Angelo ROBINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Wanza JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-4107.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
June 15, 2015.
310-315
V.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for reinstatement of the arbitration award. The Hospital‘s motion to strike is denied as moot.
Before: McKEAGUE and DONALD, Circuit Judges; and MATTICE, District Judge.*
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Angelo Robinson (“Robinson“) appeals from a district court order granting judgment on the pleadings to Defendant-Appellee Wanza Jackson (“Jackson“) regarding his claims against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC“). Robinson, a prisoner incarcerated at the London Correctional Institution (“LCI“), alleged that Jackson and other prison officials1 violated his statutory and constitutional rights when they refused to accommodate his requests for Halal meals. The district court found that Robinson‘s constitutional and statutory rights had not been violated and granted Jackson‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We AFFIRM.
I.
Robinson is a “devout Muslim who sincerely adheres to the Islamic faith.” Like others of his faith, Robinson believes he must follow the tenets of the Qur‘an, including those regarding the food he eats, which is termed “Halal” in the religious text. Not all Muslims restrict their diets to Halal foods, but some believe that doing so is required by their religion. Under Halal rules as discussed in the complaint, Robinson may “only eat meat that has been slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law (i.e., by slitting the animal‘s neck and allowing the blood to drain), and [must] refrain from eating pork, food containing alcohol, and any food contaminated with pork or alcohol.”
During his incarceration, Robinson asked several times to be provided with Halal meals. The request was “not approved” as “[t]he department provides a vegetarian meal” and Robinson was in fact being provided vegetarian meals. As the vegetarian meals contain no meat or alcohol, the prison argued it was already serving Robinson meals that met Halal rules.
After exhausting his administrative appeals, Robinson filed the present complaint in federal court. Robinson avers that the ODRC refuses to provide him Halal meals and that this refusal violates his statutory and constitutional rights because it 1) substantially burdens his sincerely-held religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA“); 2) prevents free exer-
II.
A.
We review de novo a district court‘s grant of judgment on the pleadings. Kia Motors Am., Inc. v. Glassman Oldsmobile Saab Hyundai, Inc., 706 F.3d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 2013). In so doing, we analyze the district court‘s decision using the same “review employed for a motion to dismiss under
B.
As a preliminary matter, Robinson argues that the district court erred because it “improperly relied on extrinsic evidence outside of the four corners of the pleadings without giving [him] proper notice.” Specifically, Robinson alleges that several of the district court‘s findings—including that 1) the prison‘s vegetarian meals were “per se Halal,” and 2) that Jewish and Muslim inmates are not similarly situated under a Fourth Amendment analysis—were based on information dehors the pleadings. After reviewing the record, we disagree.
We have held that a district court is entitled to evaluate a
C.
Robinson‘s first claim is that Jackson violated his rights under the RLUIPA when she denied him Halal meals. Under the RLUIPA,
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
Robinson notes that the legislative history accompanying the RLUIPA suggests a concern to protect a prisoner who is denied Halal meals during his incarceration. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716 n. 5, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005). However, by Robinson‘s own definition, a meal containing no meat or alcohol qualifies as Halal. According to the defendants, the vegetarian meals provided to him by the prison meet this definition. Robinson has not alleged otherwise.2
Abdullah averred that a prohibition against non-Halal meat was fundamental to his religion. However, he can comply with this prohibition by eating vegetarian meals. Thus, Abdullah‘s First Amendment claim fails because the disputed policy did not force him to violate his religion.
Id. citing Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep‘t Corrs., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995). Other district courts in this Circuit have since applied the logic of Abdullah in the context of RLUIPA claims. See, e.g., Hudson v. Caruso, 748 F. Supp. 2d 721, 729-30 (W.D. Mich. 2010) (holding that providing a Muslim inmate vegetarian entrees without providing Halal meat entrees did not substantially burden free exercise); Cloyd v. Dulin, No. 3:12-CV-1088, 2012 WL 5995234, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Abdullah, 173 F.3d at *1) (“Muslim prisoners do not have a right under the First Amendment or the RLUIPA to be provided [H]alal meat entrees; rather, a correctional facility need only provide Muslim prisoners with food that is not ‘haram’ (impermissible).“). Thus, as
Robinson‘s First Amendment claim suffers a similar fate for similar reasons: Under the First Amendment, inmates have the right to the free exercise of their religion. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S. Ct. 1079, 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972). However, like Abdullah, Robinson is receiving meals that do not violate his religion. And while he may prefer to be served “[H]alal meat entrees rather than vegetarian entrees and non-meat substitutes, his food preferences, as a prisoner, are limited.” Cloyd, 2012 WL 5995234, at *4; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981) (“The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons.“). Prisoners have a constitutional right to meals that meet their nutritional needs; indeed, they have a constitutional right to be served meals that do not violate their sincerely-held religious beliefs. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 290 (6th Cir. 2010). But there is no constitutional right for each prisoner to be served the specific foods he desires—such as Halal meat—in prison. See Spies v. Voiovich, 173 F.3d 398, 406-07 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that providing a Buddhist prisoner with a vegetarian diet but not a vegan diet was constitutionally permissible, and “the fact that Plaintiffs dislike the alternate diet available does not render it unreasonable or legally deficient.“).
We therefore agree with the district court that Robinson has not presented “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged” for the simple reason he alleges no specific misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Without a plausible allegation that Jackson has violated Robinson‘s free exercise of religion, Robinson fails to state a First Amendment claim as a matter of law.
Robinson‘s equal protection claim also fails on these grounds. Robinson argues that, because the ODRC provides Kosher meals to Jewish inmates but does not provide Halal meals to Muslim inmates, the department is discriminating against him and those of his faith in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
Again, the rationale of Abdullah is on point. In addition to making a First Amendment claim, Abdullah also alleged that the prison‘s provision of Kosher meals to Jewish inmates violated the Equal Protection Clause. In light of the fact that the prison‘s policy was “rationally related to legitimate penological interests[,]” we found that “Abdullah‘s equal protection claim lack[ed] merit, as he did not show that the policy was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Id. at *2 (citing Thompson v. Kentucky, 712 F.2d 1078, 1081-82 (6th Cir. 1983)). The same is true in the case at bar. As discussed supra, Robinson‘s complaint fails to allege that he was, in fact,
III.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.