SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. CITY OF VICTORVILLE, Cross-defendant and Respondent. AMANDA LAABS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
No. E053938. | No. E054740.
Fourth Dist., Div. Two.
June 17, 2013.
217 Cal.App.4th 218
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. CITY OF VICTORVILLE, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
[No. E054740. Fourth Dist., Div. Two. June 17, 2013.]
AMANDA LAABS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent.
Richard Harris Law Firm, Richard A. Harris; Ferguson Case Orr Paterson, Wendy C. Lascher and John A. Hribar for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Patricia A. Cirucci, Brian A. Cardoza; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Timothy T. Coates and Carolyn Oill for Cross-complainant and Appellant and for Defendant and Respondent.
Graves & King, Harvey W. Wimer III and Dennis J. Mahoney for Cross-defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
KING, J.—Amanda Laabs was injured when the car in which she was riding collided with another car in an intersection and then hit a light pole owned by Southern California Edison Company (SCE). Laabs sued various parties, including the City of Victorville (the City), the County of San Bernardino (the County), and SCE.
The present opinion deals with consolidated appeals from judgments following (1) the trial court‘s granting of SCE‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Laabs‘s second amended complaint and (2) the trial court‘s order sustaining, without leave to amend, the City‘s demurrer to SCE‘s first amended cross-complaint.
We first address the ruling on SCE‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings, which we reverse. We then address and affirm the trial court‘s order sustaining the City‘s demurrer without leave to amend.
A. Introduction
This is Laabs‘s fourth appeal, and the second involving SCE. In the first two appeals we affirmed summary judgments in favor of the County and the City.1 In the third appeal, we reversed summary judgment in favor of SCE. (Laabs v. Southern California Edison Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1279 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 241] (Laabs III).) In Laabs III, we held that there existed triable issues of fact as to whether SCE owed a duty of care to motorists relative to the placement of streetlights immediately adjacent to the traveling lanes of a high-speed roadway. (Id. at p. 1269.)2
Following remand, SCE moved for judgment on the pleadings based on the argument that the superior court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the present action. (See
The trial court granted the motion and the present appeal ensued. Because the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction over the present matter, we reverse.
B. Background
In Laabs‘s second amended complaint, she alleges the following facts. Laabs was a passenger in a car driven by James Dimeo. Dimeo was driving northbound on Ridgecrest Road in Victorville. Dimeo‘s car was struck by another car at an intersection with Pebble Beach Drive, spun out of control and across Ridgecrest Road, and hit a concrete light pole erected 18 inches away from the curb. Laabs was injured. The light pole was owned and maintained by SCE.
Laabs sued SCE on the theory that SCE acted negligently by installing and maintaining the light pole so close to the curb.
C. Judicially Noticed Documents
SCE‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings relies exclusively on documents of which it requested the trial court to take judicial notice. First is an “Agreement for Service for Street Lighting” entered into between the City and SCE on August 12, 1977. Attached as exhibits to this agreement are PUC “Schedule No. LS-1,” which deals with a “Utility-Owned System” and “Schedule No. LS-2,” dealing with a “Customer-Owned Installation.”
The second document is a “Schedule LS-1,” dated June 5, 1992, dealing solely with company-owned systems.4 It includes a reference to “Decision 92-06-020.”5 The tariff sets forth certain rates applicable to “street and highway lighting service where [SCE] owns and maintains the street lighting equipment and associated facilities ....” It includes two “SPECIAL CONDITIONS” relevant here. Special condition 6.a. provides: “The applicant for street light service shall specify the type of service, lamp size, and
The third document is a one-page document dated November 21, 1975, and revised April 11, 1979; it appears to be a schematic drawing which includes the descriptions “City of Victorville” and “Commercial Corner Utility Location.”6 It shows a utility pole placed 18 inches from the curb.
The trial court granted the request for judicial notice as to each document.
Based on these documents, SCE contends that Laabs‘s action is barred by
Initially, we note that Schedule No. LS-2 (Customer-Owned Installation) appears not applicable. Laabs‘s second amended complaint alleges that SCE owns the specific streetlight installation.
Further, the pleading does not allege the date the streetlight was installed; it is therefore left to some conjecture as to whether the 1977 Schedule No. LS-1 or the 1992 LS-1 applies. This date may be important because if one were to accept SCE‘s position as to the significance of the release of liability, the release is contained only in the 1992 LS-1, not the 1977 schedule. Additionally, there are no conditions in the earlier schedules referencing “location of street lights.” As such, any approval by the PUC of those schedules would not have entailed the siting of streetlights. For purposes of our opinion, however, we assume the applicability of the 1992 LS-1.7
Lastly, there is nothing about the street corner schematic depicting the location of a utility pole that suggests it was submitted to the PUC or relates to any tariff or PUC decision.
”
“We review de novo a trial court‘s judgment on an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. [Citation.] ‘On appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, the court assumes the truth of, and liberally construes, all properly pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. [Citation.] The court may also consider... matters subject to judicial notice.’ [Citation.]” (Bezirdjian v. O‘Reilly, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 321.) “‘In determining whether the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, entitle a party to judgment, a reviewing court can itself conduct the appropriate analysis and need not defer to the trial court.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 322.) “In fact, we have need not to defer....” (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146 [44 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 900 P.2d 690].)
E. Legal Background
1. Jurisdiction of the PUC
“The commission is a state agency of constitutional origin with far-reaching duties, functions and powers. (
“In particular, the commission has comprehensive jurisdiction over questions of public health and safety arising from utility operations. Thus the commission is generally authorized to require every public utility to ‘construct, maintain, and operate’ its ‘plant, system, equipment, [or] apparatus’ in such manner as to ‘safeguard the health and safety of its employees, ... customers, and the public ....’ (
“The PUC‘s most obvious regulatory authority includes the regulation of rates....” (Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 256, 270 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 38 P.3d 1098]; see
In approving a tariff, the PUC has the power to control that which in “‘any manner affect[s] or relate[s] to rates or service.‘” (Pacific Bell v. Public Utilities Com., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 274.) As part of this power, the PUC may also limit the liability of the utility to the public. In a case involving a telephone company tariff, the court explained that the limitations on liability are “an equitable trade-off—the power to regulate rates and to set them below the amount an unregulated provider might otherwise charge
Further, and as directly relevant to the present motion,
Bearing in mind the basic plenary power of the PUC, the Legislature has provided for a limited scope of private action against a utility for damages. As set forth in
2. The Relationship of Sections 1759, 2106, and Local Regulation to the Present Facts
The question before us is whether the present action for damages is precluded by the overall grant of plenary power to the PUC by the Constitution and
As such, if the PUC (1) has the authority to regulate or otherwise establish policy in a given area and (2) has exercised that authority by regulation or policy, then the superior court may do nothing that hampers or interferes with that exercise of jurisdiction, including awarding damages in a private action. (See generally San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 914–934.) Stated another way, “[t]he [PUC] has exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation and control of utilities, and that jurisdiction, once assumed, cannot be hampered or second-guessed by a superior court action addressing the same issue.” (Anchor Lighting v. Southern California Edison Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 541, 548 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 780].)
With the above said, a city exercising its police powers may impose conditions and regulations upon a public utility to the extent they are not in conflict with the exercise of jurisdiction by the PUC. As explained in Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Public Util. Com. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 945 [95 Cal.Rptr. 17, 484 P.2d 1361]: “‘[C]oncurrent jurisdiction... may well exist as to some matters but... if... there is a direct confrontation with the jurisdiction exercised by this Commission... the jurisdiction of this Commission in the matter is either exclusive or paramount....’ []... [T]he commission has been held to have paramount jurisdiction in cases where it has exercised its authority, and its authority is pitted against that of a local government involving a matter of statewide concern.” (Id. at pp. 950–951, fn. omitted.)
As stated in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Carlsbad (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 785 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 534]: “The general authorization for a local entity‘s police power is found in
Finally,
F. The PUC Does Not Have Exclusive Jurisdiction over the Location of Streetlights
As previously indicated, SCE‘s basic position is (1) the PUC has the authority to regulate the siting of light poles and (2) the PUC has exercised that authority by approving the tariff. Included within the tariff is language dealing with “location of poles” and a release of liability as to actions taken in compliance with the tariff. As such, SCE argues that (3) allowing a plaintiff to recover damages resulting from actions pursuant to the tariff would interfere with the PUC‘s jurisdiction and is thus precluded by
As evident from the above, the PUC has general plenary power over utilities. At the same time, local municipalities may, pursuant to their police power, regulate utilities to the extent the regulation is not inconsistent with law. More specifically, a city may control the location of utility poles within its jurisdiction.
Initially, SCE has not cited to any specific PUC policy, regulation, decision or study which indicates that it has exercised authority over the siting of streetlights. Indeed, the closest this court can come to determining whether the PUC has entered the field of controlling the location of utility poles is in In re Competition for Local Exchange Service (1998) 82 Cal.P.U.C.2d 510 (Decision No. 98-10-058).9 At one portion of its order, the commission addresses its jurisdiction relative to
The Commission goes on to explain that if the telecommunications company is unable to resolve its dispute with the local entity as to siting and right-of-way access, then it can apply to the PUC for a “certificate of public convenience and necessity.” (Dec. No. 98-10-058, supra, 82 Cal.P.U.C.2d at pp. 544–545.) In so indicating, however, the PUC states: “We recognize that the Commission lacks the jurisdiction to directly order a local governmental body to grant access. In the event that we grant the siting authority sought in the application, it will be the responsibility of the telecommunications carrier to notify the local governmental body of the Commission‘s order. In the event that we grant such an application, and the local governmental body still refuses to grant access in accordance with the Commission order, the telecommunications carrier‘s recourse shall be to file a lawsuit in the appropriate court of civil jurisdiction seeking resolution of the dispute over access.” (Id. at p. 545.)
Here, the City‘s schematic depicting a streetlight located 18 inches from the curb face indicates that the City has exercised control over the location of the streetlight. (See
Although the PUC has the authority to regulate the siting of light poles as a condition affecting or relating to the rates, tolls, rentals, classification, or
The release of liability found in special condition 9 of the 1992 LS-1 is also inapplicable. As provided: “The Company shall not, by taking action pursuant to its tariffs, be liable for any loss, damage, or injury, established or alleged, which may result, or be claimed to result, therefrom.” Because the placement of light poles was generally under the control of the City, SCE did not take any action with respect to the placement of the light poles “pursuant to its tariffs.”10 As a result, the limitation of liability provision is inapplicable.
While SCE argues that a utility may limit its liability to the public by way of a tariff, we note that all of the cases setting forth this proposition, save one, deal with phone service and involve subscribers to the service. Additionally, and again with one exception, the cases postdate and refer to the PUC decision in In re Telephone Corporations (1970) 71 Cal.P.U.C. 229, wherein the Commission specifically investigated “all rules, conditions or tariff provisions limiting the liability of telephone corporations.” (Id. at p. 230.)
We have not found and have not been cited to any PUC decision addressing limitations on liability for utilities other than those providing phone services. Further, as alluded to in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1571 [54 Cal.Rptr.2d 468], “[a]lthough
In conclusion, we find that while the PUC may have concurrent jurisdiction with the local entity relative to the placement of light poles, it did not, in this case, exercise that authority. Moreover, there is nothing about an award of damages against SCE that would directly contravene a specific order or decision of the Commission, or would have the effect of undermining a
II. CITY‘S DEMURRER TO SCE‘S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Introduction
SCE did not file a timely governmental claim against the City before filing its first amended cross-complaint naming the City as a cross-defendant. The trial court sustained the City‘s demurrer without leave to amend based on SCE‘s failure to comply with the government claims statute. Both at the trial level and on appeal, SCE contends it did not need to file a claim because its cross-complaint for equitable indemnity was solely defensive in nature. (See Krainock v. Superior Court (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d 1473 [265 Cal.Rptr. 715] (Krainock).) We agree with the trial court and affirm the judgment entered thereon. More particularly, we find that SCE‘s cross-complaint is based on facts outside of the pleadings to which the City was a party such that the cross-complaint is not solely defensive in nature. Because of this, compliance with the
B. Background
In October 2003, Laabs filed her initial complaint against the driver, owners, and manufacturer of the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Additional named defendants were the driver of the other vehicle, as well as the City and the County. The theory against the City and the County was that they were “negligent in designing, constructing, maintaining, controlling and otherwise creating and failing to correct a dangerous road condition due to inadequate sight distance and lack of warning signs, devices and signals.” Fifty “Doe” defendants were named. Ten Doe defendants were associated with the dangerous condition of public property. The remaining Doe defendants were alleged to be associated in some way with the vehicle in which Laabs was a passenger or the other vehicle involved in the accident.11
On April 14 and April 16, 2004, the City filed two successive cross-complaints. The more recent cross-complaint named as cross-defendants each of the City‘s named codefendants. It further alleged that unknown “Moe” cross-defendants were jointly and severally liable for plaintiff‘s injuries “as alleged in the Complaint in this action.” (Italics added.) In its charging allegations, the City went on to allege: “9. If Plaintiff sustained damages as alleged in her complaint, these damages were caused, entirely or in part, by Cross-Defendants as set forth herein: [] a. The County of San Bernardino owned and controlled the northbound lanes of Ridgecrest Road and Pebble Beach Drive, and if there was a dangerous condition thereon the County of San Bernardino is responsible therefor; [] b. James Dimeo, Jr., operated his vehicle in a negligent, careless, reckless and wanton manner, driving at a speed in excess of 100 miles per hour while under the influence of alcohol and/or intoxicating drugs; [] c. Cross-Defendants James Dimeo, Sr. and Tina Dimeo negligently supervised James Dimeo, Jr., their minor child, in that they knew of their child‘s dangerous tendency and propensity to take and operate the vehicle involved in the collision without authorization and in a reckless and careless manner. These Cross-Defendants failed to take the appropriate action and corrective measures to prevent James Dimeo, Jr. from intentionally or negligently inflicting harm on others. These Cross-Defendants further failed to secure the vehicle to prevent unauthorized use by James Dimeo, Jr. Cross-Defendants’ actions and failure to act resulted in the injuries and damages sustained by Plaintiff; [] d. The vehicle driven by James Dimeo, Jr. a 1999 Porsche Carrera, California License number 4GYX773, including its component parts, failed to perform in a manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function, including but not limited to failing to stay under control and failing to provide adequate protection and restraint of its occupants; [] e. Cross-Defendant Dorothy Jean Specter operated her vehicle negligently at the time of the collision by failing to exercise due care to ensure that she could enter safely into the roadway.”
northbound lanes of Ridgecrest Road. Defendants [City] and [County] were negligent in designing, constructing, maintaining, controlling and otherwise creating and failing to correct dangerous road conditions due to inadequate sight distance and lack of warning signs, devices and signals. The dangerous conditions created an unreasonable risk of injury to persons using the roads and such dangerous conditions were a foreseeable cause of Plaintiff‘s injuries.“’ (Laabs II, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1252.)
In May 2005, the trial court granted the City‘s motion for summary judgment as to Laabs‘s complaint. An appeal followed.12 While the appeal was pending, Laabs filed her second amended complaint. In this pleading, Laabs omitted the City and the County as named defendants. She added SCE to the action. The alleged basis for SCE‘s liability was its ownership of the luminaire and its dangerous proximity to the traveling lanes of Ridgecrest Road. SCE was served with the second amended complaint on October 13, 2005.
In November 2005, SCE filed a cross-complaint for indemnity and contribution against James Dimeo and his parents. SCE also included an affirmative cause of action for damages for the repair of the luminaire.13
In July 2007, almost two years after being served with the second amended complaint, SCE was granted summary judgment as to Laabs. Two years later, in July 2009, this court reversed the judgment. (See Laabs III, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 1260.) Following the Supreme Court‘s denial of SCE‘s petition for review, the matter was remanded to the superior court in November 2009. Approximately three months later, SCE filed a governmental claim against the City. In the claim, SCE sought indemnification and costs of defense from the City based on the allegation that “[t]he City made the decision with regards to the location of installation, type of equipment to use, mounting height, type of light and wattage/light output for the area streetlights, including the electrolier.” The claim was returned to SCE as being untimely.
C. Standard of Review
“On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled. We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded .... When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (City of Dinuba v. County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865 [62 Cal.Rptr.3d 614, 161 P.3d 1168].) Where a cross-complaint seeks indemnity from a governmental entity stemming from an underlying personal injury action, compliance with the claims statute is required. (State of California v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 754, 757 [192 Cal.Rptr. 198].)
“Failure to allege compliance with the claims statute renders the complaint subject to general demurrer. [Citation.] []...[]... [A cause of] action for damages is barred unless an exception relieves them of this requirement.” (Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 367, 382–383 [21 Cal.Rptr.3d 285].)
D. Discussion
Pursuant to
“The claim filing requirements apply to ‘all claims for money or damages against the [governmental entity]... for an injury for which the [entity] is liable.’ [Citation.]” (State of California v. Superior Court, supra,
Here, both parties to the appeal agree that SCE did not comply with the applicable claim filing requirement. Laabs‘s second amended complaint was served on SCE on October 13, 2005; SCE did not file a claim until January 2010, more than four years later.15
On appeal, SCE contends it is excused from filing a claim against the City because its cross-complaint is solely a defensive pleading and as such the governmental claim requirements do not apply. To support its position, SCE relies on Krainock, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d 1473, wherein the court held that a defendant may file a defensive cross-complaint for indemnity against a public entity which has already filed a cross-complaint against it without first filing a claim. We disagree with SCE that Krainock is applicable to the present facts.
In Krainock, plaintiff Fiorello filed a personal injury action against defendants Krainock and the Poway Unified School District. Fiorello claimed that Krainock struck him during a “fracas” at a school athletic event. The school district was sued on a premises liability theory. (Krainock, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1475–1476.) At the time of filing its answer, the school district filed a cross-complaint for indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief against Krainock. Krainock thereupon answered the cross-complaint and, without filing a governmental claim against the school district, filed a cross-complaint against the school district for the same relief sought by the school district in its cross-complaint. (Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal held that Krainock did not need to comply with the claims statute before filing his cross-complaint. (Krainock, supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1478–1479.) The court stated: “The primary purpose of the governmental claims act is to apprise the governmental body of an imminent legal action so that the entity may investigate and evaluate the claim and, where appropriate, avoid litigation by settling meritorious claims. Thus, the act should not be allowed to become a snare for the unwary litigant if its statutory purposes have been satisfied.” (Id. at p. 1477.) In applying this principle, the court stressed that “Krainock thus seeks to defend both the
Such is not the case here. We first note that the City never filed a cross-complaint in which SCE was a named cross-defendant. Thus from its inception, SCE‘s reliance on Krainock is misplaced.
To the extent the City‘s cross-complaint naming “Moes 1-30” could be construed as a cross-complaint against SCE, SCE‘s argument that its cross-complaint is purely a defensive pleading is still unsupportable. SCE‘s cross-complaint goes beyond the set of facts upon which the City defended Laabs‘s complaint and upon which the City‘s cross-complaint was premised. As a result, in order to defend the cross-complaint filed by SCE it would have to engage in new investigation beyond that which it already performed in preparing its initial answer and cross-complaint. As such, compliance with the claims statute would be necessary.
All of Laabs‘s allegations against the City dealt with inadequate sight distance at the intersection and the absence of warning signs and signals. The complaint made no reference to a luminaire or any condition of property north of the intersection of Ridgecrest Road and Pebble Beach Drive. There were no allegations that any of the Doe defendants were negligent in ways unassociated with the intersection or the vehicles involved in the accident. Likewise, the City‘s second amended cross-complaint was extremely focused as to the basis upon which the City was seeking indemnity. It was limited to the allegations of the complaint and specifically alluded to the areas of the cross-defendants’ conduct for which the City was seeking indemnity or contribution. There was nothing in the cross-complaint that remotely spoke to conditions of property adjacent to the southbound lanes of Ridgecrest Road north of its intersection with Pebble Beach Drive. There was nothing that broadened the scope of the persons from whom the City was seeking indemnity or the facts upon which it was seeking indemnity.
The City‘s involvement in the litigation was clearly limited to the design of the intersection, the design of Ridgecrest Road south of the intersection, and the signage for northbound traffic leading up to the intersection. This is made abundantly clear by the discussion in Laabs II wherein we stated: “The pleading does not mention any facts involving the southbound lanes or, more importantly, the fact that the Dimeo vehicle struck a luminaire, pole, or some similar object. In the amended complaint, there is no explicit or implicit involvement of the luminaire. The additional [undisputed] fact shifts the alleged dangerous condition to a portion of public property not remotely
SCE‘s cross-complaint, which brings into play the City‘s involvement in the siting of the luminaire north of the intersection of Ridgecrest Road and Pebble Beach Drive, is clearly based on a set of facts different from the original complaint and the City‘s second amended cross-complaint. To defend SCE‘s cross-complaint, the City would be required to perform investigation of facts beyond that which the City already performed in preparing its pleadings and participating in the original action.
SCE‘s cross-complaint is far more than merely a defensive pleading to the City‘s cross-complaint, which does not name SCE and does not state a cause of action for indemnity against SCE.16 As such, SCE was required to file a timely claim before instituting its action against the City for indemnity.
In its reply brief, SCE states: “If the City is correct, SCE is caught in a legal Catch-22: SCE was required to present a claim for damages to the City within six months after SCE was served with Laabs’ amended complaint; however, even if SCE had done so, it would still be barred from obtaining any relief from the City because the City was already out of Laabs’ case before SCE‘s claim was due. Not only can SCE not win, it was barred from obtaining relief before it even knew it was involved in the case. This result is contrary to both logic and law.” This is simply not correct.
“A ‘defendant‘s equitable indemnity action is independent of the plaintiff‘s action and a defendant is entitled to pursue his own indemnity action so long as the statute of limitations on that action has not expired. ‘” (Columbus Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sight-Seeing Companies Associated, Inc. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 622, 631 [174 Cal.Rptr. 527].) “‘[U]nder the governing provisions of
Here, there was nothing that precluded SCE from filing a timely claim and cross-complaint against the City. The fact that the City had received a summary judgment did not preclude SCE from moving forward with its cross-action in a timely manner.17
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of SCE and against Laabs is reversed. The court shall vacate its order granting SCE‘s motion for judgment on the pleadings and enter a new order denying that motion.
The judgment in favor of the City and against SCE is affirmed.
Laabs and the City shall recover their costs on appeal.
Hollenhorst, Acting P. J., and Miller, J., concurred.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 10, 2013, and the petition of appellant Southern California Edison Company for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 2, 2013, S212441.