BENJAMIN STANLEY v. WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY; WARREN HILLS and KATIE DECAMP, individually and in their professional capacities
No. 23-1808
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
June 24, 2024
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b). File Name: 24a0136p.06
Before: CLAY, THAPAR, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Eric Delaporte, DELAPORTE LYNCH, PLLC, Mason, Michigan, for Appellant. Daniel B. Tukel, Joseph E. Richotte, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Troy, Michigan, for Appellees.
OPINION
MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Benjamin Stanley worked for Western Michigan University (“WMU”) for about one month when WMU terminated his employment. Stanley then sued WMU and a few of its employees. He claimed that WMU and certain supervisors discriminated and retaliated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Stanley also brought a claim under Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed Stanley’s federal claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed his state-law claims for failure to comply with the Michigan Court of Claims Act’s notification statute. See
I.
WMU is a public university in Michigan. WMU employed Benjamin Stanley as a utility food worker in its dining hall for 31 days, from early October to mid-November 2020. Stanley claims he did not complete training for the job because “[p]artway through the training, the employee leading the training was called away for another task.” R. 1, PageID 2.
WMU terminated Stanley’s employment during his probationary period for excessive tardiness and failure to follow proper clocking-in procedures. Stanley has severe ADHD that he claims impacted his ability to timely clock in, such as by causing him to occasionally forget his swiping ID card. Stanley claims he was “disciplined for being late after having to wait for WMU staff to perform his required temperature check for COVID-19 purposes,” even though he was told he would not be disciplined following such occurrences. Id. at 3. Because Stanley sometimes forgot his ID card, he requested a reasonable accommodation—such as a punch card to be kept onsite—which WMU denied. Stanley also spoke to WMU’s office of institutional equity to determine whether he would be able to use his service dog in any department, including dining services, which Stanley claims led to employees in that office “asking improper questions regarding [his] disability.” Id. Stanley disclosed the tasks his service dog performed but did not elaborate on his disability or medical history.
Before Stanley requested a reasonable accommodation, he was “told that he was doing a fine job and was on track to complete his probationary period.” Id. However, “WMU’s praise changed” when, on or about November 10, 2020, WMU told Stanley to stop showing up to work late. Id. at
After receiving his notice of right to sue from the U.S. Department of Justice, Stanley filed suit. He brought three claims: (1) discrimination under Title I of the ADA; (2) retaliation and intimidation under Title V of the ADA and under the PWDCRA; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants, including unknown John Doe and Jane Doe employees of WMU, in their individual and professional capacities. Stanley sought the following relief: “actual and compensatory damages”; punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs; “whatever other legal or equitable remedies [the district court] deems reasonable and just pursuant to statute and common law”; and “any other relief the [district court] deems fit.” Id. at 6.
WMU, DeCamp, and Warren Hills (“Defendants”) moved to dismiss Stanley’s complaint. They sought to dismiss the ADA claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and the state-law claims for failure to comply with Michigan procedural law. Stanley responded in opposition to Defendants’ motion and sought leave to amend his complaint.
The district court dismissed all of Stanley’s claims against Defendants with prejudice. The district court also denied Stanley leave to file an amended complaint, finding that Stanley’s proposed amendment would be futile.
II.
As an initial matter, Defendants contend that we lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s appeal. That is because, according to Defendants, when Stanley appealed, the district court had not entered a final judgment. And when the district court did enter a final judgment, Stanley did not file a new or amended notice of appeal.
Before reaching the merits, we must ensure that we have appellate jurisdiction. Watkins v. Healy, 986 F.3d 648, 657 (6th Cir. 2021). Subject to exceptions not applicable here, Congress has granted us appellate jurisdiction “only from ‘final decisions’ of the district courts.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (quoting
On August 7, 2023, the district court dismissed all claims that Stanley brought against Defendants and denied Stanley leave to file an amended complaint. The district court also gave Stanley fourteen
Stanley’s premature notice of appeal does not deprive us of jurisdiction. “A notice of appeal filed too early,” as we explained recently, “ripens when the window to appeal begins.” Winters v. Taskila, 88 F.4th 665, 671 (6th Cir. 2023); see Preferred Props., Inc. v. Indian River Ests., Inc., 276 F.3d 790, 796 n.4 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[A] premature notice of appeal is effective to vest appellate jurisdiction when the judgment becomes final prior to the disposition of the appeal.”). Stanley’s notice of appeal ripened on September 7, 2023. We therefore have jurisdiction.
III.
The district court dismissed Stanley’s ADA claims against Defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The Eleventh Amendment affords broad protections for States against private suits. Unless immunity is removed, individuals cannot seek “monetary damages or retrospective relief.” Ashford, 89 F.4th at 969. But they can “seek prospective injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacity before those officials violate the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Skatemore, 40 F.4th at 733; see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
With this background in mind, we now address whether Defendants are entitled to immunity from Stanley’s ADA claims.
In Count I of his complaint, Stanley brought a claim under Title I of the ADA, which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees “on the basis of disability.”
WMU is chartered under the Michigan Constitution. See
Recognizing that Garrett bars his claim for money damages, Stanley tries to take advantage of the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. But Ex parte Young does not allow suits “against the state itself.” Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 833 F.3d 590, 598 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Thus, Ex parte Young does not apply to Stanley’s ADA discrimination claim against WMU.
But what about his ADA discrimination claims against DeCamp and Hills? Those must also fail. To the extent Stanley seeks damages against DeCamp and Hills in their official capacities, they enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 409–10 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[Eleventh Amendment immunity] protects states, as well as state officials sued in their official capacity for money damages, from suit in federal court.”). And to the extent he seeks damages against them in their personal capacities, they are not subject to liability under the ADA. See Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1999) (personal-capacity defendants are not “employers” under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 404–05 & n.6 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting Title VII and the ADA are “essentially the same” with respect to “an employee/supervisor’s individual liability”).
Stanley also fails to allege the necessary facts that show that his requested relief—an injunction barring all Defendants, including DeCamp and Hills, from firing him—will redress his injury. Nowhere does his complaint specify that DeCamp and Hills fired him or can reinstate him. Therefore, he lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief against DeCamp and Hills.
B. Retaliation under Title V of the ADA
In Count II of his complaint, Stanley alleges that WMU retaliated against him in violation of Title V of the ADA. Specifically, Stanley contends that “WMU retaliated against [him] by firing him for simply exercising his rights under the ADA . . . when making reasonable request [sic] for an accommodation based in alternative method [sic] for clocking in and for the use of his service animal.” R. 1, PageID 6.
Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has addressed previously whether the States are entitled to immunity from claims brought under Title V of the ADA. See Cook v. Garner, No. 19-5931, 2020 WL 4876309, at *3 (6th Cir. June 17, 2020) (order). To determine whether WMU is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from Stanley’s Title V ADA claim, we must decide: (1) “whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity” and, if so, (2) “whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
Congress clearly expressed its intention to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in the ADA. It stated that “[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution . . . from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of [the ADA].”
So we consider whether Congress had constitutional authority to remove the States’ immunity for claims brought under Title V. Congress cannot rely on “the powers enumerated in Article I” of the Constitution to remove Eleventh Amendment immunity. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364. It can apply the ADA to the States only “pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 518 (citation omitted); Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364; see also
We must first identify “the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. That constitutional right comes from § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects individuals’ equal-protection and due-process rights from encroachment by the States. The Supreme Court has held previously that “States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Id. at 367. Title V’s prohibition against retaliation protects related but nonetheless distinct interests than Title I. Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (“The substantive provision [of the related and substantively identical Title VII] seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status. The antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.”). But, as in this case, Title V claims are frequently predicated on Title I claims, such as when a plaintiff alleges retaliation for complaining about the very disability discrimination he experienced. It logically follows that if states have no affirmative duty, beyond rationality, to accommodate a disabled citizen in that instance, then the right against retaliation for opposition to such discrimination is similarly narrow.
Next, we must consider “whether Congress identified a history and pattern of
Because Congress’s legislative findings and the congressional record do not reflect a history and pattern of retaliation by the States against public employees for opposing disability discrimination, we hold that Congress did not have authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remove States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity for ADA retaliation claims predicated on a violation of Title I of the ADA. Our holding flows naturally from Garrett: if Congress did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for Title I claims, then it also did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity for a claim under Title V alleging retaliation for a Title I claim. See Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Title V cannot serve as a congruent and proportional remedy when paired with a Title I claim. . . . [W]hen the underlying provision—here, Title I—does not allow a plaintiff to assert a claim against the State, it logically follows that a Title V claim that is based on the exercise of a right arising only from Title I cannot be levied against the State.”). In reaching our holding today, we join every circuit to have addressed this issue. See id.; Block v. Tex. Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 952 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 2020); Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Ex parte Young exception does not help Stanley for his retaliation claim any more than for his discrimination claim. He cannot obtain an injunction against WMU because WMU functions as the State. See Puckett, 833 F.3d at 598. And, as stated above, his request for injunctive relief from the individual Defendants was deficient.
*
The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Stanley’s ADA claims because Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Stanley lacks standing to request injunctive relief from DeCamp and Hills. Because the dismissal was for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court should have dismissed Stanley’s ADA claims without prejudice. See Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir. 2021).
IV.
Stanley brought state-law PWDCRA and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims against Defendants. The district court could resolve those claims only through supplemental jurisdiction because there was no basis for original jurisdiction. See
Not all pretrial dismissals are created equal. “When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims[.]” Id. at 1254–55 (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). But when federal claims are dismissed under
V.
Finally, we address the district court’s denial of Stanley’s motion to amend his complaint. We generally review the district court’s decision to deny a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of discretion. U.S. ex rel. Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 816 F.3d 399, 407 (6th Cir. 2016). But because the district court’s denial rests on the conclusion that amendment would be futile, we review the decision de novo. Id.
Under
To survive a motion to dismiss under
Stanley’s proposed amended complaint included eight additional paragraphs, and he requested to amend the relief sought to include an order that would enjoin Defendants from firing him and that would reinstate him to his position at WMU. Specifically, Stanley argues that his proposed amended complaint “would have provided clarification and additional factual allegations to further support his claim for Ex parte Young relief, cure other minor deficiencies in the pleading, and would have ensured [he] withstood a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” D. 14 at p.28.
The district court did not err in denying Stanley’s motion. First, none of the newly added paragraphs include facts that would support a claim under Ex parte Young. The only one that comes remotely close is Paragraph 3 of the proposed amended complaint where Stanley claims “[d]uring all relevant times, Defendants Warren Hills, Katie DeCamp, and Unknown John Doe and Jane Doe employees of WMU acted as agents of WMU, and upon information and belief, maintained 15 or more employees each working day.” R. 17-2, PageID 200. Stanley added this allegation so that the district court would consider Hills and DeCamp “employers,” which could trigger personal liability under the ADA. But it states a legal conclusion that the district court did not have to accept as true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, his proposed amended complaint does not indicate that DeCamp or Hills have the power to reinstate him. Although Stanley claims DeCamp and Hills “presumably had the power to reinstate” by virtue of their positions at WMU, D. 14 at p.32, we are not required to presume as much.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Stanley’s ADA claims and the denial of Stanley’s motion for leave to amend his complaint. We VACATE the district court’s judgment dismissing Stanley’s federal and state-law claims with prejudice and REMAND this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Stanley’s federal and state-law claims without prejudice.