ANDERSON UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SHASTA SECONDARY HOME SCHOOL, Defendant and Respondent.
No. C078491
Third Dist.
Oct. 17, 2016.
November 16, 2016
262-284
DUARTE, J.
Respondent‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 18, 2017, S238632.
Lozano Smith, Sloan R. Simmons, Megan E. Macy and Anne L. Collins for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Dannis Woliver Kelley, Sue Ann Salmon Evans, Karl H. Widell; Keith J. Bray and Joshua R. Daniels for California School Boards Association Education Legal Alliance as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Young, Minney & Corr, Paul C. Minney, Lisa A. Corr, William J. Trinkle and Kathleen M. Ebert for Defendant and Respondent.
Girard & Edwards, Michael Tucker and Eric E. Stevens for Dehesa School District, Julian Union School District and Mountain Empire Unified School District as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Latham & Watkins, James L. Arnone, Winston P. Stromberg and Jennifer K. Roy for Altus Institute Network of Chartered Schools as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Ralph W. Kasarda and Joshua P. Thompson for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, John C. Lemmo, Greta A. Proctor, Merrick A. Wadsworth; Ricardo J. Soto, Julie Ashby Umansky and Phillipa L. Altmann for California Charter Schools Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, John C. Lemmo, Greta A. Proctor and Merrick A. Wadsworth for Charter Schools Development Center, Julian Charter School and Diego Valley Charter School as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
DUARTE, J.—Charter schools are “public schools funded with public money but run by private individuals or entities rather than traditional public
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation of the scope of these geographic restrictions. Specifically, the issue presented is whether the comprehensive statutory scheme governing charter schools permits a charter school—that is authorized by a school district and provides support for nonclassroom-based independent study—to locate a resource center outside the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district but within the same county.
As we explain, applying well-established rules of statutory construction to the language of the Charter Schools Act, we conclude that the answer is no.
The 2002 amendments generally require charter schools to operate within the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district. (
Shasta Secondary Home School (SSHS) operates a nonclassroom-based charter school, providing educational support for students who are home-schooled. The Shasta Union High School District is the authorizing school district for SSHS and is responsible for its oversight. (See
AUHSD brought suit, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, contending the location of this resource center violated the Charter Schools Act, as well
Because the language of the Charter Schools Act does not support that interpretation, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
SSHS is a nonclassroom-based school established in 1999. Its charter was last renewed in 2011 and expired June 30, 2016. The Shasta Union High School District authorized the charter and is responsible for oversight of SSHS. SSHS uses an individualized learning model, which consists of a combination of (1) homeschooling, (2) optional group classes, (3) online courses, (4) student-driven electives, (5) concurrent enrollment at a campus site of the authorizing school district, and (6) college-level courses.
SSHS has two resource centers in Redding, the Gold Street Resource Center and the adjacent Market Street Resource Center. These resource centers are within the boundaries of Shasta Union High School District and provide students with tutoring, special education services, computer and science labs, and student work spaces. Students can meet there with their facilitator, a guidance counselor, or the director of SSHS. A student must meet with his or her facilitator at least once every 20 days, with a parent or guardian in attendance. Optional classes are offered at the Gold Street Resource Center.
In July 2013, SSHS opened a third resource center in the East Cottonwood Elementary School (the Cottonwood Resource Center). This resource center is intended to serve students in southern Shasta County and northern Tehama County. The Cottonwood Resource Center is a one-room facility with four computer workstations, desks, a small library, and a white board. At the resource center, students may check out instructional materials, use the computer workstations, work on assignments, and receive tutoring. The Cottonwood Resource Center does not offer optional classes. It is open three days a week, and is located within Shasta County, but outside the boundaries of the Shasta Union High School District. It is inside the boundaries of AUHSD.
The head of technology at East Cottonwood Elementary School informed AUHSD of this resource center. AUHSD brought a complaint for injunctive
The trial court denied the TRO and ordered SSHS to appear and show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued restraining and enjoining it from establishing a satellite educational facility within the boundaries of AUHSD.
After a hearing, the trial court denied the preliminary injunction, finding AUHSD failed to show irreparable harm or to establish the likelihood that it would prevail on the merits.
AUHSD filed an amended complaint. It sought injunctive relief, restraining SSHS from operating a resource center within AUHSD‘s boundaries. It also sought declaratory relief in the form of a declaration that (1) the Cottonwood Resource Center was a “schoolsite” within the meaning of
The parties stipulated to a trial on the briefs, and waived their right to a bench trial. They provided a joint statement of stipulated facts and documents.
The trial court determined the Cottonwood Resource Center was not a “schoolsite,” because the resource center was not used principally for classroom instruction.2 The court found no statutory restraint on the location of a resource center within the county of the authorizing school district. It found that
The court entered judgment for SSHS and AUHSD appealed.
I
The Charter Schools Act
A. General Background
Article IX, section 5 of the California Constitution requires the Legislature to provide a free public school system. The Legislature has chosen to implement this requirement through local school districts. (Wells v. One2One Learning Foundation (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1164, 1195 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 141 P.3d 225].) Beginning with the 1990–1991 school year, the Legislature permitted a school district to offer independent study. (
In 1992, the Legislature enacted the Charter Schools Act, adding charter schools to the public education system “to provide opportunities for teachers, parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain schools that operate independently from the existing school district structure.” (
Originally, the number of charter schools was limited to 100 and a charter school could be initiated only by a petition signed by a certain number of teachers and submitted to the governing board of the school district. (Former
In 1998, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 544 (1997–1998 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 544), which “substantially revamped” the Charter Schools Act. (Wilson v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1132 [89 Cal.Rptr.2d 745] (Wilson).) Assembly Bill No. 544 replaced the cap
Other new provisions of Assembly Bill No. 544 provide greater control over charter schools. Teachers in charter schools must hold a Commission on Teaching Credentialing certificate or equivalent. (
The Legislature made further refinements to the Charter Schools Act in Senate Bill No. 434 (1998–2000 Reg. Sess.). Charter Schools are required to offer the same number of instructional minutes as school districts, maintain records of pupil attendance, and certify that pupils have participated in state testing. (
In 2002, the Legislature made significant amendments to the Charter Schools Act in Assembly Bill No. 1994 (2001-2002 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1994), adding “stringent geographical restrictions” for the operation of charter schools. (CSBA, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 1307; see
B. Provisions at Issue in the Instant Appeal
The geographic restrictions contained in Assembly Bill No. 1994 are the subject of this appeal. Under the 2002 amendments, a school chartered by a school district must identify a “single charter school that will operate within the geographic boundaries of that school district.” (
There are limited exceptions to these restrictions. Where a charter school provides a majority of its educational services in, and a majority of its pupils are residents of, the county in which it is authorized, it may establish “a resource center, meeting space, or other satellite facility” in an adjacent county, provided the facility is used exclusively for educational support of pupils enrolled in nonclassroom-based independent study. (
Assembly Bill No. 1994 added a new provision authorizing a county board of education to approve a countywide charter school in the first instance.3 The school must operate in “one or more sites within the geographic boundaries of the county.” (
Assembly Bill No. 1994 also authorized “state charter school[s],” which would be permitted to operate without geographic restrictions throughout the state. (
II
AUHSD‘s Contentions
On appeal, AUHSD contends (1) the geographic limitations in the Charter Schools Act on the location of charter school facilities apply to all charter schools, including those that operate nonclassroom-based programs; (2) the statutory exceptions to these limitations, set forth in section 47605.1, subdivisions (c) and (d), do not apply in this case; (3) the Cottonwood Resource Center is barred because its location is not identified in SSHS‘s charter; and (4) compelling public policy supports reversal of the judgment.
SSHS objects that these issues are not the same as those AUHSD asked the trial court to decide in its request for declaratory relief and requests that this court limit its review to the issues decided by the trial court.
We agree there has been a change in the emphasis of AUHSD‘s argument. AUHSD has shifted from its previous argument that the Cottonwood Resource Center is a “schoolsite” as defined in
III
Application of Geographic Restrictions to the Cottonwood Resource Center
A. Section 47605
Section 47605 sets forth the requirements for establishing a charter school that is authorized by a school district, both the requirements of the initiating petition and the requirements for the school. It addresses the
This language evinces the unambiguous legislative intent that a charter school authorized by a school district shall be located and operate entirely within the boundaries of the authorizing school district, whether at one or multiple locations. The geographic limitations apply to the operation of the charter school. The Cottonwood Resource Center, by providing educational support to students of SSHS, is part of the operation of SSHS. Therefore, the in-district geographic limitation applies to the Cottonwood Resource Center unless there is an applicable exception.
SSHS argues, and the trial court found, that subdivision (a) of section 47605 applies only to classroom-based charter schools, and not to nonclassroom-based charter schools. The reasoning is that classroom-based charter schools and nonclassroom-based charter schools are different, and are treated differently in many areas of the Charter Schools Act besides funding. SSHS contends the Legislature recognized this distinction and set different geographic restrictions for classroom-based and nonclassroom-based charter schools.
This interpretation is untenable. Nothing in subdivision (a) of section 47605 distinguishes between classroom-based and nonclassroom-based charter schools. These terms do not appear in the subdivision; it speaks only generally of a “charter school.” Section 47605 is the only section that addresses the requirements for establishing a charter school authorized by a school district. If it does not apply to nonclassroom-based charter schools, there is no statutory procedure for petitioning to establish a nonclassroom-based charter school. Since the Legislature intended charter schools to provide independent study (
We turn now to certain exceptions in section 47605.1.
B. Section 47605.1
As set forth ante, section 47605.1 requires charter schools that were granted a charter after July 1, 2002, to “locate in accordance with the geographic and site limitations” of the Charter Schools Act.4 (
SSHS contends the geographic and site limitations on charter schools apply only to sites and schoolsites and the Cottonwood Resource Center does not meet the definition of a schoolsite because it is not “used principally for classroom instruction.” (
“When construing the meaning of words in a statute, courts should first look to the plain dictionary meaning of the word unless it has a specific legal definition. [Citations.] Each word, phrase and provision in a statute is presumed to have a meaning and to perform a useful function. [Citations.]” (Ceja v. J. R. Wood, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1372, 1375–1376 [242 Cal.Rptr. 531].) The term “schoolsite” has a particular meaning, as set forth in
SSHS relies on the permissive nature of the Education Code and the flexibility granted charter schools to support its position.
As we have shown, this assertion is not accurate. Sections 47605 and 47605.1 prohibit such in-county resource centers.
C. Absurdity
SSHS contends that interpreting the Charter Schools Act to prohibit placement of a resource center outside the boundaries of the authorizing
The plain meaning of a statute will not be followed when it leads to absurd results, frustrating the manifest purpose of the law. (Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098 [282 Cal.Rptr. 841, 811 P.2d 1025].) “There are few, if any, sources guiding an appellate court on how to apply the absurdity exception to the ‘plain meaning rule.‘” (People v. Harbison (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 975, 986–987 [179 Cal.Rptr.3d 187] (dis. opn. of Yegan, J.).) “This exception should be used most sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the separation of powers principle of government. (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3.) We do not sit as a ‘super-legislature.’ [Citation.]” (Unzueta v. Ocean View School Dist. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1689, 1698 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 614].) “[E]xcept in the most extreme cases where legislative intent and the underlying purpose are at odds with the plain language of the statute, an appellate court should exercise judicial restraint, stay its hand, and refrain from rewriting a statute to find an intent not expressed by the Legislature.” (
We do not find the accurate interpretation of this statute to be so absurd as to permit us to rewrite it. Assembly Bill No. 1994 added a provision to permit a county board of education to authorize a countywide charter school “that operates at one or more sites within the geographic boundaries of the county and that provides instructional services that are not generally provided by a county office of education.” (
SSHS reads the adjacent county provision of section 47605.1, subdivision (c) as the only restriction on the location of a resource center. We
SSHS contrasts the preamble of subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 47605.1. Subdivision (c) begins, “Notwithstanding any other law ....” (
D. Interpretation by the State Department of Education
SSHS contends its position that the Cottonwood Resource Center is not governed by sections 47605 and 47605.1 is supported by the interpretation offered by the State Department of Education. In 2002, the State Department
“An agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts; however, unlike quasi-legislative regulations adopted by an agency to which the Legislature has confided the power to ‘make law,’ and which, if authorized by the enabling legislation, bind this and other courts as firmly as statutes themselves, the binding power of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of the interpretation.” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 [78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 960 P.2d 1031].) “Considered alone and apart from the context and circumstances that produce them, agency interpretations are not binding or necessarily even authoritative.” (
Here the agency interpretation simply summarizes the key provisions of section 47605.1. There is no indication that the agency is drawing upon its particular expertise or that it had any role in drafting the legislation. Rather, the agency was simply summarizing—and thus interpreting—the statute. The expertise for that task lies in the courts, not the agency. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1389 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323] [“The final meaning of a statute ... rests with the courts“].) The memorandum‘s summary appears to track subdivision (c) of section 47605.1, but without any reference to establishing a resource center in an adjacent county. Because the agency interpretation is thus incomplete, and, as set forth ante, inconsistent with the statutory language, we decline to adopt it.
In the trial court, AUHSD offered a competing interpretation by the State Department of Education. In an e-mail dated June 20, 2007, the director of the Charter Schools Division of the State Department of Education recognized that some nonclassroom-based charter schools had established resource centers outside the boundaries of the authorizing school district but within the same county. She opined, “There does not appear to be any specific statutory right to this placement.” The trial court sustained SSHS‘s objection to this e-mail. AUHSD contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. We find no abuse of discretion. For the same reasons that we
E. Public Policy Considerations
Both parties contend public policy considerations support their position. AUHSD argues Assembly Bill No. 1994, with its geographic limitations, was enacted to provide greater oversight of charter schools, oversight that is necessary due to past mismanagement of public monies. SSHS counters that since the Legislature permits a resource center in an adjacent county, appropriate oversight can occur in the same county. SSHS further argues that the Charter Schools Act was designed to provide competition (
Although initially intriguing and possibly persuasive when considered as the overarching policy objectives that they are, these policy arguments are not persuasive when applied to the instant case. This is because they are divorced from the actual unambiguous language of the statutes at issue here. In construing a statute, courts may consider public policy, but only if the language of the statute is ambiguous. (Estate of Britel (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 127, 138 [186 Cal.Rptr.3d 321].) Considerations of policy do not permit us to ignore the plain language of the statute. (Mercury Ins. Co. v. Vanwanseele-Walker (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103 [49 Cal.Rptr.2d 28].) “‘[N]o legislation pursues its purposes at all costs. Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute‘s primary objective must be the law. Where, as here, “the language of a provision ... is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative history, ‘[we should not] examine the additional considerations of ‘policy’ that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the statute.‘“’ ([Citation]; accord, Foster v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1510 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 272], [purpose of law cannot supplant legislative intent expressed in particular
Because we have interpreted the geographic limitations of the Charter Schools Act based on the plain language of the statute, we do not entertain the various policy arguments.
F. Conclusion
In statutory interpretation, our fundamental task “is to determine the Legislature‘s intent so as to effectuate the law‘s purpose.” (People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129].) “We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. [Citation.]” (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172 [124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648].)
Here the plain meaning of sections 47605 and 47605.1 is that a charter school authorized by a school district is to be located and operate entirely within the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district, unless one of the specific exceptions of section 47605.1 applies. Because the Cottonwood Resource Center does not fall within any of the exceptions of subdivision (c) or (d) of section 47605.1 (and SSHS offers no other possible exception), its location outside the boundaries of the authorizing Shasta Union High School District does not comply with the Charter Schools Act.7
IV
Requests for Judicial Notice*
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the determination
Raye, P. J., and Renner, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied November 16, 2016, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Respondent‘s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 18, 2017, S238632.