VIKKI ADAMS v. VILLAGE OF ENON
C.A. CASE NO. 2012-CA-42; T.C. CASE NO. 2011-CV-1185
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF CLARK COUNTY, OHIO
December 28, 2012
2012-Ohio-6178
GRADY, P.J.
Civil Appeal from the Common Pleas Court
Rendered on the 28th day of December, 2012.
Erica Ann Probst, Atty. Reg. No. 0073486, 88 West Mound Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
Lynnette Dinkler, Atty. Reg. No. 0065455, 2625 Common Boulevard, Suite A, Dayton, Ohio 45431 Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
GRADY, P.J.:
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a final order dismissing an action on a claim for relief brought pursuant to
No employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act
for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer. Any such employee may file an action in the common pleas court of the county of such employment in which the relief which may be granted shall be limited to reinstatement with back pay, if the action is based upon discharge, or an award for wages lost if based upon demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, offset by earnings subsequent to discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, and payments received pursuant to section 4123.56 andChapter 4141. of the Revised Code plus reasonable attorney fees. The action shall be forever barred unless filed within one hundred eighty days immediately following the discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, and no action may be instituted or maintained unless the employer has received written notice of a claimed violation of this paragraph within the ninety days immediately following the discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken. (Emphasis added).
{¶ 2} Plaintiff Vikki Adams (“Adams“) was employed as a police officer by Defendant Village of Enon (“Enon“). Adams suffered an on-the-job injury for which she was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Enon terminated Adams from her employment, effective November 9, 2011.
{¶ 3} On December 2, 2011, Adams filed a complaint alleging that her termination violates
Defendant1 (sic) provided notice to Defendant within ninety days of her termination of her claim of workers’ compensation retaliation by service of this Complaint within ninety days from her termination.
{¶ 4} Enon filed an answer denying the allegations in paragraph 13 of the complaint, and further pleading as an affirmative defense that “Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of
{¶ 5} On March 16, 2012, Enon filed a combined Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter of Adams‘s claim for relief or, alternatively, a Civ.R. 56 motion for summary judgment on Enon‘s
1. Admit that the Village of Enon did not receive written notice of a claimed violation of
Ohio Revised Code §4123.90 before Plaintiff instituted her instant lawsuit in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 11 CV 1185.
Deny. Section 4123.90 of the Ohio Revised Code requires that Defendant receive Notice of a violation within 90 days of the retaliatory conduct, here termination. Plaintiff‘s Notice was sent and received by the Defendant within 90 days. Specifically, the lawsuit was filed and served upon Defendant within 90 days of termination and was in writing. It contained the required notice. The statute does not require that a notice be sent separately from the lawsuit only that it be sent within 90 days. (Emphasis added).
{¶ 6} On April 2, 2012, Adams moved to amend her complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A) to add two new claims for relief: a claim for employment discrimination on account of a disability and a claim for employment discrimination on account of age, both in violation of
{¶ 7} On May 24, 2012, the trial court entered a judgment which states, in its entirety:
Defendant‘s motion to dismiss this case for failure to comply with written notice requirements under
R.C. 4123.90 is SUSTAINED. Defendant‘s failure to provide written notice deprives this court of jurisdiction.Pursuant to the ruling on defendant‘s motion all other pending motions are deemed MOOT and the August 14, 2012 civil pre-trial is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
{¶ 8} Adams filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of May 24, 2012.
{¶ 9} First assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED VILLAGE OF ENON‘S MOTION TO DISMISS.”
{¶ 10} Second assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED VILLAGE OF ENON‘S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.”
{¶ 11} Addressing these assignments of error in reverse order, we first overrule the second assignment of error. It is plain from the face of the May 24, 2012 judgment that the trial court granted Enon‘s Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss Adams‘s action on her
{¶ 12} With regard to the first assignment of error, compliance with the time of filing the notice, the place of filing, and the content of the notice as specified by
{¶ 13} It is undisputed that Adams served no form of notice of her claimed violation of
{¶ 14}
{¶ 15} Even if the complaint served on Enon might be construed to satisfy the notice requirement of
{¶ 17} The dissenting opinion is predicated on the proposition that because the content and timing of the notice requirements in
{¶ 18} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 19} Third assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED OR DETERMINED TO BE MOOT VIKKI ADAMS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT.”
{¶ 20} The trial court did not deny Adams‘s motion for leave to amend her complaint by adding two new claims for relief alleging employment discrimination based on age and disability, nor did the court otherwise rule on the merits of Adams‘s motion. Instead, the court dismissed the motion as moot.
As a general matter, courts will not resolve issues that are moot. Courts cannot entertain jurisdiction over a moot question. Actions are “moot” when they are or have become fictitious, colorable, hypothetical, academic, or dead; the distinguishing characteristic of such issues is that they involve no actual genuine, live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal relations. A “moot” case is one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance about a right before it has been actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason cannot have any practical effect upon a then-existing controversy. Cases are not moot when an actual controversy exists between adverse litigants.
{¶ 21} App.R. 15(A) provides, in pertinent part:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within twenty-eight days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. Leave of court shall be freely given when justice so requires.
{¶ 22} Adams‘s motion for leave to amend her complaint was filed while her action against Enon remained pending. The motion alleged an actual controversy between Adams and Enon concerning which a judgment on the motion could have a practical legal effect, whether the motion was granted or denied. Therefore, the motion was not rendered moot by the court‘s dismissal of Adams‘s
{¶ 23} Enon argues that the trial court could properly deny the motion on several grounds. Those grounds involve the merits of Adams‘s motion. On remand, the trial court must determine the merits of the arguments the parties present, and rule accordingly.
{¶ 24} The third assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 25} Having sustained the third assignment of error, the case will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings on Adams‘s Civ.R. 15(A) motion for leave to amend her
Hall, J., concurs.
FROELICH, J., concurring in part and dissenting in judgment.
{¶ 26} I agree that issues regarding the motion for leave to amend the complaint were not rendered moot by the dismissal of the claim brought under
{¶ 27} Adams was discharged from her employment with the Village of Enon on November 6, 2011, and she filed a written complaint with the trial court on December 2, 2011. In Count One of the complaint, Adams specifically raised a violation of
{¶ 28}
No employer shall discharge, demote, reassign, or take any punitive action against any employee because the employee filed a claim or instituted, pursued or testified in any proceedings under the workers’ compensation act for an injury or occupational disease which occurred in the course of and arising out of his employment with that employer. Any such employee may file an action in the common pleas court of the county of such employment in which the relief which may be granted shall be limited to reinstatement with back pay, if the action is based upon discharge, or an award for wages lost if based upon
demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, offset by earnings subsequent to discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, and payments received pursuant to section 4123.56 andChapter 4141. of the Revised Code plus reasonable attorney fees. The action shall be forever barred unless filed within one hundred eighty days immediately following the discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken, and no action may be instituted or maintained unless the employer has received written notice of a claimed violation of this paragraph within the ninety days immediately following the discharge, demotion, reassignment, or punitive action taken.
{¶ 29} This part of
{¶ 30} In construing statutes, “our paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. In determining this intent, we first review the statutory language, reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. Courts “discern the legislature‘s purpose and attempt to carry it out, but do not prostitute the language in doing so and do not construe the
{¶ 31} In concluding that a separate written notice must be provided before a complaint is filed (even if the complaint is filed within 90 days), the majority opinion relies on the legislature‘s use of the words “no action may be instituted * * * unless the employer has received written notice.” However, this interpretation does not give sufficient emphasis to the legislature‘s additional use of the word “maintained,” which must have a different meaning than “instituted,” or else it is a mere redundancy. Specifically,
{¶ 32} One definition of “institute” is to “originate” or “cause to come into existence.” Wester‘s Third New International Dictionary 1171 (1969). In contrast, “maintain” is defined as “to persevere in” or to “continue.” Id. at 1362.
{¶ 33} By inserting a reference to continuing an action, the legislature left room for the interpretation that delivery of notice may include written notice given via a complaint, so long as the complaint (i.e., notice) is filed within the 90-day period provided for giving written notice to the employer. That is, the statute gives two choices (without any preference): (1) give a separate written notice within 90 days and then file suit within 180 days (or else the
{¶ 34} At a minimum,
{¶ 35} If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters:
- The object sought to be attained;
- The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;
- The legislative history;
- The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;
- The consequences of a particular construction;
- The administrative construction of the statute.
R.C. 1.49 .
{¶ 36} Even before
{¶ 38} The legislation does not discuss the circumstances under which it was enacted, so that would be a neutral factor. Regarding legislative history, the legislation remained virtually the same throughout the legislative process, as did the notes accompanying the legislation. The legislative notes, themselves, are not significantly illuminating. As an example, the notes accompanying the bill after passage by the House and as reported to the Senate by the Committee on Commerce and Labor on November 29, 1978, state as follows:
Employer Retaliation
The bill prohibits employers from discharging, demoting, reassigning or taking any other punitive action against employees because they file a claim or testify in any proceeding under the workers’ compensation law with respect to a compensable injury or occupational disease. An employee who is damaged by an employer violation may file an action in the common pleas court of the county in which he is employed. (Lines 37.28-37.34).
The bill limits the relief granted to the aggrieved employee to reinstatement with back pay if fired or to an award of wages lost on account of a reassignment, demotion, or other punitive action. Any money received as a result of the suit is to be offset by any unemployment compensation benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and wages received during the time of the violation. The employee is entitled also to recover reasonable attorney fees (lines 37.35-38.5).
The bill bars any suit under this provision if not filed with a court within 180 days of the alleged violation and unless the employee gives the employer written notice of the violation within 90 days (lines 38.6-38.12). Am. H.B. 1782, as reported by the S. Committee on Commerce and Labor, p. 5, Ohio Legislative Service Comm. 1977-1978, LSC Box 17.
{¶ 39} While the legislative notes are not detailed, they do not support the proposition that separate notice must be received prior to the time the employee files the action; they
{¶ 40} The fourth factor mentioned in determining legislative intent refers to the common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects. Prior to the amendment of
{¶ 41} Other similar laws existed when
No person who claims damages, arising without his fault from the acts of a municipal corporation or its agents in the construction of a public improvement, shall commence a suit therefor against a municipal corporation until he files a claim for such damages with the clerk of such municipal corporation, and sixty days elapse thereafter, to enable the municipal corporation to take such steps as it deems proper to settle or adjust the claim.
{¶ 43} The Village of Enon suggests in its brief that the ninety-day time period in
{¶ 44}
{¶ 45} Prior to its amendment in 1929, G.C. 10451 stated that “A party desiring to commence an action under this chapter, must notify the adverse party to leave the premises, for the possession of which action is to be brought * * * three days before.” This section was amended in 1929, to provide that “A party desiring to commence an action under this chapter, must notify the adverse party to leave the premises, for the possession of which action is to be brought * * * three or more days before bringing the action, by handing a written copy of the notice to the defendant in person, or by leaving it at his usual place of abode.” Ohio Laws 113, v. 480. The current statute,
{¶ 46} The fifth factor in deciding legislative intent relates to the consequences of a particular interpretation. The Village received notice a little over a month after the alleged wrongful discharge, and almost five-months before the deadline for filing a lawsuit would have expired. The Village received notice well within the 90-day period, and has not even suggested how it was prejudiced.
{¶ 47} Finally,
{¶ 48} As much as legislative intent is relevant, it does not supersede what the statute says or doesn‘t say. Justice Holmes once opined, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.”3
{¶ 49} Given the ambiguity in the statute, the fact that more than one reasonable interpretation exists, and the factors in
{¶ 50} I also note that resort to federal statutes illustrates that Congress, as well, has demonstrated an ability to write statutes in a manner that expresses the specific intent to make notice a requirement before a litigant files suit. For example,
When the individual has not filed a complaint concerning age discrimination with the Commission, no civil action may be commenced by any individual under this section until the individual has given the Commission not less than thirty days’ notice of an intent to file such action. Such notice shall be filed within one hundred eighty days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. Upon receiving a notice of intent to sue, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named therein as prospective defendants in the action and take any appropriate action to assure the elimination of any unlawful practice.
{¶ 51} It is also worth noting that even though the notice provision in
We conclude that the 30-day waiting period in
29 U.S.C. § 633a(d) is not jurisdictional in the sense that a district court lacks any authority to grant relief when a complaint is filed prematurely.Section 633a(c) provides for jurisdiction of federal district courts over discrimination claims pursuant to the ADEA. * * * District courts are broadly authorized to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”28 U.S.C. § 1331 . Only Congress may classify a statute as jurisdictional. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). However, Congress did not place the 30-day waiting period within the specific provision that confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts. Moreover, because “time prescriptions, however emphatic, are not properly typed ‘jurisdictional,’ ” the mandatory language in§ 633a(d) does not support an interpretation of its time prescriptions as “jurisdictional.” Arbaugh, 126 S.Ct. at 1242 (citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the time prescriptions in29 U.S.C. § 633a , including the 30-day waiting period, are not jurisdictional and may be forfeited, waived, or equitably modified. (Footnote and citation omitted.) 500 F.3d at 928-929.4
{¶ 52} On the jurisdictional issue, the United States Supreme Court recently commented on its own use of “jurisdictional,” as follows:
This Court has endeavored in recent years to “bring some discipline” to the use of the term “jurisdictional.” Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202-1203, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). Recognizing our “less than meticulous” use of the term in the past, we have pressed a stricter distinction between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern “a court‘s adjudicatory authority,” and nonjurisdictional “claim-processing rules,” which do not. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454-455, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). When a requirement goes to subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or
have not presented. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited. The objections may be resurrected at any point in the litigation, and a valid objection may lead a court midway through briefing to dismiss a complaint in its entirety. “[M]any months of work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted.” Henderson, 562 U.S., at ----, 131 S.Ct., at 1202. Courts, we have said, should not lightly attach those “drastic” consequences to limits Congress has enacted. Ibid. We accordingly have applied the following principle: A rule is jurisdictional “[i]f the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute‘s scope shall count as jurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). But if “Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional.” * * * (Citation and footnote omitted.) Gonzalez v. Thaler, --- U.S. ---, ---, 132 S.Ct. 641, 648-649, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012).
{¶ 53} Another federal statute that contains a “notice” requirement is the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
{¶ 54} The United States Supreme Court held that with regard to this statute, that:
The language of this provision could not be clearer. A citizen may not commence an action under RCRA until 60 days after the citizen has notified the EPA, the State in which the alleged violation occurred, and the alleged violator. Actions commenced prior to 60 days after notice are “prohibited.” Because this language is expressly incorporated by reference into
§ 6972(a) , it acts as a specific limitation on a citizen‘s right to bring suit. Under a literal reading of the statute, compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory, not optional, condition precedent for suit. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989).
{¶ 55} However, due to its “literal interpretation” of the statute, the Supreme Court declined to consider whether the notice provision was jurisdictional in the “strict sense of the term.” Instead, the court relied on the general rule that “if an action is barred by the terms of a statute, it must be dismissed.” Id. at 31. In view of the Supreme Court‘s later observations in Gonzalez, the notice provision in
{¶ 56} Since I conclude that Adams complied with the requirements of
{¶ 57} Both Cross and Miller differ factually from the case before us, because no written notice was ever provided to the defendant, and the complaints in each situation were not filed within 90 days of the adverse employment action. 63 Ohio App.3d at 466; 136 Ohio App.3d at 662. Thus, the employer never argued that the complaints in those cases satisfied the 90-day notice provision.
{¶ 58} Putting this factual distinction aside, the Ninth District Court of Appeals concluded in Cross that the plaintiff‘s failure deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. The federal case cited for this holding, however, did not base its decision on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Smith v. Capitol Mfg. Co., a Div. of Harsco Corp., 626 F.Supp. 110 (S.D.Ohio 1985). In Smith, the plaintiff brought a federal action for violation of
It is undisputed that the plaintiff failed to bring a suit within 180 days of his discharge and that he failed to provide notice to the defendant of the
alleged violation. Accordingly, the plaintiff may not assert a claim against the defendant under the statute. Id.
These two sentences comprise the entirety of the court‘s analysis, and there is no mention of “subject matter jurisdiction” (and again, there was no suit as separate notice within 90 days).
{¶ 59} Likewise, in Miller, the Eighth District Court of Appeals simply cited Cross and other cases that had relied on Cross‘s brief reference to subject matter jurisdiction. Miller, 136 Ohio App.3d at 673.
{¶ 60} In Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11, the Supreme Court of Ohio noted that:
“Jurisdiction” means “the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” (Emphasis omitted.) Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1998), 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210; Morrison v. Steiner (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 61 O.O.2d 335, 290 N.E.2d 841, paragraph one of the syllabus. The term encompasses jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person. * * * Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time. * * * It is a “condition precedent to the court‘s ability to hear the case. If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void.” Id.; Patton v. Diemer (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 518 N.E.2d 941, paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶ 61} Consistent with the observation of the United States Supreme Court in Gonzalez, the Supreme Court of Ohio stressed in Pratts that “Jurisdiction has been described
{¶ 62} In view of this analysis by the Supreme Court of Ohio, I disagree with the conclusion that failure to comply with the notice requirements in
{¶ 63} I also disagree that it is “undisputed” that the employer received no written notice of the claimed violation apart from the complaint. Adams filed a Civ.R.56(F) affidavit with the trial court, stating that she had filed for unemployment benefits and had mentioned her claim for wrongful discharge therein. Adams further indicated in her 56(F) affidavit that case law provided her with additional methods of establishing that the Village had received notice of her workers’ compensation claim within the first 90 days, and stated that she needed time to conduct discovery and determine if the Village received additional written notice. The trial court dismissed the case without commenting on the request.
{¶ 64} In Lamolinaro v. Kroger Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 87AP-137, 1987 WL 32167 (Dec. 29, 1987), the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment that
Plaintiff was discharged on March 31, 1983; thus, the employer must have received written notice of a claimed violation by June 30, 1983. According to the materials submitted in summary judgment, on June 16, 1983, the employer received a written unfair labor practice charge in which it stated that plaintiff was discharged “because she attempted to process a workers’ compensation claim and to assert rights under the state workmen‘s [sic] compensation laws.” Given the liberal construction accorded the provisions of
R.C. 4123.90 in favor of the employee as stated by the Supreme Court in Bryant v. Dayton Casket Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 367, (see, also,R.C. 4123.95 ), there was obviously evidence upon which reasonable minds can differ as to whether the employer received the notice required byR.C. 4123.90 within ninety days after plaintiff was discharged. Furthermore, there were other notices given defendant that tangentially were related to the issue of notice. Id. at * 2.
{¶ 65} Subsequently, in Ira v. Price Bros. Co., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-679, 1993 WL 387104, (Sept. 30, 1993), The Tenth District Court of Appeals concluded that the plaintiff had substantially complied with the notice requirements in
{¶ 66} Civ. R. 56(F) states that:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment that the party cannot for sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party‘s opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
{¶ 67} Decisions regarding a Civ. R. 56(F) affidavit are within the trial court‘s discretion. See, e.g., Gates Mills Inv. Co. v. Village of Pepper Pike, 59 Ohio App.2d 155, 169, 392 N.E.2d 1316 (8th Dist. 1978). “[A]n abuse of discretion most commonly arises from a decision that was unreasonable.” Wilson v. Lee, 172 Ohio App.3d 791, 2007-Ohio-4542, 876 N.E.2d 1312, ¶11 (2d Dist.) “Decisions are unreasonable if they are not supported by a sound reasoning process.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
{¶ 68} In the case before us, the trial court failed to either consider or comment on the request for additional time. Therefore, the court‘s decision is not overtly supported by any reasoning process. Adams‘s action had been pending for a short period of time, and the request for additional time was reasonable, particularly in light of the cases that allow notice to be provided by unemployment filings and the like. Although the notice provided by the
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