Ayala v. HatchAyala v. Hatch
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
HARRIS L. HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Applicant Gabriel Ayala, a New Mexico state prisoner, filed a pro se application for relief under
I. BACKGROUND
In 2004 Applicant pleaded guilty to three first-degree-felony and four third-degree-felony counts of child abuse, see
Applicant aрplied for postconviction relief in the state trial court, asserting, among other things, that his counsel, Robert Cooper, had been constitutionally ineffective. The court conducted an evidentiary hearing and in March 2010 granted partial relief. It ruled that Cooper had been ineffective at sentencing by failing to
In December 2010 Applicant filed his
Applicant seeks a COA from this court to appeal the district court‘s denial of his
II. DISCUSSION
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) provides that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court, a federal court can grant habeas relief only if the applicant establishes that the state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determinеd by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Under the “contrary to” clause, we grant relief only if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Suрreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.
Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Relief is provided under the “unreasonable application” clause “only if the state court identifies the correct governing legаl principle from the Supreme Court‘s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‘s case.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, a federal court may not grant habeas relief simply because it concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. See id. Rather, that application must have been unreasonable. Moreover, “AEDPA‘s deferential treatment of state court decisions must be incorporated into our consideration of [his] request for [a] COA.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004).
We address Applicant‘s arguments in turn.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish ineffectivе assistance of counsel, Applicant first has the burden of overcoming “a strong presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), by demonstrating that his counsel‘s performance fell below “an objective standard of reasonableness,” id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Our review here is “dоubly deferential,” as “[w]e take a highly deferential look at counsel‘s performance through the deferential lens of
To begin with, we note that Applicant‘s first five ineffective-assistance claims were not preserved bеlow. As to Cooper‘s failure to assert Applicant‘s constitutional right to a speedy trial, “[w]e need not address [this] argument[] because [Appli-
That leaves only two ineffective-assistance claims: (1) Cooper‘s failure to file a motion to suppress Applicant‘s inculpatory statement to authorities and (2) Cooper‘s failure to investigate Alicia‘s medicаl conditions. Applicant raised both claims in his state postconviction proceedings, and the court summarily rejected them. When the state court rejects a claim on the merits without explanation, we must deny relief under
The district court was unquestionably correct to deny relief based on Cooper‘s failure to file a motion to suppress Applicant‘s statements to police and CYFD officials. Cooper testified at the state-court evidentiary hearing that Applicant had admitted to his wife, to authorities, and to Cooper thаt he had hit Alicia, and that Applicant never recanted his admission to Cooper. Cooper further testified that he determined, based on his view of the evidence, that Applicant‘s best course of action would be to accept responsibility for the abuse by pleading guilty, and that Cooper should focus on sentenсing. He wanted to try to get the state to work with him on a favorable plea agreement and did not think that filing a motion to suppress Applicant‘s inculpatory statements would advance this strategy. The state court could reasonably conclude that this strategy did not violate Cooper‘s duty of competent assistance. See Cullen, 131 S.Ct. at 1407-08 (counsel‘s decision to pursue a particular trial strategy to the exclusion of another is “due a heavy measure of deference” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Premo v. Moore, — U.S. —, 131 S.Ct. 733, 741-42, 178 L.Ed.2d 649 (2011) (deference to strategic decisions is “all the more essential when reviewing the choices of an attorney made at the plea bargaining stage“); id. at 742-43 (counsel not ineffective for failing to file motion to suppress before advising client to plead guilty).
There is likewise nothing debatable about the district court‘s denial of relief based on Cooper‘s failure to investigate Alicia‘s preexisting medical conditions. Applicant alleges that Alicia was diagnosеd with osteogenesis imperfecta (OI), or brittle-bone disease, which, he claims, could explain her injuries. He further alleges that before he entered his guilty plea some members of his family told Cooper that Alicia may have OI, an allegation supported by testimony at the state-court evidentiary hearing. We recognize that an OI diagnosis may exculpate a parent accused of inflicting injuries on a child. See, e.g., In re Julia BB., 42 A.D.3d 208, 837 N.Y.S.2d 398, 408-10 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (reversing finding of child abuse and termination of parental rights based in part on evidence of OI). Perhaps the requests by Applicant‘s family should have prompted Cooper to investigate this area. The problem for Apрlicant, however, is that nothing in the record establishes that Alicia actually had the disease. Despite being represented by counsel in his state postconviction proceedings, Applicant presented neither
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Applicant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the finding that all the counts to which he pleaded guilty were serious violent offenses under the EMDA. In particular, he argues that because he was suffering from severe sleep deprivation at the time of the alleged abuse, he did not possess the requisite mental state for a serious-violent-offense finding. See State v. Scurry, 141 N.M. 591, 158 P.3d 1034, 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (serious violent offense must be committed with “intent to do serious harm or with recklessness in the face of knowledge that one‘s acts are reasonably likely to result in serious harm” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“Under the Due Process Clause, evidence is sufficient if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the [required mental state] under the appropriate standard of proof.” Gonzales v. Tafoya, 515 F.3d 1097, 1126 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Sufficiency of the evidence on a habeas petition is a mixed question of law and fact. We ask whether the facts are correct and whether the law was properly applied to the facts, which is why we apply both
Entertaining the same challenge on Applicant‘s first direct appeal, the state court of appeals explained:
[Applicant] does nоt contest the extent of his daughter‘s injuries, which included three skull fractures, eight broken ribs, a broken fibula, and numerous bruises. He admitted that he inflicted injuries on at least three occasions, possibly four. The district court found that it was unlikely his daughter would ever fully recover from her injuries. Additionally the district court found that owing to the fact that [Applicant‘s] daughter was two months old, she was helpless during the abuse, and that [Applicant] had attempted to cover up his actions and their effects. These findings are sufficient to establish a serious violent offense as contemplated under the EMDA.
Ayala, 140 P.3d at 550. We cannot say that the state court unreasonably determined any of these facts, most of which were uncontested. (The court was entitled to discount the testimony of Applicant‘s expert, who testified at the sentencing hearing concerning the effects of sleep deprivation. See Gonzales, 515 F.3d at 1127.) Likewise, a rational factfinder could determine that the court‘s findings provided substantial support for the conclusion that Applicant acted with at least recklessness in the face of knowledge that his acts would likely cause serious harm to Alicia. There is nothing debatable about the district court‘s rejection of this claim.
C. Other Challenges
Applicant challenges the district court‘s denial of his request for appointed counsel. We need not decidе whether he needs a COA to pursue this issue, cf.
Finally, Applicant argues that the district court erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing, order discovery, or expand the record. But the Supreme Court has held “that review under
III. CONCLUSION
We DENY the application for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.