ALAMEDA COUNTY WASTE MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WASTE CONNECTIONS US, INC., et al., Defendants and Appellants.
A158323
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO
Filed 8/18/21
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION; (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. CIVMSC18-01546)
The landfills and their corporate owner, Waste Connections US, Inc. (collectively Waste Connections), refused to permit the inspections, contending the statute did not apply because the Authority had not shown inspection of the records was “necessary” to enforce its fee ordinance. The Authority responded that
The Authority sued Waste Connections and its landfills under the Act, invoking a provision permitting it to petition the superior court for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce its inspection authority. (
On appeal, Waste Management argues the superior court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings, contending it was entitled to contest the Authority‘s need for the records as a factual matter. It acknowledges that if we do not interpret the statute to condition inspection rights on a factual showing of necessity, there are no other disputed facts that would preclude judgment on the pleadings.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Considering the words of
BACKGROUND
The Authority is a public agency formed in 1976 by a Joint Exercise of Powers Agreement among the County of Alameda, the 14 cities in that county and two sanitary districts that provide refuse and recycling collection services there. The Authority is responsible for waste management planning in Alameda County and facilitates implementation of the statewide Disposal Reporting System for the County.2 It provides the planning and technical assistance necessary for ensuring that Alameda County and its cities meet the state‘s mandates concerning the reduction of solid waste disposed of in California landfills.
The Act allows, but does not require, local governments to “impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a countywide integrated waste management plan prepared” pursuant to the Act. (
Waste Connections, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas, is an integrated solid waste services company that provides solid waste-related services across the United States. Three of its wholly owned subsidiaries are landfills operated in California in counties other than Alameda County.
The Authority and Waste Connections have long disputed whether Waste Connections landfills are obligated to allow the Authority to conduct “weight
The following year, the Legislature amended the Act to add express inspection and copying rights for state and local governments, both for purposes of verifying tonnages and to enforce fee ordinances. (See Stats. 2015, ch. 746, § 1 (Assem. Bill No. 901);
In June 2017 and February 2018, the Authority again requested that Waste Connections allow inspection and photocopying of the records pursuant to
In its answer to the Authority‘s complaint (as well as its own cross-complaint), Waste Connections admitted the basic facts relevant to the parties’ dispute. It admitted that it was in the solid waste business and provided solid waste disposal, that it operated the three California landfill companies identified in the complaint, and that these landfills, from which the Authority sought records, received waste from Alameda County. It admitted that in 2016, shortly after Assembly Bill No. 901 took effect and pursuant to that
In February 2019, the Authority filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking dismissal of Waste Connection‘s answer, including its six affirmative defenses, and a final judgment allowing the Authority to inspect Waste Connection‘s landfill weight tags for waste originating in Alameda County. The Authority relied on undisputed facts derived from the pleadings and documents attached to a request for judicial notice that it filed with its motion. The Authority argued it was undisputed that it had requested and Waste Connections had refused to allow it to inspect the records identified in
Waste Connections opposed the motion on the ground that it had “put in issue whether [the Authority] could satisfy the statutory requirement to demonstrate that access to [Waste Connections‘] unredacted weight tickets was necessary for [the Authority] to enforce its local fees.” That was enough
The superior court granted judgment on the pleadings. It disagreed with Waste Connections’ contention that the Authority had to prove necessity. Considering “[t]he context surrounding
On August 14, 2019, the superior court issued a final judgment compelling Waste Connections to “promptly make available for inspection and copying weight tags identifying the hauler, vehicle, quantity, date, type, and origin of waste, and relating to solid waste tonnage originating within Plaintiff‘s geographic jurisdiction of Alameda County and received on or after July 1, 2015, through December 31, 2018, at the disposal facilities operated [by Waste Management US Inc.‘s subsidiaries] in Solano County, San Benito County and Kings County, California.” Waste Connections timely appealed.6
DISCUSSION
I. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a demurrer in most respects, and we review de novo trial court rulings regarding both. (Templo v. State (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 730, 735.)
There are some differences between a motion for judgment on the pleadings and a demurrer. Unlike a demurrer, a plaintiff may move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground “that the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the complaint.” (
In evaluating the sufficiency of the challenged pleading, we accept all material facts pleaded and those that arise by reasonable implication, but not conclusions of fact or law. (See Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517 [demurrer].) A party may not avoid a motion for judgment on the pleadings by omitting facts previously alleged in the same case or by suppressing such facts when they prove the pleaded facts false. (Ibid.) “In addition to the facts actually pleaded, the court considers facts of which it may or must take judicial notice.” (Ibid.) “On appeal, we do not review the validity of the trial court‘s reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself.” (Ibid.) We may also “take judicial notice of admissions in [a party‘s] opposition to the [motion].” (Id. at p. 518.)
Among the matters of which judicial notice may be taken are judicial admissions, i.e., admissions and inconsistent statements in the same case. In other words, “a court may take judicial notice of admissions or inconsistent statements by [a party] in earlier pleadings in the same lawsuit” and “may disregard conflicting factual allegations in the [challenged pleading].” (Weil
II. The Act
A. Assembly Bill 939: The Integrated Waste Management Act
In 1988, in recognition of an “emerging solid waste crisis in California,” the state Senate created a Task Force on Waste Management (Task Force) and charged it with developing ” ’ a comprehensive legislative program to help solve the solid waste crisis.’ ” The Task Force issued its report the following year.7 The problem it described was dramatic. Californians were disposing of about 40 million tons of solid waste each year, and it was estimated that amount would increase. In the meanwhile, remaining landfill capacity was “shrinking rapidly in many parts of the State,” and a number of California counties would run out of capacity within the decade. Ninety percent of the state‘s solid wastes was being buried in landfill, with less than ten percent diverted through recycling. Public opposition to siting new landfills had increased in recent years because of real and perceived problems they present with hazardous waste, air quality and water quality.
The Task Force recommended comprehensive legislation adopting a statewide integrated waste management system requiring strong source reduction and recycling incentives, and reorganization and funding to aggressively undertake mandated initiatives and planning and permitting requirements. It
In the wake of the Task Force‘s report, the Legislature enacted and the Governor approved the Integrated Waste Management Act, commonly referred to as AB 939 (the Act), that same year (1989). (Stats. 1989, ch. 1095.) The legislative findings echoed the problems described by the Task Force. (See id., § 22 [
The Act divides responsibilities for managing waste between the state and local governments and requires local governments to substantially reduce waste through source reduction, reuse and recycling, in turn lessening the amount of waste deposited in landfills. (Stats. 1989, ch. 1095, § 22 [
To enable accurate tracking of local governments’ progress in reducing and diverting waste, the Act was amended in 1992 to require landfill operators, to the extent practicable, to report periodically to each county the tonnages of waste from that jurisdiction that had been deposited at their facilities and required waste haulers to report to landfill operators the origin of the waste they delivered. (Stats. 1992, ch. 1292 (Assem. Bill No. 2494), § 44 [
In 1994, the Legislature strengthened the reporting requirements, making them mandatory by eliminating the “to the extent practicable” language and authorizing CalRecycle to adopt implementing regulations (Stats. 1994, ch. 1227 (Assem. Bill No. 688), amending
B. Assembly Bill No. 901: 2015 Amendment of Section 41821.5
Problems with reporting led the Legislature to streamline and strengthen the reporting process by amending
As amended,
The amendment added a subdivision (g) to
Finally,
C. Section 41821.5, Subdivision (g)(2) Authorizes Local Government Entities to Inspect and Copy Landfill Records Pertaining to Local Waste Without Precondition.
At the crux of this appeal is Waste Connections’ contention that
“We review de novo questions of statutory construction. In doing so, ‘our fundamental task is to “ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” ’ [Citation.] As always, we start with the language of the statute, ‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the statute‘s purpose [citation].’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 128, 135.) In determining legislative intent, ” ‘we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, then to its legislative history and finally to the reasonableness of a
For the reasons we set out below, we conclude
1. In Context, the Phrase “As Necessary” Does Not Impose a Precondition on Local Government‘s Right to Inspection of Records.
The “as necessary language” appears in a sentence in
Further, the usage of “as necessary” in the context of
The title and substance of
In short, read in the context of the entire section, the language “as necessary to enforce the collection of local fees” means local agencies with fee ordinances are entitled to inspect and copy the records identified in
2. The Surplusage Argument.
Waste Connections contends that unless the words “as necessary” are read to impose a burden on local government entities of proving factual necessity as a prerequisite to inspection the language will be “surplusage” and have no meaning. We do not agree.
Nor does “as necessary” inevitably mean, as Waste Connections argues, that landfill operators can raise a “factual defense” to an inspection demand, forcing local government entities to engage in discovery, make evidentiary showings and obtain judicial findings of “necessity.” The question is who determines what is “necessary” under the statute, and here the Legislature could well have decided for itself that inspection and copying of the specified records is “necessary” for enforcement of local fee ordinances or could have given local governments discretion decide that issue. Again, the context of the language supports the Authority‘s interpretation, which is that “as necessary to enforce collection of local fees” is simply a shorthand “for government entities that have adopted fee ordinances pursuant to
This interpretation does not render the language devoid of meaning or otherwise “surplusage.” “As necessary” is not without significance. It means that local government entities with fee ordinances have authority to use the records for a second purpose, i.e., to enforce those ordinances. Government entities without such fees, on the other hand, may inspect, copy and use records only for the purpose of verifying reported tonnages used to determine their diversion rates. In short, Waste Connections’ surplusage argument lacks merit.
3. Waste Connections’ Proffered Interpretation Would Undermine the Legislative Purposes of Both Assembly Bill No. 901 and Assembly Bill No. 939.
The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 901 also supports the Authority‘s interpretation. It indicates that, in amending
The legislative history also underscores the importance of verification both for measuring diversion and for enforcement of fees. As we have already discussed, noncompliance with reporting requirements and theft and avoidance of fees were the concerns that led to the amendment. The Senate Rules Committee Report on Assembly Bill No. 901 describes four
The broader purposes of the entire Act likewise would be ill-served by Waste Connections’ interpretation and well-served by the Authority‘s. Key among the Act‘s purposes is its requirement that local jurisdictions adopt and implement plans to reduce reliance on landfills by maximizing diversion of waste. (
The Legislature did just that. It included a provision authorizing counties and cities to “impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a countywide integrated waste management plan prepared pursuant to this division.” (
In short, the legislative history of the Act generally and the amendment of
4. The Proprietary Records and Misuse Arguments
Waste Connections contends that the “as necessary” language was included to protect against disclosure, and prevent potential misuse, of proprietary records. Those dogs won‘t hunt.
The “as necessary” language does not apply to the records obtained for the purpose of verifying tonnages used to determine diversion rates under
In short, we conclude that the meaning the Legislature intended by the phrase “as necessary to enforce the collection of local fees” is that local government entities who funded their waste management responsibilities by imposing fees could use the information they are entitled to inspect for the additional purpose of verifying the tonnages on which those fees are based. (See
D. The Authority Was Entitled to Judgment on the Pleadings.
As we have indicated, the parties’ pleadings reflect no dispute as to the material facts, which in essence are that the Authority requested the records pursuant to
In its appellate briefs, Waste Connections’ arguments are all premised on its interpretation of the statute as requiring a factual showing of necessity. According to the opening brief, this case “turns on” “what private confidential business records, if any, are ‘necessary’ for a local waste industry regulator to review in order to enforce its local fees.” It contends it was
At oral argument, we asked Waste Connections’ counsel whether, if we disagreed with his interpretation of
Waste Connections’ arguments fail because, as we have explained, the statute requires no showing of factual necessity and thus the pleadings present no factual issue. Rather, the Legislature itself determined that local governments’ access to specified documents, including hauler information, is necessary to enforce such local fee requirements for those local governments that have adopted fee ordinances under
The judgment is affirmed. The Authority shall recover its costs on appeal.
STEWART, J.
I concur.
KLINE, P.J.
Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (A158323)
RICHMAN, J.
I respectfully dissent.
My disagreement with the majority is about the following language in the Integrated Waste Management Act: “[A] government entity may, at the disposal facility, inspect and copy records related to tonnage received at the facility. . . . Those records shall be available to those government entities . . . and as necessary to enforce the collection of local fees . . . .” (
The majority construe this language, and particularly the words “as necessary,” as imposing no obligation on the governmental entity to demonstrate that an inspection demand for records is in fact related to the bona fide collection of fees the governmental entity is authorized to impose.
I read the words “as necessary to enforce the collection of local fees” very differently. To me, the plain import of these words is not a grant of unchecked power to local government. It cannot be that a governmental entity has only to assert that its inspection demand is “necessary to enforce the collection of . . . fees.” And I do not believe the Legislature intended to make that simple assertion completely immune from judicial scrutiny.
The same statute that authorizes record inspection provides that a governmental entity “may petition the superior court . . . to enforce its authority” to inspect tonnage records. (
The Statutory Scheme
The Act, better known as “AB 939” its enabling legislation (and as it will usually be referred to here), is found at
The majority discusses various parts of the pertinent legislation, including some aspects of Alameda County Ordinance 2009-01. Nowhere mentioned in the majority opinion, however, is the aspect of the Ordinance which, as the Authority itself describes it, “established procedures and reporting requirements for the collection of the $4.34 fee on each ton of solid waste deposited within or outside of Alameda County.” Not only did the Ordinance allow the Authority to collect the $4.34 fee, it also allows it to collect comprehensive information and records regarding the solid waste haulers operating in Alameda County. Thus, for example, the Ordinance requires direct data and records reporting from any individual or company handling solid waste in Alameda County, including “the weight of Solid Waste physically collected from within each Jurisdiction of Origin, the Permitted Waste Facilities or other Solid Waste Enterprises to which Solid Waste is delivered, and the weight of Solid Waste that is ultimately Deposited in Landfills and therefore subject to the Facility Fee.” (See Alameda County Ord. 2009-01, § 7 (a).) In short, all handlers of solid waste in Alameda County must report monthly to the Authority quantities, origins, and destinations of all solid waste, including all destination landfills in California and their addresses. (Id., §§ 3(a)-(m), 7(a), 7(a)(1)-(4), 7(b).) And all records documenting this reporting must be retained by the solid waste handlers for five years—and be provided to the Authority upon request. (Id., § 9.)
The Authority‘s responsibilities include ensuring that the county (and its cities) comply with California‘s waste management laws and also developing the Countywide Integrated Waste Management Plan. The Authority‘s activities are funded by its “939 Fee,” which implements a fee of $4.34 on each ton of solid waste originating within the county that is disposed of in a California landfill. And pursuant to the Authority‘s 939 Fee Ordinance, all
In October 2015, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 901, amending AB 939 in various ways, which amendment took effect on January 1, 2016. (Assem. Bill No. 901 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2015, ch. 746, §§ 1-5.) Three paragraphs of the amended
The Facts
On January 8, 2016, a week after the revisions to
Following a letter from Waste Connections seeking clarification, on January 22, a lawyer for the Authority sent another letter renewing its request for the records. The January 22 letter explained that the Authority was seeking to review “the complete disposal record attributable to Alameda County,” i.e., the identity and disposal records of all individual haulers bringing waste from Alameda County to any Waste Connections landfill in California, thus seeking access to Waste Connections‘s entire statewide set of data relating to Alameda County, including the identity of all of its California customers disposing of waste from the county. As the letter put it, “The scope of our inquiry is thus to inspect and copy all weight tickets issued at [Waste Connections] owned or operated disposal facilities within the State of California for waste which has a jurisdiction of origin within Alameda County.” This
As will be seen, the Authority has never explained—not in either letter, not in any of the pleadings it has filed—why its own information reporting and collection law is not sufficient to gather the data it needs, nor why it needs production of all of Waste Connections‘s statewide records.
The Proceedings Below
On May 9, 2018, the Authority filed in Alameda County a complaint, and shortly thereafter an amended complaint, for declaratory and injunctive relief.2 It named four defendants, Waste Connections and the operators of the three landfills, and sought an injunction ordering Waste Connections to make available for inspection a broad range of records from the three landfills going back to 2015, over three and one-half-years.
On August 23, Waste Connections filed its verified answer, a 12-page pleading that denied, paragraph by paragraph, various allegations in the complaint, and also asserted 24 affirmative defenses. Waste Connections
also filed a cross-complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, which among other things alleged that the Authority‘s inspection request violated the Fourth Amendment.
As the majority notes—without a complete discussion—on October 11, the Authority filed a demurrer to the cross-complaint, accompanied by a request for judicial notice of over 90-pages of documents. The demurrer was set for hearing in Department 15, to which the matter had been assigned for all purposes. Waste Connections filed opposition, the Authority a reply, and the demurrer came on for hearing on January 7, 2019, prior to which the court had issued a tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Waste Connections contested, and at the conclusion of a brief hearing the court announced it would adopt the tentative decision.
On January 17, the court filed its order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, which in part provided that the inspection requests “‘are sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive.’ See v. Seattle [(1967)] 387 U.S. [541,] 544.” What the majority does not mention, however, is that the order expressly noted that Waste Connections would later have the right to challenge the
As will be seen, it was not to be.
The parties stipulated that 18 of the 24 affirmative defenses would be removed leaving six remaining. So, with the cross-complaint removed from
the case, what remained was only the Authority‘s complaint and Waste Connections‘s verified answer and the six affirmative defenses.
On February 22, 2019, the Authority filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the complaint. It was set for hearing in Department 15, where the demurrer had been heard. But on February 27, the matter was reassigned to Department 33. Waste Connections filed opposition, and the Authority a reply along with a supplemental request for judicial notice. The motion came on for hearing on May 2 in Department 33, prior to which the trial court had issued a tentative ruling granting the motion. And at the conclusion of a lengthy hearing, the court took the motion under submission.
On June 21, the court filed its order granting the motion, in the course of which it rejected Waste Connections‘s primary argument that
Notably, despite the express statement in the earlier order sustaining the demurrer—that Waste Connections would have the right to “judicial
review“—the order granting judgment on the pleadings referred to that earlier ruling and observed, however conclusory, that the court had “already determined that the administrative subpoena at issue is valid.” In short, one trial
On August 14, the court entered its judgment, and on August 29, Waste Connections filed its appeal.
DISCUSSION
Introduction and Summary of the Parties’ Positions
As quoted above,
The position of the Authority—a position with which the trial court fundamentally agreed, the position the majority readily adopts—is that a showing of “necessary” is not a predicate to inspection. In the Authority‘s words, “Nothing in this language suggests that the term ‘as necessary’ was intended as a restrictive constraint on public agencies’ ability to obtain weight tag records in the first instance.” Elaborating, the Authority asserts that because
In claimed support, the Authority asserts that courts have recognized “use of the word ‘necessary’ must be understood in context,” citing Estate of Kerkorian (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 709, 720. The Authority also cites San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 674, 673, which noted that “city action [] . . ‘necessary’ to ensure compliance with antidiscrimination laws” meant action that is “convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper or conductive” to ensure compliance.
Waste Connections contends that Authority must demonstrate that the records are “necessary” for some proper purpose, that the records “are only ‘available. . ’ (i.e., for inspection) to the Authority ‘. . . as necessary’ to enforce local fees. This interpretation harmonizes the two prongs of the sentence, which are both independent, purpose-based limitations on the ‘availability’ of the records: (1) ‘for the purposes of [
As Waste Connections distills its position, “The provisions in
In short, Waste Connections contends that
Judgment on the Pleadings Was Error
Introduction
The Authority‘s amended complaint never mentions the term “as necessary,” but rather alleges that the fee ordinance “necessitates information about the source, tonnage, and haulers of waste generated in Alameda County that is deposited in other counties,” and that it “needs” the records, allegations contained in paragraphs 20 and 23 of the amended complaint: paragraph 20 alleges that “Enforcement of the Facility Fee Ordinance necessitates information about the source, tonnage, and haulers of waste generated in Alameda County that is deposited in other counties”; paragraph 23 alleges that the Authority “sent letters” asking Waste Connections to arrange for the Authority to review landfill records, which these letters “explained that the [] Authority needs these records to verify tonnage and jurisdiction of origin for purposes of the Disposal Reporting System, and for enforcement and collection of Facility Fee Ordinance.” Both letters were attached to the first amended complaint.
Waste Connections denied both allegations, and denied the Authority‘s characterization of its own letters.6
Whether something is “necessitate[d]” by the fee ordinance, or whether the Authority “need[ed]” to review Waste Connections‘s records in order to enforce its local fee ordinance are questions of fact, as cases at all levels have held for many, many years. The following are illustrative:
The Amelie (1867) 73 U.S. 18, 27: shipmaster may sell ship without owner permission where necessary, and “necessity is a question of fact“;
Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31, 41: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact“;
Carter v. Entercom Sacramento, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 337, 350: “[B]ecause necessity is a question of fact, the issue for us is whether the trial court‘s determination that the additional expenditures were not necessary is supported by substantial evidence”;
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Hay (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 905, 911: “Necessity is a question of fact“; and
Modesto Irrigation Dist. v. City of Modesto (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 652, 658: “Questions of reasonableness and necessity depend on matters of fact.”
In short, the answer to the question of necessity turns on factual information, including, for example, why were Waste Connections‘s records required? What were the Authority‘s alternative sources of information? And what was the extent of the records needed? These, among many others, are questions of fact to be determined by a fact finder, factual determinations ignored by the trial court‘s ruling, a ruling the majority readily affirms.
The trial court characterized its holding as “rejecting defendants’ proposed interpretation of ‘necessary’ that would require an undefined ‘prerequisite showing for production.‘” Necessarily, a plaintiff must prove a required factual element of a claim in order to win a case. The court‘s “rejection” of the need for the Authority to make a “showing” prerequisite to Waste Connections‘s “production” of documents—i.e., rejection of the need for the Authority to present evidence on a contested issue of fact before entry of judgment in its favor—overlooks the fundamental requirement that a claim in court must be proven. And it ignores the law of judgment on the pleadings.
The Law and the Standard of Review
As a leading Supreme Court case puts it, a plaintiff‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings “admits the untruths of [its] own allegations insofar as they
Here, as noted, Waste Connections‘s verified answer specifically denied the Authority‘s allegations of “necessitates” and “needs.” We must accept as true those denials (Rice v. Center Point, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 949, 954), liberally construing the facts in favor of Waste Connections. (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons (2000) 24 Cal.4th 468, 516.) Put slightly differently, we must accept Waste Connections‘s version of the facts as true, and presume the untruth of any of the Authority‘s allegations that have been denied. (MacIsaac, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp. 812–813.)
So, in reviewing an order to turn over records the Authority alleged were a “necessit[y],” records it “need[ed],” we must assume the opposite, that the records were not a “necessity[y],” and not “need[ed].” As the Supreme Court put it almost 100 years ago, “The denial in the answer” put the allegations “directly in issue and made it necessary for the plaintiff to introduce evidence thereof before he could become entitled to judgment.” (Cuneo v. Lawson (1928) 203 Cal. 190, 193–194 (Cuneo).)
“[W]here the answer, fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted.” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034.) And an answer that denies material allegations is a “good defense.” Again, Cuneo is apt: “It requires no citation of authority to declare that the above-mentioned denials put in issue the assignment to the plaintiff of the promissory note and cause of action sued upon. [¶] As the answer sets up a good defense and denies material allegations of the complaint, it was sufficient as against a general demurrer, and the plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings.” (Cuneo, supra, 203 Cal. at pp. 193-194.) Neither was the Authority.
But there is another basis on which the holding can be reversed—that Waste Connections‘s verified denial of the “necessity” of the Authority and of its “
But even if it did, the trial court may not simply decide, on the pleadings, what is “convenient, useful,” etc. These are questions of fact, answers to which require evidence. As our Supreme Court has held, the Authority‘s and trial court‘s own definition of “necessary”—“convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive”—means that the action must be “reasonably related” to its goal. (San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 674–675 [the “reasonably related” test is the “more concise modern formulation” of the “convenient, useful [etc.]” test].) As we ourselves have noted, “the issue of reasonableness” is a “factual question.” (Contra Costa County v. Pinole Point Props., LLC (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 914, 925.)
Here, despite the breadth of the Authority‘s request—seeking all of Waste Connections‘s Alameda County-related records from landfills in three counties over more than three years—the trial court did not even attempt to evaluate reasonableness, whether the Authority‘s request was “convenient, useful,” etc. to its fee enforcement work. Are all those records “necessitate[ed?]” Are they all “need[ed]?” Or, to put it in the words of the Supreme Court, is the Authority‘s inspection of all of those records “reasonably related” to the enforcement of local fees?
Were all that not enough, I note that other than in its two conclusory words noted above, the Authority has not alleged why it needs from Waste Connections the information it seeks from it, and the necessity to obtain such sensitive commercial records cannot simply be presumed in the absence of an actual allegation—and evidence—to support it. As indicated above, the Authority has other ways of obtaining records, the information it seeks available from other sources. This is shown, for example, by the Authority‘s own local fee ordinance that requires all solid waste handlers doing business in Alameda County to keep highly detailed records about their waste handling activities, to report those activities in detail to the Authority on a monthly basis, and to provide any record to the Authority upon request. (Alameda County Ord., §§ 7, 9.) Moreover, CalRecycle also requires all commercial waste haulers to keep documentation verifying their tonnages by jurisdiction
To sum up, the Authority filed a complaint that did not even plead the basis of its claimed need for Waste Connections‘s records, and Waste Connections filed a verified answer denying the necessity of the Authority‘s request. Despite that, and despite the law of judgment on the pleadings, the trial court determined that the case was over—a determination the majority affirms. This amounts to a rubber stamp of the Authority‘s request, the effect of which would be that there is nothing a recipient of a letter can do to contest a request by the Authority under subdivision (g)(2).
In light of this, prior to oral argument we sent a letter asking counsel to be prepared to address whether there was any constraint on the Authority‘s rights, anything a recipient of its letter can do in any way contest the request. At oral argument counsel for Waste Connections quickly answered “yes” and cited to the “judicial review” referred to in subdivision (g)(3). Asked the same question, counsel for the Authority hemmed and hawed and hawed some more, finally saying that it “was what we filed here.”8
With its focus on the 20 years of legislative history, the majority refers to “the emerging solid waste crisis in California,” going on to discuss a parade of horribles, including “high profile cases of corrupt and fraudulent reports by landfills, recycling facilities and their employees”, concluding that thus, “the purposes of the statute as a whole would be thwarted by” Waste Connections‘s reading of subdivision (g)(2). And in its penultimate paragraph the majority sets forth its conclusion: “Waste Connections‘s arguments fail because, as we have explained, the statute requires no showing of factual necessity and thus the pleadings present no factual issue. Rather, the Legislature itself determined that local governments’ access to specified documents, including hauler information, is necessary to enforce such local fee requirements for those local governments that have adopted fee ordinances. . . .” (Maj. Opn., at p. 28, italics added.) But the Legislature did not say the information “is necessary,” which would have been easy to say. No, it said the information can be inspected only “as necessary.”
Because I would reverse the holding on the “as necessary” language, I would have to reach an issue the majority does not, the ruling by the trial
The Authority‘s Letter Was Not a Valid Administrative Subpoena
To briefly recap, when sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court held Waste Connections would later have the right to challenge the ruling, noting “There is an opportunity for judicial review as provided at [Section 41821.5(g)(3)].” Then, in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings, a different trial court referred to the earlier ruling, and held that it had already been determined that the letter was a valid administrative subpoena. Waste Connections argues this was error. I agree. But before explaining why, I address the Authority‘s contention that the argument was waived.
The Authority argues that Waste Connections waived its right to argue the subpoena issue because it does not argue error on the ruling on the demurrer. Indeed, the Authority goes so far as to assert that any such appeal would have been untimely, because the order sustaining the demurrer was filed in January, 2019, and the appeal not filed until August. This, of course, is wrong, as an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend is not appealable. (Lopez v. Brown (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1133). The only valid appeal is from the judgment. And that judgment was appealed, a judgment based in part on the court‘s conclusion that “the administrative subpoena is valid”—a quotation, I note, that appears twice in the Authority‘s own brief as a basis to uphold the court‘s decision. While the trial court incorporated the prior “analysis” from the demurrer decision, I know of no authority supporting any waiver—and the Authority offers none. And I turn to the merits of the argument.
In response to Waste Connections‘s argument, the Authority asserts that even if Waste Connections is correct that “reasonableness can be a question of fact, the courts are unanimous that the reasonableness of an administrative subpoena in a question of law,” in claimed support of which the Authority cites three cases: State Water Resources Bd. v. Baldwin & Sons, Inc. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 40; Grafilo v. Cohanshohet (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 428; and State ex rel. Dept. of Pesticide Regulation v. Pet Food Express (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 841. The cases have no applicability here, for several reasons.
First, the cases all involve
Second,
Third, in all three cases the court did in fact hear and evaluate evidence. In each case, the state entity issuing the subpoena filed a petition compelling compliance required by
Last, but by no means incidentally, subdivision (g)(2) is not even a subpoena power at all, as the Authority cannot compel the production of documents, only onsite inspection.
Richman, J.
Alameda County Waste Management Authority v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (A158323)
Trial Court: Contra Costa County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Steven K. Austin
Counsel:
Beveridge & Diamond, Eric L. Klein, Gary J. Smith, James B. Slaughter, for Defendants and Appellants.
Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Ellison Folk, Joseph D. Petta, and Andrew P. Miller, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Cole Huber, Derek P. Cole, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.
Notes
We cannot agree. First, Waste Connections and its landfills are not located in Alameda County and thus are not within the reach of the Ordinance. To inspect their records, the Authority must rely on the authority provided by