ARTHUR ROBBINS еt al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Real Parties in Interest.
S.F. No. 24599
Supreme Court of California
Mar. 4, 1985.
211 Cal. Rptr. 398 | 695 P.2d 695 | 38 Cal. 3d 199
Rocky Unruh, Margaret C. Crosby, Alan L. Schlosser, Amitai Schwartz, Margo Anne Feinberg, Nancy Reardan, John Huerta and Linda Wong as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
L. B. Elam, County Counsel, J. Steven Burris and Lilly C. Frawley, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Parties in Interest.
Kenneth L. Nelson, County Counsel (Santa Barbara), Marvin Levine, Chief Assistant County Counsel, Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, Timothy D. Taron, Hefner, Stark & Marois, Richard J. Moore, County Counsel (Alameda), and Lorenzo E. Chambliss, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.
BIRD, C. J.-Does a county violate
I.
Petitioners (plaintiffs) are 20 single, employable residents of the County of Sacramento (County) who are eligible for general assistance benefits,1 the California Coalition of Welfare Rights Organizations, and the Depression Survival Action Committee. Real parties in interest (defendants) are the County, the County board of supervisors and its members, and the County department of social welfare and its director.
This lawsuit challenges the County‘s general assistance program which precludes еligible residents who are single and employable from receiving cash grants. Instead, the program offers them “in-kind” benefits-food and shelter at a County-run facility.
Pursuant to its statutory duty,2 the County established a general assistance program for its indigent residents. Until 1982, all eligible County residents received benefits in the form of cash grants, regardless of their marital status or employability.
In August of that year, the County board of supervisors (Board) passed a resolution3 which enabled the department of social welfare to replace cash grants with “in-kind” benefits for single and employable applicants.4 Effec-
Although the parties disagree about the living conditions at the Bannon Street facility,6 the basic facts are not in dispute.
The Bannon Street facility houses up to 67 men and women. These residents sleep in dormitories with shared toilet facilities.7 The dormitories are open, with no private rooms, alcoves or dividing walls.
Residents may not enter the facility or the women‘s dormitory without staff permission. There are scheduled thirty-minute meal periods three times a day and alcoholic beverages are prohibited. Telephone use is limited to a pay phone in the lobby. A “bedcheck” is conductеd each night at 9 p.m., and each resident is required to be present at that time.8 No one may leave the facility after bedcheck.9
The original complaint challenging the County‘s “in-kind” benefits policy was filed in December 1982. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 2, 1983, in which they sought a preliminary injunction. Defendants filed a general demurrer. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiffs now seek a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter an order granting the request for a preliminary injunction.10
Mandamus is appropriate “where there is nоt a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law.” (
II.
The issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Although the trial court has broad discretionary powers to grant or deny a request for a preliminary injunction, it has “no discretion to act capriciously.” (Gosney v. State of California (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 921, 924.) It must exercise its discretion “in favor of the party most likely to be injured.” (Ibid.; Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers etc. Union (1948) 88 Cal.App.2d 499, 510.) If the denial of an injunction would result in great harm to the plaintiff, and the defendants would suffer little harm if it were granted, then it is an abuse of discretion to fail to grant the preliminary injunction. (Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers etc. Union, supra, 88 Cal.App.2d at p. 510; Ellis v. American Federation of Labor (1941) 48 Cal.App.2d 440, 446; see also Isert v. Riecks (1925) 195 Cal. 569, 576; Gosney, supra, 10 Cal.App.3d at p. 924.)
The trial courts consider two interrelated questions in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction: 1) are the plaintiffs likely to suffer greater injury from a denial of the injunction than the defendants are likely to suffer from its grant; and 2) is there a reasonable probability that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69-70; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528; U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 68, 79.) “‘[By] balancing the respective equities of the parties, [the court] concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.‘” (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 528; accord IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 70.)
There is bаsic agreement as to the following facts: 1) the Bannon Street facility has a maximum occupancy of 67 residents; and 2) the County provides general assistance benefits to over 4,000 of its residents.11 It would appear that less than 2 percent of the general assistance program would be affected by the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. Therefore, the potential harm to the program is apparently far less substantial than defendants claim.
However, defendants argue that an order to remove general assistance recipients from the Bannon Street facility would adversely affect both the performance of the County‘s contract with the Volunteers of America, which operates the facility, and the interests of the Bannon Street residents, who would be forced to find shelter and food elsewhere.
Since plaintiffs do not ask for the closure of the facility, it is unclear why the granting of an injunction would have such extreme consequences. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to “prevent Sacramento County from requiring some of its indigent residents to live in a poorhouse and to require Sacramento County to provide all persons eligible for general assistance with its cash grant aid if they so desire.” (Italics added.) Thus, plaintiffs are not seeking to close the Bannon Street facility, but merely to make residence a voluntary alternative to cash grants. Defendants fail to show how this injunctive relief would impair the performance of the County‘s contract or harm the current residents of the facility.
The decision to live in the regimented Bannon Street facility requires many personal sacrifices. Even if the court were to overlook the psychological impact and physical danger that plaintiffs allege accompany residence at the facility, the loss of control over a wide range of personal decisions cannot be ignored. Residents of the facility no longer decide when or with whom they eat, dress, bathe, and sleep. They have no control over what and when they eat. They are not allowed to decide when and where they will have visitors.12 In short, the residents forego the privacy other citizens enjoy.
In addition, uprooting a person from familiar surroundings and placing him in the facility may cause other, more intangible harm. For example, forced residency with strangers who share only poverty, marital status and the ability to work, may create emotional strain. A social stigma may also attach to those housed at the facility.
The “alternative” offered plaintiffs poses a different, though equally serious problem. Those who decide to maintain their own lifestyles and to associate with whomever they choose are denied general assistance benefits. Clearly, most eligible individuals cannot readily forego public benefits. General assistance is usually a last resort. To be eligible, a resident must have no income, no savings or resources, and no financial support from family or friends. Such a person would inevitably suffer substantial hardship if forced to live without general assistance benefits until this lawsuit is resolved on the merits.
Plaintiffs will suffer great and immediate harm from the denial of the requested injunction. The alleged harm to defendants is minimal. Plaintiffs have met the first prong of the test for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The second prong is the likelihood of success on the merits. (See IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 69-70.)
Plaintiffs contend that the County‘s “in-kind” benefits policy fails to meet this statutory standard because it forces an “inhumane” choice upon those County residents to whom it applies. They argue that making residency at the Bannon Street facility a condition of the receipt of benefits robs the affected applicants of their individuality and dignity. Rather than “encourag[ing] self-respect [and] self-reliance” (
As this court recognized in County of Los Angeles v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1981) 30 Cal.3d 391, 401, the courts play an important role in assuring that the provisions of the public welfare laws are liberally interpreted and actively enforced.
On this record, plaintiffs have demonstrated that the County‘s policy violates the goals of the state‘s welfare laws as reflected in
As to those eligible persons who refuse to live in the Bannon Street facility, the County‘s policy can scarcely be characterized as “humane.” When an eligible applicant is denied benefits, he may become “self-reliant” in the sense that the County no longer provides for him. However, the price of this self-reliance may be severe deprivation. Several of the plaintiffs’ declarations indicate that rejection of the County‘s “offer” of “in-kind” benefits has left them destitute and homeless.
Neither “option” offered by the County‘s policy comports with the statutory purposes and legislative intent set forth in
Defendants assert a variety of arguments in defense of the policy. First, they contend that ““strivings toward independence are actually increased by the mild adversity” of the Bannon Street facility.” To support this contention, the County points out that “in-kind” recipients receive general assistance benefits for an average of only 29 days as compared to the 9.3-month average for cash grant recipients.
Defendants also contend that all forms of “in-kind” aid place restrictions on personal choice. Since “in-kind” aid is generally accepted by the courts, they argue that such restrictions cannot be held to violate the requirement that general assistance be administered humanely.
Defendants miss the point. Plaintiffs are not challenging all “in-kind” aid, nor are they contesting the validity of every form of general assistance that restricts choice.15 Rather, plaintiffs challenge only those “in-kind” benefits that result in the loss of privacy and choice that placement at a County institution for the poor entails.
The various forms of “in-kind” benefits differ substantially in their impact on an individual recipient‘s freedom.16 “In-kind” aid requiring residency at the Bannon Street facility is a far more pervasive restriction on the recipient‘s freedom of choice than the restriction found in other types of “in-kind” aid, for example, fоod stamps. Defendants’ suggestion that plaintiffs seek the invalidation of all “in-kind” general assistance benefits is unfounded.
Defendants cite
Finally, defendants argue that county supervisors have sole discretion to determine who is eligible for indigent relief, the type and amount of relief to be received, and the conditions to be attached to such relief.
However, there are clear-cut limits. ““This discretion . . . can be exercised only within fixed boundaries. In administering general assistance relief the county acts as an agent of the state. [Citation.] When a statute confers upon a state agency the authority to adopt regulations to implement, interpret, make specific or otherwise carry out its provisions, the agency‘s regulations must be consistent, not in conflict with the statute, and reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. [Citation.]‘” (City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 44, 49, quoting Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, 679.)18
With respect to the statutory challenge, plaintiffs have satisfied the second prong of the preliminary injunction test. They have presented a persuasive argument that thеir statutory challenge will succeed at trial.19 Defendants have offered only a weak defense of the County‘s policy.
Plaintiffs also contend that defendants’ “in-kind” benefits program violates their constitutional right to privacy.
The right to privacy was added to the
This court has recognized that the “principal ‘mischiefs‘” at which the constitutional amendment was directed were the uncontrolled collection
In City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123, 130, 134, the right to privacy was held to encompass the right to choose the people with whom one lives. (See also Welsch v. Goswick (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 398, 409-415 (conc. opn. of Staniforth, J.).) The court stated that the constitutional amendment was intended “to ensure a right to privacy not only in one‘s family but also in one‘s home.” (Adamson, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 130, fn. omitted.) Moreover, the “[f]reedom to associate with people of one‘s choice is a necessary adjunct to privacy in the family and the home.” (See People v. Katrinak (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 145, 153.)
Plaintiffs argue persuasively that the County‘s “in-kind” benefits policy infringes upon their constitutional right to privacy. Residence at the Bannon Street facility compels the individual to give up his home and the ability to choose his associates. He is forced to live in a particular location without the freedom to choose his own living companions. Further, an acute loss of personal privacy is inevitable where residents sleep in dormitories, eat in a cafeteria, use the same bathrooms, and live according to institutionally prescribed rules of conduct.
When receipt of a public benefit is conditioned upon the waiver of a constitutional right, the “government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating the practical necessity for the limitation.” (Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 505.) The governmental entity seeking to impose such a condition must establish that: (1) the condition reasonably relates to the purposes of the legislation which confers the benefit; (2) the value accruing to the public from imposition of the condition manifestly outweighs any resulting impairment of the constitutional right; and (3) there are no available alternative means that could maintain the integrity of the benefits program without severely restricting a constitutional right. (Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 265-266; Parrish v. Civil Service Commission (1967) 66 Cal.2d 260, 271)
Defendants identify four state interests which they allege are furthered by the County‘s “in-kind” benefits policy. The first is an interest in improving the quality of the aid given eligible recipients. Defendants assert that residents of the Bannon Street facility receive three balanced meals a day and are provided with shelter, a pay telephone and a bus pass. They argue that persons receiving cash assistance “often buy non-essential items, live in substandard housing, and lack adequate access to transportation, teleрhones, and recreational facilities.”
In addition, defendants have failed to demonstrate that the County cannot improve the quality of its general assistance program by adopting less restrictive alternatives to the policy requiring residence at the Bannon Street facility. Plaintiffs and amici have suggested several alternatives to the County‘s “in-kind” benefits program which they assert would improve the quality of the benefits provided, but would invade the recipients’ privacy to a lesser degree. For example, they propose that the County offer residence at the Bannon Street facility on a voluntary basis, increase the level of the cash grant, or sponsor the construction of additional low-income housing. Defendants have failed to show that these or other possible alternatives would not improve the quality of benefits while imposing fewer restrictions on an individual‘s fundamental right to privacy.
Defendants’ second justification for the County‘s policy is that it promotes self-reliance. This goal is important and even statutorily compelled. (See
Defendants base their self-reliance argument on statistics indicating that recipients of “in-kind” aid stay at the Bannon Street facility for an average of less than 30 days. On the other hand, an average recipient of a cash grant receives general assistance benefits for nine months. Although this trend may save the County money, it does not indicate that the recipients of “in-kind” aid become economically “self-reliant.” They could just as easily become destitute, involved in criminal enterprises, or dependent upon private charity. The brevity of the average sojourn at the Bannon Street facility may be less a reflection of self-reliance than a result of the inmates’ natural aversion to the restraints on their freedom. (See also ante, at pp. 209-210.)
Again, defendants have made no attempt to find alternatives which are less restrictive of an individual‘s constitutional right to privacy. Defendants
Defendants argue that the prevention of fraud is a valid state interest which justifies the County‘s policy. Indeed, fraud prevention is a legitimate state interest. (See Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 66 Cal.2d 260.) However, defendants have not adequately demonstrated that the County‘s policy furthers that goal in any meaningful way.
Of the more than 4,000 recipients of County general assistance benefits, only 67 reside at the Bannon Street facility. Further, defendants have made no attempt to restrict the receipt of “in-kind” benefits to those suspected of fraud. The County‘s policy arbitrarily imposes the “in-kind” benefit alternative on single and employable applicants, none of whom are alleged to hаve committed fraud. The County does not argue that single, employable applicants are more likely than other applicants to make fraudulent benefit claims.
Moreover, the County‘s policy imposes far broader restrictions on Bannon Street residents than is justified by an interest in fraud prevention. The County‘s policy is analogous to the “Operation Bedcheck” challenged in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission, supra, 66 Cal.2d 260. Parrish involved a challenge to Alameda County‘s policy of conducting mass morning raids on county welfare recipients’ homes to detect “unauthorized males.” As in the present case, the county‘s policy extended not only to claimants suspected of fraud, but also to nonsuspect claimants. (Id., at pp. 272-274.) Further, the evidence in the record was inconclusive as to the efficacy of the raids in reducing fraud. This court held that the raids violated the recipients’ constitutional right of privacy. (Id., at p. 272.)
The same reasoning applies here. The County has failed to demonstrate that the “in-kind” benefits policy promotes the detection and prevention of welfare fraud. The deprivation of rights caused by this policy is great. The defendants have not demonstrated that it is the least restrictive way to ensure honest claims. Thus, this policy cannot be justified on the ground that it prevents fraud.
The final governmеntal interest cited by defendants is fiscal. As discussed previously, defendants state that County recipients of “in-kind” benefits receive general assistance for an average of 29 days as compared to the average period of 9.3 months for cash benefit recipients. They argue that
This court is not unmindful of the budgetary constraints facing counties. Nonetheless, financial considerations cannot justify an infringement of a basic constitutional right absent a showing that no less onerous cost-cutting methods are available.
This court rejected an argument based on cost to a county in Mooney v. Pickett, supra, 4 Cal.3d 669. In Mooney, the plaintiff challenged the statutory validity of a county‘s denial of nonemergency general assistance benefits to employable single men. Although Mooney was decided on statutory grounds, its reasoning is instructive. “We are aware of the financial difficulties which attend present welfare programs on local, state, and national levels. This court, however, is not fitted to write a new welfare law for the State of California, and while the Legislature addresses itself to that task it remains our task to enforce the existing law. We observe that the county retains extensive authority to establish standards for general assistance, both as to eligibility and as to amount of aid. In view of this discretion, the county can surely find many ways which do not violate state [law] in which it can limit general assistance payments to the financial resources available.” (Id., at p. 680.)
This reasoning applies with equal force to the County‘s defense of its “in-kind” benefits policy here. Again, the County has not demonstrated that there are no available alternatives that conserve fiscal resources while imposing fewer restrictions on the constitutional rights of recipients.
For all of these reasons, it would appear that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional challenge. Therefore, the trial court should have granted the request for a preliminary injunction.
The two-pronged test for the issuance of a preliminary injunction has been met by plaintiffs. First, they will suffer far greater harm from a denial of the injunction than defendants will suffer from its issuance. Second, plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood that they will succeed on the merits of both their statutory and constitutional claims. Under these circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the preliminary injunction. (See Isert v. Riecks, supra, 195 Cal. at p. 576; Riviello v. Journeymen Barbers etc. Union, supra, 88 Cal.App.2d at p. 510.)
The issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to grаnt a preliminary injunction is not a decision on the merits. (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 75-76; Weingand v. Atlantic Sav. & Loan Assn. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 806, 820; Continental Baking, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 528.) A full hearing is still required to adjudicate the merits of the parties’ contentions.
Therefore, a peremptory writ of mandate shall issue directing the superior court to: 1) vacate its order denying the preliminary injunction; and 2) to enter an order granting the preliminary injunction. The statewide importance of these issues suggests that this case should be set for trial at the earliest possible date.
Mosk, J., Kaus, J., Broussard, J., Reynoso, J., and Grodin, J., concurred.
LUCAS, J.-I respectfully dissent. In my view, the trial court‘s denial of a preliminary injunction was amply supported by the evidence.
I. Procedural Setting and Standard of Review
This case does not reach us on appeal after a trial on the merits. Rather, this is an extraordinary writ proceeding aimed at reviewing denial of a motion for preliminary injunction. A trial judge, in ruling on such a motion, considers the balance of harm and plaintiff‘s chance of success on the merits. The ultimate question is whether, on the whole, ““the defendant should or . . . should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.“” (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) “Injunction has long been regarded as an extraordinary remedy which should be granted with caution. . . . Though the plaintiff makes a strong showing of the conditions which might ultimately support a final judgment . . . , that showing may be controverted by the defendant, and at this early stage the сase may be regarded as a ‘doubtful’ one. . . . A
Our limited task is to decide whether the trial judge abused his discretion. (Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 851.) We must uphold his decision if there is sufficient evidence to justify it, viewing the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and disregarding other facts that might support a different conclusion. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 925.) More specifically, our inquiry is whether the trial judge could have concluded that the relative balance of harm together with plaintiffs’ chances of success on the merits warranted the denial of the preliminary injunction pending a full trial on the merits. I find ample evidence in the record to support the trial judge‘s decision.
After concluding that the balance of harm favors plaintiffs1 (ante, p. 207) and that their likelihood of success on the merits is “strong” (id., p. 218), the majority concludes that “the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the preliminary injunction” (ibid.). I would hold that the trial judge did not err in finding that the balance of harm considered with plaintiffs’ chances of success on the merits did not warrant the granting of the preliminary injunction.
II. Balancing of Harm
The majority cites the “psychological impact” on the shelter residents from giving up control over their daily regimen and from the alternative of foregoing benefits as proof that plaintiffs “will suffer great and immediate harm” if the shelter is not enjoined. (Ante, p. 207.) The defendants challenged vigorously the evidence of psychological damage and presented competent evidence that the shelter has no deleterious psychological effect on the residents. Viewing the record most favorably to defendants, we should find that the trial judge reasonably concluded that any harm to the residents was minimal and, at least pending a trial, the balance of harm was not
III. Chance of Success on the Merits
The trial judge held that plaintiffs could not prevail on their claims regarding the county‘s lack of authority or the residents’ privacy rights but that plaintiffs might prevail on the issue of the humane administration of the shelter.
A. The County‘s Authority Under the Welfare and Institutions Code. The county observes that
The county‘s authority to establish almshouses and to condition general assistance benefits upon living in such places is not dependent upon whether a particular almshouse is administered in conformity with other statutes. The distinction is between the general and the particular. Even if the administration of this almshouse may violate the “humane” requirement of
B. The Shelter Residents’ Privacy Rights. The majority finds that the Bannon Street shelter program violates the residents’ right to privacy under the
The county first justifies the Bannon Street shelter on the ground that it improves the quality of aid given to the residents. The majority, rejecting that justification, simply declares that this policy does not outweigh impairing the residents’ right to privacy. (Ante, p. 215.) The evidence discloses that the shelter is kept clean and offers nutritious food and decent clothing to the residents. The shelter also provides free bus passes to enable the residents to seek jobs or simply to travel and to visit anyone they choose. An “incoming only” telephone (in addition to a pay telephone) serves as a message center for employment and other telephone calls for residents; often general assistance recipients do not have easy access to telephones. The residents also have access to an employment service worker for consultation at the shelter regarding job openings. The evidencе shows that these benefits are often unobtainable or available only with great difficulty for general assistance recipients who do not live in the shelter. In short, the county‘s facilities are far superior to those in which many needy people must live. The majority holds, in effect, that no matter how effectively the shelter implements the policy of providing specific benefits, the privacy rights of the shelter residents outweigh that policy. I cannot agree.
The evidence, summarized above, fully supports the county‘s position that no less intrusive alternatives are available. The trial court, in its preliminary assessment of the evidence, could well have agreed. Nonetheless, the majority speculates that making residency at the shelter voluntary, increasing the amount of cash grants, “sponsor[ing]” the construction of low-income housing, “or other possible alternatives” would be less intrusive of privacy while furthering the county‘s interest in providing specific aid to general assistance recipients. (Ante, p. 215.) The trial judge could have found that each of those “alternatives” would defeat the legitimate purpose of providing better, more specific aid to general assistance recipients. To make residency in the shelter voluntary would defeat the purpose of ensuring that all recipients receive those benefits. If plaintiffs are to be believed, the shelter would be empty if residency were voluntary, thus completely defeating the county‘s interest in maintaining the shelter. Increasing the amount of the cash grants would not ensure that the recipients would provide themselves with appropriate aid. The county‘s interest in supplying
A second interest promoted by the Bannon Street shelter is one that is required by
The majority‘s error is twofold. First, it makes an ultimate judgment on incomplete facts. Discovery has yet to be completed; live testimony has yet to be considered by the trial judge. Second, the majority relies on only those facts opposing the county‘s position. The evidence cited by the county, however, supports its position and likewise supports the trial court‘s judgment.
The majority also concludes that the cоunty has failed to show that there are no less intrusive alternatives that promote self-reliance. As examples, the majority suggests “job training, counseling, and cash benefits.” (Ante, p. 216.) Residents may consult an employment service worker, mentioned above, who provides information on available job openings and counsels residents on job searches. Of course, the shelter residents are free to take advantage of the welfare department‘s services offered to other welfare recipients. These services include job orientation, job referrals, and cash to
A third legitimate and significant interest supporting the Bannon Street shelter is fiscal. The majority‘s only oblique suggestion of less intrusive methods of saving money comes from the quotation from Mooney v. Pickett (1971) 4 Cal.3d 669, pointing out the county‘s discretion to establish standards for eligibility and amount of aid. Presumably, the majority is proposing that the county either raise the eligibility requirements, cut the amount of the cash grants, or both. The record is devoid of evidence that would support the conclusion that raising eligibility requirements would comport with the county‘s charge to provide relief to “all . . . poor, indigent persons . . .” under
The majority misapprehends the county‘s fiscal argument.4 The majority states that the fiscal savings from the Bannon Street shelter flow from the
C. The Humane Administration of the Bannon Street Shelter. The trial judge concluded that plaintiffs ultimately might prevail on their claim that the shelter is not being administered “humanely.” Nonetheless, the trial judge ruled that plaintiffs’ chances of success on that claim, coupled with their failure on their other claims and the balance of harm between the parties, warranted the denial of the preliminary injunction.
The majority asserts that the program requires residents to give up their living quarters, to surrender “control over their daily lives,” and to choose between living in the shelter or foregoing benеfits. (Ante, p. 209.) On that basis, the majority concludes that the shelter is not being administered humanely.
As the majority points out, however, residency in the shelter is not required of those who own their own homes, live with a dependent child, or have a physical or mental incapacity. Those qualities would make the residency requirement more burdensome. If the factual record were complete, we would have the benefit of the trial judge‘s considered opinion of all the evidence bearing on this fact question. As it is, we must speculate. The shelter residents retain almost total control over their daily lives. The residents are required to be in the shelter only from 9 p.m. until morning and exceptions to this rule are permitted. Except for this requirement, the record does not disclose any affirmative duties imposed on them. The residents are free to come and go, eat at the shelter or not, visit with anyone they like, speak with anyone they like, and, in general, exercise complete control over their lives. Finally, the choice between participating in the program offered or foregoing benefits is always present, but does not reflect any “inhuman-
This record fully supports the conclusion that the shelter is humanely administered. As the majority notes, the county has asserted that the shelter is clean, the food nutritious, and the rules reasonable. (Ante, p. 209.) In fact, the defendants filed 23 declarations and other exhibits that extensively discuss the operation and condition of the Bannon Street shelter. This evidence came from shelter residents and employees as well as independent experts on the subjects of welfare, nutrition, economics, and medicine. The synthesis of that evidence is that the Bannon Street shelter is a well-run institution providing clean, healthy facilities for eating, sleeping, and bathing.
The majority does not contend that defendants’ evidence is not credible. Rather, it cites plaintiffs’ evidence and concludes that the shelter is inhumanely administered. No case law or statutory authority permits or supports that conclusion. Indeed, the opposite is compelled. We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendants. If we, on review, examine the record in light of the substantial evidence supporting the judgment, the ineluctable conclusion is that plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on this claim.
IV. Consequences of the Majority‘s Holdings
The majority‘s analysis, going beyond simply examining the entire record for facts that support the trial judge‘s decision, is open to criticism on several grounds. First, of course, it is not the approach prescribed by law for our review. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 925.) Second, by its premature conclusions the majority effectively precludes a fair trial on the merits. The majority strongly suggests that, despite any facts that could be adduced by defendants at trial, the Bannon Street shelter exceeds the defendants’ statutory authority (ante, p. 212), the program is constitutionally infirm (id., p. 218) and the shelter is inhumane (id., p. 209). In light of today‘s decision a trial would seem pointless.
More importantly, by effectively foreclosing a fair trial, the majority‘s decision will deprive this court of a full factual record and the trial judge‘s thorough and thoughtful findings of fact and conclusions of law. The issues in this case are many and their resolution, particularly the constitutional issue, is largely dependent upon an evaluation of all the facts surrounding the Bannon Street shelter. By ruling now, the majority opinion is of necessity speculative and premature.
Finally, even if the majority, following the established approach, were to find that the preliminary injunction should issue, they should have stopped with a finding that the trial judge abused his discretion rather than making what, as a practical matter, are final resolutions of important issues. Much of the majority‘s opinion is unnecessary and unwarranted to resolve the question of whether the preliminary injunction should issue.
The county‘s experiment with providing general assistance benefits, which saves the county an enormous amount of money, should be permitted to continue, at least until a complete factual record is created during trial. Overwhelming evidence supports the trial judge‘s decision to deny the preliminary injunction. I find no abuse of discretion.
I would deny the peremptory writ.