Adam GAFF, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA-PURDUE UNIVERSITY OF FORT WAYNE, Appellee-Defendant.
No. 02S03-1604-PL-201.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 22, 2016.
45 N.E.3d 458
Since the prior case file was readily and publicly available, and its cause number was repeatedly and unambiguously identified in the record to enable investigation and objection if warranted, the failure to formally enter the relevant documents from CM-195 into this record was not an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, we echo Graham‘s explanation of why it is by far the preferable practice to enter into the record the particular documents of which the court is taking notice.
Conclusion
We decline to abandon the well-established requirement that a felony defendant personally communicate waiver of the Indiana constitutional jury trial right. By proceeding to trial absent personal waiver by Horton himself, the trial court committed fundamental error. But under the circumstances here, it was not an abuse of discretion to take judicial notice of the court records showing Horton‘s prior conviction without formally entering them into the record. Therefore, although we do not disturb Horton‘s conviction for Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, we reverse his conviction for D-felony domestic battery and remand with instructions to proceed to a new trial limited to that count.
DICKSON, RUCKER, DAVID, and MASSA, JJ., concur.
William P. Kealey, Stuart & Branigin LLP, Lafayette, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
On Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 02A03-1504-PL-136.
DICKSON, Justice.
The plaintiff, Adam Gaff, appeals from the grant of summary judgment sought by
As consolidated by the Court of Appeals, the plaintiff‘s appeal presents claims alleging that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment as to the plaintiff‘s federal and state constitutional claims and as to the plaintiff‘s retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
In affirming the summary judgment on the retaliation claim, however, the Court of Appeals noted language from Indiana Civil Rights Commission v. Culver Educational Foundation, wherein we stated that “the ultimate burden of persuasion that the defendant engaged in unlawful discrimination remains at all times with the plaintiff.” 535 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ind. 1989). The Court of Appeals in Gaff acknowledged that “IPFW is the party who moved for summary judgment,” but nevertheless applied Culver Educational—which was not a summary judgment case1—to hold that “the initial burden is still on Gaff to prove a prima facie case of retaliation.” Gaff, 45 N.E.3d at 465. The Court of Appeals ventured that “Indiana‘s ‘heightened’ summary judgment standard, discussed in Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind.2014), under which the moving party must negate an opponent‘s claim, does not apply to a Title VII claim.” Gaff, 45 N.E.3d at 465 n. 9. We disagree.
As we recently emphasized in Hughley, “[e]ven though
The initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to come forward with contrary evidence showing an issue for the trier of fact. And although the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial court‘s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.
Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also, e.g., Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 230-31 (Ind.2015); Reed v.Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ind.2012); Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ind.1994); Oelling v. Rao, 593 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ind.1992). Upon an appellate challenge to summary judgment, de novo review applies, with the reviewing court “applying the same standard as the trial court....” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003.
In reaching a final judgment where a plaintiff is asserting in Indiana trial courts a federal statutory cause of action, the elements to be proven and the standard of proof required are determined by federal law. See James v. City of Boise, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 685, 686, 193 L.Ed.2d 694 (2016) (per curiam) (“It is this Court‘s responsibility to say what a [federal] statute means, and once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that understanding of the governing rule of law.“); Gunn v. Minton, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1067, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013) (“State courts adjudicating civil RICO claims will ... be guided by federal court interpretations of the relevant federal criminal statutes, just as federal courts sitting in diversity are guided by state court interpretations of state law.“). But the state court proceedings in which such a claim is pursued are governed by the procedural law of the forum, in this case Indiana procedural law. Cf. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 1194 (1938) (holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim); Brill v. Regent Commc‘ns., Inc., 12 N.E.3d 299, 306 (Ind.Ct.App.2014) (Indiana adheres to “lex fori (law of the forum) concerning procedural issues.“) trans. denied; JKL Components Corp. v. Insul-Reps, Inc., 596 N.E.2d 945, 950 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (“[T]he procedural law of the forum state applies to procedural issues.“) trans. denied. Thus, while the plaintiff‘s cause of action arises under federal law, summary judgment proceedings arising under
As to the plaintiff‘s Title VII retaliation claim, we must thus determine whether IPFW demonstrated the “absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue....” Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (citation omitted). As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals in Gaff, the essential elements required for the plaintiff to recover under his Title VII retaliation claim included “(1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a material adverse action; and (3) a causal link between the two.” Gaff, 45 N.E.3d at 465.
With respect to the retaliation claim in this case, according to the parties’ Agreed Statement of Material Facts, the plaintiff‘s Charge of Discrimination filed May 1, 2013 alleged that he had been “harassed, discriminated and retaliated against on the basis of [his] sex.” Appellant‘s App‘x at 92 (alteration in original). In his complaint in the present lawsuit, filed October 22, 2013, the plaintiff “alleges that he was discriminated against on the basis of gender (male), sexual orientation and [was] retaliated against ...,” and that his supervisor “retaliated against him” due to reports by a co-employee about the plaintiff‘s “behavior toward” the co-employee. Id. at 93; Appellee‘s App‘x at 163-64.
IPFW argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiff “cannot sufficiently establish a prima facie case of retaliation.” Appellee‘s Br. at 30. IPFW contends that there was an absence of evidence to show both that the plaintiff was “engaged in a statutorily protected activity,” and that there was a “causal connection between his alleged protected activity and his termination.” Id. As ex-
Here, the undisputed facts in the parties’ “Agreed Statement of Material Facts” do not establish any basis for the plaintiff‘s retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff‘s retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals as to all other issues. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
RUSH, C.J., and RUCKER, DAVID, and MASSA, JJ., concur.
In the matter of the termination of the parent-child relationship of N.G., L.C., & M.C. (minor children), and A.C. and J.G. (their parents). A.C. (mother), Appellant (Respondent below), v. The Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee (Petitioner below).
No. 02S04-1604-JT-207.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 26, 2016.