ALBERTO RUIZ, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus OFFICER JENNIFER WING, #7741, OFFICER DANNY FALLS, #1833, Defendants - Appellees, UNKNOWN OFFICER, City of Miami Police, et al., Defendants.
No. 18-10912
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
March 12, 2021
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-22618-UU. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
[PUBLISH]
Before MARTIN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit
LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
This appeal asks us to determine whether a pro se motion for a new trial that is stricken because the movant is represented by counsel tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal of the judgment under
Alberto Ruiz brought an action against Officers Jennifer Wing and Danny Fals2 under
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the morning of September 24, 2014, Ruiz stole a Sports Utility Vehicle (“SUV“) from the valet area of a Miami hotel. During the carjacking, Ruiz scuffled with the valet staff and, in his attempt to drive away, crashed the SUV into parked cars and hotel employees, knocking over luggage carts and injuring many of the hotel employees in the valet area. Ruiz then fled the scene with the SUV. The hotel‘s security cameras captured all of Ruiz‘s actions on video (the “Hotel Video“). After stealing the SUV, Ruiz sold the personal property
Later that day, City of Miami police officers located Ruiz by tracking his cellphone to a motel, although his exact location within the motel was unknown. Officers Wing and Fals, members of a tactical City of Miami Police Department unit focused on robbery, were called to assist with the arrest. Although the Officers knew the nature of the crimes for which Ruiz was to be arrested—carjacking, attempted murder, and robbery—they had not viewed the Hotel Video prior to arriving at the motel.
Ruiz was eventually subdued and arrested in his motel room. By the end of the arrest, Ruiz suffered a broken jaw and fractured ribs. The Miami-Dade County State Attorney‘s Office chargеd Ruiz with several felonies based on his theft of the SUV, and Ruiz ultimately pled guilty to those charges in state court and was sentenced to a twenty-year prison sentence.
Ruiz subsequently filed a pro se complaint in federal district court against the Officers pursuant to
Prior to trial, Ruiz, through counsel, filed a motion in limine to exclude, among other things, certain facts relating to Ruiz‘s arrest. The motion in limine did not reference the Hotel Video or any specific facts or evidence, but instead sought to exclude all facts relating to Ruiz‘s crimes as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. The district court denied the motion, finding that the information relating to Ruiz‘s underlying crimes would be relevant at trial to the severity of the crimes for which Ruiz was arrested, which is a factor when considering the reasonableness of the Officers’ use of force during Ruiz‘s аrrest. The district court further noted that, given the physical altercations during the commission of Ruiz‘s crimes, information surrounding the crimes would be relevant as to causation of Ruiz‘s injuries.
At a pretrial conference, Ruiz noted his intent to play the Hotel Video for the jury during his opening statement. Ruiz and the Officers later agreed to jointly play the Hotel Video to the jury as a court exhibit before opening statements. The case proceeded to trial, and, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the district court began the trial by playing the Hotel Video. Ruiz did not object to the presentation of the Hotel Video. Indeed, he referred to the Hotel Video throughout trial.
During trial, Ruiz and the Officers presented conflicting testimony regarding the events immediately prior to Ruiz‘s arrest. Ruiz testified that he was in his motel room when he heard a commotion outside of the door. He testified that he opened the door and complied with the Officers’ demands to lay on the floor. Ruiz explained that, after he laid down, Officer Fals kicked him in the face and ribs and directed Officer Wing to taser Ruiz while
Of relevance to this appeal, counsel for the Officers made certain comments and arguments during opening statement, closing argumеnt, and direct examinations that Ruiz now characterizes as improper and based on facts outside of the evidence presented. These include comments (1) regarding how and when the police tracked Ruiz‘s phone, (2) implying that Ruiz‘s crimes were covered by the media, (3) implying that Ruiz had smoked crack cocaine on the day of his arrest and that a crack pipe was found in Ruiz‘s motel room, (4) discussing Ruiz‘s other crimes and his danger to the community, (5) bolstering the Officers’ credibility, including calling them “heroes,” and (6) using words and phrases that Ruiz contends are inflammatory or exaggerated. Ruiz, however, objected to only some of these statements. Additionally, follоwing Ruiz‘s first objection, he stated that he “ha[d] a motion,” but did not explicitly raise this “motion” as a motion for mistrial. After making a second objection, Ruiz asked to renew this “motion” later in the proceedings. But Ruiz again did not specify the nature of this “motion” nor ever raise the motion later in the proceedings.
Also of relevance to this appeal, the district court interrupted questioning during the examination of Ruiz to clarify and ensure responsive answers. For example, when Ruiz‘s counsel described the person who purchased Ruiz‘s stolen goods as a “pawn shop,” the district court interjected to clarify that the person was a “fence” who deals in stolen goods and not a pawn shop. Throughout trial, the district court also directed Ruiz‘s counsel to refrain from argumentative questioning, to proceed expeditiously, and to not seek duplicative or otherwise improper testimony.
During the jury‘s deliberations, the jury requested to see the Hotel Video again. No party objected, and the district court allowed the jury to see the video. The jury then returned a verdict for the Officers. On January 11, 2018, the district court entered final judgment in favor of the Officers and against Ruiz.
On January 26, 2018, Ruiz—acting pro se—filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to
On Fеbruary 27, 2018, the district court struck Ruiz‘s motion for a new trial as an unauthorized pro se filing by a represented party. Ruiz, through counsel, moved for reconsideration of the order striking the motion. On March 6, 2018, the district court denied Ruiz‘s motion for reconsideration, noting that Ruiz had been continuously represented by counsel since his counsel‘s initial notice of appearance. That same day, Ruiz filed his notice of appeal, and this appeal ensued.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Generally, we review a district court‘s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1317 (11th Cir. 2013). However, on issues that a plaintiff fails to object to at trial, we review only for plain error. See ML Healthcare Servs., LLC v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 881 F.3d 1293, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018). Additionally, we review the district court‘s disрosition of a motion for a new trial and a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. Ard v. Sw. Forest Indus., 849 F.2d 517, 520 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining review standard for disposition of a motion for new trial); Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc., 205 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining review standard for disposition of a motion for mistrial).
III. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Ruiz argues that the final judgment in favor of the Officers should be vacated and that this Court should remand this case for a new trial. Specifically, Ruiz argues that the district court erred by (1) allowing the Hotel Video to be shown to the jury; (2) allowing and not correcting comments made by the Officers’ counsel during opening statement, closing argument, and examination of the witnesses; (3) not considering Ruiz‘s intended motion for mistrial made during the Officers’ opening statement; and (4) directly questioning Ruiz and instructing Ruiz‘s counsel on their questioning and trial management. Ruiz also argues that the district court erred in striking his pro se motion for a new trial. In response, the Officers contend that we lack jurisdiction to consider Ruiz‘s appeal because his notice of appeal was untimely. We first address the jurisdictional issue before turning to the merits of the appeal.
A. Jurisdiction
Here, the district court entered final judgment on January 11, 2018, and Ruiz filed his notice of appeal on March 6, 2018—more than thirty days later. Although Ruiz filed his notice оf appeal more than thirty days after entry of final judgment, it was filed within thirty days of the district court‘s order striking his January 26, 2018, pro se motion for a new trial.4 And the Officers do not dispute that Ruiz filed his pro se motion for a new trial under
The Officers, however, argue in their motion to dismiss5 that Ruiz‘s pro se motion, which the district court struck as an unauthorized pro se filing by a represented party, was not “file[d]” for purposes of
We construe rules of procedure like any other statutory scheme, i.e., by determining the rule‘s plain meaning. Burns v. Lawther, 53 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1995). Thus, we begin our analysis by looking at the language of the rule, and, absent a definition of a term contained in the rule, we look to the common usage of words for their meaning. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2018); In re Hood, 727 F.3d 1360, 1364 (11th Cir. 2013). “Dictionary definitions speak to common usage,” and the plain meaning of a word must be viewed in the context of the entire text. Miami Seaquarium, 879 F.3d at 1146–47. Indeed, “[t]he ordinary-meaning rule is the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation. It governs constitutions, statutes, rules, and private instruments.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 69 (2012) (footnote omitted). While most words carry more than one dictionary definition, “[o]ne should assume the contextually appropriate ordinary meaning unless there is reason to think otherwise.” Id. at 70.
If a party files in the district court any of the following motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—and does so within the time allowed by those
rules—the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion: . . .
(v) for a new trial under
Rule 59 . . .
(emphasis added). Black‘s Law Dictionary defines the verb “file” as “[t]o deliver a legal document to the court clerk or record custodian for placement into the official record.” File, Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). In order to toll the time to file a notice of appeal,
While the Officers contend that the order striking Ruiz‘s pro se motion as an unauthorized pro se filing rendered the motion a nullity, nothing in
Finally,
B. Whether the Hotel Video‘s admission was erroneous
Ruiz challenges the district court‘s аdmission of the Hotel Video, which depicts violent actions by Ruiz that were not observed by the Officers prior to the arrest and that occurred hours before, and miles away from, the arrest. Ruiz argues that the Hotel Video is irrelevant to his claims against the Officers and unfairly prejudicial because it is inflammatory. In response, the Officers contend that the Hotel Video is relevant because it shows
A party introducing evidence generally “cannot complain on appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 755 (2000). This is true even when a party preemptively introduces evidence that the party sought to exclude in a motion in limine as a “tactical advantage.” See id. at 756–60 (concluding that “a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the admission of such evidence was error“). While Ohler wаs decided in the criminal context, other circuit courts have found that “[t]he logic of Ohler applies with equal force in both criminal and civil cases.” See, e.g., Clarett v. Roberts, 657 F.3d 664, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2011) (listing other circuits’ cases finding Ohler waiver in civil cases and noting that “[t]he tactical nature of each party‘s decisions is the same; indeed, the stakes are higher in a criminal case, and still the Supreme Court found waiver“). Ruiz, however, urges this Court not to adopt Ohler in the civil context. Ruiz asserts that adopting the Ohler waiver rule in a civil case extinguishes the meaning of a pretrial ruling in limine and forces counsel to make decisions that could prejudice their client if counsel does “not get ahead of bad evidence that he or she knows, from the in limine ruling, is coming in anyway.” We are unpersuaded. Every trial—whether civil or criminal—involves strategic and tactical decisions. Some decisions are of minor significance, while others can change the trajectory of the trial. Ruiz could have decided not to agree to play the Hotel Video at trial, but he chose otherwise. Ruiz cannot avoid the consequences of his decision to agree to jointly introduce the Hotel Video prior to opening statements by arguing that he was forced to do so in order to diminish the prejudice. Again, any trial—whether civil or criminal in nature—creates those dilemmas for both counsel and the client.
We thus join our fellow circuits in finding that Ohler applies to civil cases and conclude that Ruiz waived his objection to the admissibility of the Hotel Video by preemptively agreeing to play the video at the outset of the trial as a joint exhibit and referring to the video throughout trial. While Ruiz now claims that this arrangement was meant to minimize the prejudice from presentation of the Hotel Video to the jury, Ruiz‘s strategic trial decision waived his right to now contest the admissibility of the video. As expressed by the Supreme Court in Ohler, it would be unfair to allow a party to preemptively introduce evidence to “remov[e] the sting,” while preserving an objection to its admissibility for appellate review. See id. at 758. We therefore find that Ruiz waivеd his objection to the admissibility of the Hotel Video.7
Ruiz next argues that the Officers’ counsel made inappropriate comments during trial that impaired the jury‘s ability to consider Ruiz‘s claims. While Ruiz points to various instances of purportedly inappropriate commentary, Ruiz objected to only a few of these remarks. Based on our review of the record, these comments, even considered together, do not warrant a new trial.
A party must raise an objection to errors in the opposing party‘s argument. Oxford Furniture Cos. v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 984 F.2d 1118, 1128 (11th Cir. 1993). When a timely objection is made, we must determine whether the inаppropriate comment “impaired a substantial right of the objecting party.” Newman v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 648 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981)8; see also United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1044 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that counsel‘s “remarks, suggestions, insinuations, and assertions are improper when they are calculated to mislead or inflame the jury‘s passions“). We consider “the entire argument, the context of the remarks, the objection raised, and the curative instruction,” and inappropriate statements made by counsel will not justify a new trial unless the “remarks were ‘such as to impair gravely the calm and dispassionate consideration of the case by the jury.‘” Vineyard v. County of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1213 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. James, 845 F.2d 315, 318 (11th Cir. 1988)); accord Higgs, 969 F.3d at 1307.
When no objections are raised to the allegedly improper comments, however, we reviеw for plain error, “but a finding of plain error ‘is seldom justified in reviewing argument of counsel in a civil case.‘” Oxford Furniture, 984 F.2d at 1128 (quoting Woods v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 768 F.2d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 1985)); accord Higgs, 969 F.3d at 1307. As noted above, plain error requires a showing that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected substantial rights; and (4) “not correcting the error would seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceeding.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999); accord Brough, 297 F.3d at 1179. When the complaining party objects to some but not all allegedly improper statements, we apply these two differing standards while considering the record as a whole. See Newman, 648 F.2d at 335.
As to the objected-to comments, during opening statement, Ruiz objected to the Officers’ counsel‘s references to evidencе regarding the media‘s coverage of Ruiz‘s crimes and Officer Wing‘s taser log. During closing argument, Ruiz objected to the Officers’ counsel‘s reference to the Officers as “heroes” and suggestion that Ruiz used some of the proceeds of the stolen property to purchase crack cocaine.
We conclude that these objected-to comments did not impair Ruiz‘s substantial rights. The reference to the media coverage of the carjacking did not serve to inflame and prejudice the jury, given the fact that the Hotel Video, which captured the events surrounding the carjacking, was played to the jury with Ruiz‘s consent. We
D. Whether the district court‘s questioning and comments to Ruiz and his counsel were prejudicial
Ruiz also argues that the district court deprived him of a fair trial by directly questioning him during his examination and by commenting on his counsel‘s questioning and trial effiсiency. Ruiz claims the district court improperly questioned him on irrelevant and prejudicial topics and gave the jury the impression that Ruiz‘s counsel was inept.
Because Ruiz did not object to the district court‘s allegedly improper behavior, we may only order a new trial if we find plain error. See Newman, 648 F.2d at 334–35. In this context, plain error arises only if the district court‘s comments “were so prejudicial as to deny a party an opportunity for a fair and impartial trial.” Id. at 335 (quoting Miley v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 473 F.2d 856, 857–58 (5th Cir. 1973)). For example, in Newman, this Court‘s predecessor ordered a new jury trial because the district court made comments that could have led the jury to conclude that the court favored the plaintiff‘s position. See id. at 336.
After reviewing the district court‘s questioning and comments in context of the trial, we do not find impropriety by the district court that jeopardized the fairness of the trial. Ruiz first points to the district court‘s questioning as to the “fence” who purchased the stolen goods from Ruiz. This questioning, however, was meant to correct Ruiz‘s counsel‘s mischaracterization of that person as a “pawn shop,” which is a legitimate business. And the district court did not, by eliciting more information about the “fence,” introduce irrelevant or prejudicial evidence. Similarly,
As to the district court‘s admonitions to Ruiz‘s counsel, these were not improper. Nor could they have been reasonably perceived by the jury as the district court‘s bias in favor of the Officers. The record shows the district court‘s ongoing attempts to have the trial proceed as efficiently as possible, without improper questioning or discussion of irrelevant topics. The comments cited by Ruiz follow prior warnings and instructions by the district court. As such, we find that they are neither unreasonable nor hostile. Moreover, as the Officers correctly point out, the district court also admonished the Officers’ counsel when they asked improper questions and made inappropriate comments. For example, the district court directed the Officers’ counsel to “calm down” at one point, interrupted the Officers’ counsel when making argumentative questions or questions calling for hearsay, and repeatedly reminded the Officers’ counsel to not lead the witnesses. Because the district court did not give the appearance that it favored the Officers over Ruiz nor otherwise deprived Ruiz of a fair trial, Ruiz failed to show plain error in the district court‘s questioning and commentary.
E. Whether Ruiz‘s motion for mistrial was erroneously not considered or denied
During the Officers’ opening statement, Ruiz coupled his first two objections with references to a “motion” but did not state the grounds or request any relief. Ruiz now claims that he intended to raise a motion for mistrial based on improper comments, and the district court erred in refusing to consider it or, alternatively, summarily denying it. We conclude that Ruiz failed to raise a cognizable motion for mistrial, and, even if he had made such a motion, the district court‘s summary denial of such a motion would not constitute reversible error.
While a motion made at trial need not be made in writing, it must “stаte with particularity the grounds for seeking the order” and “state the relief sought.”
Here, Ruiz first stated that he “[had] a motion,” to which the district court responded, “I don‘t see the problem. I‘m not going to hear any of that.” After his second objection, Ruiz stated, “We are renewing our motion when you have time.” The district court then directed the Officers’ counsel to “[g]o on to something else.” Ruiz, however, never specified what type of “motion” he was seeking to make nor did he raise his motion at a later point during the trial proceedings. Without any indication in the record as to the substance of Ruiz‘s motion, we find that Ruiz did not assert a proper motion for mistrial under
F. Whether the district court erred in striking Ruiz‘s pro se motion for new trial
Finally, Ruiz argues that the district court erred in striking his pro se motion for a new trial as an unauthorized pro se filing. We find this argument without merit. “It is the law of this circuit that the right to counsel and the right to proceed pro se exist in the alternative and the decision to permit a defendant to proceed in a hybrid fashion rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. LaChance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1987). We also give great deference to a district court‘s interpretation of its local rules. Clark v. Hous. Auth. of Alma, 971 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1992). Here, Ruiz‘s counsel filed a notice of appearancе on behalf of Ruiz and did not seek to withdraw from the case after trial. Ruiz nonetheless filed a pro se
Ruiz argues that he was not represented by counsel when he filed the pro se motion because his attorneys had only agreed to represent Ruiz pro bono for the trial. Even accepting this description of Ruiz‘s arrangement with his attorney as true—and that Ruiz‘s counsel was simply slow to formally withdraw his representation—Ruiz never sought an order of substitution from the district court following trial or at the time he filed his pro se motion for new trial in violation of the Southern District of Florida‘s local rules. See S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1(d)(4). Ruiz further asserts that the local rules and LaChance should not apply to him based on his attorneys’ pro bono participation through a volunteer program. We find this argument without merit, as there exists no authority or support for Ruiz‘s claimed exception. Therefore, when the district court struck Ruiz‘s pro se motion for a new trial, it acted within its discretion and based on a permissible interpretation of its governing local rulеs.
Finally, Ruiz premised his motion for a new trial on the admission of the Hotel Video at trial. As we have previously explained, that argument is without merit. Thus, even considering the merits of Ruiz‘s motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion by striking Ruiz‘s motion for a new trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. And having examined each of Ruiz‘s arguments, we conclude that no error has been shown. Accordingly, we affirm both the district court‘s entry of final judgment in favor of the Officers and the district court‘s order
AFFIRMED.