BBBB BONDING
A162453 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG19041553)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
Filed 12/29/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
In this putative class action, the trial court enjoined appellant BBBB Bonding Corporation, doing business as Bad Boys Bail Bonds (BBBB), from enforcing bail bond premium financing agreements entered into by respondent Kiara Caldwell and other similarly situated persons who had cosigned on behalf of an arrestee without having first been provided with this statutory notice. BBBB asserts that this consumer protection law has never applied to bail bond agents or to bail bond premium contracts before. BBBB raises many substantive and procedural challenges to the trial court‘s preliminary injunction, arguing primarily that because the Legislature adopted a comprehensive scheme to regulate the conduct of bail bond licensees, it intended to exclude from such transactions the consumer protections applicable to consumer credit contracts.
We hold that a bail bond premium financing agreement between a cosigner and the bail bond agent is a consumer credit contract subject to the notice provision of
On June 21, 2018, Caldwell was contacted by BBBB and informed that her friend D.C. had been arrested and was being held in the City of San Leandro jail. To bail her friend out, Caldwell was asked to sign several documents and provide a bail bond premium. Caldwell signed an “Unpaid Premium Agreement” (Premium Agreement) in which she became legally responsible for the bail bond premium of $5,000, representing 10 percent of D.C.‘s bail. Pursuant to the Premium Agreement, Caldwell agreed to make a downpayment of $500 and pay the balance due of $4,500 in $450 monthly installments until paid in full.
Caldwell was also required to sign an “Indemnity Agreement for Surety Bail Bond” (Indemnity Agreement) with the North River Insurance Company (North River). That contract provided that the bail bond premium payment would be “fully earned” upon D.C.‘s release from jail, and would be renewed annually until the surety was legally discharged from all liability on the bond posted. Finally, Caldwell signed an “Indemnitor/ Guarantor Check List,” which contained a series of acknowledgements, including an acknowledgment that she was responsible for making payments on the premium. Caldwell was told that D.C. would separately sign her own copies of the same contracts. Caldwell asserts that she was not informed of the financial risks associated with cosigning for D.C.‘s bail bond, and maintains that she would not have cosigned for the bail bond premium if she had been provided with the
Caldwell was unable to make the installment payments beyond the initial $500 deposit. BBBB attempted to collect from her, repeatedly calling her phone, her mother, and her place of employment in an effort to persuade her to resume payments. BBBB representatives reportedly threatened litigation and claimed she could lose her job if she did not make payments. Eventually, Caldwell changed her cell phone number to avoid the repeated phone calls. Other cosigners attested to similar aggressive collection efforts by BBBB, including highly embarrassing calls to employers, calls made to homes very early in the morning or late at night, and calls in which BBBB representatives stated it could have the cosigner arrested if payment was not made.
In October 2019, BBBB initiated a collection action by filing a complaint for breach of contract and common counts against Caldwell. BBBB alleged she had breached the Premium Agreement by failing to pay the $4,500 owing on the bail bond premium.
In October 2020, Caldwell filed a class action cross-complaint against BBBB alleging causes of action for violation of the unfair competition law
Caldwell then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin BBBB from enforcing or attempting to collect on Premium Agreements signed by cosigners who were not provided with the notice required by
On April 8, 2021, the trial court granted Caldwell‘s motion for a preliminary injunction. In reviewing the collections complaints filed by BBBB in the other actions, the trial court found that the premium agreements were “typically signed by both the arrestee and the family or friend who acts as an indemnitor.” The trial court determined that Caldwell had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of her UCL claim under the UCL‘s unlawful prong. The court found that the premium financing agreements are consumer credit contracts subject to the notice requirements of
The court further found that the balance of hardships tipped decidedly towards Caldwell because she had demonstrated that she and others like her had been victimized by BBBB‘s failure to provide
The court enjoined BBBB from filing any actions to enforce or collect on bail bond premium agreements against cosigners who were not provided with
The trial court‘s ruling was stayed for 15 days. Shortly before that stay expired, BBBB petitioned this court for a writ of supersedeas. We stayed the trial court‘s ruling and ordered expedited briefing.
II. RELEVANT STATUTORY SCHEMES
At the center of this appeal are two statutory schemes: consumer credit protections under the
A. California Consumer Credit Protection Laws
In 1975, the Legislature enacted a series of laws commencing with
Under the notice provision, if a creditor obtains the signature of more than one person on a consumer credit contract, and the signatories are not married, the creditor must provide the cosigner with a specified cosigner notice.
“Unless the persons are married to each other, each creditor who obtains the signature of more than one person on a consumer credit contract shall deliver to each person who does not in fact receive any of the money, property, or services which are the subject matter of the consumer credit contract, prior to that person‘s becoming obligated on the consumer credit contract, a notice in English and Spanish in at least 10-point type as follows:
“NOTICE TO COSIGNER . . .
“You are being asked to guarantee this debt. Think carefully before you do. If the borrower doesn‘t pay the debt, you will have to. Be sure you can afford to pay if you have to, and that you want to accept this responsibility.
“You may have to pay up to the full amount of the debt if the borrower does not pay. You may also have to pay late fees or collection costs, which increase this amount. “The creditor can collect this debt from you without first trying to collect from the borrower. The creditor can use the same collection methods against you that can be used against the borrower, such as suing you, garnishing your wages, etc. If this debt is ever in default, that fact may become a part of your credit record.
“This notice is not the contract that makes you liable for the debt.”
If the required cosigner notice is not given, the creditor may not enforce any resulting security interest against the cosigner. (
The cosigner provisions apply to any ” ‘Consumer credit contract,’ ” defined in the statute as an “obligation[] to pay money on a deferred payment basis, where the money, property, services or other consideration which is the subject matter of the contract is primarily for personal, family or household purposes” and the obligation falls within any of six broad categories: (1) retail installment contracts; (2) retail installment accounts; (3) conditional sales contracts; (4) loans or extensions of credit secured by other than real property or unsecured; (5) loans or extensions of credit that are subject to certain
B. Bail Bond Contracts and Statutory Scheme
“While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. [Citation.] ‘The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure
The bail bond transaction “is a function of ‘two different contracts between three different parties‘—namely, (1) a contract between a criminal defendant and a surety under which the surety posts a bail bond in exchange for the defendant‘s payment of a premium and his [or her] promise to pay the full amount of the bond in the event of his [or her] nonappearance, and (2) a contract between the surety and the People under which the surety ’ ” ’ “act[s] as a guarantor of the defendant‘s appearance in court under risk of forfeiture of the bond.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 226, 235.) If the defendant fails to appear, the surety becomes the state‘s absolute debtor for the full amount of the bond. (People v. Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1213, 1225; see also People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13, 22.)
This appeal raises questions about a third contract not previously addressed by the above authorities—bond premium financing agreements between an arrestee (or cosigner) and the bail bond agent to finance the payment of the premium. A bail bond is generally arranged by a bail agent who acts on behalf of the surety company. The client (the arrestee and/or a friend or family member) utilizes the services of the bail agent to secure the undertaking of bail and the arrestee‘s release from detention. The bail agent charges the client the bail premium, which is normally set at 10 percent of the cash bail amount. This bail premium is typically nonrefundable.2 If the client cannot afford to pay the full bail premium amount, the bail agent may offer to arrange for installment payments to be made over time until the debt is paid off.
The bail bond industry is regulated under the Bail Bond Regulatory Act (
statutory scheme. The Department of Insurance (Department) issues regulations that supplement the statutory scheme. (See
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
” ‘Pursuant to long-standing Supreme Court case law, “trial courts should evaluate two interrelated factors when deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm that the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” [Citation.] We review a trial court‘s application of these factors for abuse of discretion.’ ” (Urgent Care Medical Services v. City of Pasadena (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1092.) The party challenging the injunction has the burden to make a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, and “[a] trial court will be found to have abused its discretion only when it has ’ “exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence.” ’ ” (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69.)
“[Q]uestions underlying the preliminary injunction are reviewed under the appropriate standard of review. Thus, for example, issues of fact are subject to review under the substantial evidence standard; issues of pure law are subject to independent review.” (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1136-1137 (Gallo).)
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
BBBB raises numerous challenges to the trial court‘s determination that Caldwell was likely to succeed on the merits of her UCL claims. Because many of these contentions turn on questions of statutory interpretation or other questions of law, we review such claims de novo. (Millennium Rock Mortgage, Inc. v. T.D. Service Co. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 804, 808-809.) Where other standards of review are applicable to our analysis, we discuss our review of those matters below.
BBBB first contends that consumer protection laws, such as the cosigner notice provision, have no application to bail bond transactions because the bail bond industry is governed by its own statutory scheme—the Bail Bond Regulatory Act and its licensee regulations. BBBB maintains that it has not violated any provision of the
BBBB fails to support this argument by reference to any statutory text, legislative history, or court precedent. Nothing within the text of California‘s consumer credit laws offers any indication that the Legislature intended to exclude bail bond transactions that otherwise qualify as a ” ‘Consumer credit contract’ ” within the meaning of
Nor does BBBB point to any provision of the Bail Bond Regulatory Act or its regulations to support its argument that this legal regime was intended to operate as the exclusive source of law for the bail bond industry. That is not surprising because California law generally does not operate this way. Commercial enterprises are aware that they will be subject to many laws and regulations touching on different aspects of legislative interest. The
ii. The Bail Premium Financing Agreement Qualifies As a Consumer Credit Contract
BBBB next asserts that the consumer credit contract laws have no application here because the Premium Agreement “is not a consumer credit transaction within any plain understanding of that term.” This contention requires us to construe the meaning of these statutory provisions and whether they apply to the premium financing agreements at issue in this appeal.
“The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] ‘In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its “plain meaning.” ’ [Citations.] . . . Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562.) “[I]f the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute. [Citation.] In the end, we ’ “must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” ’ ” (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003.)
We conclude the Premium Agreement qualifies as an “extension of credit” under
As amici curiae the Attorney General observes, “[t]his plain language interpretation is consistent with definitions in other statutes governing consumer transactions.” For example, the Credit Services Act of 1984 (
Thus, Caldwell‘s Premium Agreement with BBBB qualifies as a consumer credit contract because Caldwell signed an agreement (1) “to pay money on a deferred payment basis“; (2) the subject matter of the contract was “primarily for personal, family or household purposes“; (3) the obligation involved an “extension[] of credit” because Caldwell was allowed to satisfy her bail
BBBB does not dispute that the contracts signed by Caldwell and her declarants were primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. Rather, BBBB contends that Caldwell was not a party to a “consumer credit
contract” but was instead “the indemnifier of the surety issuing the bond.” BBBB reasons that in bail bond transactions, “the bail agent pays no money to the court that imposed the bond on behalf of the person requesting the bond.” Instead, “the agent collects a premium from the person requesting a bond, and in return secures the promise of a surety company . . . to pay the bail amount in the future” if the arrestee fails to appear and the court declares the bond to be forfeited. BBBB adds that the terms used in the
BBBB‘s arguments confuse the contract at issue in this appeal. While an arrestee or indemnitor may contract with the surety to guarantee the full amount of the bail if the defendant fails to appear in court as ordered (see People v. The North River Ins. Co., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 235), the contract we are concerned with here is a different one. A bail premium financing agreement extends credit to cosigners who are unable to afford the bail bond premium by accepting an initial downpayment and allowing them to pay the balance of the premium in monthly installments. This financing agreement is ancillary to the bail bond transaction. Defendants who have financial means will have no occasion to execute such an agreement when obtaining a bail bond because they can pay the full premium outright. And, unlike the indemnity agreement between a defendant and the surety company (here North River), the premium financing agreement is between the arrestee (or cosigner) and the bail bond agent, here BBBB.4
In short, the premium financing agreement does not “indemnify the surety issuing the bond,” as BBBB contends. Rather, the subject Premium Agreements allowed the cosigner to satisfy his or her obligation to pay the bail bond premium over a series of monthly payments. Thus, the transaction
In its reply brief, BBBB argues that the Premium Agreement cannot be an “extension of credit” because “a construction of the statute that includes installment contracts within ‘loans’ or ‘extensions of credit’ would necessarily render the California Legislature‘s decision to specifically and separately include the term ‘retail installment contracts’ in [
BBBB fails to explain how it would construe the phrase “extensions of credit” under
not qualify as a retail installment contract under subdivision (a)(1) of
iii. Caldwell Is a Cosigner Entitled to Statutory Notice
Because we conclude that the bail premium financing agreement at issue here is a consumer credit contract within the meaning of
In determining that Caldwell was likely to succeed on the merits of her claims, the trial court found that Caldwell, her declarants, and the other cosigners of the 150 enforcement actions filed by BBBB, had not received
BBBB raises two specific challenges to the applicability of
The trial court appropriately rejected this argument, asking, “Can
Second, BBBB asserts that
received by the person who is released from detention as a result of the posting of a bail bond. BBBB’s argument would write the statutory notice provision out of existence because any cosigner might derive a “personal” or psychic benefit by helping to guarantee a consumer credit contract on behalf of a friend or loved one. We do not believe the Legislature intended such a strained and self-defeating reading of this provision.
BBBB suggests another unworkable construction of the statute when it argues that Caldwell was not a “cosigner” because she received “the unique service” under the Premium Agreement of “the ability to pay part of the agreed premium over time rather than upfront.” But this feature is true of all consumer credit contracts, which involve “obligations to pay money on a deferred payment basis.” (
iv. BBBB’s Additional Contentions
BBBB raises several additional arguments in its briefing, some addressing the propriety of the trial court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction, and
a. Effect of Failed Amendment to Civil Code
BBBB argues the trial court’s interpretation of
The trial court rejected BBBB’s argument, reasoning that the failure to pass the amendment did not “establish a legislative intent to exclude such transactions from that section’s reach.” We agree. As our Supreme Court explains: “In most cases there are a number of possible reasons why the Legislature might have failed to enact a proposed provision. One reason might have been, of course, that the Legislature rejected the proposal on its merits. But the Legislature might equally well have been motivated instead by considerations unrelated to the merits, not the least of which is that it might have believed the provision unnecessary because the law already so provided . . . . Indeed, when . . . a provision is dropped from a bill during the enactment process, the cause may not even be a legislative decision at all; it may simply be that its proponents decided to withdraw the provision on tactical grounds. [¶] Because these reasons apply equally to a failure to enact a new statute and to a failure to amend an existing statute, we decline to draw any such distinction: both cases are governed by our often stated rule that “Unpassed bills, as evidences of legislative intent, have little value.” ” (Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 28–29.) Under these principles, we decline BBBB’s invitation to draw any inference over the Legislature’s failure to pass Senate Bill No. 318.
b. Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine
BBBB contends the trial court’s injunction runs afoul of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, arguing that the Department has primary jurisdiction over this matter because its bail bond regulations set forth extensive disclosure requirements and “there is no indication that the [Department] has ever
Primary jurisdiction ” “applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such a case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.” ” (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 390 (Farmers), italics omitted; accord, Jonathan Neil & Assoc., Inc. v. Jones (2004) 33 Cal.4th 917, 931–932.) The primary jurisdiction doctrine advances two policies: “it enhances court decisionmaking and efficiency by allowing courts to take advantage of administrative expertise, and it helps assure uniform application of regulatory laws.” (Farmers, at p. 391.) “No rigid formula exists for applying the primary jurisdiction doctrine [citation]. Instead, resolution generally hinges on a court’s determination of the extent to which the policies noted above are implicated in a given case. [Citations.] This discretionary approach leaves courts with considerable flexibility to avoid application of the doctrine in appropriate situations, as required by the interests of justice.” (Id. at pp. 391–392, fns. omitted.)
The trial court below properly rejected the doctrine of primary jurisdiction on the ground that “the question [at issue] is one of interpretation of applicable statutes,” which is ” “an inherently judicial function.” ” It is clear that “[t]his case involves neither disputed facts of a technical nature nor a voluminous record of conflicting evidence.” (Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 454.) The pivotal issue in this appeal involves a question of statutory interpretation, a matter with which courts have considerable experience and which does not necessitate deferral to an administrative agency. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply.7
c. Exclusive Concurrent Jurisdiction
BBBB next contends that the preliminary injunction violates the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, asserting that the trial court lacked the power to enjoin the enforcement of hundreds of other actions that BBBB claims were pending before Caldwell filed her cross-complaint. The contention lacks merit.
Importantly, “[t]he rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is not a defense to a request for a preliminary injunction. Exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a judicial rule of policy which mandates that the second action be stayed upon the filing of an appropriate pleading. Prior to the filing of such an appropriate pleading, the trial court in the second action retains jurisdiction to act. Opposition to a request for a preliminary injunction is not such an appropriate pleading. A trial court may not stay or dismiss an action in connection with a hearing on a preliminary injunction; it is without power to grant such relief.” (Garamendi, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 774.)
As Caldwell points out, BBBB has never sought to obtain a stay in this matter in deference to some earlier-filed case. Further, there are no active earlier-filed cases in which a cosigner has cross-claimed on the grounds that BBBB is legally barred from enforcing a premium financing agreement under
BBBB also contends that the preliminary injunction improperly “overturns” or ” “nullif[ies]” ” the entry of judgement in prior collection actions,
d. Due Process
BBBB asserts that the superior court’s ” “retroactive application” ” of an “entirely new” interpretation of
BBBB’s reliance on Moss v. Superior Court (1998) 17 Cal.4th 396 (Moss) is misplaced. In Moss, the Supreme Court concluded that it could not retroactively apply “criminal contempt sanctions” to conduct that was authorized by settled case law in effect at the time the acts were committed. (Id. at p. 429.) Doing so would have posed an evident due process problem because the parties had legitimately relied on existing law. (Ibid.) Here, BBBB cannot claim reasonable reliance on settled law. No prior precedent authorized the conduct addressed by the preliminary injunction. Moreover, the purpose of the preliminary injunction is not to criminally sanction BBBB, but to protect the statutory rights of cosigners.
Relying on Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367 and Williams & Fickett v. County of Fresno (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1258, BBBB argues that “[g]iven the long-standing rules by which bail agents have conducted themselves for decades, the imposition now of a sweeping new application of
Nor do we perceive any unfairness in enforcing the consumer protection laws at this juncture. To apply the injunction prospectively, as BBBB urges, would exclude scores of unsuspecting cosigners who never received statutory warning of the risks of cosigning a bail bond premium agreement and became liable for the full amount of the premium and subject to enforcement actions, garnishment of wages, damage to their credit, and other serious financial and legal consequences. Caldwell and other putative class members contend they would not have agreed to cosign bail bond premium financing agreements had they be given proper warning of the consequences of their decision. As discussed above, the preliminary injunction merely ensures that no injury will befall the putative class members as the case reaches the merits of their claims. We see nothing unfair about the order, and certainly nothing violative of BBBB’s due process rights.
e. Violation of the UCL
BBBB contends that even if we conclude that the Premium Agreement is subject to
The Supreme Court has explained the “safe harbor” doctrine in this way: “Although the unfair competition law’s scope is sweeping, it is not unlimited. . . . Specific legislation may limit the judiciary’s power to declare conduct unfair. If the Legislature has permitted certain conduct or considered
Even if the trial court were incorrect in concluding that administrative regulations cannot create a safe harbor under the UCL, an issue we need not decide, BBBB does not cite any Department regulation that “expressly” or “explicitly” bars the relief sought by Caldwell under the consumer credit protection statutes or “clearly permits” BBBB’s conduct here. Instead, BBBB repeats its general point that the Department has adopted regulations governing all aspects of bail transactions, and reiterates its view that it is in compliance with its obligations under the Insurance Code.
Such showing is insufficient to support a safe harbor claim as a matter of law. If a statute does not “explicitly prohibit liability” for a defendant’s specific acts or omissions, the court may not create an “implied safe harbor.” (Krumme v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 924, 940 & fn. 5; see also Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1379 [declining to infer safe harbor where Legislature regulated similar conduct but did not expressly permit challenged conduct].)
C. Balance of Hardships
As previously discussed, to demonstrate entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show both a probability that he or she will prevail at trial, and that the ” ‘ “interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied [(favored the plaintiff)] as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” ’ ” ” (Gallo, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1109.)
The trial court weighed the relative harms to both parties and concluded that the balance of hardships tipped decidedly towards Caldwell because she
On appeal, BBBB seeks to minimize Caldwell’s harm by suggesting that the only wrong she suffered was the failure to receive notice “in exactly the language proscribed by
On the other side of the equation, the trial court concluded that compliance with the notice requirement is not burdensome. BBBB disagrees, asserting the court “did not come to grips with the enormous harm that would inure to BBBB from being deprived of its contractual rights.” BBBB argues that it cannot go back and provide
BBBB finally contends that the trial court incorrectly excused Caldwell of the obligation to post an appeal bond. BBBB claims that Caldwell was required to show that each or all members of the class are unable to afford a bond to protect BBBB from the harm it will experience from having to comply with the preliminary injunction in the event it ultimately prevails on the merits. BBBB claimed below that a bond of at least $3 million was required.
Caldwell, citing to
In entering a preliminary injunction, the trial court ordinarily must require the posting of an appropriate bond. (
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing Caldwell from any bond requirement. The court noted that BBBB cited no authority in support of its claim that the court was required to take into account the financial resources of putative class members. On appeal, BBBB does not provide us with any such authority. We find no error.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUMES, P. J.
BANKE, J.
A162453
BBBB Bonding Corporation v. Caldwell
Trial Court: Alameda County
Trial Judge: Hon. Brad Seligman
Counsel:
Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Cohon, APC, Jeffrey M. Cohon; Weintraub Tobin Law Corporation, Brendan J. Begley, Charles L. Post, James Kachmar and Audrey A. Millemann for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
Keker, Van Nest & Peters LLP, Laurie Carr Mims, Jay Rapaport, Niall Mackay Roberts, and Donna Zamora-Stevens; Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Elisa Della-Piana, Zal K. Shroff and Rio Scharf for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, Mark C. Humphrey, Elaine K. Kim and Alexandra Anfuso for Public Counsel, Community Legal Services in East Palo Alto, National Consumer Law Center, The Debt Collective, The Public Law Center, Watsonville Law Center, and East Bay Community Law Center as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney General, Michele Van Gelderen, Michael Gowe, and Alicia K. Hancock, Deputy Attorneys General for the Attorney General of the State of California and the California Department of Insurance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher LLP, Eduardo E. Santacana and Joshua D. Anderson; Chesa Boudin, District Attorney (San Francisco) and Alex Feigen Fasteau, Deputy District Attorney for Prosecutors Alliance of California and District Attorney of the City and County of San Francisco as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.