandoned appellate review of her medical malpractice claim by explicitly disavowing that claim in her brief. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995). However, because “the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis omitted), we construe Farland‘s filings in the district court to raise a battery claim.

We review de novo a district court‘s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there

Notes

*
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to amend the official caption as set forth above. The Honorable Chief Judge Christina Reiss, of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
**
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Case Details

Case Name: Berry v. New York City Department of Correction
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date Published: Nov 10, 2015
Citations: 622 F. App'x 10; 14-2142-cv
Docket Number: 14-2142-cv
Court Abbreviation: 2d Cir.
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