ASSOCIATION FOR LOS ANGELES DEPUTY SHERIFFS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants.
B331881
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FIVE
Filed 11/20/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 23STCP01745)
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, Jason W. Kearnaghan, Kent R. Raygor and Valerie E. Alter for Defendants and Appellants.
ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Dae Keun Kwon, Tiffany M. Bailey and Mohammad Tajsar as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants.
Rains Lucia Stern St. Phalle & Silver, Jacob A. Kalinski, Richard A. Levine and Brian P. Ross for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The new legislation did not address or alter pre-existing procedures for officer discipline required by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) (
On May 12, 2023, the Office of the Inspector General for the County of Los Angeles (OIG) sent a letter to 35 individual Los Angeles Sheriff‘s Department (LASD) deputies selected based
The union representing the deputies — the Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs (ALADS) — filed an unfair labor practice claim with the Los Angeles County Employee Relation Commission (ERCOM) and simultaneously sought injunctive relief from the trial court, unavailable in the administrative tribunal, to enjoin the OIG from proceeding with the interviews without first meeting and conferring with ALADS under the MMBA and the Los Angeles County Employee Relations Ordinance (ERO), promulgated pursuant to the MMBA. ALADS further contended the planned interrogations violated deputies’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The trial court rejected ALADS’ constitutional claims but, concluding the interview directive triggered the meet-and-confer obligations under the MMBA, enjoined the OIG‘s interviews pending adjudication of the unfair labor practice claim or the completion
We conclude the trial court committed no error in determining ALADS showed a probability of prevailing on its claim that the interview directive triggered the duty to meet and confer (or bargain)2 with ALADS under the MMBA and we find the trial court acted within its discretion in balancing of the interim harm. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. ALADS and the OIG
ALADS is an employee organization representing LASD deputies. The OIG, created by the County of Los Angeles ordinance to provide independent oversight of and reporting about LASD‘s operations (L.A. County Code, § 6.44.190), serves as the investigative arm of the LASD Civilian Oversight Committee (COC).3 (Ibid.) The same ordinance requires LASD to “cooperate with the OIG and promptly provide any information or records requested by the OIG, including confidential peace officer personnel records,” further stating that “confidentiality of peace officer personnel records . . . and all other privileged or confidential information” OIG receives “shall be
B. Ballot Measure “R“, ERCOM Decision, and Meet and Confer
In January of 2020, the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors adopted County Ordinance 20-0520, conferring subpoena power on the COC and the inspector general.
In July 2020, ALADS filed a charge with ERCOM alleging that Los Angeles County violated the ERO (L.A. County Code, § 5.04.240) by implementing the new ordinance without first meeting and conferring with ALADS about its effects.
In November 2022, ERCOM issued its decision, finding Los Angeles County had violated the ERO by failing to negotiate the effects of the legislation with ALADS and ordered the county to meet and confer, expressing its “expectation that negotiations will be completed no later than [60] days from the[ir] commencement.” ERCOM further ruled that the deputies were not required to respond to any subpoenas served under the new legislation until the completion of the meet-and-confer process.
Los Angeles County agreed to meet and confer with ALADS on May 9, 2023. Before the meeting, ALADS sent a draft policy it proposed LASD adopt. At the meeting, the county rejected the proposal but made no counterproposal, stating that it would require time to prepare one.
C. The May 12, 2023 Letter and Resulting ERCOM Charge
On May 12, 2023, without negotiating or providing notice to ALADS, the OIG sent letters to 35 deputies. Citing
The OIG‘s letter contained such interview questions as: “Do you have a tattoo related to the Banditos or the Executioners anywhere on your body?” “Did you ever have [any such] tattoo . . . removed, altered, or covered?” “Who else have you seen the tattoo on?” “Have you ever been told about other deputies who might be in . . . the [Banditos or Executioners]?” The letter further advised that a deputy‘s “failure to answer may adversely affect [his] employment with Los Angeles County or [his] status as a certified peace officer.” The letter instructed the deputies to “bring a photograph of any tattoos on your leg[s] from the area of the ankle to the knee and a photograph of any tattoo anywhere on your body that has” a symbol or image resembling those in the photos attached to the letter. The letter informed the deputies they would be subject to inspection of their legs at the interview.
On May 18, 2023, Sheriff Luna sent the deputies an email, ordering them to cooperate in the OIG‘s interviews and reminding them that under Civil Service Rule 18.031 and County of Los Angeles Department of Human Resources Policy Procedures and Guidelines, their failure to cooperate may subject them to disciplinary action, including discharge.
On May 19, 2023, ALADS filed an unfair labor practice claim with ERCOM alleging that the county violated ERO section 5.04.240(A) by sending the OIG May 12, 2023 letter without first negotiating with ALADS.
On May 22, 2023, ALADS sued Los Angeles County, Sheriff Luna, the Office of the Inspector General of Los Angeles County (OIG), and Inspector General Max Huntsman (collectively, the County) for declaratory and injunctive relief.
ALADS’ first cause of action seeks declaratory and injunctive relief related to the deputies’ rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, their right to privacy under the California Constitution, and their rights under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). The second cause of action seeks traditional mandamus on grounds that the planned interrogations “constitute significant and adverse changes to the terms and conditions of employment of ALADS-represented [deputies],” such that the interrogations are “mandatory subjects of bargaining pursuant to the [MMBA] as well as [the ERO], section 5.04.240(A).”
On June 1, 2023, ALADS filed an ex parte application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and an order to show cause (OSC) re: preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from conducting the interviews outlined in the OIG‘s May 12, 2023 letter and requiring production of photos of the deputies’ tattoos and inspection of the deputies’ legs.
On June 2, 2023, the trial court issued the TRO and scheduled an OSC re: preliminary injunction for June 29, 2023, specifying that it rejected the Fifth Amendment as a basis for granting the TRO and OSC, but would hear argument on the other grounds. Defendants filed an opposition to the OSC re: preliminary injunction.
During the June 29, 2023 OSC hearing, the trial court inquired about the scope of the photographs sought from the deputies, and the County reported that, since issuing the May 12, 2023 letter, it had agreed to narrow its request, from photographs of tattoos anywhere on the deputies’ bodies to photographs on the “shoulder to arm, . . . face, neck, and legs from the knees and below.” After argument, the trial court took the matter under submission.
In its July 10, 2023 written ruling, the trial court concluded ALADS had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its Fourth Amendment, right to privacy, or Pitchess claims, but that it had shown such a likelihood on its claim under the MMBA and ERO. Specifically, the court held: “Whether the manner of the . . . interviews is a matter subject to bargaining, the consequences of those interviews include the duty to cooperate on pain of discipline, the discretionary application of discipline and its range, and the referral to POST for possible decertification, all of which are easily the subject of bargaining.” Recognizing that “irreparable harm [would result] from the County‘s failure to meet and confer” before implementing its interviews, and that “there is no compelling need for immediate investigation,” the court concluded that “[t]he balancing of the harms works in favor of a preliminary injunction that will maintain the status quo.” The trial court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the OIG‘s interviews of the deputies “until the County completes its
Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
This appeal addresses only the trial court‘s grant of a preliminary injunction based on the merits of plaintiff‘s labor claim, the sole ground upon which the trial court issued its preliminary injunction. Defendants and Amici Curiae argue the trial court erred in both its assessment of the merits of plaintiff‘s claim under the MMBA and ERO and its balancing of the relative harms to the parties and the public.
A. Standard of Review and General Principles
A preliminary injunction aims to preserve the status quo until a final determination of the merits of the action. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528 (Continental Baking).) “In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, a trial court weighs two interrelated factors: the likelihood the moving party ultimately will prevail on the merits, and the relative interim harm to the parties from the issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.” (Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 999.) These two factors operate on a sliding scale: “[T]he more likely it is that [the party seeking the injunction] will ultimately prevail, the less severe must be the harm that they allege will occur if the injunction does not issue.” (King v. Meese (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1217, 1227; accord Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must generally show a risk of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief pending adjudication of the merits. (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 555; see also Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources
The grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is not an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy; it is merely a determination by the court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, that the defendant should or should not be restrained from exercising a claimed right. (Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 206; Continental Baking, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 528.)
We review a trial court‘s order granting a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, but review any subsidiary factual findings for substantial evidence and any subsidiary legal questions de novo. (Tulare Lake Canal Co. v. Stratford Public Utility Dist. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 380, 402-403; Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1184; Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711 [abuse of discretion “is not a unified standard,” but rather calls for deference that “varies according to the aspect of a trial court‘s ruling under review“].)
B. The MMBA and Its Applicability to Law Enforcement Unions
1. “Scope of Representation”
The MMBA requires a public employer and employee representatives “to meet and confer in good faith about a matter within the ‘scope of representation,’ concerning, among other things, ‘wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.‘” (Claremont Police Officers Assn. v. City of Claremont (2006) 39 Cal.4th 623, 628 (Claremont);
“The obligation to bargain ‘in good faith’ means that the parties must genuinely seek to reach agreement, but the MMBA does not require that an agreement actually result in every instance, and it recognizes that a public employer has the ultimate power to reject employee proposals on any particular issue.” (International Assn. of Fire Fighters, Local 188, AFL-CIO v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 259, 271 (International Assn. of Fire Fighters).)
“The definition of ‘scope of representation’ and its exception are ‘arguably vague’ and ‘overlapping.‘” (Claremont, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 631, quoting Building Material, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 658.) ” ‘[W]ages, hours and working conditions,’ . . . broadly read[,] could encompass practically any conceivable bargaining proposal; and “merits, necessity or organization of any service” . . . , expansively interpreted, could swallow the whole provision for collective negotiation[,] . . . relegat[ing] determination of all labor issues to the city‘s discretion.’ ” (Claremont, at p. 631, quoting Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 615.)
Consistent with Justice Moreno‘s concurrence, other reported decisions have found management directives impacting employee discipline triggered the MMBA‘s meet and confer requirements. (City of Palo Alto v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1271, 1296 [city failed to meet its obligation under MMBA by not meeting and conferring in advance with firefighters’ union before sponsoring a ballot measure that repealed provision requiring binding arbitration upon impasses in negotiations]; Holliday v. City of Modesto (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 528, 530, 540 (Holliday) [implementation of mandatory drug testing subject to meet-and-confer requirements]; Vernon Fire Fighters v. City of Vernon (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 802, 815 (Vernon) [adoption of disciplinary rule
2. MMBA Administrative Oversight: the ERO and PERB
Throughout California, “[t]he MMBA is administered by PERB [(the Public Employee Relations Board)], a quasi-judicial administrative agency modeled after the NLRB [(National Labor Relation Board)].” (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 916 (County of Los Angeles).) The statute bringing the MMBA within PERB‘s authority expressly does not apply to Los Angeles County (id.;
In 1971, Los Angeles County “passed its own ordinance conforming to the legislative policies expressed in the MMBA . . . creat[ing] ERCOM to administer its provisions.” (County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 916; City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Bd. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 159-160.) ERCOM, not PERB, has jurisdiction to decide charges of unfair labor practices that arise during Los Angeles County employment. (See
Under the ERO, “[a]ll matters affecting employee relations, including those that are not subject to negotiations, are subject to consultation between management representatives and the duly authorized representatives of affected employee organizations. Every reasonable effort shall be made to have such consultation prior to effecting basic changes in any rule or procedure affecting employee relations.” (L.A. County Code, tit. 5, ch. 5.04, § 5.04.090(A).) The scope of negotiation includes “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment within the employee representation unit.” (Id., § 5.04.090(B).)
The ERO makes it “an unfair employee relations practice” for the county to, among other things, “refuse to negotiate with the representatives of certified employee organizations on negotiable matters.” (L.A. County Code, tit. 5, ch. 5.04, 5.04.240(A)(3).)
ERCOM performs the same function for the Los Angeles County as PERB does for other public employers in the State. (County of Los Angeles, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 913, fn. 5.) PERB decisions are persuasive authority on legal matters within its area of expertise. (City of Palo Alto, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1288.) We grant ALADS’ request for judicial notice of various PERB decisions.
C. Penal Code Sections 13670 and 13510.8
Neither
The County argues “the trial court erred in enjoining the OIG‘s investigation based on an obligation to engage in effects bargaining.”
1. Merits of Plaintiffs Labor Claim
Relying on various Court of Appeal and PERB decisions, the trial court concluded the subject interviews — targeting 35 specific individuals with questions about their own and their colleagues’ affiliations with law enforcement gangs — affect discipline so as to trigger the obligation to meet and confer under the MMBA and ERO, even though the OIG‘s decision to investigate was not itself negotiable.5 (See, e.g., Rio Hondo Community College Dist. (2013) PERB Dec. No. 2313 at pp. 14-16 [use of surveillance footage for disciplinary purposes was negotiable effect of nonnegotiable decision to install cameras]; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees v. Regents of University of California (2021) PERB Dec. No. 2783H at pp. 32-33 [University of California violated the MMBA by failing to meet and confer over effects of implementing mandatory vaccine policy]; El Dorado County Deputy Sheriff‘s
At the outset, we reject ALADS’ argument that the balancing test in Claremont does not apply because its decision to interview the 35 deputies qualified as a “decision[] directly defining the employment relationship, such as wages, workplace rules, and the order of succession of layoffs and recalls,” decisions which International Assn. of Fire Fighters, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 272 identified as “always mandatory subjects of bargaining.” The decision to investigate law enforcement gangs plainly falls outside the scope of representation, as it is mandated by California legislation. (
a. Significant and adverse effects on working conditions
Unlike the study at issue in Claremont, which required all officers to fill out short, preprinted forms to facilitate the “determin[ation of] whether officers engaged in racial profiling,” the interviews here target specific deputies with questions about their personal affiliations with law enforcement gangs.
We agree with the trial court that, “[t]here is a difference between meeting and conferring over the adoption of
We are not persuaded by the County‘s argument that the issue is not ripe for bargaining because “there is no evidence in the record as to what th[e] potential discipline could be because the County has not yet made a firm decision.” Our Supreme
We agree with the trial court that the relevant decision here is not to discipline any particular deputy, but rather the decision the OIG has made to investigate two alleged law enforcement gangs under
We also agree with the trial court‘s observation that “[a]part from a new discipline for participation in a law enforcement gang, the significant and adverse effects of the OIG‘s interviews include whether the statements can be transmitted to POST without violating POBRA‘s prohibition on using compelled statements in subsequent civil proceedings [(
b. Claremont balancing
The County argues that its “need for unencumbered decision-making in managing its operations through OIG‘s various investigative channels outweighs any benefit to employer-employee relations that bargaining would provide, even as to implementation of the decision.” It cites “[t]he fundamental policy decision by the State, as evidenced by the passage of
The County relies on San Francisco Police Officers’ Assn. v. San Francisco Police Com. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 676, 690 (San Francisco Police Officers’ Assn.), in which the court observed that “decisions involving ‘the avoidance of unnecessary deadly force are of obvious importance, and directly affect the quality and nature of public services. The burden of requiring an employer to confer about such fundamental decisions clearly outweighs the benefits to employer-employee relations that
As the trial court observed, the “manner of the . . . interviews can be a management decision not subject to bargaining” to the extent it concerns the interviews’ reliability and integrity. (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1625, 1644 (ALADS) [no meet and confer required for decision to implement policy
c. Trial court‘s consideration of the 2022 ERCOM decision
The County argues that the trial court improperly relied on ERCOM‘s 2022 decision and on the comments of ERCOM commissioners in a May 2023 hearing.
The trial court cited the 2022 ERCOM decision as “support” for its own conclusion, appropriately recognizing that although the decision, “is not controlling,” it is “evidence that ERCOM has applied its expertise to conclude that the County must bargain for the effects of the OIG‘s exercise of new authority in investigating law enforcement gangs. It is not hard to expand this conclusion to the effects of OIG‘s decision to compel the [deputies] to submit to an interview and show their arms and legs pursuant to
The County points out that the 2022 ERCOM decision concerned subpoenas issued under “laws adopted through different legislative channels,” but fails to explain the import of this distinction, and we can discern none. Neither in this case nor in the 2022 ERCOM case was the legislation itself being challenged; both cases concern the effects of the County‘s implementation of the legislation.
The trial court also considered comments by ERCOM commissioners at a hearing on May 22, 2023, stating that the OIG‘s May 12, 2023 letter appeared to be an ” ‘end around’ ” ERCOM‘s decision and that ERCOM‘s intent was not to delay the investigation, but to encourage expeditious effects bargaining. The trial court attributed to these comments only “minimal value,” recognizing that the commissioners were ” ‘shooting from the hip.’ ” We see no impropriety here, and the County cites no authority to persuade us otherwise.
2. Interim Harm
We find the trial court acted within its discretion in balancing the harm in favor of the meet-and-confer requirements impacting public employees under the MMBA. “[F]ailure to bargain in good faith[] has long been understood as likely causing an irreparable injury to union representation.” (Frankl v. HTH Corp. (9th Cir. 2011) 650 F.3d 1334, 1362; accord Small v. Avanti Health Systems (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3d 1180, 1192.) Whether or not an employer bargains with its employees’ union is normally
As the trial court acknowledged, the harm to the public of delaying the OIG‘s investigation must also be considered. (See, e.g., Tahoe Keys, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1472-1473 [where “the plaintiff seeks to enjoin public officers and agencies in the performance of their duties[,] the public interest must be considered“].) The trial court determined that juxtaposed with the irreparable harm posed by the County‘s failure to meet and confer before implementing its investigation, “there is no compelling need for immediate investigation,” particularly given “the slow course of th[e OIG‘s] investigation.”
We agree with the County and the ACLU that the public‘s interest in ridding law enforcement agencies of gangs is substantial, and that it was incumbent upon the trial court to consider that important public interest.8 (See O‘Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1468 [trial court
We conclude, however, that the trial court duly considered this interest, as shown by its express recognition that “the OIG‘s need to investigate . . . is significant.” Critically, the trial court enjoined the interviews from taking place pending either the adjudication of ALADS’ claim with ERCOM or the completion of the meet-and-confer process, thereby allocating to the OIG some degree of control in furthering its own investigation. In its November 2022 written decision, ERCOM expressed its expectation that negotiations on a similar issue should take no longer than 60 days to complete. The trial court recognized the lack of any evidence in the record to suggest the effects bargaining could not be performed expeditiously so that the OIG may proceed with its investigation. We cannot say on the record before us that the trial court‘s conclusion ” ‘exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (ALADS, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1634.)
The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
DAVIS, J.*
We Concur:
MOOR, Acting P. J.
KIM, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.