Andrea MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Woodston MADDOX, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-5021
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Decided and Filed: August 3, 2017
866 F.3d 386
Before: MOORE, STRANCH, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge.
Andrea Miller was arrested, charged, and indicted on charges of reckless driving and resisting arrest, based on false statements made by officer Woodston Maddox. The district court granted summary judgment in Maddox‘s favor on Miller‘s malicious prosecution claim under
I.
Miller brought a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim under
This court reviews a district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III.
We have reсognized that a plaintiff may bring a malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment based on a defendant officer‘s wrongful investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration of a plaintiff. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 715-16 (6th Cir. 2006). To succeed on such a claim, Miller must establish that (1) a criminal prosecution was initiated against her and Maddox made, influenced, or participated in the prosecution decision; (2) there was no probable cause to support the charges; (3) as a result of the lеgal proceedings, Miller suffered a deprivation of liberty “apart from the initial seizure“; and (4) the criminal proceedings ended in Miller‘s favor. Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308-09 (6th Cir. 2010). The last element is not in dispute in this case.
a.
Miller first insists that because, in affirming the denial of Maddox‘s motion to dismiss, this court found in her favor on the first and third elements, the law of the case doctrine conclusively establishes that those elements are met and precludes our review of those issues on summary judgment.
Initially, despite Miller‘s claims to the contrary, our prior decision did not resolve whether her allegations of post-process detention deprived her of liberty so as to satisfy the third element. Rather, it mentioned, in passing when rejecting Maddox‘s argument that Miller‘s claim should be construed as one for false imprisonment, that “the detention that Miller challenges is the three-to-four-hour period of confinement that resulted from the allegedly wrongful institution of this legal process.” Order, R. 20 at 4, Case No. 14-6216. We noted that this was “the exact harm that a malicious-prosecution claim is intended to remedy.” Id. We therefore, did not resolve the third element.
Furthеrmore, the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit our review of these issues. Under the law of the case doctrine, “when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). Importantly, however, this doctrine is intended to enforce a district court‘s adherence to an appellate court‘s judgment, and so is applied only loosely when we reconsider our own decisions. Williams v. McLemore, 247 F. Appx. 1, 7 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Dunbar, 357 F.3d 582, 592 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Patterson v. Haskins, 470 F.3d 645, 660-61 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting the prudеntial nature of the law of the case doctrine). Consistent with this latter principle, we have also held that this court‘s prior “holding on a motion to dismiss does not establish the law of the case for purposes of summary judgment, when the complaint has been supplemented by discovery.” McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 513 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Williams, 247 F. Appx. at 7 (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996)) (observing that the denial of qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss does not trigger the law of the case doctrine following the denial of the defendant‘s motion for summary judgment). So we may consider issues not expressly or impliedly deсided by the previous opinion. McKenzie, 219 F.3d at 513 (quoting Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir. 1992)). Given the prudential nature of the law of the case doctrine and the fact that we previously decided these issues under a standard more favorable to Miller, we conclude that this doctrine does not bar us from revisiting these issues.
We now turn to the three elements of malicious prosecution at issue in this case.
b.
To succeed on her claim, Miller must first establish that a criminal prosecution was initiated against her and that Maddox made, influenced, or partiсipated in the prosecution decision. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308. Neither party disputes that a criminal prosecution was initiated against Miller. Rather, the dispute centers on whether Maddox made, influenced, or participated in the prosecution decision. “To be liable for ‘participating’ in the decision to prosecute, the officer must participate in a way that aids in the decision, as opposed to passively or neutrally participating.” Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d 721, 731 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015)). In Sykes, for instance, we concluded that an officer influenced or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiffs where the officer gave false testimony at a preliminary hearing, which was material because the officer was the only one to testify. 625 F.3d at 312-14. We further held that a second officer likewise participated or influenced the decision to prosecute the plaintiffs when the officer made misrepresentations and omissions in his application for an arrest warrant and investigative rеport, which were relied on by the prosecutors in proceeding against the plaintiffs. Id. at 314-17.
Here, Maddox swore as a “prosecutor” in an affidavit for an arrest warrant that Miller ran a stop sign, then proceeded to speed down the street, became verbally confrontational when Maddox asked her to get out of the vehicle, then jerked and twisted away from him when he tried to physically remove her. As a result, the night court commissioner issued an arrest warrant. Later, at a preliminary hearing, Maddox testified to these same facts. Based on Maddox‘s testimony, the court found sufficient evidence to bind Miller‘s case over to the grand jury. It appears that Maddox was the only witness to testify during that hearing. Although it may be true that Maddox never directly spoke with the prosecutor regarding the case, because Maddox swore out the warrant affidavit
c.
We next turn to the issue of whether there was probable cause to support the charges. The district court resolved the claim on this element, reasoning that Miller could not rebut the general rule that an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause. However, our recent decision in King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017), which creates an exception to that general rule, calls the district court‘s conclusion into question. In light of King, we concludе that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this ground.
Shortly prior to our decision in King, we decided Sanders, which observed the apparent tension in our jurisprudence on the element of probable cause in a malicious prosecution case. There, we noted that an indictment, fair on its face, generally conclusively establishes the existence of probable cause, but also observed the exception to that rule when a defendant knowingly or recklessly presents false testimony to the grand jury to obtain an indictment. Sanders, 845 F.3d at 728-29. We examined the tension that this exception creates with the Supreme Court‘s decision in Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012), which held that absolute immunity extends to false testimony given by a grand jury witness. Sanders, 845 F.3d at 729-30. In particular, we analyzed “the tensions between Rehberg and our malicious prosecution cause of action to determine whether malicious prosecution remains a viable claim where a plaintiff was indicted by a grand jury, given that Rehberg lends absolute immunity to grand jury testimony.” Id. at 731.
The plaintiff in Sanders argued that the officer was not entitled to absolute immunity because her malicious prosecution claim was not based on the officer‘s grand jury testimony, but rather on his allegedly false police report. Id. at 730. We held that although the officer was not entitled to absolute immunity for his police report, the statements made therein could not overcome the presumption of probable cause because they could not be material to the grand jury‘s finding of probable cause. Id. at 732-33. We so reasoned because “[f]alse statements could affect the grand jury‘s determination of probable cause only if introduced through grand jury testimony, and if that testimony is by the defendant, he is absolutely immune under Rehberg.” Id.
In King we recognized the “harsh” result produced by Sanders, noting that to avoid that outcome, we would need to create an exception to the rule that an indictment conclusively establishes probable cause. King, 852 F.3d at 587. So, we created an exception, holding that:
where (1) a law-enforcement officer, in the course of setting a prosecution in motion, either knowingly or recklessly makes false statements (such as in affidavits or investigative reports) or falsifies or fabricates evidence; (2) the false statements and evidence, togethеr with any concomitant misleading omissions, are material to the ultimate prosecution of the plaintiff; and (3) the false statements, evidence, and omissions do not consist solely of grand-jury testimony or preparation for that testimony ... the presumption that the grand-jury indictment is evidence of probable cause is rebuttable and not conclusive.
Id. at 587-88. We, therefore, look first to whether the King exception applies to cre-
First, Maddox accepts as true for the purpose of this appeal that his statements that Miller was speeding and subsequently resisted arrest werе false. We conclude that these false statements were committed in the course of setting the prosecution of Miller in motion because, as discussed above, Maddox as the complaining witness filed the affidavit that led the night commissioner to issue a warrant for Miller. Additionally, he was the only witness at the preliminary hearing where it was determined there was probable cause to bind Miller‘s case over until trial. While, as Maddox insists, there may not be evidence that the “fabricated evidence [was] presented to the grand jury and relied upon in securing an indictment,” R. 25, Appellee Br. at 18, his false statements were instrumental in the stages leading up to the ultimate indictment, so set the prosecution in motion.
Next, the false statements were material to Miller‘s prosecution because there is no indication of evidence in the record that would allow the charges against Miller to proceed to the grand-jury stage absent Maddox‘s false testimony. Finally, Maddox‘s false statements do not consist solely of grand jury testimony. To the contrary, as Maddox emphasizes, he did not testify during the grand jury proceedings and there is nothing but speculation to suggest that Maddox‘s statements were used during these proceedings.
Accordingly, we conclude that the King exception applies to overcome the conclusive presumption that an indictment by the grand jury establishes probable cause. So, Miller is entitled to rebut the presumption of probable cause.
As noted, Maddox accepts for the purposes of his appeal that Miller did not physically resist his attempts to remove her from the vehicle. Maddox points to no other evidence in the record supporting probable cause for resisting arrest, so we conclude that there is no probable cause to support the charge against Miller for reckless driving in violation of
Lastly, Miller must demonstrate not just that she was seized, but that she suffered a deprivation of liberty “apart from the initial seizure.” Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308-09. The record reflects that after Miller participated in the video conference with the night court commissioner who found probable cause, she remained detained for approximately forty-five minutes.4 Thereafter, she paid a $355 fee to be released and was required to participate in a pretrial release program, which mandated that she show up on time for all court appearances and call the pretrial case manager every week until the case was resolved. Participation in this рrogram was an alternative to Miller posting a $3,000 bond.
Miller‘s participation in the pretrial release program constitutes a deprivation of liberty separate from the initial seizure. In Noonan v. County of Oakland, No. 15-2192, 683 F. Appx. 455, 462-63, 2017 WL 1102912, at *7-8 (6th Cir. Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished), we concluded that the plaintiff was not deprived of his liberty apart from his initial seizure because the plaintiff was “never arrested or incarcerated, required to post bail or bond, or subjected to any travel restrictions.” Id. at 463, 2017 WL 1102912 at *8. In that case, we concluded that the аggravation and costs associated with hiring an attorney and reputational harms were not “a deprivation of liberty as understood in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 463, 2017 WL 1102912 at *8. However, in Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2015), we “assume[d] that” conditions of pretrial release “represent a sufficient deprivation of ... liberty to satisfy the third element” of Sykes. Also, in Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, 493 (6th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases), we indicated that imposing restrictions designed to compel court appearance, “such as obligations to post bond, attend court hearings, and contact pretrial services” could constitute a seizure.
Miller was not only arrested and incarcerated, but also required to pay $35 to be accepted into the pretrial program, could have been required to post a $3,000 bond, was required to attend court appearances, and required to check in with a case manager once per week. This case involves precisely the factors that were missing in Noonan and that Johnson v. City of Cincinnati suggested could constitute a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure. Additionally, after the night commissioner signed the arrest warrants and instructed that Miller could be released after paying the $35 fee, Miller was detained for approximately an additional forty-five minutes while being screened for the program. The Conditions of Release Order states that Miller “SHALL be released” upon being accepted by the Pre-Trial Services Department for supervision. Conditions of Release Order, ECF No. 67-18, Page ID 607. Any extension of a seizure beyond the time reasоnably required to carry out the seizure‘s purpose is unlawful. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1613 (2015) (concluding that the extension of a traffic stop seven or eight minutes beyond the time reasonably required to complete the stop‘s mission was unlawful); see also Manuel v. City of Joliet, 581 U.S. 357, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017)
For the aforementioned reasons, Maddox has not established the absence of genuine issues of material fact such that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Miller‘s malicious prosecution claim.
IV.
As the district court concluded, Maddox contends that he is entitled to absolute immunity for his false statements. We disagree.
In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld absolute immunity from
Maddox seems to suggest that he cannot be held liable for the false statements made in the warrant affidavits because his testimony before the judicial commissioner was based on the false statements. His logic is apparently that because he is absolutely immune from
V.
Lastly, we address Maddox‘s argument that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions unless (1) the plaintiff has estаblished a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at time of the incident. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). The key inquiry is whether the defendants had “fair warning” of the unconstitutionality of their actions. Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 687 (6th Cir. 2005). The right also “must be clearly established in a ‘particularized’ sense, so that ‘the contours of the right’ are clear enough for any reasonable official in the ‘defendants’ position to know that what the official is doing violates that right.” Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239, 1242 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “In other words, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question confronted by the official beyond debate.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
Maddox spends a considerable portion of his brief illustrating why it is not clear that he should be liable for malicious prosecution, thus reasoning that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Yet, his claim that the contours of our jurisprudence concerning malicious prosecution are not entirely clear misses the point. Our inquiry is whether Maddox‘s alleged actions—arresting and detaining Miller based on false pretenses and then seeking an arrest warrаnt based on these false statements—violated Miller‘s clearly established constitutional rights. We conclude that they did.
In Spurlock for instance, we determined that the plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to allege a violation of their constitutional rights where their complaint stated “that [the defendants] wrongfully investigated, prosecuted, convicted and incarcerated them; that [an officer] fabricated evidence and manufactured probable cause;
VI.
For the reasons discussed above, we REVERSE the grant of summary judgment in Maddox‘s favor and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.