JULES AWDZIEWICZ ET AL. v. CITY OF MERIDEN ET AL.
(SC 19422)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued February 17—officially released June 9, 2015
Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and Robinson, Js.
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Thomas A. Weaver, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
John H. Gorman, associate city attorney, for the appellee (named defendant).
Opinion
ZARELLA, J.
The record reveals the following facts, as stipulated to by the parties, and procedural history, much of which is also set forth in Kiewlen v. Meriden, 317 Conn. 139, 116 A.3d 273 (2015), a companion case arising out of the same factual circumstances but involving distinct legal issues. Each of the plaintiffs retired from the Meriden Police Department or Meriden Fire Department by 1998. Upon retiring, the plaintiffs were entitled to begin collecting their respective pensions from the city, which were largely controlled by the terms of two documents: (1) § 85D of a prior version of the city charter;4 and (2) a 1982 stipulated
In 2002, the unions representing Meriden police officers and firefighters renegotiated their respective collective bargaining agreements with the city. The new collective bargaining agreements for both groups, which became effective on July 1, 2002, required active police officers and firefighters to pay a ‘‘cost share’’ for their heаlth insurance. Essentially, this new requirement mandated that active police officers and firefighters pay a certain percentage of the cost of their health insurance as a condition of participating in the group health insurance policy provided by the city.5 Three years after this cost share requirement went into effect for active police officers and firefighters, the city imposed the cost share requirement on retired police officers and firefighters, including the plaintiffs, thereby effectively reducing their health insurance emoluments.
In response to this reduction in their pension benefits, the plaintiffs instituted the present action against the city in 2007.6 The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus prohibiting the city from imposing the cost share requirement on them. The plaintiffs also claimed that the city had breached its ‘‘retirement contract’’ with the plaintiffs and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and had violated the stipulated judgment and their right to due process under the Connecticut constitution. The plaintiffs also sought to recover damages under
The case was tried together with Kiewlen v. Meriden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. NNI-CV-05-4014677-S.7 The plaintiffs introduced into evidence § 85D and the 1982 stipulated judgment, and argued that, because neither one included a cost share provision for pensioners’ health insurance emoluments, the city could not
Rejecting each of thе plaintiffs’ claims, the trial court rendered judgment for the city. The trial court concluded that § 85D and the stipulated judgment permitted the city to impose the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs because § 85D and the stipulated judgment ‘‘index[ed] the [plaintiffs’] health insurance emolument[s] to the cost of health insurance for firemen and policemen actively working.’’ In light of this interpretation, the trial court concluded that the city had not violated the stipulated judgment or breached any contract with the plaintiffs, nor had it violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the federal constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court declined to address some of the plaintiffs’ claims because they were inadequately briefed, namely, the plaintiffs’ good faith and fair dealing claim, state constitutional claim, and claim for attorney’s fees. The trial court also determined that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim under
The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to
I
The plaintiffs first claim that the trial court improperly interpreted § 85D and the stipulated judgment, which control their pension benefits. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the language of § 85D and the stipulated judgment does not allow the city to impose the cost share requirement on them. The plaintiffs further claim that the city cannot impose the cost share requirement on them because they did not participate in the collective bargaining process that gave rise to the cost share requirement for active police officers and firefighters, and because the city has not provided them with the additional рension benefits included in the renegotiated collective bargaining agreements, which purportedly offset the financial burden that the cost share requirement creates for retirees. In opposition, the city responds that the trial court correctly concluded that § 85D and the stipulated judgment make retirees’ health insurance emoluments dependent on those of active police officers and firefighters and, thus, that the city properly reduced the plaintiffs’ health insurance emoluments when it reduced those of its active employees. We agree with the city and conclude that the trial court properly intеrpreted § 85D and the stipulated judgment as allowing the city to impose the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs.
Before addressing the plaintiffs’ claim, it is necessary to clarify the relationship between § 85D and the stipulated judgment. Section 85D originally was the sole governing provision for pension plans for retired Meriden police officers and firefighters. In 1982, the Retired Police and Firemen’s Association of Meriden, Inc., brought an action against the city, among others, for benefits it claimed were due under § 85D. As a result of the litigation, the Retired Police and Firemen’s Association of Meriden, Inc., and the city entered into a stipulated judgment pursuant to which the city
Because a stipulated judgment is in essence a con-tract; see, e.g., Rocque v. Northeast Utilities Service Co., 254 Conn. 78, 83, 755 A.2d 196 (2000); we interpret the stipulated judgment at issue in the present case according to general principles governing the construction of contracts. Ahmadi v. Ahmadi, 294 Conn. 384, 390, 985 A.2d 319 (2009). ‘‘[T]he language used [in a contract] must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the contract. . . . Where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms. . . . [Additionally], in construing contracts, we give effect to all the language included therein, as the law of contract interpretation . . . militates against interpreting a contract in a way that renders a provision superfluous.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 390–91. Our review of the trial court’s construction of the stipulated judgment is plenary. See id., 390.
With respect to § 85D, our standard of review is similarly broad. ‘‘As with any issue of statutory construction, the interpretation of a charter or muniсipal ordinance presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. . . . In construing a city charter, the rules of statutory construction generally apply. . . . In arriving at the intention of the framers of the charter the whole and every part of the instrument must be taken and compared together. In other words, effect should be given, if possible, to every section, paragraph, sentence, clause and word in the instrument and related laws.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Broadnax v. New Haven, 270 Conn. 133, 160–61, 851 A.2d 1113 (2004).
We begin our analysis with the language of the stipulated judgment. The stipulated judgment requires the city to provide pensioners with ‘‘such policy or policiеs of group health insurance, group dental insurance and group life insurance as are provided by the [c]ity . . . to active policemen [and firemen] and their dependents.’’ Additionally, the city is required to pay a certain percentage of a retiree’s insurance premium depending on how many years he or she has been retired. After two years of retirement, the city must pay ‘‘one-half . . . of the total premium attributable to the participation of each retired policeman and fireman and his respective dependents.’’
We turn next to the language at issue in § 85D. Section 85D sets the pension rate for a retired Meridеn police officer or firefighter at ‘‘one-half of the prevailing rate of pay for the rank he has attained and holds at the time of retirement.’’ Section 85D defines ‘‘[p]revailing rate of pay’’ as ‘‘the annual pay as fixed from time to time by the [state] board of public safety,8 and in addition thereto shall include such cost-of-living bonus or other emolument as may be granted to the active mem-bers of the fire and police departments . . . .’’ (Footnote added.)
We conclude that the language at issue in § 85D and the stipulated judgment,
The plaintiffs have failed to explain why the language of § 85D and the stipulated judgment, which makes their health insurance emoluments dependеnt on that of active city employees, is not dispositive. Instead, they focus on paragraph 1 (c) of the stipulated judgment, which requires the city to pay a certain percentage of ‘‘the total premium attributable to the participation of each retired policeman and fireman and his respective dependents,’’ depending on how long the retiree has been retired.9 (Emphasis added.) The plaintiffs claim that this language establishes that the city must pay for their health insurance emoluments irrespective of what active Meriden police officers and firefighters are receiving. We disagree. The language prеceding paragraph 1 (c) makes clear that the ‘‘total premium’’ of which the city must pay a certain percentage is the premium prescribed by the group insurance policies that the city offers to active police officers and firefighters. The parties stipulated to the fact that active Meriden police officers and firefighters have paid a cost share for their health insurance since July 1, 2002. Accordingly, the plaintiffs also must pay the cost share for their health insurance emoluments. Thus, we reject the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the stipulated judgment, which focuses too narrowly on paragraph 1 (с).10
We also reject the plaintiffs’ claim that the city cannot impose the cost share requirement because retirees did not participate in the collective bargaining process that gave rise to the cost share requirement for active Meri-den police officers and firefighters. In effect, the plaintiffs argue that it is unfair for the terms of their
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the city cannot impose the cost share requirement on them because the city has not afforded them the additional benefits that active Meriden police officers and firefighters receive under the collective bargaining agreements that took effect on July 1, 2002. Even if we assume that this is true, it would not change the fact that § 85D and the stipulated judgment base a retiree’s health insurance emolument on that of active city employees. It is possible that the plaintiffs are being denied other benefits to which they are entitled under § 85D, but they have not sought those benefits in this litigation. Regardless, their entitlement to such other benefits is irrelevant to the calculation of their health insurance emoluments. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court сorrectly interpreted § 85D and the stipulated judgment as allowing the city to impose the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs.
Our resolution of this claim is dispositive of three of the plaintiffs’ other claims, namely, their two federal constitutional claims and their claim regarding whether they adequately briefed an issue at trial. With respect to the constitutional claims, the plaintiffs assert that the city deprived them of their rights to due process and to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution by imposing the cost share requirement on them. The plaintiffs do not challenge the constitutionality of § 85D but, rather, clаim that the city, in imposing the cost share requirement in violation of § 85D and the stipulated judgment, also violated their rights under the federal constitution. Because we conclude that the city did not violate § 85D and the stipulated judgment in imposing the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs, we need not address either of their constitutional claims.
Likewise, we need not address the plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that they inadequately briefed, and thereby abandoned, their claim that the city had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by imposing the cost share requirement on them. Like the plaintiffs’ cоnstitutional claims, this claim depends on the premise that the city violated § 85D and the stipulated judgment by imposing the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs. Our contrary conclusion makes it unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiffs, in fact, inadequately briefed their good faith and fair dealing claim because the plaintiffs could not prevail on that claim even if they had adequately briefed that issue. Thus, we also decline to address this claim.
II
We next address the plaintiffs’ evidentiary claim. The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly deemed certain evidence regarding the 2002 collective
As we previously discussed, the parties stipulated at trial to the fact that, as of July 1, 2002, active Meriden police officers and firefighters were required to pay a cost share for their health insurance emoluments under the terms of new collective bargaining agreements that had been negotiated with the city. The plaintiffs thereafter repeatedly proffered evidence regarding these collective bargaining agreements and, specifically, pension benefits provided under those agreements that Meriden police officers and firefighters had not received under prior collective bargaining agreements. For instance, the plaintiffs sought to elicit testimony from a city official regarding health insurance subsidies that Meriden police officers and firefighters would receive upon retiring after the collective bargaining agreements in question went into effect on July 1, 2002.
The city objected on the basis of relevance. The city argued that, aside from the cost share requirement, the details of the pension plan set forth in the collective bargaining agreements were irrelevant with respect to whether § 85D and the stipulated judgment allowed the city to impose the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs because all of the plaintiffs had retired prior to the effective date of the collective bargaining agreements in question, and none of the plaintiffs had pleaded that they were entitled to additional benefits under those agreements. The trial court sustained the city’s objection and ruled that the evidence regarding the collective bargaining agreements was inadmissible.
The plaintiffs now claim that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. Specifically, they contend that the evidence regarding the collective bargaining agreements was relevant to show that the city selectively appliеd the cost share requirement from those agreements to retirees who retired before 2002, without affording them the additional pension benefits included in the collective bargaining agreements, thereby violating § 85D and the stipulated judgment.
‘‘The trial court has wide discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence . . . . Every reasonable presumption should be made in favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion. . . . The proffering party bears the burden of establishing the relevance of the offered testimony.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Information Officer v. Computers Plus Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60, 116, 74 A.3d 1242 (2013). ‘‘Evidence is relevant if it has аny tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the contested evidence was not relevant and, thus, inadmissible. The рroffered evidence regarding the additional benefits included in the collective bargaining agreements is not relevant because it is immaterial to whether the city violated § 85D and the stipulated judgment by imposing the cost share requirement on the plaintiffs, which is the factual allegation that forms the basis of the plaintiffs’ complaint. As
III
Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly declined to take judicial notice of
In the present case, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim regarding
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
‘‘(iii) For the third year and all subsequent years of participation, an amount equal to one-half . . . of the total premium attributable to the participation of each retired policeman and fireman and his respective dependents.’’