ROSALINDA BAEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JETBLUE AIRWAYS CORPORATION, TIFFANY MALABET, Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 14-2754-cv
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
July 16, 2015
August Term, 2014 (Argued: June 15, 2015 Decided: July 16, 2015)
Before: JACOBS, RAGGI, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
JON L. NORINSBERG, New York, New York, for Appellant Rosalinda Baez.
ROBERT J. BURNS (with Christopher G. Kelly and Sarah G. Passeri on the brief), Holland & Knight LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee JetBlue Airways Corporation.
GEORGE S. KOLBE, Raven & Kolbe, LLP, New York, New York, for Appellee Tiffany Malabet.
DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Rosalinda Baez brought claims against defendants JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue“) and its former employee, Tiffany Malabet (“Malabet“), arising out of an encounter at John F. Kennedy Airport (“JFK Airport“), in which Baez was reported by Malabet for making an alleged bomb
Baez asserted claims under both federal and state law against JetBlue and Malabet, including (at issue on this appeal) negligence and defamation claims against JetBlue, and claims of false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation against Malabet. The district court dismissed the case on summary judgment on the ground that defendants are immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
Baez appealed, arguing: that a jury should decide whether Malabet‘s statements relaying what Baez had said were materially false and therefore outside the protection of the ATSA; that the district court erred in concluding Malabet‘s statements were materially true; and that Malabet is not entitled to
There is no dispute about the salient fact in this case: Baez made reference to an arguably hypothetical bomb in her luggage, which had made it onto the JetBlue plane that she missed. We conclude that no reasonable jury could have found Malabet‘s statements relaying that reference to be materially false, and that the report she made, first to her supervisor, and subsequently to law enforcement officials, is covered by the ATSA. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of defendants was correct on the ground that defendants are entitled to immunity.2
Affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Baez arrived at JFK Airport at about 6:20 in the morning, and checked in at the JetBlue counter for her 8:05 flight to Austin. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11-12. She did not, however, appear at her gate until minutes prior to the flight‘s scheduled
Baez, upset by this turn of events, asked Malabet about her checked luggage. According to Baez, Malabet informed her that her luggage would remain on the plane and she would be able to retrieve it in Austin when she got there on a later flight. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. By Baez‘s own account, Baez then made cryptic reference to the possibility of a bomb in her luggage: “Isn‘t it a security risk to let a bag go on a plane without a passenger, what if there was a bomb in the bag?” Id. ¶ 25. Baez alleged that Malabet responded: “TSA agents would know if there was a bomb in the bag“; and Baez retorted “TSA--my ass” and walked away. Id. ¶¶ 26, 31.
Malabet relayed her conversation with Baez to her supervisor. J.A. 97-98. According to Baez, Malabet purposely misrepresented the relevant conversation in making her internal report, and conveyed that “Baez had stated that [she had] a bomb in [her] bag” and asked: “[S]o are you guys going to turn the plane around ‘cause I need my bag?” Am. Compl. ¶ 41. Baez alleged that Malabet falsely attributed to Baez the observation that the TSA did not know how to do its job, and would not catch a bomb on board a plane. Id. ¶ 42. According to
Malabet‘s supervisor advised her that JetBlue security personnel would be contacted, as well as the TSA. Id. at 97-98. An FBI agent interviewed Malabet while security officers were locating Baez. Id. at 942-43.
JetBlue security personnel located and detained Baez. Am. Compl. ¶ 46. Baez was then questioned at length by law enforcement agents. J.A. 60. The criminal complaint later filed by an FBI agent reported that Baez asked Malabet, “What if I had a bomb in my bag?,” and that when Malabet replied that the “TSA would have detected it,” Baez stated that she did have a bomb in her bag.
Baez was charged with making a false bomb threat.
Baez‘s arrest garnered some media attention. When she lost her job, she “suspected this was as a result of the JetBlue matter.” Id. at 28. Baez brought a host of claims against defendants, some of which were previously dismissed. The claims that survived defendants’ motions to dismiss were for negligent supervision, retention, training, and hiring; defamation; false arrest; and
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when, having resolved all ambiguities and permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In enacting the ATSA, Congress sought “to ensure that air carriers and their employees would not hesitate to provide the TSA with the information it needed” to respond to potential threats. Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852, 862 (2014). Accordingly, the statute provides:
Any air carrier or . . . employee of an air carrier . . . who makes a voluntary disclosure of any suspicious transaction relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation, relating to air piracy, a threat to aircraft or passenger safety, or terrorism, . . . to any employee or agent of the Department of Transportation, the Department of Justice, any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer, or any airport or airline security officer shall not be civilly liable to any person under any law or regulation of the United States, any constitution, law, or regulation of any State or political subdivision of any State, for such disclosure.
The Supreme Court has held that an air carrier (such as JetBlue) and an airline employee (such as Malabet) are immune from liability for the type of
II
Baez argues that the district court erred in deciding the question of materiality for ATSA purposes at the summary judgment stage because such a determination is subject to fact questions for resolution by a jury. But Baez conflates two distinct materiality inquiries: whether there is a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” which would preclude summary judgment,
Not all factual disputes bar the grant of summary judgment. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We accept, as we must, Baez‘s version of the facts. Nevertheless, we reject her contention that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, because we conclude that “the facts and the law will reasonably support only one conclusion” on which “reasonable persons” could not differ. McDermott Int‘l, Inc. v. Willander, 498 U.S. 337, 356 (1991); cf. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 864 (“[W]e conclude that even if a jury were to find the historical facts in the manner most favorable to Hoeper, Air Wisconsin is entitled to ATSA immunity as a matter of law.“). Resolution of the immunity issue at this stage is also consistent with the Supreme Court‘s “repeated[]” admonition to “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible” point in the litigation. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
B
There are differences between the statements Baez concedes she made and the statements she alleges Malabet reported to law enforcement officials.
“[T]o accept [Baez‘s] demand” that an airline employee relay the “precise wording” of a potential security threat “would vitiate the purpose of ATSA immunity.” Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 865. At an airport, a bare reference to a bomb may be enough to set off the chain of events that resulted in Baez‘s detention, interrogation, and arrest by the FBI. See id. (“Baggage handlers, flight attendants, gate agents, and other airline employees who report suspicious behavior to the TSA should not face financial ruin if, in the heat of a potential threat, they fail to choose their words with exacting care.“). A gate agent or
The “substance,” or “gist,” Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 861 (internal quotation marks omitted), of Baez‘s statements are pleaded in her complaint: she raised questions about a bomb and disparaged the effectiveness of the TSA. Had JetBlue reacted otherwise, it might have been in violation of its obligation to report potential threats, and could have been subject to civil penalties. See
In any event, “[t]his standard is an objective one, involving the hypothetical significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to a reasonable security official, rather than the actual significance of that fact to a particular security official.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Any reasonable security officer would follow up on a report of a disgruntled
As other courts have held, “the use of ambiguous language does not preclude a statement from being a threat,” and a “bad joke can fall within the scope of [§ 46507(1)].” United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted) (citing cases). Against this backdrop, and the Supreme Court‘s holding that “ATSA immunity may not be denied under § 44941(b) to materially true statements,” Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 862, we agree with the district court that a passenger who speculates aloud about whether there is a bomb in her luggage cannot be heard to complain when an airline representative reports the use of those words, even if the passenger‘s precise words are misrepresented. Indeed, the TSA‘s policy “known as ‘when in doubt, report,‘” id. at 867, would be defeated if air carriers and their employees were exposed to liability for reporting a statement that references a bomb in luggage.
Baez argues that Malabet should be stripped of immunity because, in essence, she made her initial report to the wrong person: her supervisor, rather than a law enforcement official. We disagree. Malabet‘s report to her supervisor was the first step in a chain of events that led to “a voluntary disclosure” of a possible threat to law enforcement personnel.
Malabet was interviewed by the FBI before that agency made any arrest or charging decisions with respect to Baez and Baez alleges that the FBI acted on Malabet‘s misstatements. It was thus the report to law enforcement, as defined by § 44941(a), that led to Baez‘s detention, interrogation, and arrest. Similarly, the report in Hoeper made its way through channels at Air Wisconsin before airline management made a report to the TSA. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. at 858-59.
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Malabet and JetBlue are required to report “threat[s] to civil aviation” to law enforcement officials. See
Because it is undisputed that Malabet and JetBlue were aware of ominous (even if ambiguous) references to a bomb on a flight, no reasonable jury could find that differences in wording between Baez‘s account and Malabet‘s constituted materially false statements made to law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.